After reviewing @Entropy’s clarification and feedback from other delegates, we’ve decided to vote FOR in the temp check.
I have voted FOR this proposal, thanks @Entropy the changes make a lot of sense. On a side note, for disputes with binary outcomes, one option could be to use the Kleros protocol to gather feedback from a neutral third party outside the Arbitrum Ecosystem. This could be a step in the process of solving disputes. I’m happy to help explore this with you guys !
We are voting in favor of this proposal.
While there are areas that could be further improved, the changes overall represent a solid step forward in updating and clarifying the DAO’s operating norms. In particular, we support efforts to standardize expectations around delegate behavior and responsibilities.
We would, however, like to echo @SEEDGov’s concerns regarding the removal of the Responsible Voting Policy:
“We’re not entirely comfortable with the removal of this policy. While it’s true that enforcement is not possible in the case of vote-buying platforms like LobbyFi, we believe that what can be enforced should be enforced… Typically, the response to such loopholes is to amend the policy to address the gap (if possible) — not to remove the rule entirely because one edge case cannot be controlled.”
We think this is an important point. Even if full enforcement isn’t possible, having a policy in place provides a clear signal on the DAO’s values and expectations. A weaker stance here risks normalizing behavior that most of the community sees as misaligned.
At the same time, we understand Entropy’s perspective:
“…there seems to be strong consensus that such censoring would be embarking on a losing game of cat and mouse and push what are currently public/semi-transparent vote buying services to transform into being more opaque/private… Entropy is not in favor of creating a system that incentivizes or leaves the door open for participating candidates to discreetly gain an advantage.”
That said, this could be an opportunity for the DAO to engage more proactively with vote-buying platforms. If these platforms are willing, we may be able to co-develop rules or features that disallow buying votes in specific contexts, particularly for elected or incentivized roles without needing to rely solely on enforcement after the fact.
Overall, we support the proposal, but recommend revisiting the Responsible Voting Policy in a future update and not to discard it, but to refine it into something both enforceable and directionally valuable for the DAO.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We voted FOR.
During the first iteration, we backed the first six-month trial, noting that the document would need real-world feedback and progressive iterations. This new version is exactly that: it removes an unenforceable self-voting cap, broadens the language to cover all paid contributors—not just delegates—and addresses two governance gaps by clarifying how to replace an elected member and how to wind down an underperforming program.
For a clearer understanding, we created a comparison between the initial iteration and the proposed changes.
| Item | What v1 (Oct 2024) Introduced | What v2 (Jul 2025) changes | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|---|
| Audience & vocabulary | Uses “delegate” everywhere; COI & enforcement tied to Delegate Incentive Program (DIP) | Re-labels participants as “contributors”; expands to any DAO-approved program (AAEs, councils, etc.) | Broadens the code so it applies to everyone paid or elected by the DAO, not just voting delegates |
| Trial window | 6½-month pilot Nov 11 2024 → May 30 2025 | Second pilot Jul 24 2025 → Jan 31 2026 (Arbitrum Foundation can auto-extend to Mar 31 2026 if a new version isn’t ready) | Extends the experiment and gives the DAO ~7 additional months of data |
| Responsible Voting Policy | Introduces detailed limits on self-voting weights for multi-seat elections | Completely removed (vote-buying services make it “impossible to enforce”) | Simplifies elections; candidates may now self-vote 100 % (but must still disclose COI) |
| New operational processes | None (other than voting schedule & shielded elections) | • Member replacement procedure when an elected person steps down | |
| • Initiative cancellation process & quorum (Snapshot, 3 % FOR votes) | Fills two governance gaps repeatedly encountered during the last iteration of the CoC. | ||
| Constitutional ambitions | Envisions adding the Code & procedures to the Constitution after the first trial | Calls that premature; keeps procedures as a living social contract; only high-level values likely to become Section 7 someday | Lowers stakes, makes it easier to iterate annually |
| Voting schedule & shielded elections | Weekly cadence (Thursday starts), shielded + weighted voting as default | Kept unchanged, but shielded voting pilot extended | Confirms delegates liked 2024 rhythm; continues to study shielded effects |
| Holiday break | Dec 20 2024 – Jan 6 2025; recommends no new forum posts | Dec 18 2025 – Jan 5 2026; forum posts allowed, but voting strongly discouraged | Slightly longer, more flexibility for non-urgent forum activity |
One thing that we would like to point out is that we believe that this is the type of document that needs to be treated as a living document, one that will be flexible in response to the situations that may arise in the DAO. We see no blocker to another trial run and look forward to this new version.
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We support these changes at a high level. In general, we are supportive of this proposal as it finishes Snapshot.
We have but a few suggestions moving forward:
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For the member replacement process, we think that it’s somewhat important to include a timeline in here, as in a new member must be appointed as program manager within X amount of time. We’ve seen proposals sit by the wayside for months being delayed by payment scheduling and additional planning due to unforeseen circumstances, we should safeguard against accidentally casting proposals and initiatives to the side.
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If we are adding language detailing the removal/step down process for a member on a committee, then we should probably include more committee/council skeleton details here. The replacement process serves the DAO by decreasing decision fatigue and making rules less hazy. Following that same rationale, we should have more “preset” rules for committees. For example, during the end of incentives we saw a few stragglers that had last minute extension proposals. It may be in the scope of the Code of Conduct to explicitly provide some policy for initiative extensions and the returning of funds, like an automatic return date, so if funds have not been returned and there was no established return date, then by default the funds are expected to be returned within 90 days or X amount of time, etc.
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Additionally, while we support the AF as a mediator, we are uncertain if this is a truly neutral mediator in the long term, especially as we foray further into AAEs. In other words, it’s a good start, but maybe we should think further than that (maybe Kleros is a good idea for the future, but this might be pushing it a bit too ideologically far).
4 Likes
Voting “For”
Not much to say other than agree on all points. I’m glad these types of clerical things are being addressed - just because it’s a DAO doesn’t mean it can’t have some type of guidelines and structure to run more efficently. I think the changes make sense, and a few gaps were filled. I’m also glad to see not much was removed as I think overall it was an effective idea.
As mentioned above, Entropy is not confident that this is solely attributable to shielded voting, and could be partially due to the more predictable voting schedule with elections now being posted only on Thursdays.
FWIW - I agree with this take. My thought would have been non-shielded voting would have had the higher 11th hour voting due to gamification, but with the changes to the Thursday voting schedule I think that makes sense. For example I usually set aside time on Weds/Thurs to vote in a block, as its just easier to manage and lets me make sure all point shave been made. (which might be another explanation, people want to make sure all available info is out there versus voting righ at the start). And if the early voting dropped undre shielded conditions, that may point to the lack of gamification as well. Where in unshielded voting would cause people to try and get early support because then they seem to be a canidate where their vote is less ‘wasted’ oon.
Updating the Code of Conduct and formalising DAO‐level procedures makes Arbitrum more predictable for large token-holders and protocol treasuries that are considering delegation. Clear disclosure standards, an explicit recusal rule, and documented grievance-handling improve trust without adding material overhead. The revision borrows tested language from MakerDAO and Aave, so implementation risk is minimal. Strong governance hygiene is a prerequisite for deeper institutional participation; supporting this update signals that the DAO values transparency and accountability—exactly the environment responsible treasuries want before delegating significant ARB voting power.
At first, the proposal received reasonable objections from various members. I noticed that Entropy responded to these concerns multiple times and even made changes before the proposal reached the Snapshot stage. Their responsiveness and the meaningful adjustments they made, all in the context of a proposal that serves broader DAO utility, lead me to vote FOR.
The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.
This proposal enhances Arbitrum governance by refining the Code of Conduct to strengthen transparency, accountability, and adaptability. In the first half of the year, we witnessed several members stepping down from their roles, which surfaced key operational challenges. It’s encouraging to see those issues being directly addressed in this proposal. The extended trial period also allows for further testing of shielded voting and member replacement processes, providing valuable flexibility before these rules are codified in the Constitution. We will be voting in favor of this proposal.
I voted FOR on this proposal, as it is an useful update, helping clarifying several items. I still think it is relevant to enhance the wording to avoid any type of confusion and I’m still available to help on that regard.
DAOplomats voted FOR this proposal on Snapshot.
We support strengthening the DAO’s governance framework through this updated Code of Conduct. This proposal improves accountability and clarity, sets expectations for “contributors’” behavior, and gives the community a process to address violations.
These updates are foundational for scaling governance participation responsibly and credibly.
With the proposal passing and meeting the 3% votable supply quorum on Snapshot, the revised Code of Conduct and DAO Procedures are now in effect. This 2nd trial period will last until January 31st, 2026, with the Arbitrum Foundation reserving the right to extend it by 2 months till March 31st, 2026.
The new versions of the Code of Conduct and DAO Procedures have been posted in the Guides and Documentation sub-category. Contributors should refer to these posts as the most up to date and active versions. The previous posts have been moved to the archive and locked.
Thank you again to all the contributors who provided thoughtful feedback and questions.
I have voted in Favour. All highlighted changes look good, and iterations made after delegate comments were also an improvement.
I disagree with this sentiment, candidates should not be able to use their voting power to vote for themselves, usually terms or elections come with compensation… but battle is already lost, and I understand the DAO and delegates want another direction. Voted FOR
1 Like
voted Against on this offchain vote because I don’t agree with removing the Responsible Voting Policy and the inclusion of policing language about how contributors can’t publicly talk about conflicts in the DAO.