Arbitrum Triple Dip (Delegate Incentive Program)

[paulofonseca]

@TempeTechie

the main question in your Snapshot vote is whether we want a predictable, algorithmic DIP.

Hey @TempeTechie just to clarify that, as it says in the intro of the offchain vote proposal text, the main thing this vote is trying to do is:

…to sense the appetite of the DAO towards experimenting with an objective, rules-based, and algorithmic based Delegate Incentive Program, that doesn’t require a dedicated program manager to run it, and rewards delegates in a predictable, transparent, automatic, meritocratic, and faster way.

also, regarding this argument of yours to justify a centralized program manager instead:

@TempeTechie

The main reason is that every system eventually gets gamed. That’s why we need flexibility, so that rules can be quickly adjusted when that happens. This naturally requires some level of centralization, in the form of a program manager.

do you think the reason for @SEEDGov to have changed (sometimes retroactively) the rules of the current DIP (going from DIP 1.5, to DIP 1.6, and now to DIP 1.7), was because the program was being gamed? can you produce evidence of past participating delegates “gaming” the current system to substantiate your argument?

because… on the other hand… I can produce evidence of a centralized program manager gaming the current DIP system, last month:

[DIP v1.7]Delegate Incentive Program Questions and Feedback

well, it’s also obviously self-serving to you guys, the current service provider managing the DIP, to not reward contributions to improve/change the DIP, especially if those contributions show that delegates are not very happy with the way you’ve been running the DIP, like the negative Net Promoter Score that came from the survey I ran, shows: but ok whatever… I knew from the get-go that my contributions to try to improve the DIP wouldn’t be rewarded because of this exception that you’ve crea…

and clearly abusing it’s power to actively penalize contributors based on forum comments, in May:

@paulofonseca

First, I would like to highlight that with the current scoring, I’m not qualified to receive any DIP compensation for May, since despite contributing meaningfully to the DAO during this month, @SeedGov decided to actively penalize me for two comments I made, scoring them with 0/0/0/0/0, so that my Delegate Feedback metric would be averaged down, and so that I wouldn’t have enough points to qualify for any compensation, therefore choosing to reward me with $0 USD this month, for the first time ever since I started as a delegate in Arbitrum DAO.

and also abusing it’s power to straight up suspend contributors for tweeting an image, in June:

[DIP v1.6] Delegate Incentive Program Results (June 2025)

June Participants For the April iteration of the program, 79 participants enrolled, 66 of whom met the regular requirements to qualify. You can see the full list here. Parameters Breakdown Snapshot Voting During the month, there were a total of 7 Snapshot Votes, which were considered for the assignment of scores by SV. These are the proposals that were considered: Adjust the Voting Power of the Arbitrum Community Pool & Ratify the Agentic Governance Pivot Wind Down the MSS + Transfer Paymen…

so I would ask, aren’t we really capable of figuring out a way, collaboratively, to have a Delegate Incentive Program that rewards delegates for the value they provide, with a collection of rules that can’t be gamed?

I mean… I personally believe that the whole point of smart contracts running in public decentralized blockchains, is indeed to design incentive systems that can’t be gamed. That’s why I’m here. And that’s precisely what I’m trying to do with this proposal.

And I would appreciate feedback regarding exactly that, how do you think the specific rules and parameters of this program can be gamed?