After examining the conversation further, we would like to question the notion of creating a new working group for the DAO to conclude new incentive design/approaches. Our ARDC work has extensively discussed this, and we would like to ask all to review the work already published (we have an included TLDR section for those that are busy). In light of this, we think that it may be somewhat excessive to create a new working group rather than simply taking a break for 3 months, pushing for new treasury management initiatives, and discussing to new incentive compliance rules, etc. Given the work that the ARDC has already done, this might be best left as an ARDC deliverable rather than spawning a new working group.
There is definitely a noticeable uptick in L2 traction from other competitors that we have seen in the past year, with incentive programs being launched as we speak (Linea with its points program, etc). There are also ecosystem players elsewhere that are focusing on other verticals to onboard users (account abstraction, etc) that may be worth incentivizing in some way as well.
Additionally, in reference to a possible perpetual incentive program, it may be better to allocate the feasibility/operational analysis of that to the ARDC and then examine preexisting incentive mechanisms and then issue a new compliance ruleset accordingly. Some other things that we may need to consider is whether there should be some incentive program allocation matching. If a protocol applies for STIP, maybe they should be required to put up some of their capital as well so that the risk is not entirely on the DAO. It might not be best practice for the DAO to completely subsidize activity. Finally, if we are to discuss a perpetual incentive program, it may be time to open a greater conversation on what ArbitrumDAO and Arbitrum receive beyond acquired users.
We have a greater deliverable on our findings with STIP/revenue coming soon, and we will revisit this forum discussion once published. Here’s what we can say right now: there is some evidence that revenue was attributable to STIP, though there should be an operational overhaul regardless.
Here are some of the incentive designs we witnessed and their percentage of STIP allocation:
- standard liquidity incentives (30% of total allocation)
- fee rebates (25% of total allocation)
- points/usage-based programs (12% of total allocation)
- native token liquidity incentives (8% of total allocaiton)
- liquidity incentives with long-term locking (8% of total allocation)