Hi all, glad to see this proposal kicking off the process of formally establishing the Arbitrum DAO. While I’m aligned with many of the items with this proposal, and support the creation and funding of the Arbitrum Foundation, I echo some of the same concerns that have been laid out in this thread.
Proposal Structure
The structure of this proposal reminds me of omnibus bills within the US where many different potentially non-contentious and contentious items are packaged together under a single vote. I don’t believe this is a process or precedent we want to establish. I’m aligned with @cp287 that it would be better to vote on the sub-items within this proposal separately so the opposition to one contentious sub-item doesn’t impact the passage of other non-contentious sub-items.
I understand that in order for the DAO to take effective control over the Arbitrum network, some variation of all of the sub-items within this proposal are required to pass first, but I’m not clear on why this would necessitate a single proposal to vote on everything wholesale. My suggestion would be to split the five specifications within AIP-1 into their own proposals, before handing off control to the DAO, unless there’s a clear reason why this cannot be done.
Administrative Budget Wallet
In my opinion, the creation and funding of the Arbitrum Foundation is a logical route for the Arbitrum DAO to take, supporting the development of the Arbitrum ecosystem, allowing the creation of an effective grants program without voter apathy blockers, and the ability to efficiently execute on the desires of the DAO, all while providing the DAO oversight over who makes up the Foundation and by which rules it operates. It appears to address some key legal hurdles as well with DAO operations.
That said, there seems to be a general consensus that there’s too little insight into how 750M ARB was determined or the plans in regards to asset management and anticipated usage over time. While there is sufficient background on the entities proposed for the Security Council, there is no background provided on the proposed initial Foundation directors. Given the amount of capital involved with funding the Foundation, it would be beneficial to have a greater level of clarity here.
Retroactive Voting
As noted by @BlockworksResearch, the 750M ARB has already been split into its own multi-sig wallet (confirmed to be the Administrative Budget Wallet) with 50.5M ARB having been sent into child-wallets, including ARB being sent CEXs. It’s not clear why the language in the original proposal is future-facing, when the Administrative Budget Wallet has already been funded with the proposed amount. It’s also not clear why a portion of the tokens proposed to be sent to Administrative Budget Wallet is already being actively used. Is the ARB that was sent to CEXs being used for market making purposes or Foundation diversification?
This seems a bit murky, because the proposal that establishes the DAO’s governance authority over the Foundation (AIP-1), hasn’t yet been approved. Is the intent for the DAO to retroactively approve the actions that have already taken place?
If AIP-1 or a sub-proposal focused on Administrative Budget Wallet doesn’t pass, what happens to the ARB in the Administrative Budget Wallet multi-sig? How will the ARB usage from the child-wallets be reconciled with such a vote result? These type of situations are why I’m generally opposed to retroactive votes.
Voting Threshold
As mentioned in this thread, the 5M ARB minimum threshold for the creation of an on-chain proposal seems far too high, with only four delegates currently meeting this threshold. I have seen with ENS and other DAOs, that as people liquidate their airdrops over time to other market participants, the top delegators see their delegation amounts decrease. The new acquirers of governance tokens often don’t delegate. A high minimum threshold can lead to various issues, including centralization of delegation power to a few actors, which doesn’t seem ideal.
For the above reasons, I have voted no against AIP-1, though I am open to changing my mind based on new information as it arises.