[DIP v1.6] Delegate Incentive Program Results (May 2025)

[SEEDGov]

May Participants

For the May iteration of the program, 78 participants enrolled, 67 of whom met the regular requirements to qualify.

You can see the full list here.

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Security Council Elections: Mandatory Voting

Please note that for the months of April and May, we have added a special requirement to be eligible for the program: delegates must have voted in the Security Council Elections that concluded on May 3rd, 2025.

You can visualize this in each Delegate’s Profile in the Karma Dashboard.

Delegates who didn’t vote on Security Council elections and won’t qualify for April and May incentives:

• DisruptionJoe
• Lovely4Wonders
• BristolBlockchain
• LobbyFi
• danielo - RnDAO
• McFly - Bacon Labs
• Agnes
• Bobbay
• Bruce1

Parameters Breakdown

Snapshot Voting

During the month, there were a total of 4 Snapshot Votes, which were considered for the assignment of scores by SV. These are the proposals that were considered:

1. Approval of STEP 2 Committee’s Preferred Allocations
2. [Non-consitutional]: Top-up for Hackathon Continuation Program
3. DeFi Renaissance Incentive Program (DRIP)
4. [Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction

Tally Voting

For this month, a total of 2 Tally Votes were considered for TV scoring. These are:

1. The Watchdog: Arbitrum DAO’s Grant Misuse Bounty Program
2. [CONSTITUTIONAL] AIP: ArbOS Version 40 Callisto

It is important to note that only those proposals that ended in May were counted.

Participation Rate (90D)

During the last 90 days (March-April-May), a total of 6 on-chain votes were considered for the assignment of scores by PR90. These are the proposals that were considered:

1. The Watchdog: Arbitrum DAO’s Grant Misuse Bounty Program
2. [CONSTITUTIONAL] AIP: ArbOS Version 40 Callisto
3. [NON-CONSTITUTIONAL] Arbitrum Audit Program
4. [NON-CONSTITUTIONAL] Arbitrum Onboarding V2: A Governance Bootcamp
5. [CONSTITUTIONAL] - Adopt Timeboost + Nova Fee Sweep
6. Request to Increase the Stylus Sprint Committee’s Budget

Note that proposals are always considered in the month in which they are finalized.

Delegate Feedback

In the Karma Dashboard, you can find the detailed breakdown of your Delegate Feedback.

Presence in Discussion Multiplier

As approved in the Tally proposal, the Presence in Discussion parameter acts as a multiplier that measures the presence and participation of delegates throughout the month.

For May, 8 proposals were considered:

1. [RFC] Proposal to Adjust the Voting Power of the Arbitrum Community Pool & Ratifying the Agentic Governance Pivot
2. [Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction
3. [Non-Constitutional] Invest in Builders & Ignite ARB Demand with q/acc
4. Wind Down the MSS + Transfer Payment Responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation
5. Agentic Governance Initiative [AGI]
6. DeFi Renaissance Incentive Program (DRIP)
7. A Vision for the Future of Arbitrum
8. SOS Discussions

To get the multiplier a delegate needed:

For 5% (1.05) = At least 2 comments (≥25%)

For 10% (1.10) = At least 4 comments (≥50%)

For 20% (1.20) = At least 6 comments (≥75%)

It is important to note that we considered JamesKBH feedback, so for the multiplier calculation, if the delegate made a valid comment on that topic/thread in the previous month, it was considered in the current month.

Delegate Feedback Reporting

You can check the Delegate Feedback Reporting in our Notion page.

We want to keep iterating these reports with community feedback. If you have any suggestions, please feel free to reach us.

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May Results

You can see the dashboard with the results implemented by Karma here.

Of all the participating delegates, 26 were eligible to receive compensation.

• Tier 1: 1 delegate. (3.85%)
• Tier 2: 7 delegates. (26,92%)
• Tier 3: 18 delegates. (69,23%)

Delegate	TIER	PUSD
L2Beat	1	7,000.00
MaxLomu	2	4,740.54
Reverie	2	4,663.80
GMX	2	4,603.80
Jojo	2	4,309.09
Tekr0x.eth	2	4,288.71
Camelot	2	4,253.40
olimpio	2	4,219.80
Griff	3	3,219.34
Karpatkey	3	3,164.23
Areta	3	3,158.50
Gauntlet	3	3,149.00
Tane	3	3,138.41
Uniswap-Arbitrum Delegate Program	3	3,135.97
CastleCapital	3	3,127.41
AranaDigital	3	3,116.50
404DAO	3	3,090.18
StableLab	3	3,089.04
Curia	3	3,046.85
BlockworksResearch	3	3,042.50
TempeTechie	3	3,038.62
jameskbh	3	3,034.01
paulofonseca	3	3,017.51
GFXLabs	3	3,012.83
Bob-Rossi	3	3,011.59
DAOplomats	3	3,005.63
		93,677.26

The total cost destined for the delegates this month would be $93,677.26.

It’s important to note that the final numbers might be different because of the ARB Cap, as stated in the proposal.

You can also check our Public Table to see the detailed breakdown of delegates’ results.

Eligible Delegates - Average Voting Power

This month, we decided to display the incentive distribution based on the Average Voting Power (AVP) of each delegate eligible for compensation.

Total Voting Power Incentivized

During May, the Delegate Incentive Program incentivized an average of 111,308,290 ARB (+8.98% MOM).

AVP-Based Distribution – May

From a total of 26 eligible delegates:

• Delegates with AVP < 1,000,000: 10 (38.46%)
• Delegates with AVP > 1,000,000: 16 (61.54%)

Within the group of Delegates with AVP < 1,000,000:

• Delegates with AVP < 100,000: 7 (70.00% of this group, 26.92% of total)
• Delegates with AVP > 100,000: 3 (30.00% of this group, 11.54% of total)

Distribution Per Tiers – May

• Tier 1: 1 eligible delegate in total
  • Delegates with AVP < 1,000,000: 0 (0%)
  • Delegates with AVP > 1,000,000: 1 (100%)
• Tier 2: 7 eligible delegates in total
  • Delegates with AVP < 1,000,000: 1 (14.29%)
  • Delegates with AVP > 1,000,000: 6 (85.71%)
• Tier 3: 18 eligible delegates in total
  • Delegates with AVP < 1,000,000: 9 (50.00%)
  • Delegates with AVP > 1,000,000: 9 (50.00%)

Conclusion

During May, there was a higher amount of incentivized Voting Power at the same time that the number of incentivized delegates decreased compared to April.

This is related to the fact that high-VP delegates have increased their participation in the incentive program, while the number of incentivized low-VP delegates has decreased compared to April.

Payments

We track all payment data for greater transparency in our Payment Distribution Thread.

Bonus Points

This month, 2 bi-weekly and 1 GRC calls took place, with a maximum possible score of 3.75%.
Note on Delegates Who Didn’t Qualify

• For the GRC calls, 1,25% BP will be awarded for each attendance.
• For the Open Discussion of Proposal(s) - Bi-weekly Governance calls, 1.25% BP will be awarded for attending each call.

Extraordinary Contributions

This month, four delegates were awarded Bonus Points for their contributions to Arbitrum DAO:

• L2Beat team were given 27.5 Bonus Points:
  We would like to highlight three “extraordinary” contributions:
  • Builders’ Voices Needed: Shaping the Future of Arbitrum Together: Although the ultimate impact of this call to action is yet to be fully defined, we have already seen partial results, as several builders—many of whom typically do not engage with the DAO—have responded to the thread. This is highly valuable, and in our view, this initiative already deserves 10 Bonus Points.
  • SOS Discussion Calls: During April (and the beginning of May), L2Beat effectively organized a series of calls to discuss the different SOS submissions that appeared on the forum. These sessions provided a space for each proposer to present their SOS matrices and allowed delegates and other stakeholders to ask questions. We also view this as an initiative that deserves 12.5 Bonus Points.
  • GRC Calls: While May wasn’t the first month in which L2Beat began organizing these calls, we want to formally start acknowledging their efforts. They’ve successfully restructured the format of these calls, enabling the community to receive updates on all funded initiatives within a one-hour session. For this reason, we are awarding them 5 Bonus Points in recognition.
• Tekr0x received 10 Bonus Points: During the analysis month, the delegate made an outstanding contribution to the Arbitrum Gaming Ventures initiative through the post “Gaming on Arbitrum – A Guide for DAO Members” which we consider highly valuable and detailed. This contribution was also acknowledged by a member of the AGV
• Cp0x received 5 Bonus Points for his participation in the SOS Discussions ([SOS Submission] {Merged: TBD} – Strategic Objectives)
• TempeTechie received 10 Bonus Points for his participation in the SOS Discussions ([SOS Submission] {Merged: TBD} – Strategic Objectives )

On Delegates Who Did Not Qualify

We know that some delegates, mostly smaller ones, came close to meeting the criteria this month but did not qualify. While this can be discouraging, it’s important to understand that the program is built around two core pillars:

1) Participation in Voting to Help Reach Quorum
Delegates with larger voting power are in a better position to influence outcomes and contribute to quorum.

2) Contributor Professionalization in Arbitrum
Regardless of voting power, the program evaluates the substance of each delegate’s participation in discussions. It is essential that contributions either lead to proposal changes, influence the positions of other delegates, or add clear value to ongoing debates.

For smaller delegates, this second point is especially important. If their contributions are limited in visibility or impact, it becomes difficult to justify compensation, as their voting activity alone carries limited weight in meeting the DAO’s goals.

Lastly, we want to clarify that the feedback shared in our monthly reports is intended to be constructive. It is not a judgment of individual value, but part of a broader effort to support and develop capable delegates and contributors who can bring meaningful input to both daily governance and long-term decision-making.

Dispute Period

As stated in the proposal, delegates have a timeframe to express their disagreement with the results presented by the Incentive Program Administrator.

To raise a dispute, delegates should do so by posting a message in the forum using the following template:

Title: Dispute

Delegate Name

Reason for dispute (please detail):

Side note: We would like to remind everyone that we will not be processing disputes regarding other delegates’ scores, except in cases related to objective parameters (such as voting or call attendance).

Additionally, it’s important to note that disputes concerning subjective parameters (DF and Bonus Points) are unlikely to succeed unless they are exceptionally well-argued.

[DonOfDAOs]

Title: Dispute

Delegate Name: DonOfDAOS

Reason for dispute (please detail): I received 0 on delegate feedback yet I contributed notably, specifically targeted novel and useful contributions, and I checked in throughout the month to make sure I was on track.

1. I was the only person to notice or respond to this builder and provided in-depth feedback. I went further to meet them on call, to which they explicitly acknowledged I was the only member of the community to take the time to try and help them build here: [RFC] Signals Protocol
2. again, I was the only community member to point this builder in the right direction: [RFC] Protocol Participation Request: DAO Liquidity Injection via Smart Contracts into Paribus on Arbitrum - #3 by DonOfDAOs
3. Similarly, I was the first community member to address these builders after nearly a week with no response: [CONSTITUTIONAL] Register $BORING in the Arbitrum generic-custom gateway - #2 by DonOfDAOs
4. I was one of the first to provide detailed feedback and questioning to help evolve this proposal: [Non-Constitutional] Invest in Builders & Ignite ARB Demand with q/acc - #10 by DonOfDAOs
5. I opened discussion on broader privacy standards for the DAO here: Proposal: enable the new TogetherCrew functionality: Free* summarizer and Q&A for delegates telegram chat - #33 by DonOfDAOs
6. Contributed to the Quorum discussions here: [Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction - #27 by DonOfDAOs

And this is among several other general communications. Certainly, 0 points must be a mistake as I also don’t see any delegate feedback in the Notion.

Further, why is my participation 83% (5/6) when I voted on every single proposal? In fact, it shows immediately next to this number that I voted on all 6, yet =5/6 is the manually entered forumla in my participation column.

The next section shows I didn’t vote on the Stylus proposal which had a snapshot of Feb 19th, 119 days ago and well beyond the 90 day window.

I see the following:

@SEEDGov

Note that proposals are always considered in the month in which they are finalized.

How does it make any sense to count the end of the voting window for participation when one cannot for the full length of that time if they were not delegated to before the snapshot? Effectively, they are being docked for a proposal which began weeks prior to the 90 window for which they may not have even had voting power to use even if they wanted to participate. The start should be the beginning of the period.

Besides which, I haven’t missed a single proposal and there were many more than 6 in the past 90 days.

Finally, I commented on all of the following to qualify for presence in discussions:

@SEEDGov

As approved in the Tally proposal, the Presence in Discussion parameter acts as a multiplier that measures the presence and participation of delegates throughout the month.

For May, 8 proposals were considered:

1. [RFC] Proposal to Adjust the Voting Power of the Arbitrum Community Pool & Ratifying the Agentic Governance Pivot
2. [Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction
3. [Non-Constitutional] Invest in Builders & Ignite ARB Demand with q/acc
4. Wind Down the MSS + Transfer Payment Responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation
5. Agentic Governance Initiative [AGI]
6. DeFi Renaissance Incentive Program (DRIP)
7. A Vision for the Future of Arbitrum
8. SOS Discussions

1. here: [RFC] Proposal to Adjust the Voting Power of the Arbitrum Community Pool & Ratifying the Agentic Governance Pivot - #7 by DonOfDAOs
2. here: [Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction - #27 by DonOfDAOs
3. here: [Non-Constitutional] Invest in Builders & Ignite ARB Demand with q/acc - #10 by DonOfDAOs
4. N/A
5. Avoided Conflict of Interest
6. here: DeFi Renaissance Incentive Program (DRIP) - #11 by DonOfDAOs
7. N/A
8. here: [SOS Submission] Gabriel – Strategic Objectives - #3 by DonOfDAOs

[paulofonseca]

Title: Dispute

Delegate Name: paulofonseca

Reason for dispute (please detail): I believe my bonus points for attending the calls are not correct, since it says that I’ve only participated in 1 of the 2 by-weekly Open Governance Calls in May.

In fact, I’ve participated in both biweekly Open Governance Calls, even asking questions (as it’s typical of me) on both May 6th and May 20th.

Here is my face in the May 6th recording at 6 minutes 15 seconds asking a question.

And here is my avatar in the May 20th recording at 20 minutes 40 seconds also asking a question.

So, my bonus points should be updated accordingly.

Thank you!

[jameskbh]

Title: Dispute

jameskbh

I want to dispute the low score assigned to the comment below. I will share the evaluation criteria below only to make it easier to visualise the dispute basis.

As there is no translation from the four-level table to the 10-point score, is it reasonable to assume that each level equals 2.5 points?

Regarding relevance, the comment received 4 points, which corresponds to level 2. In the post, we were discussing the possibility of merging all SOS posts and presenting a unified proposal. I brought up the point that, in my opinion, we were lacking estimates of cost and funding for each topic within it. Without it, we would risk approving a goal that was not feasible. This positioning was backed by content from the original Mission, Vision and Purpose post. I want to request a reassessment of my current score.

Regarding depth of analysis, the comment also received 4 points (level 2, acceptable). I would like to request a reassessment of my current score, based on the same points raised previously and the concept I outlined in my comment (strategic planning), specifically regarding the current structure (MVP and SOS), which lacked important definitions before moving to execution. L2Beats reinforced that in their comment.

Regarding Timing, Clarity and Impact, I understand that they are related to the previous items, but I also want to request a review. Specifically of “Impact”, as 2 points equals level 1.

@jameskbh

Thanks for creating this thread! I want to congratulate all submitters on their excellent work and excellent suggestions for moving Arbitrum forward.

I will make my intervention here, not regarding the overlap between the submissions, but to resurface a comment I made at the beginning of this SOS proposal:

Thanks for your proposal! Regarding the proposal submission minimum items, I would like to suggest an addition. Expected resources to be utilized. In Lido’s case, we are talking about objectives for one protocol. When thinking about Arbitrum, the spectrum is broader and, two objectives, while perfectly aligned with our MVP, may be competing for the same resources. My understanding is that the 1-year goals are effectively proposals/initiatives to achieve the 2-year objective (the beginning …

I always saw this process, which started with the Unifying Arbitrum’s Mission, Vision, Purpose (MVP) post, as a Strategic Planning exercise.

Source: 6 Elements of Effective Strategic Planning

In this exercise, the MVP would act as the Vision, Mission and Objective (Purpose) levels, and the SOS, the other levels as, AFAIK, there is no other proposal in the pipeline to move down the pyramid.

I believe this view was also shared by @entropy when they stated:

@Entropy

• Once the DAO’s end state goals have been solidified, anyone will have the opportunity to propose a strategy matrix made up of 12- and 24-month focus areas for the DAO through an open process named Strategic Objective Setting (SOS). These areas should have well-established guidelines for tangible implementation and what they aim to accomplish, as well as only have one purpose—optimally moving the DAO towards its end state. This is the step that will allow the DAO to refocus its attention on the most critical deliverables and judge how one-off initiatives fit into its short- to medium-term priorities. Entropy Advisors is working on the SOS proposal in tandem with the MVP, and it will be posted as a subsequent separate proposal with the DAO choosing one matrix of strategies as the winner.
• Combined with financial forecasting, the SOS will enable the DAO to budget itself for the next 12/24 months by earmarking capital to each strategic focus area ratified in step 2. Arguably, the most important aspect of this step is for the DAO to align on how profitable/loss-making it wants to be during the coming year(s). Lastly, with clearly defined strategic focus areas, it should also become simpler for the DAO to begin marketing its efforts since, e.g., a clear identity, as well as narratives, can be built around each of the DAO’s focus areas.

However, after reading all the submissions, I noticed some levels were not addressed, and we stayed mostly at the “Strategy” level. And why is this an issue?

Right now, we don’t have a clear view of two critical items: the budget and the execution.

• How much is each SOS going to cost?
• Who will execute the projects and actions supporting the Objectives laid down?
• How do the proposed AAEs interact with those objectives?
• How will the DAO resort to other parties to execute any Objective not covered by the current structures in place?

Therefore, we now review items without knowing if we can execute them or if enough funds will be dedicated to them. We need to address this.

I believe that we will end with a merged version of all submissions as the way to move forward. While doing “The Merge”, our actual planning for the steps ahead, we must introduce those other items in the final proposal to ensure provision for the actual execution.

Source: What is Strategic Planning and why does it matter?

I hope this makes sense to all. Looking forward to the next steps on this.

Thanks in advance!

[EzR3aL]

Title: Dispute

Delegate EzR3aL

Reason for dispute (please detail):
So I get these points as delegate feedback for one comment I made.

Relevance: 4 people quoted me and/or build their answer up on my comment in the proposal.
Depth of analysis: Not sure tbh what you expect here.
Timing: I made the comment 2 days after the proposal was posted and have been the 5th person to comment.
Clarity & Communication: I think I made it pretty clear what the source of the problem is about. Even with an example.
Impact: Again, 4 people quoted me and said that I have been saying whats the problem is about. But not relevant to you?

[EventHorizonDAO]

Title: Dispute

Delegate Name: Event Horizon DAO

Reason for dispute (please detail):

As a preface, we would highlight that several delegates with half the delegation size or less have qualified with far fewer comments and whose comments were far less rigorous. In fact, some simply acknowledging how they chose to vote.The reason they are still compensated is largely due to the ‘large delegates help achieve quorum’ reasoning SeedGov applies. However, if this reasoning is to be used, it should be applied evenly and fairly, and at 7M in delegation last month, Event Horizon should qualify

We point this out not to specify any specific delegates or contest their compensation, but instead to say that we are concerned about the subjective assessment of this program. This has been a question mark in our minds for a while. And, now, when we are given 0 points for contribution after objectively providing more context, more content, more novel feedback, more timely responses than delegates (who are compensated) with less than 50% our delegation size, the subjective overwriting becomes a greater concern.

We would like clarity from Seedgov, as to why this is the case and why Event Horizon was objectively judged with far more subjective scrutiny than other large, but still much smaller, delegates. Unless this can be explained, it feels like highly partial judging

The rationales we’ve been providing have been consistently detailed and clear.

• While the most common rationale for ArbOS Version 40 Callisto was along the lines of “no objection on my side” including SeedGov’s own rationale, Event Horizon provided the following detailed response:
  

  

• On the Watchdog Grand Misuse Bounty Program again, many rationales from top delegates were a paragraph at most, Event Horizon provided a detailed and clear explanation of why we voted as we did including a detailed response for how similar proposals may be improved going forward. This is not merely a comment on length, but on content. Our rationales are extensively detailed and clear.
  

  
  
  
  

• For the DRIP proposal, we highlighted, not only our overall rationale, not only the pros and the cons, not only proposed improvements, but also a full fledged debate with conviction scores, conviction deltas post debate, and an overall conclusion.
  

  

There are several other examples of the same level of elaboration by our delegation but the overall point should be clear. We struggle to see how this level of response is worth not even a single point.

In the Delegate Feedback, we’re grateful that SEEDGov has noticed that “Event Horizon has made significant efforts to upgrade the rationales and to add pre-vote feedback.” However, they cite a lack of “tangible impact” without specifying what that looks like. Several compensated delegates get by with “No objection” rationales, yet our extensive, curated, and quantified rationales broken down by points in favor, points against, debate, and conviction score do not qualify. It’s unclear what counts. Do rationales need to be liked? Replied to? This was never specified. What is clear is that there seems to be an inconsistent application of the rubric. And, again, why is this requirement and scrutiny applied to some delegates, such as EH, and objectively not to others? Often, when smaller delegates beg this question SeedGOv response that it is because the less scrutinized delegates have larger delegation. Delegation size cannot be the true answer as Event Horizon has a much larger delegation than several of these delegates receiving subject, fast tracking. It evokes question of if other unstated factors or relationships are being considered.

The feedback then goes on to say that given the recent proposal, which Event Horizon co-authored, to reduce our delegation so that the DAO could focus less on our delegation size and more on what we ship for the DAO, we should not be included in DIP because it is experimental. This is puzzling. Delegates, including Event Horizon, voted on that proposal to reduce our delegation. It is also a complete mischaracterization of the nature of the proposal. Delegates voted in favor of continuing Event Horizon. Delegates, crucially, did not vote on that proposal to cut support for our efforts. Event Horizon’s forum contributions ought to be assessed on their own merits. Bringing in this proposal, which ratified the DAO’s support of this experiment, is irrelevant and not a part of the DIP criteria.

Once we remove this proposal from the picture, it strikes us as a challenge to justify the assessment that our highly detailed responses are worth exactly the same as not posting at all. Further, it again brings into question the reliability of blackbox, subjective assessment and judging. We believe that a fair reassessment of our comments, on their own terms, should result in a significantly higher score. Beyond that reassessment, any further clarity is appreciated.

Given Event Horion rightfully deserves some delegate feedback points, the following should apply:

@SEEDGov

Presence in Discussion Multiplier

As approved in the Tally proposal, the Presence in Discussion parameter acts as a multiplier that measures the presence and participation of delegates throughout the month.

For May, 8 proposals were considered:

1. [RFC] Proposal to Adjust the Voting Power of the Arbitrum Community Pool & Ratifying the Agentic Governance Pivot
2. [Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction
3. [Non-Constitutional] Invest in Builders & Ignite ARB Demand with q/acc
4. Wind Down the MSS + Transfer Payment Responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation
5. Agentic Governance Initiative [AGI]
6. DeFi Renaissance Incentive Program (DRIP)
7. A Vision for the Future of Arbitrum
8. SOS Discussions

1. [RFC] Proposal to Adjust the Voting Power of the Arbitrum Community Pool & Ratifying the Agentic Governance Pivot - #3 by EventHorizonDAO
2. [Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction - #29 by EventHorizonDAO
3. [Non-Constitutional] Invest in Builders & Ignite ARB Demand with q/acc - #15 by EventHorizonDAO
4. No Comments
5. Agentic Governance Initiative [AGI] & Agentic Governance Initiative [AGI] - #5 by EventHorizonDAO & Agentic Governance Initiative [AGI] - #26 by EventHorizonDAO
6. DeFi Renaissance Incentive Program (DRIP) - #72 by EventHorizonDAO
7. No Comments
8. No Comments

Finally, Event Horizon has been leading the Agentic Governance Working Group to co-create the future of ai governance with the community and delegates.

[cp0x]

Title: Dispute

Delegate Name: cp0x

Reason for dispute:

I believe my contribution this month has been seriously underestimated. Let me explain in detail:

1. Out of 44 comments I made this month, you considered only one — and gave it the lowest scores I’ve ever seen:
   Wind Down the MSS + Transfer Payment Responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation - #22 by cp0x

Objectively, this is a solid and thoughtful comment:

• Relevance (3/10) — Clearly, the comment is on-topic. It highlights potential negative outcomes that voters should be aware of. A score of 3 implies it’s a poor comment. If that were the case, why was it even taken into consideration?
• Depth of Analysis (2/10) — This rating suggests that my analysis was extremely weak. But all I did was point out problematic elements of the proposal in a structured and reasoned way. Are you saying that identifying potential flaws is not valuable?
• Timing (2/10) — This is especially confusing. For context, I posted my comment before @JoJo , who received a 5 for timing. According to Karma’s own criteria, timing is based on when the comment is made, not its relevance or depth — those are covered by other metrics. This score seems either deliberately reduced or simply careless.
  At the same time, I believe JoJo’s comment is also valuable — he presents the perspective from within the system, while I provide an external view. Together, we complement each other and contribute to a more well-rounded discussion
• Clarity & Communication (3/10) — Again, a surprisingly low score. My comment clearly outlines the issues in a numbered, color-coded format, making it easy to follow and understand. If this isn’t considered clear communication, what is?
• Impact (1/10) — This one is the most puzzling. How is impact measured? If we consider influence over voting:
  I voted against with a VP of 95.2k. The total “against” votes amounted to 5.2 million. Paulo, who voted before me, also voted against. Even if we assume our votes had similar influence, my participation likely helped sway a significant number of votes. A basic estimate would show I influenced ~2.5 million votes. That’s certainly not an “impact” score of 1 — and arguably more than 10.

For another comparison — Camelot received higher scores for Impact and Depth of Analysis, even though their comment simply expressed support and repeated the rationale already provided by Entropy in the motivation section. In other words, it didn’t add any new insights or original points to the discussion

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Now let’s look at the second part of this evaluation

You chose to assess my comment that was posted after the vote had started. However, four days earlier, I posted another comment that was no less valuable — yet it was completely overlooked. You may have missed it, so I’m sharing it here again:

Wind Down the MSS + Transfer Payment Responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation

Thanks for identifying the problem and voicing it, however I have many doubts Lately, Entropy has been advocating for trading decentralization for efficiency. Of course, direct control is always more efficient than decentralized processes — but I see several major downsides to this proposal: It represents a shift away from decentralization and DAO governance toward centralization under the Arbitrum Foundation If we continue down this path in every case, we’ll eventually reduce the DAO to a …

This comment received several likes, indicating that it was recognized by other delegates (even if not by you), and it was also referenced in a separate comment by another delegate. In other words, its impact may have been even greater than the one you initially evaluated.

Therefore, this earlier comment should also be taken into account — particularly for its impact and timing.

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I will break my comment into several parts to make it easier to read.
The second part will focus on the missing evaluations for my comments on other proposals

[cp0x]

Title: Dispute part 2

Delegate Name: cp0x

Reason for dispute:

Let’s look at other comments that I believe you may have overlooked. I understand that reviewing all 44 comments is a demanding task — that’s fair

1. Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction

[Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction

Thank you for the proposal I understand the goal perfectly well and it is supported by everyone - not to lose control But this can be done in different ways. The method presented here seems to me to be one of the most problematic: At the moment, the cost of the ARB token has fallen to minimum values, several times lower than at its peak, which means that the seizure of control is currently the cheapest (compared to other periods). If earlier it was hundreds of millions of $, now 80 million …

I highlighted the core issue — the loss of control — and pointed out that this proposal does not actually solve the problem, but merely delays it. I believe my comment should be evaluated as follows:

• Relevance (5/10): The proposal doesn’t address the problem, only postpones it.
• Depth of Analysis (5/10): I outlined several alternative solutions that could — and arguably should — have been considered, referencing how other DAOs handled similar issues.
• Timing (5/10): Any well-reasoned comment submitted before the vote should receive at least a 5 here.
• Clarity & Communication (8/10): My feedback is clearly structured, proposals are listed, conclusions are drawn — it would be hard to ask for better organization.
• Impact (10/10): I voted against, and along with Paulo was among the first to voice that position on the forum. My 95k VP contributed to a 4M vote “Against” swing — that’s a significant impact.

Additionally, forum scoring doesn’t account for off-forum influence. I regularly post about governance topics on Twitter, and it’s entirely possible that some of the impact came from there:
https://x.com/cp0xdotcom/status/1929546466281783561

---

2. DeFi Renaissance Incentive Program (DRIP)

DeFi Renaissance Incentive Program (DRIP)

Thank you for the long-awaited proposal. First, I want to support the initiative, where the goals of the Arbitrum are put first, not the protocols. This time, the Arbitrum will voice the goals, and not the protocols themselves, saying what they need. This is good, however, why are you sure that in this case there will not be the same result as last time? Why in the same example about wstETH all the borrowing will not go to another chain when the season ends? In this program, vesting of rewards…

I supported the initiative, but suggested improving it through vesting, greater transparency in allocation and governance, clearer budgeting, and mitigation of reputational risks

• Relevance (5/10): I expressed both support and highlighted areas for improvement, including the funding amount — a topic that was later discussed by other delegates as well.
• Depth of Analysis (8/10): I considered the lessons from the previous program and raised concerns to avoid repeating past mistakes. I pointed out the advantages of vesting, questions around payment frequency and who will manage the calculations, user awareness of incentives, the lack of clarity on operational cost breakdowns, and more. The analysis was comprehensive
• Timing (9/10): I’ll reiterate my belief that any meaningful comment made before voting should receive at least a 5. I provided my feedback the same day the proposal was published.
• Clarity & Communication (8/10): My arguments were clearly structured and numbered for ease of understanding.
• Impact (5/10): While impact is difficult to measure precisely, my questions sparked responses from the proposal authors and drew attention from other delegates — indicating meaningful influence

---

3. Non-Constitutional] Invest in Builders & Ignite ARB Demand with q/acc

[Non-Constitutional] Invest in Builders & Ignite ARB Demand with q/acc

Thank you for the offer, I like the principle of the ABC model itself, but there are many questions: In essence, this is a parallel investment, in addition to another project - AVI Why not combine these programs? If we invest money in projects, then we can launch them through ABC pools, which will give us a guarantee that the project tokens will not be dumped Why will new projects choose Arbitrum if there are other more well-known and chain-independent products: – Balancer LBP (where there …

I wrote that there are many open questions about its overlap with other initiatives, unclear financial allocations, competitiveness with existing solutions, and the lack of clarity on incentives and limits for participating projects.

I believe this is an important discussion to explore the pros and cons of the proposal, especially in light of the high operational costs.

• Relevance (5/10): I raised several questions and suggestions, some of which the author acknowledged — particularly regarding the interaction with AVI. Since each point received a response, all of them were clearly relevant.
• Depth of Analysis (7/10): As seen in the comment, I compared this solution with similar alternatives and provided examples, demonstrating a thoughtful and in-depth analysis.
• Timing (5/10): I’ll reiterate my belief that any meaningful comment made before voting should receive at least a 5.
• Clarity & Communication (5/10): My arguments were clearly structured and numbered for ease of understanding.
• Impact (4/10): It’s hard to assess this point precisely because no vote has yet taken place, but I believe it’s no less than 4

---

4. SOS Submission] {Merged: TBD} – Strategic Objectives

[SOS Submission] {Merged: TBD} – Strategic Objectives

Thanks to the author for combining the SOS projects in one topic. I went a little further, because it is still quite a long text on many pages. To make it easier for delegates and those simply interested, I combined the main data in a table My comments can also be read there for each goal

I put significant effort into analyzing and structuring all the proposals so that delegates could at least preliminarily assess their importance and likelihood of support, based on my summary table — which received positive feedback, including likes and direct praise from the post’s author.

• Relevance (6/10): This was a summary of all relevant information in a concise table format.
• Depth of Analysis (10/10): I believe this work was highly valuable and useful — including the key parameters, impact estimates, and my own assessments.
• Timing (5/10): It’s difficult to assess since there was no active vote, but in this case, it clearly deserves no less than a 5.
• Clarity & Communication (10/10): The presentation of such a large amount of information was extremely well-structured and easy to understand — arguably the most accessible way to digest it.
• Impact (6/10): Again, it’s hard to evaluate this precisely without a vote, but I believe it’s at least a 6, considering the likes and the positive mention by the author.

---

5. Constitutional] AIP: Remove Cost Cap on Arbitrum Nova

[Constitutional] AIP: Remove Cost Cap on Arbitrum Nova

First, I would like to outline a few pros and cons: Pros: Reduction of unnecessary and quite significant costs for Arbitrum. No more need to subsidize Nova, as Arbitrum has already significantly reduced fees thanks to recent updates. Cons: Potential loss of Nova chain users. The chain’s TVL is only $700,934 (according to DeFiLlama), which is very low, and transaction fees are already so minimal that most users may not even notice any changes Considering Nova’s substantial operational cost…

I also believe this comment should be taken into account, as it highlights an important aspect — the TVL of the chain — which is essential for understanding its relevance.

• Relevance (5/10): I pointed out a key metric — the chain’s TVL — to help assess how important or relevant it is.
• Depth of Analysis (6/10): I found data on the chain’s TVL and concluded that, due to its low value, it doesn’t justify allocating significant resources to it.
• Timing (10/10): It would be strange to give anything less than 10 here — I was the first to comment on this proposal.
• Clarity & Communication (6/10): The message was concise and to the point, with a clear conclusion.
• Impact (6/10): While there was no vote on this proposal, I believe the comment had influence and should be scored no lower than 6.

---

In conclusion, I believe all of the above comments were valuable — both for the DAO and for the delegates who referenced them or used them to inform their own reasoning and opinions.

I’m not saying that you need to evaluate all 44 of my messages — some of them were part of ongoing discussions — but it’s clear that several of these comments absolutely should have been considered. I genuinely don’t understand how they could have been overlooked

[Zeptimus]

Title: Dispute
Delegate Name: Zeptimus
Reason for Dispute (please detail):

I am submitting this dispute regarding the DIP V1.6 results as I believe there are inaccuracies in the scoring and assessment of my participation.

Call Attendance (5 June)

I attended all three, including the one on 5 June. I believe the system may have failed to properly record my participation in one of them. I recall specifically one instance where I joined while multitasking, and that somehow generated an audio bug that made me had to rejoin the call and maybe the clock registered the last part without accounting for the first part. I kindly request a double-check of attendance records for the June 5 call.

Forum Contributions

I would also like to dispute the scoring of several forum posts that I believe should have qualified for points due to their depth and relevance. Specifically:

1. SOS Submission: Merged TBD Strategic Objectives
   → This post contains meaningful feedback and a call to maintain clarity in the strategic objectives. I believe it deserved recognition under the DIP criteria.

2. Agentic Governance Initiative
   → This post reflects a genuine attempt to engage with the philosophical foundations of governance in Arbitrum and should be considered for its intent and contextual relevance And also connects dots with SOS and how AI could support busy stakeholders running their own businesses.

3. SOS Initiation Announcement
   → While the feedback mentions that I based my comment on an incorrect premise, I respectfully note that my suggestion still aimed at improving process clarity and governance direction and key stakeholders recognized the value.

Also, I want to mention that I genuinely enjoy giving a bit of feedback on every proposal. I’m reading all of them anyway, so spending five minutes sharing my thoughts feels right. I’m not expecting extra points or anything for those comments, but I truly believe they’re helpful for the proposers. It’s a way to show I’m paying attention and that their work matters. Reading the feedback now, it kind of feels like that habit is being punished, which is disappointing.

[Ignas]

Title: Dispute

Ignas

Reason for Dispute:

I want to file a dispute regarding the presence in Discussion category for the “Agentic Governance Initiative [AGI]” proposal.

This proposal was listed under the required discussions for May 2025, but it did not appear on my Karma dashboard. I was not aware that it was being tracked and therefore did not evaluate it accordingly.

For details, please check: My comment on the AGI proposal

Thank you!

[paulofonseca]

Title: Dispute

Delegate Name: paulofonseca

Reason for dispute (please detail): The current 0/0/0/0/0 scoring of this comment, and the current consideration of this comment as valid and its 0/0/0/0/0 scoring.

Context for this dispute

First, I would like to highlight that with the current scoring, I’m not qualified to receive any DIP compensation for May, since despite contributing meaningfully to the DAO during this month, @SeedGov decided to actively penalize me for two comments I made, scoring them with 0/0/0/0/0, so that my Delegate Feedback metric would be averaged down, and so that I wouldn’t have enough points to qualify for any compensation, therefore choosing to reward me with $0 USD this month, for the first time ever since I started as a delegate in Arbitrum DAO.

If SeedGov were to fairly score my comment regarding the D.A.O. program and consider the other comment about the SOS process invalid, as I’m arguing with this dispute, I would be in the top 5 of the delegate ranking for May, and I would receive over $4,000 USD in compensation this month, which makes a significant difference for me personally, since I live off of this DIP compensation ever since I’m working full-time for Arbitrum DAO, both as a delegate and by building arbitrum.proposals.app.

In the Notion feedback to Delegates (when opening the May section and then the paulofonseca section), SeedGov states that the reasons they scored both of these comments with 0/0/0/0/0 were:

• “we do not support delegates publicly attacking the reputation of valuable contributors in this community”;
• “we believe these comments contribute to a toxic environment that discourages others from continuing to engage and contribute meaningfully. For this reason, we have taken the uncommon step of penalizing this behavior.”
• “We consulted with multiple DAO stakeholders regarding this situation, and all agreed that this kind of conduct is unacceptable.”
• “This penalty should also be seen as a warning: if this behavior continues, we will take further action.”

You can read their complete rationale here.

I want to point out that according to the passed DIP 1.5 onchain proposal, SeedGov only has the legitimacy to penalize delegates by executing a DIP Ban (which they’ve done before for two delegates that were trying to farm the DIP rewards), or a DIP Suspension (which was never done, at least to my knowledge).

@SEEDGov

DIP Ban
The program administrator will have the right to expel a delegate if they attempt to game or exploit the program or if the delegate does not meet any of the aforementioned requirements to be considered eligible.

@SEEDGov

DIP Suspension
The program administrator will have the right to suspend a delegate if he/she/they commits a fault that in the administrator’s judgment is insufficient cause for expulsion. The decision and duration of the suspension are at the discretion of the program administrator (duration can’t exceed the program’s current iteration).

Therefore, I believe SeedGov lacks the legitimacy to use a 0/0/0/0/0 rubric scoring system for comments to reduce the average of the Delegate Feedback metric and penalize delegate behavior as they see fit. If they want to penalize delegates, they can only ban or suspend delegates from the program.

I believe that for the Program Manager of the DIP to resort to this kind of tactic, where the subjective assessment of the Delegate Feedback metric is weaponized to determine who qualifies for incentives and who doesn’t, is a clear abuse of power by SeedGov, and puts them in a situation where they clearly can’t be credibly neutral. Even worse, this behaviour is a surefire way to guarantee that valuable and committed delegates disengage from the DIP, since from a talented contributor’s point of view, the juice is not worth the squeeze, as this example aptly illustrates. Therefore, I believe that the 0/0/0/0/0 scoring of these comments of mine, with the intent to penalize me explicitly, is not legitimate nor legal under the scope of the passed DIP onchain proposal, and this situation should be corrected.

Arguing for the merit of my comments that were used to penalize me

Now, let me argue why I believe my comments, which were explicitly scored by SeedGov with 0/0/0/0/0 to penalize me, were actually a good example of me acting as a delegate and doing important delegate work for the DAO, are also the kind of contributions we should be incentivizing other delegates to do more of, and therefore deserve to be disputed and rescored/invalidated for the month of May.

Comment about the SOS Submissions

Let’s first go through this comment of mine, where SeedGov argues that “we found it disrespectful toward one of the most dedicated and active delegates/contributors in the Arbitrum ecosystem. It is also unfounded, as L2Beat has selflessly organized several calls to help facilitate the SOS Submissions and move the initiative forward”.

This comment of mine is a response to the previous comment from @Sinkas, in which L2BEAT argues that none of the SOS submissions put forward by several members of the DAO are good enough to be voted “For”. In my comment, I ask what I believe to be a fair question (which hasn’t been replied to, for more than a month now) as to why L2BEAT didn’t submit their own SOS proposal that would cater to their preferences of being something that can be materialized and wouldn’t pigenhold ourselves into something.

The reason I asked this question is that I believe being in the role of critiquing and pointing out flaws in the current options, while simultaneously not providing alternative suggestions, improvements, or solutions, is one of the main reasons our DAO is not effective right now. I believe that a delegate like L2BEAT needs to participate meaningfully in the process, as a participant rather than a moderator, before they have the legitimacy to say that not a single one of the current SOS proposals merits a “For” vote on their part.

That’s why I added the “you can just do things… you know?” part. It was a critique of L2BEAT’s stance during the entire SOS framework process, where they acted critically towards all SOS proposals submitted by contributors, and didn’t create any improvements, suggestions, or mergers of proposals that catered to their preferences. And they could have.

I believe that my role as a delegate in Arbitrum DAO is to pay attention to what is happening in the DAO and point out this type of behavior L2BEAT demonstrated, which doesn’t contribute to better outcomes in the DAO. Having one of the most respected delegates like L2BEAT saying that none of the SOS Submissions are good enough and not creating one themselves is not helpful for the DAO. It’s destructive to the goodwill and effort of other contributors who invested time and energy in this process.

SeedGov decided to penalize me for this comment because they “found it disrespectful” toward L2BEAT, and also “unfounded, as L2BEAT selflessly organized several calls to help facilitate the SOS Submissions”.

From my perspective, nothing in my comment is inherently disrespectful. Furthermore, if L2BEAT themselves found my comment disrespectful, in accordance with the delegate code of conduct they subscribed to, they should have reached out to me privately about this, and I’m sure we would have sorted it out. They didn’t reach out to me about this. In fact, they still didn’t reply to my comment.

I would also like to point out that L2BEAT was (fairly, in my opinion) compensated with DIP Bonus Points for organizing those SOS calls, so it wasn’t that “selfless” of a contribution as SeedGov claims.

I would also like to point out that L2BEAT can very effectively defend themselves from criticism, as they’ve done many times before, both in the forum and in the delegates’ Telegram chat. They don’t need SeedGov to police the questions/comments other delegates say to them in the forum.

All in all, I believe that this comment of mine should be considered invalid for the purposes of the DIP, because it didn’t have an impact on the discussion, since it wasn’t even replied to.

Comment about the Arbitrum D.A.O. Grant Program performance

Regarding this other comment, SeedGov argues that it has “a particularly concerning statement in which Paulo insinuates that Castle’s actions are one of the main reasons builders avoid Arbitrum and choose other ecosystems instead.”. They also argue that “Paulo fail to contact any Castle Labs team member privately to understand the nature of the alleged discrepancy (as clearly outlined in the Code of Conduct)” and also that it “insinuates that the team might not care about dedicating sufficient time to reviewing grant applicants”.

Before going through each claim one by one, I would like to highlight that “insinuates” is pulling a lot of weight in this argument by SeedGov. We all know it’s always challenging to communicate effectively in online forums, especially in written form, without being misunderstood. But in this case, SeedGov dismisses any nuance regarding what I said and immediately adjudicates an insinuation that was not stated by me at all, and then uses it as justification for the 0/0/0/0/0 scoring penalty. This opens the door to a dangerously subjective assessment and bias, where Program Managers can essentially adjudicate that someone is insinuating something about another individual and weaponize that subjective assessment to penalize them, which is effectively what is happening in this case.

This behavior by SeedGov as the Program Manager effectively censors speech, something they are not entrusted by the community to do, as only forum admins can currently do so by removing forum comments that violate community guidelines and the delegate code of conduct, therefore being a clear overreach of their power and over stepping of their mandate. And even worse, in this case, this behavior is censoring speech of a controversial or contrarian nature, which is the kind of speech we’ve learned to understand is necessary for DAOs if they want to become the most resilient and capture-resistant forms of organization.

If you read my original comment carefully, I believe it’s clear that I didn’t insinuate that “one of the main reasons builders avoid Arbitrum and choose other ecosystems instead” is because of @castlecapital’s behaviour. In my original comment, I start by asking, “what’s going on with the New Protocols and Ideas domain acceptance rate?” and all subsequent paragraphs in my comment refer to the acceptance rate of this domain, not anyone’s behavior.

When I say: “ This is the main cause for good builders to shy away from Arbitrum, forever. When they get rejected a “smallish” grant, from the only program that is supposed to be the allocator for early stage builder in the whole Arbitrum ecosystem, it sends a very bad signal.” The “This” at the beginning of that paragraph relates to the original question and central point of my comment, the low acceptance rate, not specific Castle Labs behavior. And I say so from personal experience, as both a builder and someone who is regularly contacted by fellow builders in the ecosystem looking to build on Arbitrum, as I mentioned in a personal anecdote in a subsequent comment in the same thread.

Regarding SeedGov’s claim that what I said in my comment “insinuates that the team might not care about dedicating sufficient time to reviewing grant applicants”, I can confirm that this was indeed targeted at a specific behaviour of Castle Caps, given that they rejected a particular application with a set of questions that seemed part of a template (as @jojo subsequently confirmed in this comment) and with feedback to the answers to those questions that seemed also a default template feedback that ignored information that the respondents volunteered in their answers (as the applicants subsequently alluded to in this comment). When reading the whole forum thread, the application in question, for Arbitrum to fund the Signals Protocol by Lighthouse, (who some would even consider a competitor to proposals.app and therefore I personally shouldn’t even be particularly concerned that they didn’t get funded by Arbitrum DAO) was rejected based on information that the applicants considered to be interpreted by the domain allocator in an incorrect way, and that the applicants tried to correct, to no avail—reinforcing the idea that Arbitrum is not very welcoming to builders, as highlighted by these comments in this thread here and here.

When carefully reading this part of my comment:
“It feels like @CastleCapital is either being too conservative with allocating these funds, or they just don’t care enough to spend the proper time to vet the projects that apply and reject them too soon.”
It’s clear that I’m proposing both of these options as hypotheticals, since I don’t understand why we would want to throttle the acceptance of grants for the new protocols and ideas domain, given that we approved an onchain proposal to spend $1.5M USD in this term, for this domain. I’m hypothesizing what the reasons would be for that. I’m not insinuating anything specifically about Castle Capital’s team.

Then, finally, regarding SeedGov’s claim that I have “failed to contact any Castle Labs team member privately to understand the nature of the alleged discrepancy (as clearly outlined in the Code of Conduct)” I have to say that this is simply not true and a grave misrepresentation of fact by SeedGov. I indeed contacted Castle Labs founder, @atomist, as well as the program manager @jojo, about this exact issue, on April 17ᵗʰ 2025, almost a whole month before I posted this comment of mine, which was penalized.

Here are the screenshots of the Telegram chat, along with the zkTLS proof of the third message in that group chat, where I tagged the intervenients in that private group chat, including Atomist.

I subsequently inquired about this acceptance rate discrepancy during the May 7ᵗʰ Arbitrum Reporting Call (GCR), as seen in the linked recording, where I asked the same question about the discrepancy in the acceptance rate between domains at the 35-minute mark.

Given all of this, I think it’s clear I was acting in good faith in my comment, that I followed the community guidelines and the delegate code of conduct I subscribed to, that I’ve been paying attention to the several activities and programs in the DAO, that I’ve been asking relevant questions, that I spent a significant amount of time researching about this issue before commenting, and that therefore, this is the kind of delegate behaviour we should be aiming to have more of in this DAO, and incentivize with the DIP.

I hereby request that this comment of mine be scored appropriately and not penalized with a score of 0/0/0/0/0.

Thank you!

[ZER8]

Hey @SEEDGov latam, I would like to suggest an improvement idea for the DIP program.

It would really be cool if delegates that participate in the program(could only be the ones that qualify for rewards or not) could nominate other delegates for Bonus Points. This is mainly because as the DAO grows(and if the next DIP proposal will pass ofc, but assuming it will this may be valuable and worthwhile to experiment with) and it becomes an ever more complex cyber organism it will be harder and harder to keep up track of all the things that delegates do to earn bonus points, other delegates may be more in the loop at times.

Simplest way to do this is via polls in the forum ,for the first month you could start just by allowing delegates to nominate via a form and you could post the eligible ones on the forum so other delegates could vote on them, if over 50-70% vote yes, then the bonus points would be awarded. To make it bulletproof and non farmable, Seed Latam would have the power to veto the vote if if decides it’s not valuable, the dao could dispute it.

Thinking this could also be a simple and low cost governance experiment that people migh enjot participating in:)

[Oni]

Title: Dispute

Delegate Name: Oni

Reason for Dispute:

I believe the comments I shared this month may have added value, and I would appreciate it if you could take a moment to revisit them:

STEP 2 Committee Preferred Allocations

DeFi Renaissance Incentive Program (DRIP)

[Proposal [Non-consitutional]: Top-up for Hackathon Continuation Program]

Thank you for your work!

[krst]

@paulofonseca

All in all, I believe that this comment of mine should be considered invalid for the purposes of the DIP, because it didn’t have an impact on the discussion, since it wasn’t even replied to.

FWIW, I can agree with Paulo that the comment in question could be considered invalid. We never responded to it because we found it off-topic and irrelevant to the main thread (it sidelined the conversation to what Paulo believes L2BEAT should or should not be doing).

[KlausBrave]

The base of performance is integrity.
Integrity is managed by agreement.
When agreements are not followed trust in the social contract breaks down.
Performance degrades.

One trusts a set of agreements as the ground from which to stand and act.

There is agreement for a singular Code of Conduct assessment and enforcement process to be run by the Foundation.

There is no agreement for SeedGov to run its own Code of Conduct assessment and enforcement process and to issue penalties on a delegates DIP rewards.

This newly invented penalty mechanism is not prescribed in the DIP Bible or in the DIP onchain proposal. To judge Paulo and withhold $4,000 against an unprescribed and newly created rule is illegitimate.

In addition the Foundation concluded there was no violation of the Code of Conduct, by what right or logic is SeedGov to overrule and supplant this conclusion?

When rules are hidden, inconsistently applied, enabled through an environment of not repairing and clarifying agreements then integrity of the social contract breaks down.

People don’t know where they stand in an ambiguous environment.

They can choose: not to play, limit risk, or take advantage of strategic ambiguity.

None of these behaviours portend a trusted and performant system.

Analogous to the US providing regularity clarity enables people to trust and commit to make decisions to invest time, money, energy into building within that environment - Arbitrum DAO needs to adopt and uphold providing an environment of the utmost governance clarity.

This cannot stand that both the Foundation and SeedGov are arbiter and enforcer of the Code of Conduct - the later is undocumented, and has no agreement.

If we let this stand, lets play this out, is it also ok now for the grants domain allocators to issue penalties by withholding a payment to a grantee because they don’t like how they spoke on the forum and independently deem it a Code of Conduct violation?

Can any program do this now and ignore the Foundation run Code of Conduct process making it redundant?
Why, why not, by what criteria would we use to deem that illegitimate?

The present environment has now become confused, clarity and trust is diminished and repair is needed.

Will Arbitrum allow a reputation to grow as a DAO that presents confused process and doesn’t follow its own agreements? or can we take this as a great learning opportunity to grow as a home that stands for clear and fair agreements talent can know and trust?

This is an easy fix to course correct and quickly get back in good standing.

SEEDGov took an action they aren’t authorised to take. @SEEDGov do you recognise you didn’t follow process deferring to AF as the sole legitimate authority to handle Code of Conduct violation assessment, enforcement and penalties?

Will you undo this action and ongoingly for the future leave this responsibility in its legitimate place with the Foundation?

@Arbitrum Foundation, can you weigh in that you are the singular responsible party for Code of Conduct assessment, enforcement and penalties? if not, can you explicitly state so as right now its really unclear how Code of Conduct is and will be handled going forward and that clarity is required for participants to know how to participate.

This may seem like an isolated thing, but it is categorically not, letting this linger debases integrity in DAO wide governance and that’s for all of us to uphold.

[SEEDGov]

DonOfDAOs

Hey ! Thanks for your feedback.

@DonOfDAOs

1. I was the only person to notice or respond to this builder and provided in-depth feedback. I went further to meet them on call, to which they explicitly acknowledged I was the only member of the community to take the time to try and help them build here: [RFC] Signals Protocol
2. again, I was the only community member to point this builder in the right direction: [RFC] Protocol Participation Request: DAO Liquidity Injection via Smart Contracts into Paribus on Arbitrum - #3 by DonOfDAOs
3. Similarly, I was the first community member to address these builders after nearly a week with no response: [CONSTITUTIONAL] Register $BORING in the Arbitrum generic-custom gateway - #2 by DonOfDAOs
4. I was one of the first to provide detailed feedback and questioning to help evolve this proposal: [Non-Constitutional] Invest in Builders & Ignite ARB Demand with q/acc - #10 by DonOfDAOs
5. I opened discussion on broader privacy standards for the DAO here: Proposal: enable the new TogetherCrew functionality: Free* summarizer and Q&A for delegates telegram chat - #33 by DonOfDAOs
6. Contributed to the Quorum discussions here: [Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction - #27 by DonOfDAOs

And this is among several other general communications. Certainly, 0 points must be a mistake as I also don’t see any delegate feedback in the Notion.

First of all, we apologize for the issue with your report. There was an issue during the migration from the private Notion to the public one, which resulted in your report being excluded from the public version. This has already been resolved.

1. Regarding the first comment, you are right in noting that you were the only one to comment on that thread. However, it is difficult to assess its impact on the DAO. The fact that it received no other responses is an indicator that the topic is a lower priority for most delegates.

2. In this case, we respectfully disagree. The builder was requesting that the DAO deposit treasury funds into their protocol. They specifically stated the following:

   @Nikola_Paribus

   Why We’re Reaching Out

   We are not requesting a grant or direct token allocation.

   Instead, we propose that the DAO:

   • Use idle treasury assets (e.g., $ARB, $ETH, $USDT, $BTC)
   • Deposit them directly into Paribus’s live lending pools via smart contracts
   • Maintain full on-chain custody and control at all times

   This makes it clear that directing the proposal to the DRIP program — which is intended to provide incentives to protocols — is not the appropriate path.

3. We want to emphasize that the program does not reward being the “first” to comment just for the sake of it. There has to be a combination of factors. One can be the first to comment, but if the comment doesn’t add value, that alone is not sufficient. That said, we fail to see how asking a builder to engage in the DAO’s day-to-day governance relates to the goal of having their token listed on the bridge. It seems more like we are adding unnecessary friction for builders rather than making things easier. We invite you to review this comment made by Jose from StableLabs, which actually takes the opposite view.

   We also recommend revisiting the thread and the builder’s response in detail.

4. Regarding this comment, we did not see how it contributed to improving the proposal. In fact, the proposer rejected the second suggestion as it would have increased the cost of the proposal.

5. We appreciate you opening that discussion, but there was no real follow-up on the topic. In particular, the thread titled Proposal: enable the new TogetherCrew functionality: Free* summarizer and Q&A for delegates telegram chat is not a discussion we’ve encouraged since the Telegram chat is not owned or governed by the DAO.

6. Once again, while some suggestions were made, they have not led to any specific outcomes.

@DonOfDAOs

The next section shows I didn’t vote on the Stylus proposal which had a snapshot of Feb 19th, 119 days ago and well beyond the 90 day window.

I see the following:

@SEEDGov

Note that proposals are always considered in the month in which they are finalized.

How does it make any sense to count the end of the voting window for participation when one cannot for the full length of that time if they were not delegated to before the snapshot? Effectively, they are being docked for a proposal which began weeks prior to the 90 window for which they may not have even had voting power to use even if they wanted to participate. The start should be the beginning of the period.

This criterion has been in place since the beginning of the program. Proposals are counted based on the month in which they are finalized. This applies to all three voting parameters (PR90, SV, and TV). In the case of “Request to Increase the Stylus Sprint Committee’s Budget,” the proposal concluded in March 2025, which is why it is included in the PR90 calculation. This approach ensures consistency across the framework and is particularly reasonable given that the majority of votes are typically cast during the final week of the voting period.

@SEEDGov

As approved in the Tally proposal, the Presence in Discussion parameter acts as a multiplier that measures the presence and participation of delegates throughout the month.

For May, 8 proposals were considered:

1. [RFC] Proposal to Adjust the Voting Power of the Arbitrum Community Pool & Ratifying the Agentic Governance Pivot
2. [Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction
3. [Non-Constitutional] Invest in Builders & Ignite ARB Demand with q/acc
4. Wind Down the MSS + Transfer Payment Responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation
5. Agentic Governance Initiative [AGI]
6. DeFi Renaissance Incentive Program (DRIP)
7. A Vision for the Future of Arbitrum
8. SOS Discussions

@DonOfDAOs

1. here: [RFC] Proposal to Adjust the Voting Power of the Arbitrum Community Pool & Ratifying the Agentic Governance Pivot - #7 by DonOfDAOs
2. here: [Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction - #27 by DonOfDAOs
3. here: [Non-Constitutional] Invest in Builders & Ignite ARB Demand with q/acc - #10 by DonOfDAOs
4. N/A
5. Avoided Conflict of Interest
6. here: DeFi Renaissance Incentive Program (DRIP) - #11 by DonOfDAOs
7. N/A
8. here: [SOS Submission] Gabriel – Strategic Objectives - #3 by DonOfDAOs

For the purposes of this parameter, only comments that are deemed valid are taken into account—simply commenting on those threads does not necessarily increase your multiplier.

Overall, our final response is that we do not consider the combination of your contributions (voting power provided to the DAO through voting activity + forum engagement) to be sufficient to warrant compensation.

paulofonseca

We would like to begin by noting that we had a productive meeting with Paulo, during which we were able to reach several points of agreement:

• First, we had an in-depth discussion regarding the comment made in the DAO Grants Program thread. In this context, SEEDGov clarified to the delegate that our intention is to maintain a healthy and constructive discussion environment and that it is important to follow due diligence processes before raising concerns in a public setting. This aligns with SEEDGov’s mandate as Program Manager to help improve and professionalize delegates within the Arbitrum DAO.
  Paulo acknowledged that he could have exhausted the existing channels to clarify his concerns before bringing the matter to the forum, and also recognized that the way he had raised the issue was not ideal. He showed clear reflection on the situation and committed to improving in these aspects. Although Paulo expressed that he does not fully agree with our approach—specifically regarding the use of the scoring under the DF parameter—We explained our point of view on this, and we stand by this decision.
• The comment made on L2Beat has been marked as invalid, enabling the delegate to qualify for Tier 3. From our perspective, this was the most debatable judgment within the assessment, and we thank @krst for sharing his point of view.
  We want to emphasize that this decision by the Program Manager is a gesture of goodwill in recognition of Paulo’s willingness to find a peaceful resolution to the situation, as well as the self-awareness he demonstrated in reflecting on his previous approach.

We thank Paulo once again for his openness to dialogue, and we are pleased to have found a middle ground. Paulo is a prominent delegate and contributor, and discouraging his participation is not in anyone’s interest.

With that said, we would like to clarify a few points:

@paulofonseca

In fact, I’ve participated in both biweekly Open Governance Calls, even asking questions (as it’s typical of me) on both May 6th and May 20th.

Here is my face in the May 6th recording at 6 minutes 15 seconds asking a question.

And here is my avatar in the May 20th recording at 20 minutes 40 seconds also asking a question.

So, my bonus points should be updated accordingly.

Thank you!

You’re right — in this case, we missed it because you joined the May 6th call under a different nickname/ENS. We’ve now made the corresponding update.

@paulofonseca

I would receive over $4,000 USD in compensation this month, which makes a significant difference for me personally, since I live off of this DIP compensation ever since I’m working full-time for Arbitrum DAO, both as a delegate and by building arbitrum.proposals.app.

On this point, we want to make it clear that no delegate is guaranteed to receive compensation throughout the program. Everything depends on the contributions they make to the DAO.

@paulofonseca

This behavior by SeedGov as the Program Manager effectively censors speech, something they are not entrusted by the community to do, as only forum admins can currently do so by removing forum comments that violate community guidelines and the delegate code of conduct, therefore being a clear overreach of their power and over stepping of their mandate. And even worse, in this case, this behavior is censoring speech of a controversial or contrarian nature, which is the kind of speech we’ve learned to understand is necessary for DAOs if they want to become the most resilient and capture-resistant forms of organization.

We want to clarify that our intention has never been to censor anyone. In fact, as one of the most vocal delegates in opposition to certain stakeholders in this community, Paulo has qualified for incentives in all 7 months of this iteration, on more than one occasion in the highest Tier.

Paulo is also the only delegate in the history of the DIP to receive 45 Bonus Points for a single initiative.

These precedents demonstrate that SEEDGov has never assessed delegates based on their views or opinions. In fact, your comment in the thread A Vision for the Future of Arbitrum received the highest score in May, despite being a strongly critical response to the proposal made by the Arbitrum Foundation.

EventHorizonDAO

Although some members of our team have already discussed this privately with the Event Horizon team, we would like to publicly reinforce what we have expressed in our feedback report:

We appreciate the effort Event Horizon has made to improve the rationales shared with the DAO. Compared to those submitted a few months ago, the current rationales provide significantly more clarity and detail regarding the protocol’s decision-making process. However, we have not yet seen these rationales have a positive impact on the community, nor have they delivered insights that meaningfully influenced or added significant value to the broader ecosystem. For that reason, in our view, the delegation does not deserve to qualify for compensation this month.

That said, as this is the first month in which the delegation has begun incorporating user-generated feedback through the Agents, we recognize there is room for improvement, and we believe this approach has the potential to be rewarded by the program in the future. We want to emphasize that this should not be discouraging—on the contrary, we encourage you to continue along this path.

Zeptimus / Oni

In both cases, we do not believe that the overall contributions were sufficient to warrant compensation for this month.

To briefly explain each case:

• In Oni’s case, we kindly ask you not to take it personally, but we believe that the three disputed comments contain generic suggestions that did not have any tangible impact on the final outcome of the discussions.
• In Zeptimus’ case, we acknowledge a greater effort compared to previous months to engage with ongoing discussions. However, effort ≠ value. While the delegate has indeed made efforts to add value to the conversations, this value has been rather limited when we assess the actual impact on the outcomes of those discussions.

cp0x

Regarding the first dispute, there is one main point:

• We do not believe it is appropriate to compare the scoring with other delegates of a different nature. In this case, Camelot is a delegation with 10 million VP, whose opinion can clearly have a greater impact on the community.

Regarding the second dispute:

1. We consider that the justification provided for this comment is not sufficiently strong to warrant a change in our decision. In particular, we note that you are repeating a suggestion made on multiple previous occasions, and the impact mentioned is not supported (only 4.6% voted against on Snapshot, and there is no evidence that the delegate influenced the 8.7 million votes against).
2. This comment dates back to April.
3. We believe the proposer’s response speaks for itself. The suggestion that this initiative might overlap with the AVI (which, let us remember, only reached the research phase and is not operational today) is incorrect. Furthermore, the remainder of the comment does not appear to have contributed to improving the proposal or enriching the discussion.
4. We do not understand the grounds for the dispute here, as Bonus Points were awarded for this contribution.
5. We do not believe this comment adds new information. Nova’s metrics are publicly available through various platforms, and ultimately this is a straightforward decision with no controversy.

Ignas

The mentioned comment was made during the month of June and will therefore be evaluated accordingly in the June results.

jameskbh

We would like to begin by saying that this case was extensively discussed internally within the team. We consider that during the month of May you were on the borderline between qualifying or not qualifying (that is, the line separating both outcomes is very thin). We want to provide you with feedback on your well-justified dispute:

• First of all, we understand everything you raised in that comment. It is clear that the DAO currently does not have a framework to allocate a budget to each strategic objective, although it is worth mentioning that this had already been acknowledged by Entropy in the original proposal:

@Entropy

Once a set of objectives and related key results has been approved, Entropy will strive to build a budgeting framework where each high-level objective is allocated a certain amount of capital on a yearly basis, with interested contributors having the ability to request a share of this capital through a standardized structure. It’s important to note that contributors will still maintain the ability to post standalone proposals outside of this structure and are not forced to tie their initiative to the MVP/SOS/budget framework. Having said that, as the established objectives should be regarded as one of the DAO’s highest priorities, contributors should expect more friction when it comes to passing a proposal that doesn’t reasonably demonstrate that it fits within the established short- to medium-term objectives. In other words, while the freedom to make proposals that fall outside the SOS will not cease to exist, we expect that the DAO will discourage it via the creation of a social contract among delegates.

• Also, we consider your concerns about the execution of the objectives to be valid and relevant. After further discussion regarding the assessment of this comment, we have determined that a slight increase in its scoring is appropriate.

Having said this, we kindly remind you that, since you were on the borderline between being compensated or not, it will be necessary for you to increase your efforts in order to qualify in the coming months.

EzR3aL

I believe that most of us (if not all) agree with your analysis of the issue. The challenge we face here is that, beyond that analysis, there are no novel conclusions, suggestions, or other actionable steps to address it. The scoring we provide is intended to reflect that the analysis was accurate and that it had some impact on certain delegates who agreed with it.

In this regard, we have adjusted the scoring related to impact to reflect this; however, we want to make it clear that this contribution alone does not constitute sufficient grounds to qualify for incentives this month.

---

With this, we consider all disputes resolved for this month, and from this point forward, we will not be accepting further disputes regarding this month’s results.

We will soon update the framework and this report to reflect the changes made.

Additionally, we would like to mention that this month’s payments may be delayed due to the migration of the DIP MSS to a Multisig controlled by the Arbitrum Foundation. We apologize in advance for any inconvenience this may cause.

Best regards, and thank you all for your feedback!

[DonOfDAOs]

TL;DR Ironically, the value of DIP as a program might be broken based on the programs own criterion and assessment: by the program managers own scoring, no delegates are improving or adding value as a result of DIP.

—

To be clear, you’re valuing the entirety of my contributions as equal to never having contributed at all?

Do you have any instances of SeedGov policing having improved the quality of a delegates contributions such that a delegate who did not qualify, went on to qualify in the future?

As far as I’m aware by your repeated denial of admission to the same small delegates month on month your own program approach, by your own non disclosed subjective scoring, has failed to meaningfully improve delegate contributions.

Can we agree that the program is failing on this front? — I have a suspicion completely opaque rubrics and generic ‘do more statements’ might be the issue!

One would think that the number of new, contributing delegates, included in the program and scored as valuable to the DAO would be an important factor to determine program success. Unless, as you’ve stated before, the point of the program is mostly just to encourage large delegates to achieve quorum, in which case, I’m not sure why the program needs so much management and scoring at all.

If the program continuously says everyone failed to provide value month after months ironically, the program is clearly unable to uphold its mandate toward improving DAO governance participation as, by your unilateral assessment, no one is improving or providing value. Effectively the longer you continue to reject honest contributors, the more it seems you cannot actually drive valuable contributions to the DAO.

So either you’re over policing, and people are contributing, or your program as the DAO pays for fails to explain or encourage better participation. Which do you believe to be the case?

[cp0x]

Hello!

@SEEDGov

We consider that the justification provided for this comment is not sufficiently strong to warrant a change in our decision

When I said I found some of your scoring numbers inaccurate, I provided a detailed explanation for each one.
In contrast, your response was just a single sentence — that my input was “not sufficiently strong to warrant a change in your decision.”

I would appreciate a more reasoned reply, with specific points explaining why you believe I’m wrong — otherwise, it gives the impression that my arguments weren’t actually read.

In particular, I’d like to understand how you assess timing, because I see inconsistencies in the scores given to different delegates depending on when they posted. In some cases, a delegate who submitted a comment earlier received a lower timing score — how can that be justified?

@SEEDGov

Camelot is a delegation with 10 million VP, whose opinion can clearly have a greater impact on the community

So just to clarify — are you saying that all delegates with lower voting power will continue to be punished twice?

• First, by subtracting 12 points from the total voting score ( 60 – 12 = 48 )
• And second, by lowering the score for their comments, because you believe their impact is smaller compared to those with higher voting power?

Do you consider this double scoring penalty for delegates a fair action on your part?

Not only is this a double penalty, but I also believe it’s fundamentally flawed.
Impact comes from those who are heard — not just those who hold more tokens. These are two different things and should not be conflated

@SEEDGov

This comment dates back to April

Let’s clarify something.
In April, you didn’t count that comment — presumably because there was no vote yet.
And now you’re saying you won’t count it because it belongs to the previous month.

Interesting logic: so even the most valuable and relevant comment won’t be considered if its timing doesn’t fit neatly into your window?

But I clearly remember you saying that past comments would be taken into account in the current month if they weren’t previously scored and still had an impact

@SEEDGov

The suggestion that this initiative might overlap with the AVI (which, let us remember, only reached the research phase and is not operational today) is incorrect

I interpreted that quite differently — the author literally says:
“We will absolutely coordinate with Lino and AVI.”

So I don’t understand why you considered my comment incorrect. From my perspective, it directly relates to what’s written and should be considered appropriate

@SEEDGov

We do not understand the grounds for the dispute here, as Bonus Points were awarded for this contribution

Then please explain — why don’t you consider this a contribution?
If the author of the original post explicitly called my work “Awesome”, how is that not a contribution?

Unfortunately, you’re not providing any arguments for your assessment — you simply state it’s not a contribution.
But I believe I have the right to a detailed explanation of why you reached that conclusion.

@SEEDGov

We do not believe this comment adds new information. Nova’s metrics are publicly available through various platforms, and ultimately this is a straightforward decision with no controversy

I can say with confidence that almost all the information being discussed here is public.
So, using “this information is publicly available” as a reason to disregard a comment would essentially disqualify almost every contribution — but clearly that’s not the case.

Now, here’s the core point of my comment:

First, the information I provided was not included in the proposal. To find it, one needs to do additional research.
Second, the information is valuable not by itself, but because it serves as a key argument — it shows that Nova has very low activity and low TVL, which in turn is the main reason why we should stop subsidizing this chain.

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Given all of the above, I kindly ask you to re-read my comments carefully, adjust the scores in line with the arguments I’ve provided, and give specific justifications for your ratings if you believe they are correct.

I have clearly explained the reasoning behind my own assessments — but your scoring still remains unclear to me

[Argonaut]

In our opinion, it’s unacceptable for @SEEDGov to punish a user based on a perception of disrespect when no aggression occurred. This isn’t a kindergarten, and there’s no need for an authority to lecture us on how to phrase our comments. We’re glad the situation has been clarified.