With the current change within the DAO I do support the Wind down of the MSS.
Execution, costs and efficiency should become better making the DAO also move faster.
I voted AGAINST this proposal
The MSS simplified and saved DAO funds by organizing multisigs â now all signings are performed by the MSS, not by separate groups in each initiative, while remaining transparent to the DAO
Now, due to the fall in the value of the ARB token, the Arbitrum Foundation (AF)
will take over signing functions to itself, and we believe that this is a bad decision:
1. Centralization of powers, which has been a trend lately
This reduces community participation, which increases the risk of a decrease in active voting, as we have already seen in the recently adopted initiative to reduce the quorum.
The centralization increases risk by creating a single point of failure and reducing operational redundancy
2. The AF is less transparent and will not report to the DAO on the costs of the MSS.
It is unknown how much higher the AFâs costs will be compared to supporting the current model. If you have seen the annual reports of the AF, you understand that all administrative costs are aggregated into a single line item, making it difficult to assess efficiency or control expenditures
3. Instead of solving the budgeting problem, which has already manifested itself in many initiatives, it is simply suggested to spend money from another source and without the control of the DAO.
Without addressing this systemic issue, this merely postpones the problem and reduces accountability
What can be done?
There are several solutions, each with its pros and cons:
â Sell ARB immediately for the entire duration of the initiative, ensuring that there are always sufficient funds for all expenses
â Hedge ARB to mitigate risks associated with market volatility
â Analyze the market and dynamically manage the treasury â selling or buying back ARB depending on the situation
None of these options are currently being implemented
Before distributing further funds to initiatives, this problem must be resolved
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I am voting in favor of disbanding the MSS.
I am one of the signer and have been serving the MSS since the beginning of the term.
The initiative, while well intended, has always clashed with the reality of multisig management that I personally tried to suggest at the time and boils down to the following points:
- the chair role, as it was conceived, had an amount of work way higher than what was planned. The initial role of ownership, and partial administration, became over time almost a secondary PM role for each initiative with a decent lift at the very beginning of the funding of a new proposal. At the same time, only 3 chairs meant (when we had a lot of initiative) that the role was likely underpaid
- the distinction between chairs and signers doesnât make sense. We need to have general accountability on all people in there, with a potential split in the initiatives to manage. This would be the only way to have also good performance for signers (see next point)
- the performances have been not great. This comes from several factors, the first being a general 7/12 and 8/12 setup. Itâs extremely difficult to have transactions signed in 24h when you have to gather 8 people; and, in general, the sheer amount of signers while can increase security posture doesnât match a reality with several msig, way more important than ours, being 3/5 or 5/7. This is a very superficial take of course since we would have to analyse the opsec of each participant, but is just to convey a general point. A second factor is tied to the performances of single signers. Without going in the specific, we have seen big discrepancies in how fast people were available to first verify all the data and then sign transactions. While this was not noticeable when most of the people were around, during period like weekends, holidays etc it meant that some transactions would be stale way above the 24h sla that we imposed in the proposal.
Is there a way to restructure all of this, keep the initiative in the DAO and make it efficient? Potentially, yes. 5 or 7 signer, a PM (not a chair) that assigns ownership of initiatives, a schedule for unavailability, rules like no transactions being submitted on a friday unless is super urgent, periodic performance audit with rules to replace signers.
But I would still advocate that it doesnât necessarily make sense, also in the new setup put forward with AAE and OpCo operationalizing the DAO, having the initiative not falling under AF or OpCo itself.
AF is needed, in every initiative, and almost in every transaction. As a signer, we always have to wait for the greenlight of AF from a compliance standpoint; this has also meant back and forth via email with them. Just this point really reduces performances, which to me are paramount here: we have to pay people in a timely fashion to become a professionalized DAO, full stop. Foundation will always be a middle layer, so it makes sense to move the whole function to this middle layer. OpCo will likely be able to have more agile communication with AF as well in future.
We vote for this proposal.
This effectively addresses the critical issue of the MSS funding shortfall by transitioning multisig responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation, leveraging its existing compliance and execution capabilities. Consolidating these functions under a single entity not only reduces operational expenses but also mitigates the complexities of coordination between separate entities. We recognize the concerns around centralization but view this transfer as an essential interim solution until OpCo can fully assume multisig management. The Foundationâs commitment to transparency, through separate wallets and periodic updates, offers sufficient accountability to mitigate risks in the transition.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting For: Wind Down the MSS in the Snapshot voting.
We sincerely appreciate the work of all MSS chairs and signers who have contributed their time and efforts to operate the program. Despite some recent operational challenges, the MSS played a crucial role in supporting multisig coordination during a key period of DAO growth.
As shared in our earlier comment, we believe that in the current environment, the most effective short-term path is to transfer MSS responsibilities to the AF, which has both the resources and compliance infrastructure to manage this transition until the OpCo becomes fully functional.
We also acknowledge the operational friction highlighted by @JoJo:
While this reflects the current reality, we hope that as OpCo takes shape, such dependencies on the Foundation can be reduced through better tooling and more autonomous operational structures. Until then, centralizing the responsibility with AF appears to be the most stable option, and we expect transparent communication from AF about the same.
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my guess is as good as yours here but since we are talking about compliance, here we have to possibilities:
- opco builds a compliance arm, has his own kyc/b provider and legal department
- opco doesnât build the above.
While if I recall opco has a legal budget, and I see them potentially having a dedicated legal person, I am not necessarily sure that duplicating some of the functions of the foundation would be the most efficient way of using opco resources. Would only be viable if we want opco to be able to execute initiatives from 0 to 1 without any action needed on the foundationâs side.
Unsure if this is going to happen knowing the very strict relationship all the AAEs are building.
I align with your point, duplicating compliance and legal functions across both OpCo and the Foundation may not be the most efficient use of resources, especially when the Foundation already has well-established systems in place.
While OpCoâs approved budget does include funding for legal setup and access to outsourced legal and auditing services, it would likely be more efficient if one entity takes primary responsibility for compliance. Splitting this across multiple entities could create confusion or operational friction, particularly in high-stakes or time-sensitive processes.
Whether or not OpCo should eventually become capable of independently executing from 0 to 1 is still open for discussion. Still, I agree that any move in that direction should be weighed carefully against the need for clarity, cost-efficiency, and smooth coordination.
Appreciate your perspective as always, it grounds the conversation in whatâs practical now, while we plan for a more efficient future.
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I voted against it.
IMO, there is a âsoft consensusâ that this function should be taken by the OpCo, as it would be the âOperational Armâ of the DAO. Following this line of thought, it does not makes sense to transfer the responsabilities to the AF and then back to the OpCo: this will only increase the friction in the process. While this seems to be a cheaper âshort termâ solution, I donât see it as the best one in the long term.
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We will vote against this proposal because moving all multisig authority to the Foundation concentrates decisionâmaking power in one place and removes the transparent, communityâdriven cost structure that MSS signers provided, making it harder for delegates to verify administrative expenses and adds unnecessary complexity, risks payment delays, and requires extra governance approvals instead of allowing OpCo to assume these duties seamlessly from the start.
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Vote: FOR
This oneâs pretty clear tbh. ARB tanked and now MSS is running out of money, but hereâs the thing, the Foundation already has to approve every single transaction anyway because of compliance stuff. So weâre basically paying 12 people to click approve on things that are already pre-approved.
The Arbitrum Foundation is already handling the heavy lifting on legal and compliance, so it makes sense to let them take care of things for now until OpCo, which we agreed will take over, is ready. Thereâs no point in spending extra funds if the Foundation can manage temporarily. It might look like centralization, but itâs only temporary, and thereâs strong agreement that OpCo will step in soon.
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I am voting Against: Continue with the MSS for this proposal for the same reasons mentionned by @jameskbh. In my view, the most efficient approach is to continue with the MSS until the OpCo is live to assume this responsibility.
We are voting FOR this proposal.
As not to be redundant, our voting justification mirrors that mentioned by Zeptimus. We also want to thank JoJo for illuminating some of the current functioning of MSS.
We do believe that decentralization is worth prioritizing, but do not see a pragmatic temporary stopgap, until OpCo is up and running, as the proposal to make it a priority.
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Vote: FOR (Wind Down the MSS)
I fully support winding down the service. I see the MSS from the inside as a signer and the math is simple. Weâre facing a funding shortfall, and rather than asking for a top-up, this is the more efficient path forward.
To everyone that says âbut now itâs not decentralizedâ Every payment requires Foundation approval due to compliance. They send out an email to all the the multisig holders (myself included) saying âThis address can receive money from you.â and we are supposed to ensure we don;t send money to anyone without getting that email, they already are the gate keepers. They should just make the payments.
The MSS served its purpose, saving the DAO lots of money, and making payments way more efficient⊠but just having the AF do it is better, I wonder honestly if they should even give it over to OpCo given the fact that they will probably still do the compliance check⊠but thatâs a different discussion for another thread.
Thanks to the MSS team for the work weâve done together, and thank you to Arbitrum DAO for entrusting me with this responsibility.
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Voting AGAINST.
We should not focus on saving money at the cost of decentralisation.
In this DAO we should be always asking ourselves when should we not make things more efficient because they would compromise another quality of the system?
The DAO via MSS (and then OpCo) should control decision making and execution over dispersing funds, and use the Foundation for compliance.
The Foundation is a necessary step in the process (compliance) in any way we configure this, it does not follow therefore that we should group the AF also as making payments.
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Voting in favour of winding down the MSS
As a related note, I have concerns with the lack of transparency in the foundation, and believe in addition to this proposal we should demand significantly higher transparency in the foundationâs reporting.
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I am voting yes on this proposal. I believe this is a timely and necessary step to avoid any more unnecessary waste.
Also, since the Foundation has already been involved in most of the checks and verifications (KYC, wallet info, recipient confirmationâŠ), this proposal just formalizes what they have been doing. Itâs not about giving more power to the AF.
Agree, and the current MSS process is quite heavy and with signers in different timezones, signing transactions within 24 hours is almost impossible and not practical.
OpCo will soon take over managing the approvals, and they will have their own handover process. I think this proposal is just making that transition smoother and earlier.
AF has clear internal processes, experienced staff, and professional operations, so payments, handling errors, and communication will be faster and more efficient than with a scattered multisig group.
Iâm voting for wind down the MSS cause it makes sense to let the Arbitrum Foundation handle payments since they already do most of the work. Itâll save money and make things simpler for the DAO. Plus, the Foundationâs got the skills to keep our funds safe.
We agree that winding down the MSS and temporarily handing over responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation is the right move, especially given the operational overlap and the compliance demands already requiring Foundation involvement.
That said, have the next steps after the MSS wind-down been thought through in more detail?
Specifically:
- How will the transition to OpCo be managed once it is operational?
- Is there a plan to clearly define when and how the handover from the Foundation to OpCo will occur?
- Will there be a public-facing operational framework for payment processing post-Foundation, and how will community involvement be considered?
Weâre aligned on the transition, but believe itâs important to begin shaping the path beyond the Foundationâs interim role to avoid ambiguity later.
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I have voted âAgainst: Continue with the MSSâ, because I feel the path forward suggested here as far too ambiguous.
I see the issues raised by the MSS as valid and I donât doubt that AF and later the OpCo could perform this task well..but before we decide to terminate the MSS we should have a passed proposal for how this task is to ultimately be performed by the OpCo, along with clear assent form the OpCo that they believe the terms set forth in that proposal are realistic and acceptable.
Right now it seems we are committing to having the AF and later OpCo perform this role, with no actual control or plan for exactly how those parties will perform it. Will it require additional OpCo funding? What security measures will the OpCo have to undertake? What risks are associated with this switch-over? Without answers to at least most of those questions I donât think I can vote for this proposal.
gm, voting FOR.
AF first, then OpCo once theyâre ready and trained - a major advantage over using the MSS, as emphasized in the proposal:
Come on, itâs a multisig. It starts in one AAE that can hold it indefinitely if needed, and eventually transitions to another. Why do we always have to overcomplicate things for the sake of bureaucracy?
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