Thank you for clearly articulating these points. We strongly agree with the issues and inefficiencies highlighted in your post. At kpk, we’ve consistently identified and communicated similar operational challenges within the Arbitrum DAO and are glad to see these areas formally recognized for improvement.
We view the proposal for Arbitrum Foundation and Offchain Labs to be more actively involved in the DAO as positive. Their increased engagement will undoubtedly provide valuable strategic guidance and facilitate overcoming existing bottlenecks.
We also support leveraging Arbitrum Aligned Entities (AAEs) to create a cohesive strategy across Arbitrum’s ecosystem, enhancing both operational efficiency and overall effectiveness. This approach mirrors the model of SubDAOs, which, in our direct experience, significantly improves the coordination and execution of DAO initiatives.
We have confidence that the AAEs identified possess the necessary expertise, execution capabilities, and alignment with Arbitrum’s objectives to fulfil their new roles effectively. Our only reservation concerns the Gaming Catalyst Program (GCP). While reassured by AF and Labs’ supportive stance, we’ve yet to witness tangible outputs directly attributable to this initiative. Additionally, we recognise the potential of gaming for the Arbitrum ecosystem, but it feels strange to have an AAE focused on gaming and none focused on DeFi.
Overall, we support the proposed transformational operational changes. We agree that the operational inefficiencies identified do exist and believe this is a valuable solution to addressing them.
Regarding the changes related to delegates, we agree with the underlying rationale that delegates and Arbitrum stakeholders should ideally converge. However, we’re curious—how do you envision the role of delegates evolving to effectively achieve this convergence?