Proposal - Updates to the DIP, The Complete 1.7 Version

SEEDGov · July 18, 2025, 9:52am

Summary of Changes - July 30th

To provide greater clarity and reassurance to all delegates and stakeholders, we confirm that the following changes have been made:

Adjustment to Delegates’ Feedback Evaluation Criteria

In the original proposal, point 4.3 stated:

“3. The Program Manager may also propose outstanding contributions, provided these are submitted for validation by the OP or other relevant stakeholders.”

This has now been amended to:

“3. The Program Manager may also include outstanding contributions.”

This change ensures that the inclusion of outstanding contributions is not perceived as an additional validation hurdle for participants. The updated process intends to strengthen the assessment by incorporating feedback from proposers and major stakeholders — thereby reducing overreliance on the PM’s subjectivity — not to make the program less inclusive.
Change in TL;DR Wording

Accordingly, we’ve updated the TL;DR phrasing for clarity:

The Delegates’ Feedback parameter will be evaluated more objectively and robustly. (instead of “stringently”).

This aims to avoid confusion regarding the evaluation process. As we’ve stated before, our goal is to make the process more robust and well-grounded — not more restrictive.
Clarification on Vote-Buying Platforms. Previously, the clause stated:

7. Exclusion of vote-buying platforms

Vote-buying platforms will be excluded from the Delegate Incentive Program, given that these platforms operate with their own economic incentives for how the Voting Power they acquire is used.

We’ve now introduced discretionary language to allow for future alignment if the DAO reaches consensus:

7. Exclusion of vote-buying platforms Vote-buying platforms will be excluded from the Delegate Incentive Program, given that these platforms operate with their own economic incentives for how the Voting Power they acquire is used. The Program Manager reserves the right to revisit this decision if, in the future, the DAO gains greater clarity on the matter and finds it feasible to use the DIP as a mechanism for alignment with vote-buying platforms. This means that, if consensus is reached, pathways may be proposed to allow these platforms to participate in the program for the benefit of the DAO.

This leaves the door open for future changes that may enable the DAO and the DIP to better align with such platforms.
DIP’s Terms and Conditions and Requirements to Participate in the DIP

In the original proposal, one of the Requirements to participate in the DIP stated:

Adhere to the DIP’s Terms and Conditions and any other Social Agreement: Each DIP Participant must adhere to the DIP’s Terms and Conditions and all social agreements reached through Snapshot, including those outlined in proposals such as ‘Improving Predictability in Arbitrum DAO’s Operations,’ ‘Should the DAO Create COI & Self Voting Policies?,’ ‘Incentives Detox Proposal,’ [Non-Constitutional] Arbitrum DAO Delegate Code of Conduct + Formalizing the DAO’s Operations and any other proposals or codes of conduct that may be approved in the future. If there are contradictions between a Social Agreement (such as the DAO’s Code of Conduct) and the DIP’s Terms and Conditions, then the DIP’s policies shall take precedence.

Now, we included a sentence that states that current DIP Participants are considered to automatically adhere to the DIP’s Terms and Conditions.

Adhere to the DIP’s Terms and Conditions and any other Social Agreement: Each DIP Participant must adhere to the DIP’s Terms and Conditions and all social agreements reached through Snapshot, including those outlined in proposals such as ‘Improving Predictability in Arbitrum DAO’s Operations,’ ‘Should the DAO Create COI & Self Voting Policies?,’ ‘Incentives Detox Proposal,’ [Non-Constitutional] Arbitrum DAO Delegate Code of Conduct + Formalizing the DAO’s Operations and any other proposals or codes of conduct that may be approved in the future. If there are contradictions between a Social Agreement (such as the DAO’s Code of Conduct) and the DIP’s Terms and Conditions, then the DIP’s policies shall take precedence.
Current DIP Participants are considered to automatically adhere to the DIP Terms and Conditions unless they state otherwise. In this case, they will be excluded from the program, as adherence to these Terms and Conditions is a mandatory requirement for participation.

With this, we seek to avoid current participants having to reapply or edit their applications to indicate that they agree to the new Terms and Conditions, leaving the possibility for those who do not agree with these TyCs to withdraw their applications from the program.
Disputes

In the original proposal, the dispute modifications stated:

Rubrics on DF and Bonus Points may receive feedback, but will not be altered.

We have now included a sentence clarifying that the Program Manager reserves the right to make changes to the scoring of DIP Participants once the monthly results have been published:

Rubrics on DF and Bonus Points may receive feedback, but will not be altered. The Program Manager reserves the right to make amendments to the scoring of a DIP Participant after presenting the results.

The aim of this is to prevent the PM from being unable to make amendments if we overlook an important contribution.
Tier’s Caps were recalculated

New table:

Tier TP% Min (USD) Max (USD) ARB Cap

1 90–100% $3,600 $4,200 12,350

2 75–90% $2,500 $3,000 8,800

3 65–75% $1,800 $2,000 5,900

X 50–65% $1,000 $1,500 4,400

The ARB Caps have been recalculated using 80% of the VWAP from the last 30 days at the time the Snapshot vote is published.

Note: The ARB 30-day VWAP on July 31st is $0.425, therefore the 80% of the VWAP is $0.34 which is the price used to recalculate the ARB Caps.

Summary of Changes - July 24th

To provide clarity and reassurance to all delegates and stakeholders, we confirm that the following changes have been made:

The proposal will not be submitted for a vote today. We will allow at least one more week to continue collecting feedback from the community.
There will be no retroactive changes for July. However, we want to be clear that if the proposal is approved during the first half of August, the changes will apply to that month, as delegates will have already been informed of the potential updates in advance.
We are still open to making changes throughout the week, so we will be waiting for more feedback from the delegates.

TL;DR

Introduction of Tier X, exclusively for delegates with a Voting Power of ≥500,000 ARB, focused solely on voting activities.
A ≈40% overall reduction in compensation is proposed across all Tiers.
A new “proportional adjusted cap” method is implemented to maintain meritocracy within each Tier.
The Delegates’ Feedback parameter will be evaluated more objectively and robustly.
Disputes will only be allowed for objective parameters.
The minimum VP threshold for new participants is raised from 50K to 500K ARB.
Vote-buying platforms will be excluded.
Adding DIP’s Terms and Conditions, Program Manager self-enforcement clause, and a new appeal process
Introduced new KPIs.
Activating Program’s Growth Clause
This version of the proposal will be valid and will deliver evaluated results until October 2025, as stated in Tally’s original proposal. This new version should not be considered an extension of the original proposal.
Changes will apply retroactively in the same month in which they’re approved.
These changes will be submitted for a Snapshot vote on July 31st.

Abstract

This RFC presents a comprehensive proposal for modifications to the Arbitrum’s DAO Delegate Incentive Program (DIP) aimed at its version 1.7. This version of the proposal will be valid and will deliver evaluated results until October 2025, as stated in Tally’s original proposal. This new version should not be considered an extension of the original proposal.

Motivation & Rationale

After six months of operating under DIP v1.5–1.6, multiple areas for improvement have been identified that motivate this update. The analysis for most of these areas can be found in our mid-term report.

It is worth noting that this update serves as an interim step to address the program’s most pressing issues. In the meantime, SEEDGov is gathering feedback and beginning to design the next iteration, which is expected to launch in November 2025 following the conclusion of the current program.

Areas for Improvement

Friction for high-VP delegates: In several months, some Top Delegates weren’t eligible for a reward from the program despite high participation in voting, due to not meeting minimums in non-voting activities.
Also, there are 35 out of the 65 Contributors with ≥500,000 ARB whose Participation Rate is below 75% (they have an average historical Participation Rate of 19.73%), and together they account for approximately 107M ARB in Voting Power.

We will undertake a Business Development effort focused on onboarding to the program those Contributors who are above the threshold but are not yet participating.

The new Tier X aims to address both issues by incentivizing voting exclusively and looking to onboard new DIP Participants with ≥500,000 ARB VP, who are not participating in the program due to these frictions.
Lower activity in the DAO: The number of both on-chain and off-chain proposals has dropped significantly in 2025 compared to 2024 (-41.52% YoY for on-chain proposals and -71.70% YoY for off-chain proposals in the first four months of 2025), due to a more institutionalized environment, with the emergence of Evaluation Committees, the OpCo, Entropy as Governance Facilitator, and both the Arbitrum Foundation and OCL playing a more active role in the DAO. This shift in context can be seen particularly in examples such as the recently approved DeFi Renaissance Incentive Program (DRIP). Unlike in previous years, when, for example, delegates had to vote on the approval of individual incentive allocations for each protocol, this time the role of voters was focused on approving high-level directives — including a budget and a dedicated team or committee tasked with designing the final strategy. We expect this trend to continue in the medium to long term, as it suggests that delegates will face a reduced burden in their responsibilities.

It is worth noting that in addition to our activity analysis in the 6-month report, we have received recurring feedback from highly relevant stakeholders in the DAO, indicating that rewards levels were somewhat high, particularly considering the new DAO landscape.

This justifies a reduction in rewards, as the delegates’ workload is expected to decrease over time.
Reducing subjectivity in Delegates’ Feedback: This parameter represented an experiment in which the DAO had to place a high level of trust in SEEDGov as Program Manager, just as SEEDGov had to assume the uncomfortable (but necessary, in our view) role of evaluating each DIP Participant input subjectively, with the dual goal of making the program more resistant to farming and helping delegates improve their contribution quality through personalized feedback.

During this process, both the framework and our internal criteria evolved. As some requirements became stricter and we, as Program Managers, attempted to raise the bar for DIP Participants’ contributions, we began encountering frictions that had not been as evident during the initial months of the program— a few participants frequently disagreed with how we applied the program’s subjective parameters, while others requested explanations and later accepted them.

As Program Managers, we believe it would be valuable to improve this parameter by:
- Providing greater clarity/reducing subjectivity so that participants clearly understand which contributions will be included (eliminating the need to dispute subjective parameters),
- Ensuring that Delegates’ Feedback allocated points accurately reflect a participant’s impact on the DAO’s decision-making—something that has been difficult to assess clearly in recent months,
- Reducing dependence on the Program Manager’s discretion, so that expanding the number of individuals/entities involved will lead to a more robust and consensus-based assessment.
Disputes: Between December and April, 35 disputes were filed regarding subjective parameters, mainly Delegates’ Feedback and Bonus Points. These have required a significant amount of time from the Program Managers and have caused tension with delegates. A quote from the 6-Month Report:

“We have found ourselves dedicating several days each month responding to these disputes—a task that consumes considerable time and energy, both for us as Program Managers and for Delegates, who we believe could better spend that time participating in the DAO’s key discussions.”

Additionally, subjectivity generates uncertainty and discourages participation from certain profiles. By limiting disputes to objective parameters only, operational strain and forum noise will be significantly reduced.

Finally, considering the previous point, we believe that by achieving a more robust and consensus-based assessment, there will no longer be grounds to dispute the subjective aspects of the program. If a contribution is not considered valuable by the Program Manager, nor by the person who initiated the discussion or proposal, and no other relevant stakeholder (e.g., AAEs or contributors with ≥500,000 ARB delegated) highlights the contribution — whether publicly or privately — then it can reasonably be argued that there is insufficient basis to consider the contribution valuable and therefore eligible for rewards under the terms of the program.
Unrewarded “invisible” contributions: We’ve received feedback — both in previous discussions about the DIP and through private conversations — highlighting the many instances in which a DAO participant provides valuable feedback to a proposer before the proposal reaches the forum. Under the current framework, these types of contributions are not being rewarded — something we aim to address in order to properly recognize the efforts of delegates and contributors who may not participate actively in the forum but still add value to initiatives in their own way.
Inefficiency in rewarding small delegates’ voting activities: Economic analysis in our last report shows that incentivizing voting participation from delegates with >500K ARB is 47 times more efficient than incentivizing those in the 50K–500K ARB range.

This figure is enlightening regarding how cost-effective it is to incentivize small delegates’ voting activity. While this was a deliberate approach during the early phase of the program—to attract talent and enrich the DAO with greater pluralism and human capital—this “investment” should naturally be scaled down over time as these smaller contributors are successfully onboarded into full-time DAO roles (as occurred with Pedrob and the OAT, for example). It’s important to mention that these onboardings are, of course, based on the merit of the contributor, and not every participant in the program will necessarily end up working full-time for an AAE or any other DAO initiative.

The 500K threshold is directly related to the voting power that a cluster of delegates can contribute. Initially, we considered incentivizing only the Top 50 delegates within Tier X — this cutoff was somewhat arbitrary. However, when we looked at the next 15 delegates (ranked 51–65), we found they collectively hold just over 10M VP. While the “ROI” (in this case, ARB per USD Spent actively voting) of incentivizing voting activity from these 15 delegates is lower than that of the Top 50, 10M VP is a significant figure that shouldn’t be overlooked.
Our goal is to identify and support the cluster of delegates holding the largest amount of VP. Based on current data, there are approximately 65 delegates with 500K VP or more. Below that point, the VP per delegate drops steeply. As such, the “ROI” of incentivizing delegates beyond the Top 65 declines sharply, along with the additional amount of VP being incentivized.
Intra-Tier fairness: The new “adjusted ARB cap” system prevents all delegates within the same Tier from receiving the same compensation regardless of their score, correcting meritocratic disincentives.
Vote-buying platforms: One of the main goals of the program is to incentivize individuals or organizations to dedicate time to analyzing proposals and voting, so that the DAO can reach quorum. In the case of vote-buying platforms such as LobbyFi, we see no reason for the program to provide incentives for voting when participation in governance depends on external factors unrelated to the incentive itself (i.e., someone purchasing the vote). The previous framework did not consider these platforms as eligible for the DIP, and in this iteration, changes will be made to explicitly exclude them from the program.
While SEEDGov believes there may be ways for the DIP to align vote-buying platforms with the DAO’s interests — especially in the case of constitutional proposals — we believe that is a separate discussion that should be addressed outside the scope of this proposal.
DIP’s Terms and Conditions, Enforcement and Appeal Process:

Regarding the DAO’s Code of Conduct and its enforcement, we would like to highlight three points:
1. The recent expiration of the Code of Conduct is inconvenient for the DIP, as it leaves the Program Manager without tools to promote healthy and constructive behavior among program participants. This suggests the need for the DIP to incorporate its own Terms and Conditions within the framework (including relevant sections of the DAO’s Code of Conduct), so that if DIP Participants commit a violation, they can be sanctioned regardless of whether the DAO has an active Code of Conduct in place.
2. In line with this, we believe the Program Manager should have the discretion to penalize behavior that creates a toxic environment or harms Arbitrum’s overall reputation. This means the Program Manager could determine whether there has been a violation of the program’s Terms and Conditions and act accordingly within the scope of the program they manage — while, of course, providing the sanctioned delegate the opportunity to appeal such a decision to a third-party entity.
3. Regarding this appeal process, the program currently proposes a Snapshot vote, exposing other DAO contributors or DIP participants to the task of deciding on the sanction of a fellow DIP participant. This level of exposure — and especially the over-involvement of those who are meant to focus on key decisions such as allocating treasury funds and approving protocol upgrades — is counterproductive and creates unnecessary noise. For this reason, in this iteration, the system will be replaced with a separate entity that will act as a neutral mediator.

Specifications

The proposed changes for the Delegate Incentive Program v1.7 are:

1. Introduction of a new Tier for high Voting Power delegates: Tier X

Exclusive to the DIP Participants with a VP ≥500,000 ARB. New delegates with ≥500,000 ARB can apply in the subsequent month after they get that VP, unless they achieve it in the first 5 days of the month. The Program Manager reserves the right to apply exceptions regarding this rule, as long as it provides a rationale for this decision.
Requires only voting activity (no need for feedback or other tasks). The purpose of Tier X is to ensure baseline compensation for high-VP delegates based on their voting activity alone, regardless of whether they engage in other activities. However, this does not mean their additional contributions — such as forum feedback — will be ignored.
This means that an eligible delegate would secure Tier X by simply voting, but could still move up to higher tiers by actively contributing with feedback or earning Bonus Points through other initiatives.
TP Range: 50–65%.
Compensation: $1,000–$1,500 (ARB cap: 5,100).
The only additional requirement will be to apply in the corresponding forum thread and adhere to the DIP’s Terms and Conditions. The requirement of having a PR90 ≥ 75% will not be enforced to apply, but moving forward, the delegates will still need to comply with this requirement during their participation. This means that new delegates with 500,000 ARB will not have to wait three months to join the program. However, once they reach a PR90 ≥ 75%, they will be required to maintain it to remain eligible. This is a natural requirement, as they will need to vote regularly on Tally to reach the 50 Total Participation points.

2. General Reward Reduction

All Tiers will undergo a ≈40% reduction in Rewards ranges.

New table:

Tier	TP%	Min (USD)	Max (USD)	ARB Cap
1	90–100%	$3,600	$4,200	12,350
2	75–90%	$2,500	$3,000	8,800
3	65–75%	$1,800	$2,000	5,900
X	50–65%	$1,000	$1,500	4,400

The ARB Cap have been recalculated using 80% of the VWAP from the last 30 days at the time the Snapshot vote is published.

Note: The ARB 30-day VWAP on July 31st is $0.425 therefore the 80% of the VWAP is $0.34 which is the price used to recalculate the ARB Caps.

3. Proportional Adjusted Cap Method

Only the delegate with the highest score in each Tier receives the full cap.
The rest receive a reward proportional to their score.
This maintains meritocratic incentives within each Tier.
Details here

Let’s suppose:
- ARB Price = $0.20
- Theoretical Max Payout for Delegate 1 = $4,200 → 21,000 ARB
- Tier 1 Cap = 15,700 ARB
Step 1: Calculate the adjustment ratio

image1228×196 9.37 KB

Step 2: Apply that ratio to all theoretical ARB payouts within the Tier

For example:
Delegate 1: 21,000 × 0.7476 = 15,700 ARB
Delegate 2: 19,341 × 0.7476 = 14,460 ARB
Delegate 3: 19,050 × 0.7476 = 14,242 ARB
Delegate 4: 18,767 × 0.7476 = 14,030 ARB
… and so on.

This way:
The top contributor still earns more than the second.
Uniform Tier payouts are avoided.
Proportionality is preserved within the limits imposed by the Cap.

Example with March Payments Batch 1:

image1211×1086 244 KB

image1737×1071 98.1 KB

4. Reduced subjectivity in the Delegates’ Feedback parameter

About Data Collection and filtering: At the end of the month, the complete set of contributions by each DIP Participant across all discussions is reviewed and the Program Manager will consult with the different proposers/key stakeholders to determine whether or not to include contributions.

A criterion is established to determine when a comment is considered valid or invalid:

Only comments with tangible impact (e.g., concrete changes in proposals) will be automatically considered.
Contributions highlighted by proposers will also be valid. This includes pre-forum (draft) or “invisible” contributions, as previously mentioned in the Rationale.
The Program Manager may also include outstanding contributions.
Key stakeholders (Contributors with ≥500,000 ARB delegated) may also publicly highlight or privately recommend a specific contribution to the Program Manager. The rationale behind this item is that if a specific comment from a Contributor had an impact on a Key Stakeholder with significant Voting Power, we can reasonably assert that such a contribution held value within the decision-making process.

Clarifications:

The anonymity of those who propose valuable contributions under either of the four points above will be preserved.
Proposers or other key stakeholders must disclose to the Program Manager any CoI with the DIP Participant who has made the highlighted contribution.
The rubric will continue to be used to evaluate the contributions mentioned in points 1, 2, 3, and 4, so it is expected that, for example, a small change introduced to a proposal may carry more value than a significant one. This means the Program Manager will still have discretion to categorize and assess the contributions from points 1, 2, 3, and 4, although determining whether a comment is considered valid or invalid will no longer depend solely on the PM.
The Program Manager reserves the right to exclude any of the contributions from points 1, 2, 3, and 4 due to CoI or potential collusion.

5. Disputes on subjective parameters will be discontinued

Only objective parameters (votes, call attendance, dashboard errors, etc.) can be disputed.
Rubrics on DF and Bonus Points may receive feedback, but will not be altered. The Program Manager reserves the right to make amendments to the scoring of a DIP Participant after presenting the results.

6. New minimum VP threshold

Increased from 50K to 500K ARB only for new participants.
This will not apply retroactively to those delegates already in the program. DIP Participants already enrolled with less than 500,000 delegated ARB will be allowed to continue participating in the program. However, if in any given month they fail to meet the previous requirement (holding at least 50,000 delegated ARB for at least 85% or 25 days of the month) or any other requirement (as example maintaining a PR90≥75%), they will be required to reapply and meet the 500,000 ARB threshold outlined in this proposal.

7. Exclusion of vote-buying platforms

Vote-buying platforms will be excluded from the Delegate Incentive Program, given that these platforms operate with their own economic incentives for how the Voting Power they acquire is used. The Program Manager reserves the right to revisit this decision if, in the future, the DAO gains greater clarity on the matter and finds it feasible to use the DIP as a mechanism for alignment with vote-buying platforms. This means that, if consensus is reached, pathways may be proposed to allow these platforms to participate in the program for the benefit of the DAO.

8. Creating the DIP’s Terms and Conditions and replacing the current appeal system

The DIP initially included the requirement that each DIP Participant must adhere to the social agreements reached by the DAO:

Each delegate must adhere to all social agreements reached through Snapshot, including those outlined in proposals such as ‘Improving Predictability in Arbitrum DAO’s Operations,’ ‘Should the DAO Create COI & Self Voting Policies?,’ ‘Incentives Detox Proposal,’ and any other proposals or codes of conduct that may be approved in the future.

In this iteration, and in light of what is outlined in the Rationale, we incorporated a specific set of Terms and Conditions for the program, to which DIP Participants must adhere to participate in the DIP.

Terms

DIP Participants: An individual or entity who applied to the Delegate Incentive Program and is eligible to participate in it, and/or is compensated via the DIP.

DAO Contributor: An individual or entity who willingly engages in Arbitrum governance and/or is compensated via a DAO-approved program.

Community Guidelines: The rules of engagement for the Arbitrum DAO forum as outlined and enforced by the Arbitrum Foundation.

Conflict of Interest (COI): A situation where a contributor, or any entity with which a contributor has a direct professional or financial relationship, stands to directly benefit from the outcome of a proposal or election.

Delegate Incentive Program Terms and Conditions

1. Values Alignment

DIP Participants should always strive to uphold the seven community values stated below:

Ethereum-aligned: Arbitrum is part of the Ethereum ecosystem and community
Sustainable: Focus on the long-term health of the protocol over short-term gains
Secure: Arbitrum is security-minded
Socially inclusive: Open and welcoming to all constructive participants
Technically inclusive: Accessible for ordinary people with ordinary technology
User-focused: Managed for the benefit of all users
Neutral and open: Foster open innovation, inter-operation, user choice, and healthy competition

2. Good Faith and Best Interest

DIP Participants should conduct themselves with honesty, integrity, and transparency, fostering trust and confidence among community members.
DIP Participants should act and vote in accordance with what they see is in the best interests of Arbitrum, which encompasses but is not limited to all of the following: Arbitrum One, Arbitrum Nova, the Orbit Ecosystem, and any future Arbitrum DAO-governed chains.

3. Due Care and Attention

DIP Participants should remain knowledgeable of developments in regards to Arbitrum DAO’s initiatives and the broader Arbitrum ecosystem.
DIP Participants should make a professional and unbiased review of each proposal before submitting their vote.
DIP Participants are advised to vote abstain when unable to conduct the necessary diligence to understand the proposals.

4. Civility and Professionalism

While separate from the Terms and Conditions, DIP Participants are expected to uphold the community guidelines for activity on the Arbitrum DAO forum and de facto understood gathering places for the Arbitrum DAO, whether online or in-person.
DIP Participants should seek to create a respectful and inclusive environment for all community members, free from harassment and discrimination.
- Unacceptable behavior includes, but is not limited to:
  - Publicly or privately harassing or intimidating others
  - Sharing someone’s private information without their consent
  - Using sexualized language or imagery, or making unwanted advances
  - Making insulting or derogatory comments about others
DIP Participants should strive to provide constructive feedback that is well-researched and respectful, focusing on the proposal’s merits. Personal attacks are never acceptable.
DIP Participants should be open-minded and respectful of differing viewpoints, even if they disagree with them. Disagreements are an inevitable part of healthy debate, but they often yield positive results when approached in a civil manner.
DIP Participants should make a best effort to provide constructive feedback through appropriate channels and avoid taking discussions to social media in a manner that could tarnish Arbitrum DAO’s brand and reputation.
DIP Participants should avoid making unsubstantiated accusations that imply malice without proper evidence. They should conduct proper due diligence before making any public accusations via social media, public forums, or any other recognized communication channels. This includes exhausting all available avenues — for example, seeking clarification privately — before issuing any public statement that contains an unsubstantiated accusation about a DAO contributor.

5. Responsibility

Maintaining a culture of productive debate, integrity, and transparency requires a sense of collective responsibility. As entrusted leaders of the Arbitrum community, DIP Participants should take responsibility in fostering and maintaining a culture that promotes the principles outlined herein.
Best practices of responsible DIP Participants:
- Participation: DIP Participants should make an effort to vote (even if they vote abstain) on all proposals.
- Communication: DIP Participants should clearly communicate their rationale behind votes and discussions to the Arbitrum community.
- Accountability: DIP Participants should maintain knowledge of all DAO initiatives and hold managing parties or elected representatives accountable.
- Responsiveness: DIP Participants should use their best efforts to connect with the Arbitrum community and be accessible to answer questions or concerns.

6. Other Social Agreements

DIP Participants must adhere to the remaining social agreements reached by the DAO, with the understanding that, if there are contradictions between a Social Agreement (such as the DAO’s Code of Conduct) and the DIP’s Terms and Conditions, then the DIP’s policies shall take precedence.

Enforcement & Appeal Process

All DIP Participants are expected to abide by the DIP’s Terms and Conditions. The DIP’s Program Manager is the one responsible for determining violations of the Terms and Conditions and reserves the right to take what it deems as appropriate action, which may include but is not limited to issuing a warning, a penalty, suspension, or a total removal from the program. Any DAO member can raise a concern to the Program Manager concerning a DIP Participant failing to uphold the DIP’s Terms and Conditions, and the Program Manager must provide an answer; however, the final determination and resulting course of action will depend on the Program Manager and/or the Appeal Process.

Regarding the appeals process, the following mechanism had previously been defined:

The affected delegate may request a Snapshot vote to ratify, change, or revoke the Administrator’s decision. This serves as a one-time appeal, and the decision made by the DAO will be final.

In the new iteration, appeals of any type of sanction (whether a penalty, suspension or removal from the program) should be submitted by the affected DIP Participant to the Arbitrum Foundation, which would act as a neutral mediator in the situation and have the authority to ratify, change, or revoke the Program Manager’s decision.

In the future and once OpCo is fully operational, responsibility for the resolution of conflicts can be transferred to the OpCo at the Program Manager’s discretion. The Program Manager will acknowledge when this transfer can take place and make it public on the governance forum when it goes into effect.

9. New conditions for payment calculation

Monthly payments will be made using the last 7-day VWAP on the day the transaction is submitted to the Arbitrum Foundation.

10. Cancelation or Modification Program Clause

Previously, in order to cancel the program, the following was required:

ArbitrumDAO may cancel the program or modify parameters, such as scoring methodology, through an instantaneous vote.

The new requirement will be:

ArbitrumDAO may cancel the program or modify parameters, such as scoring methodology, through a Snapshot vote where the number of FOR votes to modify or wind down the initiative meets 3% of the votable supply level. If there are more voting options than the basic FOR/AGAINST/ABSTAIN, the option with the largest number of votes will be applied, given that the options to modify/cancel the initiative together exceed the 3% of the votable supply level.

11. New KPIs

With the DAO’s shifting priorities and reduced operational burden for delegates, we believe the original goals may no longer be fully aligned with the current context. It’s important to note that this proposal was approved nearly 9 months ago, and naturally, in a fast-moving environment like crypto, some expectations become outdated.

The program naturally has two main objectives today:

To support the DAO in achieving quorum, particularly for constitutional votes. It is a fact that a significant number of stakeholders require these incentives to justify the time they dedicate to reviewing proposals and voting with proper due diligence.
To serve as a pipeline that supports external contributors who are interested in making valuable contributions and are looking to find their place within the DAO. In this way, the DIP has been functioning as a framework that attracts and retains talent within the Arbitrum ecosystem, especially when it comes to stakeholders with smaller amounts of delegated ARB.

Considering this, we propose the following KPIs for the remaining months:

Currently, there are approximately 65 Contributors with ≥500,000 ARB delegated, of which 21 are actively participating in the DIP. These 21 DIP Participants currently maintain an average Participation Rate of 85% in on-chain proposals. Since there is limited room for further improvement in terms of DIP Participants’ Participation Rate, one of the objectives will be to retain these DIP Participants, maintain the current average, and ideally increase it to 90%.
Where there is indeed room for improvement is in the number of Contributors with ≥500,000 ARB delegated participating in the program. Currently, there are 35 out of the 65 Contributors with ≥500,000 ARB whose Participation Rate is below 75% (they have an average historical Participation Rate of 19.73%), and together they account for approximately 107M ARB in Voting Power.

We will undertake a Business Development effort focused on onboarding to the program those Contributors who are above the threshold but are not yet participating.

With the introduction of the new Tier X, we believe it will be easier to onboard these stakeholders by encouraging them to dedicate time to reviewing and voting on proposals with proper due diligence, in exchange for a reward.

Therefore, we aim to onboard at least 5 of these Contributors with 500K or more VP, ideally 10 or its equivalent in Voting Power.
Increase the ARB per USD Spent metric by 30% compared to last quarter: This means that the program will aim for greater efficiency when incentivizing Voting Activities, seeking to maximize the amount of ARB actively voting per dollar spent.
Identify at least 5 contributors who can add value in specific verticals: So far, the DIP has demonstrated some success in attracting, identifying, and guiding contributors — especially those with lower VP — to deliver value within specific verticals. Examples include:
- Tekr0x for organizing side events at ETH Bucharest and ETHcc, as well as contributions to expand the outreach of the Arbitrum Gaming Ventures.
- Paulo Fonseca for facilitating and organizing the ETH Bucharest event, for creating the New Delegates’ Telegram Group or identifying double payments in a Questbook proposal.
- Tempetechie for contributions to the SOS process and ETH Bucharest.
- Tamara and JoJo for providing valuable perspectives and feedback across various discussions.
- Pedrob, who was an active participant in the program and was later onboarded to the OAT.
- Organizations like Castle Capital and 404DAO have not only actively contributed through feedback and valuable input but have also participated in or continue to participate in key initiatives. (For example, Castle Capital was recently onboarded to the AGV in a communications role.)
- Organizations like L2BEAT have helped the DAO in various ways, including conducting the SOS process, engaging with builders to encourage their participation, and identifying structural problems. They have also collaborated horizontally with Arbitrum to contribute to its success.
- Blockworks Research for making a podcast with AJ Warner that actually had outreach (+15k views), giving Arbitrum an important communication channel.
We are likely forgetting to mention others (apologies if that’s the case). The key point is that, after speaking with a few of them, they’ve all been able to affirm that the DIP allowed them to dedicate meaningful time and effort to Arbitrum DAO — and that, without programs like this, they likely wouldn’t have found a sustainable path to long-term collaboration.

12. Program Growth Clause

At the moment of approving the 1.5 proposal, we had a Program Growth Clause that allowed the Program Manager to reopen discussions on the budget:

Although the proposed administrative budget is sufficient in both versions, we understand that if there is a considerable increase in registrations, the workload would increase significantly. That is why we will incorporate a clause where if the program exceeds 65 registered delegates (which is the number that we believe we could cover with the budget requested) we will reopen discussions in the forum on the budget, also considering the possibility of increasing the number of delegates incentivized.

In light of the increase in Eligible Participants, the addition of new responsibilities such as the formalization of our authority to determine cases of non-compliance with the Terms and Conditions / DAO Code of Conduct, and our commitment to carry out a Business Development effort to onboard new DIP Participants into the program, we propose a 25% increase in the Program Manager’s compensation for the remaining four months.

13. Effective Period

If approved, the changes will begin to run retroactively in the same month that the Snapshot vote ends.

14. Snapshot vote

This proposal is intended to be submitted to a vote on July 31st, requiring at least 3% of the votable supply to consider the vote binding.

Delegate Incentive Program V1.7

For the purpose of publishing the final text of the amended proposal on the public forum and Snapshot, we present it below:

General parameters

Duration

The program was initially approved for 12 months starting in November 2024; therefore, the last month of this iteration will be October 2025.

ArbitrumDAO may cancel the program or modify parameters, such as scoring methodology, through a Snapshot vote where the number of FOR votes to modify or wind down the initiative meets 3% of the votable supply level. If there are more voting options than the basic FOR/AGAINST/ABSTAIN, the option with the largest number of votes will be applied, given that the options to modify/cancel the initiative together exceed the 3% of the votable supply level.

Delegate Incentive Program Terms and Conditions

The DIP initially included the requirement that each DIP Participant must adhere to the social agreements reached by the DAO:

Each delegate must adhere to all social agreements reached through Snapshot, including those outlined in proposals such as ‘Improving Predictability in Arbitrum DAO’s Operations,’ ‘Should the DAO Create COI & Self Voting Policies?,’ ‘Incentives Detox Proposal,’ and any other proposals or codes of conduct that may be approved in the future.

In this iteration, and in light of what is outlined in the Rationale, we incorporated a specific set of Terms and Conditions for the program, to which DIP Participants must adhere to participate in the DIP.

Terms

DIP Participants: An individual or entity who applied to the Delegate Incentive Program and it’s eligible to participate in it, and/or is compensated via the DIP.

DAO Contributor: An individual or entity who willingly engages in Arbitrum governance and/or is compensated via a DAO-approved program.

Community Guidelines: The rules of engagement for the Arbitrum DAO forum as outlined and enforced by the Arbitrum Foundation.

Conflict of Interest (COI): A situation where a contributor, or any entity with which a contributor has a direct professional or financial relationship, stands to directly benefit from the outcome of a proposal or election.

1. Values Alignment

DIP Participants should always strive to uphold the seven community values stated below:

Ethereum-aligned: Arbitrum is part of the Ethereum ecosystem and community
Sustainable: Focus on the long-term health of the protocol over short-term gains
Secure: Arbitrum is security-minded
Socially inclusive: Open and welcoming to all constructive participants
Technically inclusive: Accessible for ordinary people with ordinary technology
User-focused: Managed for the benefit of all users
Neutral and open: Foster open innovation, interoperation, user choice, and healthy competition

2. Good Faith and Best Interest

DIP Participants should conduct themselves with honesty, integrity, and transparency, fostering trust and confidence among community members.
DIP Participants should act and vote in accordance with what they see is in the best interests of Arbitrum, which encompasses but is not limited to all of the following: Arbitrum One, Arbitrum Nova, the Orbit Ecosystem, and any future Arbitrum DAO-governed chains.

3. Due Care and Attention

DIP Participants should remain knowledgeable of developments in regards to Arbitrum DAO’s initiatives and the broader Arbitrum ecosystem.
DIP Participants should make a professional and unbiased review of each proposal before submitting their vote.
DIP Participants are advised to vote abstain when unable to conduct the necessary diligence to understand the proposals.

4. Civility and Professionalism

While separate from the Terms and Conditions, DIP Participants are expected to uphold the community guidelines for activity on the Arbitrum DAO forum and de facto understood gathering places for the Arbitrum DAO, whether online or in-person.
DIP Participants should seek to create a respectful and inclusive environment for all community members, free from harassment and discrimination.
- Unacceptable behavior includes, but is not limited to:
  - Publicly or privately harassing or intimidating others
  - Sharing someone’s private information without their consent
  - Using sexualized language or imagery, or making unwanted advances
  - Making insulting or derogatory comments about others
DIP Participants should strive to provide constructive feedback that is well-researched and respectful, focusing on the proposal’s merits. Personal attacks are never acceptable.
DIP Participants should be open-minded and respectful of differing viewpoints, even if they disagree with them. Disagreements are an inevitable part of healthy debate, but they often yield positive results when approached in a civil manner.
DIP Participants should make a best effort to provide constructive feedback through appropriate channels and avoid taking discussions to social media in a manner that could tarnish Arbitrum DAO’s brand and reputation.
DIP Participants should avoid making unsubstantiated accusations that imply malice without proper evidence. They should conduct proper due diligence before making any public accusations via social media, public forums, or any other recognized communication channels. This includes exhausting all available avenues — for example, seeking clarification privately — before issuing any public statement that contains an unsubstantiated accusation about a DAO contributor.

5. Responsibility

Maintaining a culture of productive debate, integrity, and transparency requires a sense of collective responsibility. As entrusted leaders of the Arbitrum community, DIP Participants should take responsibility in fostering and maintaining a culture that promotes the principles outlined herein.
Best practices of responsible DIP Participants:
- Participation: DIP Participants should make an effort to vote (even if they vote abstain) on all proposals.
- Communication: DIP Participants should clearly communicate their rationale behind votes and discussions to the Arbitrum community.
- Accountability: DIP Participants should maintain knowledge of all DAO initiatives and hold managing parties or elected representatives accountable.
- Responsiveness: DIP Participants should use their best efforts to connect with the Arbitrum community and be accessible to answer questions or concerns.

6. Other Social Agreements

DIP Participants must adhere to the remaining social agreements reached by the DAO, with the understanding that, if there are contradictions between a Social Agreement (such as the DAO’s Code of Conduct) and the DIP’s Terms and Conditions, then the DIP’s policies shall take precedence.

Enforcement & Appeal Process

All DIP Participants are expected to abide by the DIP’s Terms and Conditions. The DIP’s Program Manager is the one responsible for determining violations of the Terms and Conditions and reserves the right to take what it deems as appropriate action, which may include but is not limited to, issuing a penalty, a warning, suspension, or a total removal from the program. Any DAO member can raise a concern to the Program Manager concerning a DIP Participant failing to uphold the DIP’s Terms and Conditions, and the Program Manager must provide an answer; however, the final determination and resulting course of action will depend on the Program Manager and/or the Appeal Process.

Regarding the appeals process, the following mechanism had previously been defined:

The affected delegate may request a Snapshot vote to ratify, change, or revoke the Administrator’s decision. This serves as a one-time appeal, and the decision made by the DAO will be final.

In the new iteration, appeals of any type of sanction (whether suspension or removal from the program) should be submitted by the affected DIP Participant to the Arbitrum Foundation, which would act as a neutral mediator in the situation and have the authority to ratify, change, or revoke the Program Manager’s decision.

In the future and once OpCo is fully operational, responsibility for the resolution of conflicts can be transferred to the OpCo at the Program Manager’s discretion. The Program Manager will acknowledge when this transfer can take place and make it public on the governance forum when it goes into effect.

Requirements to Participate in the DIP

The requirements to participate in the program are as follows:

Voting Power: ≥500,000 ARB: New delegates with ≥500,000 ARB can apply in the subsequent month after they get that VP, unless they achieve it in the first 5 days of the month. DIP Participants should have this amount of VP for at least 25 days during the month
The Program Manager reserves the right to apply exceptions regarding this rule, as long as it provides a rationale for this decision.
DIP Participants already enrolled with less than 500,000 delegated ARB will be allowed to continue participating in the program. However, if in any given month they fail to meet the previous requirement (holding at least 50,000 delegated ARB for at least 85% or 25 days of the month) or any other requirement (as example maintaining a PR90≥75%), they will be required to reapply and meet the 500,000 ARB threshold outlined in this proposal.
Participation Rate (Karma): ≥75% participation in on-chain votes in the last 90 days: In the Tier X case, the requirement of having a PR90 ≥ 75% will not be enforced to apply, but moving forward, the delegates will still need to comply with this requirement during their participation. This means that new delegates with 500,000 ARB will not have to wait three months to join the program. However, once they reach a PR90 ≥ 75%, they will be required to maintain it to remain eligible. This is a natural requirement, as they will need to vote regularly on Tally to reach the 50 Total Participation points.
Adhere to the DIP’s Terms and Conditions and any other Social Agreement: Each DIP Participant must adhere to the DIP’s Terms and Conditions and all social agreements reached through Snapshot, including those outlined in proposals such as ‘Improving Predictability in Arbitrum DAO’s Operations,’ ‘Should the DAO Create COI & Self Voting Policies?,’ ‘Incentives Detox Proposal,’ [Non-Constitutional] Arbitrum DAO Delegate Code of Conduct + Formalizing the DAO’s Operations and any other proposals or codes of conduct that may be approved in the future. If there are contradictions between a Social Agreement (such as the DAO’s Code of Conduct) and the DIP’s Terms and Conditions, then the DIP’s policies shall take precedence. Current DIP Participants are considered to automatically adhere to the DIP Terms and Conditions unless they state otherwise. In this case, they will be excluded from the program, as adherence to these Terms and Conditions is a mandatory requirement for participation.

Incentive Program Application

Delegates who meet the requirements must confirm their participation in the DIP via the DIP Application Thread. Delegates can join the program anytime within 12 months, provided they meet the specified criteria. To minimize the potential for manipulation, delegates who sign up until the third day of the month will be included in the incentive calculations for that month. The Program Manager reserves the right to apply exceptions regarding this rule, as long as it provides a rationale for this decision.

Regarding DIP Participants’ Compliance Process

It is important to mention that it won’t be necessary for the DIP Participants already registered to complete the compliance process again

Incentive Program Application Template

Forum Username (Link):
Twitter Profile (Link):
Telegram Username (Link or handle):
Snapshot Profile (Link):
Tally Profile (Link):
Wallet Address (Link to arbscan):
Participation Rate 90 days - Karma (Link):
COI Disclosure:
DIP’s Terms and Conditions Agreement: "As a participating member of the Delegate Incentive Program, I declare that I have read and understand the DIP’s Terms and Conditions in its entirety, and therefore, adhere to it in its entirety, being aware that non-compliance may result in suspension or removal from the program, with the Arbitrum Foundation as the sole appeal instance for such a decision.”
Team composition (please add forum tags from team communicators): only applicable for organizations.

As a final note, it is worth mentioning that we rely on the good faith of participants regarding COI Disclosure and urge them to keep this information as up-to-date as possible so that if a new conflict arises, both the Program Administrator and the DAO can be aware of it.

Note: Any delegate who chooses to withdraw from the program can indicate their intention to opt out by posting a message in the forum.

Specific Parameters Breakdown

Maximum Number of Delegates to Receive Incentives

We will maintain this parameter at 50 delegates.

Tiers and Rewards

The Tier determines the final Reward (USD). Since Rewards are being calculated in USD but paid in ARB, each tier has an ARB Cap.

Tier	TP%	Min (USD)	Max (USD)	ARB Cap
1	90–100%	$3,600	$4,200	12,350
2	75–90%	$2,500	$3,000	8,800
3	65–75%	$1,800	$2,000	5,900
X	50–65%	$1,000	$1,500	4,400

The ARB Caps have been recalculated using 80% of the VWAP from the last 30 days at the time the Snapshot vote is published.

Note: The ARB 30-day VWAP on July 31st is $0.425 therefore the 80% of the VWAP is $0.34 which is the price used to recalculate the ARB Caps.

Monthly payments will be made using the last 7-day VWAP on the day the transaction is submitted to the Arbitrum Foundation.

Payments to delegates are expected to be processed in ARB from the Arbitrum Foundation Controlled Address between the 20th and the last day of each month.

Please note that this is an estimated timeline intended as guidance and does not constitute a binding deadline, as the actual payment date will depend on two factors:

The date on which the Program Manager submits the transaction to the Arbitrum Foundation.
OpSec/Compliance processes applicable to the Arbitrum Foundation.

It is also important to consider that any new DIP Participants who become eligible for a reward for the first time will need to complete the Arbitrum Foundation’s Compliance process. As a result, disbursements in these cases may be delayed beyond the dates specified.

Proportional Adjusted Cap Method

Only the delegate with the highest score in each Tier receives the full cap.
The rest receive a reward proportional to their score.
This maintains meritocratic incentives within each Tier.

Details here

Let’s suppose:

ARB Price = $0.20
Theoretical Max Payout for Delegate 1 = $4,200 → 21,000 ARB
Tier Cap = 15,700 ARB

Step 1: Calculate the adjustment ratio

Step 2: Apply that ratio to all theoretical ARB payouts within the Tier

For example:

Delegate 1: 21,000 × 0.7476 = 15,700 ARB
Delegate 2: 19,341 × 0.7476 = 14,460 ARB
Delegate 3: 19,050 × 0.7476 = 14,242 ARB
Delegate 4: 18,767 × 0.7476 = 14,030 ARB
… and so on.

This way:
The top contributor still earns more than the second.
Uniform Tier payouts are avoided.
Proportionality is preserved within the limits imposed by the Cap.

Example with March Payments Batch 1:

image1211×1086 244 KB

image1737×1071 98.1 KB

Scoring

The minimum score to get a Reward is 50 Total Participation Points (TPP) for Tier X and 65 Total Participation Points (TPP) for Tier 3.

To determine which delegates will receive monthly payments, we will continue using the dashboard developed by Karma.

Note: The program manager may adjust the scoring parameters without the need for a DAO Vote, provided they inform the DAO of the reasons for the changes.

Voting Participation

1. Participation Rate (PR90) – Weight: 15 points

Tracks delegate voting activity over the past 90 days to measure consistency in participation.

Formula: (PR90 * 15) / 100

PR90: The participation rate of the delegate over the last 90 days, expressed as a percentage.
15: Weight assigned to this parameter (15% of the total score).

Example: If a delegate has a PR90 of 80%, their score for this metric is:

(80 * 15) / 100 = 12

2. Snapshot Voting (SV) – Weight: 20 points

Measures participation in voting on Snapshot proposals during the evaluation month.

Formula: (SV(Rn) / SV(Tn)) * 20

SV(Rn): The number of proposals the delegate voted on during the month.
SV(Tn): The total number of proposals on Snapshot during the month.
20: Weight assigned to Snapshot voting (20% of the total score).

Example: If a delegate votes on 8 out of 10 proposals, their score for this metric is:

(8 / 10) * 20 = 16

3. Tally Voting (TV) – Weight: 25 points

Measures on-chain voting participation using the Tally platform.

Formula: (TV(Rn) / TV(Tn)) * 25

TV(Rn): The number of on-chain proposals the delegate voted on during the month.
TV(Tn): The total number of on-chain proposals during the month.
25: Weight assigned to on-chain voting (25% of the total score).

Example: If a delegate votes on 9 out of 12 proposals, their score for this metric is:

(9 / 12) * 25 = 18.75

4. Voting Power Multiplier (VPM)

A linear function that adjusts the scoring of the Voting Participation parameters by using a multiplier based on the Average Monthly VP of each Delegate.

Formula: 0.00000005063 * Delegate VP (monthly avg) + 0.7974685

Minimum: 0.8 (for 50,000 VP)
Maximum: 1.0 (for 4,000,000+ VP)
Uses a weighted average of VP over the month.

b. Forum Engagement and other Contributions

1. DF (Delegate Feedback Score) - Weight: 40 points

Assesses the quality of a delegate’s feedback using a rubric with five criteria (e.g., clarity, depth, relevance). Feedback is scored from 0 to 10 (0 is reserved for penalties), and the presence in discussions acts as a multiplier.

Formula: (Σ qualitative criteria / 50) * 40 * Multiplier

Σ qualitative criteria: The total score across the rubric (max: 50 points).
/50: Normalizes the rubric score to a percentage.
40: Weight assigned to Delegate Feedback
Multiplier: Based on the delegate’s participation in discussions.

Example: If a delegate scores 40/50 on the rubric and participates in 80% of discussions (multiplier = 1.2): (40 / 50) * 40 * 1.2 = 38.4

2. Bonus Points (BP) – Extra 30 points

Awarded for exceptional contributions, such as attending governance calls.

1.25% Bonus Points per Governance Report Call (GRC) attended.
1.25% Bonus Points per Open Discussion of Proposals Governance Call attended.
Max Bonus Points per month from attending calls is 5%. The Program Manager reserves the right to make exceptional changes to this limit and to the specific calls to be rewarded.

Governance Activity	New Bonus
Governance Report Call	1.25% BP per call
Open Discussion of Proposals Call	1.25% BP per call
Max Bonus Cap	5% BP

The rest is reserved for extraordinary contributions.
A DIP Participant can only get a total of 30 points between both concepts.

Parameters Overview Table

Metric	Weight	Formula
Participation Rate (PR)	15	(PR90 * 15) / 100
Snapshot Voting (SV)	20	(SV(Rn) / SV(Tn)) * 20
Tally Voting (TV)	25	(TV(Rn) / TV(Tn)) * 25
Voting Power Multiplier (VPM)	0.8 to 1	0.00000005063 * Delegate VP (monthly avg) + 0.7974685
Delegate Feedback (DF)	40	(Σ rubric score / 50) * 40 * Multiplier
Bonus Points (BP)	Extra	+30 TP

Total Participation Points Calculation Steps

It combines all the aforementioned parameters to calculate the delegate’s overall score and it follows these steps:

Compute PR90, SV, and TV individually.
Sum these and apply the Voting Power Multiplier (VPM): (PR90 + SV + TV) * VPM
Add Delegate Feedback Score (DF).
Add Bonus Points (BP) - (Max 5% of (PR90+SV+TV)*VPM+DF).
Final result determines the delegate’s performance or Total Participation score for compensation.

Formula: (PR% + SV% + TV%) * VPM + DF% + BP

Example: If a delegate scores:

PR = 15

SV = 20

TV = 25

VPM = 0.8

DF = 30

BP = 5% + 0 additional BP

TPP = [(15 + 20 + 25) * 0.8 + 30] * 1.05 + 0 addBP = 81.90

Payment USD (PUSD) Calculation

Determines the monthly compensation in USD based on TP% and tier.

Formula:=MIN(4200, SI(TIER=X, 1000 + (TP-50)*(1500-1000)/(65-50), SI(TIER=3, 1800 + (TP-65)*(2000-1800)/(75-65), SI(TIER=2, 2500 + (TP-90)*(3000-2500)/(90-75), SI(TIER=1, 3600 + (4200-3600)/(100-90), 0)))))

TIER = X,3,2,1: Compensation tiers based on Total Participation percentage.
1000, 1800, 2500, 3600: Minimum USD payments for tiers X, 3, 2, and 1, respectively.
1500, 2000, 3000, 4200: Maximum USD payments for tiers X, 3, 2, and 1, respectively.
50, 65, 75, 90: Minimum TP scores for tiers X, 3, 2, and 1, respectively.
65, 75, 90, 100: Maximum TP scores for tiers X, 3, 2, and 1, respectively.
(TP-50)(1500-1000)/(65-50)
(TP-65)(2000-1800)/(75-65)
(TP-75)(3000-2500)/(90-75)
(TP-90)*(4200-3600)/(100-90)
Scales payment based on delegate performance within each tier.

Example: For a Tier 2 delegate with TP = 81.90

PUSD = 2500 + (81.90-75) * (3000-2500) / (90-75) = USD 2,730.00

Payment ARB (PARB) Calculation

Converts USD payment to ARB, capped by a tier-specific limit.

Formula:IF(PUSD/ARB Price > Tier Cap; Tier Cap; PUSD/ARB Price)

PUSD: Delegate’s final USD payment.
ARB Price: Last 7D ARB’s VWAP based on Coingecko.
Tier Cap: Maximum ARB tokens for the delegate’s tier.

Example 1: If PUSD = USD 2,730.00, ARB Price = USD 0.31, and Tier 2 Cap = 11,200 ARB:

PARB = MIN(2,730.00 / 0.31, 11,200) = 8,806.45 ARB

Example 2: If PUSD = USD 2,730.00, ARB Price = USD 0.20, and Tier 2 Cap = 11,200 ARB:

PARB = MIN(2,730.00 / 0.20, 11,200) = 11,200.00 ARB (only if it’s the best delegate of the Tier, see details about Adjusted Cap Method above)

Other Specifications

Evaluation System for Delegates’ Feedback

Rubric

The rubric assesses the valid feedback provided by the delegate throughout the month (from day 1 at 00:00 UTC to the last day of the month at 23:59:59 UTC), based on a summary of their participation in various proposals and discussions. The aim is to measure the consistency, quality, and overall impact of their contributions.

Key point: Feedback or opinions that violate community rules or the DIP’s Terms and Conditions will not be considered. Your interactions should contribute constructively to the discussions and improvement of the proposals.

Here is a breakdown of each criterion included in the rubric:

Relevance: Analyzes whether the delegate’s feedback throughout the month is relevant to the discussion.
Depth of Analysis: It evaluates the depth of analysis provided by the delegate concerning the proposals or discussions. This serves as a metric to assess whether the delegate takes the time to thoroughly meditate on the discussion and demonstrates attention to the details. Key elements include solid arguments, relevant questions, and thorough reasoning.
Timing: Considers when the delegate provides feedback, rewarding those who provide feedback earlier, as long as they provide a valid contribution. Note that this parameter may be adjusted to Relevance, Depth of Analysis, and Impact on Decision-making parameters.
Clarity and Communication: this is a review of the clarity, structured communication, and overall readability of the delegate’s feedback. Clear and well-written feedback is rewarded. Note that this parameter may be adjusted to Relevance, Depth of Analysis, and Impact on Decision-making parameters.
Impact on Decision-Making: While the proposer ultimately decides whether to incorporate feedback, high-quality feedback from a delegate often influences the final proposal that goes to vote. This criterion evaluates whether the delegate’s feedback tends to drive changes in proposals/discussions.
Presence in Discussions: This is a more quantitative analysis, intended to reflect the effort of DIP Participants who engage in the most relevant discussions. This parameter serves as a multiplier to the score obtained across the previous five criteria. The Program Manager reserves the right to include their own set of Discussions for this parameter each month.

1. Data Collection and filtering: At the end of the month, the complete set of contributions by each DIP Participant across all discussions on the forum is reviewed and the Program Manager will consult with the different proposers/key stakeholders to determine whether or not to include contributions made in the forum.

A criterion is established to determine when a comment is considered valid or invalid:

Only comments with tangible impact (e.g., concrete changes in proposals) will be automatically considered.
Contributions highlighted by proposers will also be valid. This includes pre-forum (draft) “invisible” contributions, as previously mentioned in the Rationale.
The Program Manager may also include outstanding contributions.
Key stakeholders (Contributors with ≥500,000 ARB delegated) may also publicly highlight or privately recommend a specific contribution to the Program Manager. The rationale behind this item is that if a specific comment from a Contributor had an impact on a Key Stakeholder with significant Voting Power, we can reasonably assert that such a contribution held value within the decision-making process.

Clarifications:

The anonymity of those who propose valuable contributions under either of the two points above will be preserved.
Proposers or other key stakeholders must disclose to the Program Manager any CoI with the DIP Participant who has made the highlighted contribution.
The rubric will continue to be used to evaluate the contributions mentioned in points 1, 2, 3, and 4, so it is expected that, for example, a small change introduced to a proposal may carry more value than a significant one. This means the Program Manager will still have discretion to categorize and assess the contributions from points 1, 2, 3, and 4, although determining whether a comment is considered valid or invalid will no longer depend solely on the PM.
The Program Manager reserves the right to exclude any of the contributions from points 1, 2, 3, and 4 due to CoI or potential collusion.

2. Overall Evaluation: After gathering all contributions considered “valid” for the month, a rubric is used to assess the delegate’s overall performance on each criterion, based on a holistic view of their participation.

3. Score Assignment: A level of 1 to 5 is assigned to each criterion, based on the consistency and quality of the DIP Participant’s contributions over the month. Each level has an assigned score, from 1 to 10. (0 is reserved for penalties)

4. Monthly Report: A qualitative and quantitative report summarizing the DIP Participant’s performance over the month is then produced.

Scoring Methodology

Each rubric criterion has levels with an assigned score, from 1 to 10, depending on the level achieved.

The initial score is obtained by adding the first five criteria, while the final score results from applying the “Presence in Discussions” multiplier to the initial average score. The maximum Initial Score is 50 points, and 40 points for the Final Score.

For illustrative purposes, here’s an example:

Relevance: Level 3 - Scoring achieved = 6
Depth of Analysis: Level 2 - Scoring achieved = 4
Timing: Level 4 - Scoring achieved = 7
Clarity and Communication: Level 2 - Scoring achieved = 3
Impact on Decision-Making: Level 3 - Scoring achieved = 5

Initial Score/Average: 50% or 25/50 or 5/10

Participation in Discussions: Level 2 - Multiplier assigned: 1.10x

Final Score: 50% x 1.1 = 55% or 22/40 Delegates’ Feedback points.

Exclusion of vote-buying platforms

Vote-buying platforms will be excluded from the Delegate Incentive Program, given that these platforms operate with their own economic incentives for how the Voting Power they acquire is used. The Program Manager reserves the right to revisit this decision if, in the future, the DAO gains greater clarity on the matter and finds it feasible to use the DIP as a mechanism for alignment with vote-buying platforms. This means that, if consensus is reached, pathways may be proposed to allow these platforms to participate in the program for the benefit of the DAO.

Conflict resolution

Dispute

If DIP Participants disagree with the results presented by the Karma Dashboard at the beginning of each month, they have a four-day period to contest them.

To raise a dispute, delegates must post a message in the forum using the following template:

Title: Dispute
Reason for Dispute (provide details)

The DIP administrator will address the issue promptly, with a resolution expected within a maximum of 4 days.

Important clarifications:

Only objective parameters like votes (PR90, Snapshot Voting, and Tally Voting), call attendance, and dashboard errors can be disputed.
Rubrics on DF and Bonus Points may receive feedback, but will not be altered. The Program Manager reserves the right to make amendments to the scoring of a DIP Participant after presenting the results.
DIP Participants can’t dispute the scorings/assessments of other DIP Participants

DIP Ban

The program administrator will have the right to expel a delegate if they attempt to game or exploit the program or if the DIP Participant does not comply with the DIP’s Terms and Conditions. This decision is at the discretion of the program administrator. In all cases, the ban is permanent.

The affected DIP Participant may submit an appeal to the Arbitrum Foundation, which would act as a neutral mediator in the situation and have the authority to ratify, change, or revoke the Program Manager’s decision.

In the future and once OpCo is fully operational, responsibility for the resolution of conflicts can be transferred to the OpCo at the Program Manager’s discretion. The Program Manager will acknowledge when this transfer can take place and make it public on the governance forum when it goes into effect.

DIP Suspension

The Program Manager will have the right to suspend a DIP Participant if commits a fault that, in the Program Manager’s judgment, is insufficient cause for expulsion. The decision and duration of the suspension are at the discretion of the program administrator (duration can’t exceed the program’s current iteration).

The affected DIP Participant may submit an appeal to the Arbitrum Foundation, which would act as a neutral mediator in the situation and have the authority to ratify, change, or revoke the Program Manager’s decision.

In the future and once OpCo is fully operational, responsibility for the resolution of conflicts can be transferred to the OpCo at the Program Manager’s discretion. The Program Manager will acknowledge when this transfer can take place and make it public on the governance forum when it goes into effect.

DIP Scoring Penalty (New)

The Program Manager will have the right to penalize a DIP Participant if commits a fault that, in the Program Manager’s judgment, is insufficient cause for expulsion or suspension. The penalty could consist of allocating negative bonus points or marking a comment as valid with a score of 0 points to affect the average score in the Delegates’ Feedback Parameter.

The affected DIP Participant may submit an appeal to the Arbitrum Foundation, which would act as a neutral mediator in the situation and have the authority to ratify, change, or revoke the Program Manager’s decision.

In the future and once OpCo is fully operational, responsibility for the resolution of conflicts can be transferred to the OpCo at the Program Manager’s discretion. The Program Manager will acknowledge when this transfer can take place and make it public on the governance forum when it goes into effect.

Program Growth Clause

At the moment of approving the 1.5 proposal, we had a Program Growth Clause that allowed the Program Manager to reopen discussions on the budget:

Although the proposed administrative budget is sufficient in both versions, we understand that if there is a considerable increase in registrations, the workload would increase significantly. That is why we will incorporate a clause where if the program exceeds 65 registered delegates (which is the number that we believe we could cover with the budget requested) we will reopen discussions in the forum on the budget, also considering the possibility of increasing the number of delegates incentivized.

In light of the increase in Eligible Participants, the addition of new responsibilities such as the formalization of our authority to determine cases of non-compliance with the Terms and Conditions / DAO Code of Conduct, and our commitment to carry out a Business Development effort to onboard new DIP Participants into the program, we propose a 25% increase in the Program Manager’s compensation for the remaining four months.

Management and development of the Delegate Incentives Program: Responsibilities and Deliverables

The SEEDGov team and Karma will continue to collaborate to maintain and manage this new version of the DIP.

Program Dashboard Management (Karma)

Over the past six months, our team has successfully built and maintained the DAO’s compensation dashboard. Based on this experience, we anticipate the following work for the upcoming year:

Infrastructure Maintenance and Expenses: We will continue to ensure that the dashboard operates smoothly, with real-time data updates for most metrics and daily overall calculations. This includes regular software maintenance, such as updating libraries and other necessary tasks to keep the system secure and efficient.
Ongoing Collaboration with SEEDGov: Regular calls with the SEEDGov team over the past six months have been instrumental in maintaining the program’s smooth operation. These meetings have allowed us to address bugs, resolve data discrepancies, and implement enhancements based on administrative needs. We will continue these calls to ensure ongoing improvements in operational efficiency.
Compensation Calculation Logic Updates: As outlined in the new proposal, we will implement necessary changes to the compensation calculation logic. This includes introducing a tier system, adjusting weights and metrics, and incorporating a 90-day calculation period.
Automation of Voting Statistics: Our current system fully automates voting statistics, streamlining the process for admins to determine compensation. Collecting data on Communication Rationale and Proposal Feedback has historically been time-consuming. A few months ago, we introduced an MVP that automates this process using LLM tools. We plan to continue enhancing this feature to further assist administrators.
Verification of Statistics: All statistics need to be verified for accuracy in a timely manner, specifically by the first of each month. We will continue to ensure that this verification process is completed on schedule to maintain the reliability of the data.

Program Manager (SEEDGov)

Check the corresponding data to see delegates’ eligibility.
Collaborate with the Arbitrum Foundation to ensure delegates complete the KYC/KYB process and perform the necessary follow-up.
Constantly monitor delegates’ activity.
Support delegates with any questions or concerns related to the incentive program through Telegram, forum, or Discord.
Collect feedback from delegates and the community to improve the program.
Collect feedback from AAEs, proposers and other Key Stakeholders to assess DIP Participants’ contributions.
Review delegate comments in the forum and filter out spam messages.
Communicate to the DAO any changes in the incentive program
Publish monthly results in the forum.
Publish monthly program costs in the forum.
Solve disputes
Determine which DIP Participants receive Bonus Points.
Collaborate with Arbitrum Foundation to ensure payments to delegates are processed each month.
Periodic review of the information uploaded to the Karma dashboard.
Have weekly meetings with Karma to fix bugs and enhance the dashboard.
Prepare periodic reports
Prepare a rubric and a monthly report about each Delegate’s feedback performance.
Monitor the participation of the DIP Participants in the governance calls mentioned for the bonus points.
Run a Business Development Effort to onboard new DIP Participants with ≥500,000 ARB delegated.

Deliverables

We commit to delivering:

Monthly results of the DIP with Individual DIP Participants Reports
Public cost reports allow for audits by any interested party.
Mid-term and final evaluation reports of the program.

Additionals

Hold meetings with contributors to gather feedback on the program and provide them with updates.
Constantly work on improvements to the program.

Administrative Budget

Despite what we mentioned in the Program’s Growth Clause, the administrative budget won’t undergo any significant changes

Karma Details:

$7,250/month * 12 = $87,000 for continuing to build and enhance the dashboard. (5 months remaining at the time of writing this post)

SEEDGov Details:

2 Program Administrators (2 Full-time): $169,000 over 12 months.
1 Data Analyst (Part-Time): $35,000 over 12 months.

Total: $204,000 ($16,000 per month from November to July and $20,000 from August to October) (4 months remaining at the time of writing this post)

KPIs

With the DAO’s shifting priorities and reduced operational burden for delegates, we believe the original goals may no longer be fully aligned with the current context. It’s important to note that this proposal was approved nearly 9 months ago, and naturally, in a fast-moving environment like crypto, some expectations become outdated.

The program naturally has two main objectives today:

To support the DAO in achieving quorum, particularly for constitutional votes. It is a fact that a significant number of stakeholders require these incentives to justify the time they dedicate to reviewing proposals and voting with proper due diligence.
To serve as a pipeline that supports external contributors who are interested in making valuable contributions and are looking to find their place within the DAO. In this way, the DIP has been functioning as a framework that attracts and retains talent within the Arbitrum ecosystem, especially when it comes to stakeholders with smaller amounts of delegated ARB.

Considering this, we propose the following KPIs for the remaining months:

Currently, there are approximately 65 Contributors with ≥500,000 ARB delegated, of which 21 (115M VP approximately) are actively participating in the DIP. These 21 DIP Participants currently maintain an average Participation Rate of 85% in on-chain proposals. Since there is limited room for further improvement in terms of DIP Participants’ Participation Rate, one of the objectives will be to retain these DIP Participants, maintain the current average, and ideally increase it to 90%.
Where there is indeed room for improvement is in the number of Contributors with ≥500,000 ARB delegated participating in the program. Currently, there are 35 out of the 65 Contributors with ≥500,000 ARB whose Participation Rate is below 75% (they have an average historical Participation Rate of 19.73%), and together they account for approximately 107M ARB in Voting Power.

We will undertake a Business Development effort focused on onboarding to the program those Contributors who are above the threshold but are not yet participating.

With the introduction of the new Tier X, we believe it will be easier to onboard these stakeholders by encouraging them to dedicate time to reviewing and voting on proposals with proper due diligence, in exchange for a reward.

Therefore, we aim to onboard at least 5 of these Contributors with 500K or more VP, ideally 10 or its equivalent in Voting Power.
Increase the ARB per USD Spent metric by 30% compared to last quarter: This means that the program will aim for greater efficiency when incentivizing Voting Activities, seeking to maximize the amount of ARB actively voting per dollar spent.
Identify at least 5 contributors who can add value in specific verticals: So far, the DIP has demonstrated some success in attracting, identifying, and guiding contributors — especially those with lower VP — to deliver value within specific verticals. Examples include:
- Tekr0x for organizing side events at ETH Bucharest and ETHcc, as well as contributions to the AGV.
- Paulo Fonseca for facilitating and organizing the ETH Bucharest event and for creating the New Delegates’ Telegram Group.
- Tempetechie for contributions to the SOS process.
- Tamara and JoJo for providing valuable perspectives and feedback across various discussions.
- Pedrob, who was an active participant in the program and was later onboarded to the OAT.
- Organizations like Castle Capital and 404DAO have not only actively contributed through feedback and valuable input but have also participated in or continue to participate in key initiatives. (For example, Castle Capital was recently onboarded to the AGV in a communications role.)
- Organizations like L2BEAT have helped the DAO in various ways, including conducting the SOS process, engaging with builders to encourage their participation, and identifying structural problems. They have also collaborated horizontally with Arbitrum to contribute to its success.
- Blockworks Research for making a podcast with AJ Warner that actually had outreach (+15k views), giving Arbitrum an important communication channel.
We are likely forgetting to mention others (apologies if that’s the case). The key point is that, after speaking with most of them, it’s clear they’ve all been able to affirm that the DIP allowed them to dedicate meaningful time and effort to Arbitrum DAO — and that, without programs like this, they likely wouldn’t have found a sustainable path to long-term collaboration.

Continuous Upgrades

The SEEDGov team and Karma are committed to gathering feedback, obtaining more information, and implementing the necessary changes to optimize performance. Considering the new duration of the program, the Program Administrator reserves the right to make changes in the scoring methodology by giving public notice in the forum.

Why do we need a Vote for these changes?

While it’s true that SEEDGov previously made changes without needing a vote, the original proposal approved only certain discretionary powers for the Program Manager to modify parameters related to the scoring/assessment framework:

In this regard, the changes made between v1.5 and v1.6 solely affected scoring parameters within the assessment, as was agreed upon when the on-chain vote was conducted.

The key point here is that the Program Manager does not have the authority to make changes to the reward amounts, modify the minimum requirements for joining the program, or, more importantly, define the new Terms and Conditions of the DIP.

For any of these, we believe it is necessary to obtain a clear consensus from the delegates.

We Want Your Feedback!

We invite all delegates, contributors, and interested community members to share their comments, suggestions, and concerns regarding this proposal. Your input will be essential in refining this update before it is submitted for a Snapshot vote.

We look forward to your active participation as we continue to strengthen the Delegate Incentive Program and, with it, the governance of ArbitrumDAO.

paulofonseca · July 18, 2025, 12:27pm

@SEEDGov just to clarify that following the previous DF criteria, any feedback from delegates in this specific proposal, won’t be considered for their DF score since this is a proposal about the DIP, correct?

Gianluca · July 18, 2025, 1:51pm

That’s correct Paulo! Thanks for pointing it

paulofonseca · July 18, 2025, 10:36pm

Why is this needed? why is this a proposal in the first place? @SEEDGov was entrusted to run this program for 1 year, ending next October, and has been changing the program (sometimes even retroactively) from version 1.5 to 1.6 without the need for a proposal and offchain vote.

Why is it different this time?

tamara · July 19, 2025, 5:16am

Thanks for this elaborate proposal. While it is obviously not great for me as tiny delegate the logic and financial rationale behind it makes absolute sense.

One idea while you are trying to reach out to the 35 contributors with ≥500,000 voting power:
Maybe it makes sense to create a “portfolio” (easy to share and read) of smaller delegates who most likely will stop participating sooner or later and share them with larger delegates (who are not yet really participating)

In a way giving them the potential to match - in this way you will be using the knowledge & expertise they managed to built up during the first version of the DIP.

gauntlet · July 21, 2025, 8:30pm

As a larger delegate, we understand some sensitivities around commenting on the delegate threshold. That said, it makes sense for Arbitrum DAO’s financial sustainability and voting incentivization. We support re-evaluating and exploring new and alternative funding routes for value creation (contribution) versus incentives for delegate participation (quorum, voting, etc.).

SEEDGov · July 21, 2025, 8:32pm

Hi @Paulofonseca ! Good question!

The difference is that the original proposal approved certain discretionary powers for the Program Manager to modify parameters related to the scoring/assessment framework:

In this regard, the changes made between v1.5 and v1.6 solely affected scoring parameters within the assessment, as was agreed upon when the on-chain vote was conducted.

The key point here is that the Program Manager does not have the authority to make changes to the reward amounts, modify the minimum requirements for joining the program, or, more importantly, define the new Terms and Conditions of the DIP.

For any of these, we believe it is necessary to obtain a clear consensus from the delegates.

Hi @Tamara! Just to clarify, in your specific case (or in the case of any other delegate already enrolled), the change in the threshold does not impact your ability to continue participating in the program. Delegates who have already enrolled with ≥50,000 ARB delegated will still be able to participate in the DIP.

Regarding your suggestion, it seems like an excellent idea, particularly for cases where large but inactive delegates hold their own tokens and could consider redelegating. In any case, for the upcoming v2.0 of the program, we anticipate that smaller delegates will be able to participate as Contributors (rather than as delegates) regardless of the Voting Power they hold.

The mentioned portfolio could also serve as a “talent pool,” highlighting contributors who are adding value to the DAO — not only as a means of increasing Voting Power, but also as a way to help outstanding contributors gain access to different positions within the DAO through the merit and reputation earned from their contributions to the community.

Open Community Call

We will be hosting an Open Community Call next Wednesday, July 23rd, at 4:00 PM UTC to provide a brief walkthrough of the new version 1.7 and to answer questions or gather feedback.

maxlomu · July 21, 2025, 10:16pm

gm, thanks Seed for the proposed changes.
The 40% compensation reduction seems reasonable to me as the (passive) activity of a delegate has dropped significantly in recent months. On the new tier and changes proposed, I am in favor, though I’m less affected than other delegate: I’d like to hear their thoughts.

In anticipation of v2, I am looking forward to a mindset change from “delegates discuss in the forum and vote” to “delegates are contributors”.

I suggest (on the lines of what I wrote in the past):

— Min flat compensation for voting on snapshot and tally: the number of votes required will be much lower going forward.
— Structure and entry points for delegates to contribute, even if not full time / involved in the AAEs. There’s demand for activities like project support, mentorship, events, and new initiatives: delegates should be encouraged to plug into these. I’ve spoken to projects actively looking for this kind of help, and the DAO could fill that gap.

— Reward exclusivity. It still puzzles me how we treat the same people who work only for Arbitrum and people who also work for Optimism, zksync ecc.. Their opinion cannot be unbiased and fully committed to the success of Arbitrum.

— Mix USDC and ARB payment. We must share in the success and downsides of our own economy

Jean_MUX · July 23, 2025, 5:00am

Thanks for putting up the well-thought proposal! As a builder & delegate, we embrace the idea of differentiating delegate and contributor, and support the structure change that attracts both of them to contribute.

We are on board with the direction of decreasing incentives since the activities required are less generally and the introduction of committee. But usually a more mild trending down might find its way easier so that some delegates can adapt accordingly. If 40% percent is a bit aggressive, 20% might be a good start.

Curia · July 24, 2025, 10:48am

Thank you for the thoughtful and comprehensive update on DIP v1.7. It is clear that a great deal of care has gone into shaping this version of the program, and we truly appreciate the continued efforts to adapt the Delegate Incentive Program to the changing needs of the DAO.

We would like to offer a few reflections that we hope can support the continued refinement of this proposal.

First, regarding the introduction of Tier X, we understand and appreciate the intent to improve quorum by encouraging more participation from high-VP delegates. That said, we are not entirely confident that rewarding voting alone, without any expectation for broader engagement, will lead to long-term value creation for the DAO. There is a possibility that some delegates may simply vote in order to receive compensation, while others who regularly contribute to discussions, attend governance calls, and help shape proposals are held to higher expectations. This could discourage smaller but highly engaged delegates who have consistently added value. We are also curious whether there has been any outreach or analysis to better understand why many high-VP delegates have chosen not to participate to date. If these delegates have not clearly expressed interest in joining under easier terms, it may be worth exploring other ways to encourage meaningful engagement or to incentivize further delegation to already active contributors.

Second, regarding the proposed reduction in delegate compensation, we see the logic in aligning rewards with a lighter overall workload. At the same time, we believe it is worth considering whether this same principle could be extended to other roles in the program. As proposal volume, dispute rates, and subjective evaluations decrease, it seems that the responsibilities of the Program Manager may have also been reduced. If efficiency and fairness are important goals of this update, it may be valuable to revisit whether current administrative compensation still reflects the level of ongoing effort. More broadly, we would also note that the drop in proposal activity is not solely the result of streamlined processes. It also reflects a need for greater support of the delegates who continue to take initiative and contribute to proposal development. Ensuring that these contributors remain incentivized feels especially important for the health and sustainability of the DAO.

Lastly, we wanted to briefly share a thought on the removal of dispute rights for subjective scoring. We understand the desire to reduce friction and simplify operations. However, a complete removal of this process might limit transparency and participant confidence. If the number of disputes in recent months was unusually high, it could suggest a need for clearer standards or improved communication. Perhaps there is room for a more balanced solution that keeps dispute rights available in a limited or well-defined way, while still reducing the burden on the program administrator.

We share these reflections with full respect for the work behind this proposal and in the spirit of open collaboration. Overall, we appreciate the direction this program is taking and hope these points are helpful in further shaping a model that supports both active participation and long-term governance effectiveness within the Arbitrum ecosystem.

MinistroDolar · July 24, 2025, 12:21pm

Hey everyone, publishing the recording from the Open Community Call that took place on 23rd July 2025.

Recording (23.7.2025)
Chat Log (23.7.2025)
Gemini Notes

FYI: For some reason, the transcription failed and we do not have the file, sorry for that.

cp0x · July 24, 2025, 2:10pm

Yesterday we discussed the new version on the call, but there was clearly not enough time for everyone to express their opinions on all the comments, so I should write down all my thoughts based on the results of this call

The goal of the DIP is to ensure engaged, responsible, and high-quality participation of delegates in the governance of Arbitrum, so I will be starting from these goals in my reasoning

I believe some fundamental issues remain in the current version of the program:

Lack of time for community discussion
The community has had very little time to review this proposal — only a few days for one of the most comprehensive and complex programs. This creates the impression that either it was rushed or that delegate feedback is not a priority.
This does not promote healthy dialogue, I do not see much need for urgent adoption of new changes.
Suggestion: Please consider postponing the vote by at least two weeks to allow for meaningful discussion
Retroactive rule-making is unacceptable
Establishing rules retroactively is a bad precedent. In every legal system, laws apply only from the moment they are adopted — not retroactively. Applying changes in this way undermines basic governance principles. It would be logical if everyone knew about the upcoming changes a couple of months in advance, but the proposal appeared literally just now.
New rules cannot be applied to a month that is already in progress and the participants did not agree to such rules at that time.
Suggestion: This clause should be removed, as it contradicts fundamental norms of fair process.
Excessive increase in the entry threshold
You just said on the call that you see a problem in the fact that there are small delegates and they need to be encouraged, and then you propose a barrier that simply won’t let such delegates into the system.
Raising the minimum delegation to 500,000 ARB (a 10x increase) creates a major barrier for smaller but active delegates. This will likely shrink the number of active participants — which goes against the stated goal of the program.
I understand this might reduce the review load for the program operator, but the objective of the program is not to simplify operations for administrators.
Suggestion: Remove this requirement, especially considering the many other limitations already in place
Tier X incentivizes low-effort participation and system abuse
Tier X encourages delegates to accumulate 500,000 ARB and then do nothing beyond voting — yet still receive $1–1.5K. Worse, large delegates can split into multiple 500K wallets to farm rewards, earning far more than an active 2M ARB delegate who contributes meaningfully.
On the call L2beat said that everyone goes through KYC and it is not a problem to gather 4 friends just to get money 4-6k just for 2M quorum.
Ministro said that a situation where a lot of 500k delegates will go through Tier X is unlikely. But above I just described a situation where previously non-participating users will make several 500k delegates.
This Tier does not help in any way with the main purpose of this program.
Suggestion: Remove Tier X — it creates opportunities for abuse and undermines the value of substantive contributions
Voting Power Multiplier (0.8) unfairly penalizes smaller delegates
When combined with 30 points of subjective scoring, this multiplier can effectively block smaller delegates from qualifying. Since the subjective scores will not be debated, the operator alone decides whether a small delegate gets paid.
The new rule itself that it will be impossible to debate 30% of the points is simply unfair and only says that the operator is tired of debating, but it has not yet been possible to build a system where this is excluded. If such disputes exist, there is a problem, and you are not planning to eliminate the problem, but simply to force them to remain silent about it.
Suggestion 1: Remove the multiplier entirely. Instead, apply the multiplier to payment amounts, not to eligibility. For example, set a base reward of $Х,ХХХ and scale it with the multiplier — this would be fairer and still acknowledge delegation size without excluding anyone
Suggestion 2: Reduce subjective score influence to Tier 1 only, with a 10-point maximum — higher tiers should rely only on objective criteria
The new KPI “ARB per USD Spent” works against small delegates
This KPI incentivizes giving rewards only to large delegates to improve cost-efficiency. That contradicts the spirit of the program and discriminates against smaller but active delegates. It turns out that the best KPI result is to pay nothing - you will get the best KPI, but then what is the point of the program?
This program should attract the maximum number of delegates, and with this KPI you will only reduce it
Suggestion: Remove this KPI entirely — it undermines program inclusiveness
The KPI to attract 5–10 new ≥500K delegates is prone to abuse
As I wrote earlier in p.4, this KPI can be gamed by large delegates splitting their holdings across multiple wallets to qualify as new participants. It doesn’t guarantee meaningful participation and could lead to artificial token movements.
This KPI leads to replacing active small delegates with silent voters, which is contrary to the main objective of the program.
Suggestion: Remove this KPI to avoid incentivizing such behavior.
Operational spents are 50% of incentives (27k vs 55k)
You have talked a lot about some efficiency of the program. But I see increasing costs for operational expenses.
You can say that this is a complex system that requires large human resources and you will be right. BUT it was you who built such a system - make it simpler and more transparent
Just imagine the same situation with grants, where the operating costs for a $10 million grant would cost $5 million.
Suggestion: It is necessary to exclude the increase in the cost of operating expenses - you determine them yourself and can regulate them

In addition to the comments on the presented version, I have additional thoughts on improving the program:

It would be important to introduce clear KPIs for the program operator’s performance, such as:

Monthly reports must be submitted on time without exception
Monthly reward distributions must be executed strictly on schedule
Anonymous monthly or quarterly evaluations of the operator’s performance should be collected
The operator should respond to all forum messages from delegates related to the program
Biannual reports on overall progress and execution should be published

Based on these KPIs, the monthly compensation for the program operator should be determined

At last, linking the operator’s KPI to payments should be excluded so that the operator is not interested in specific reductions for specific delegates in accordance with the KPI

Hawheik · July 24, 2025, 7:46pm

I have two somewhat separate points I would like to make, so I will make two separate posts.

First, I find the current proposal far too eager to cut off grandfathered DIP participants.

I believe this will, de-facto, filter out most existing DIP participants below 500k ARB over an extended period of time. This section here, specifically:

if in any given month they fail to meet … any … requirement (as example maintaining a PR90≥75%) … they will be required to reapply and meet the 500,000 ARB threshold

In practice this means that existing sub-500k ARB participants must maintain a nearly perfect record of voting, or be locked out. Go to the hospital for a month? You’re out. Have a family emergency that takes you away for a few inopportune, high-activity weeks? You’re out.

The second requirement that will cause such an expulsion is any failure, in the DIP Program Manager’s opinion, of a participant to “Adhere to the DIP’s Terms and Conditions and any other Social Agreement”, which I think most of us can agree is a matter of subjective judgement.

I think this is far too strict. It would be far better to apply a permissive time window, such as “a failure of a grandfathered DIP participant to qualify for a period of 6 months renders them ineligible to continue with a grandfathered status, and they must reapply under the current requirements”.

Hawheik · July 24, 2025, 7:50pm

Secondly, I believe the additional restrictions to what comments and feedback will be considered for the Delegates’ Feedback rubric in scoring will further reduce what’s already a very restrictive category.

SEEDGov:

1. Data Collection and filtering: At the end of the month, the complete set of contributions by each DIP Participant across all discussions on the forum is reviewed and the Program Manager will consult with the different proposers/key stakeholders to determine whether or not to include contributions made in the forum.

A criterion is established to determine when a comment is considered valid or invalid:

Only comments with tangible impact (e.g., concrete changes in proposals) will be automatically considered.

Contributions highlighted by proposers will also be valid. This includes pre-forum (draft) “invisible” contributions, as previously mentioned in the Rationale.

The Program Manager may also propose outstanding contributions, provided these are submitted for validation by the OP or other relevant stakeholders.

Key stakeholders (Contributors with ≥500,000 ARB delegated) may also publicly highlight or privately recommend a specific contribution to the Program Manager. The rationale behind this item is that if a specific comment from a Contributor had an impact on a Key Stakeholder with significant Voting Power, we can reasonably assert that such a contribution held value within the decision-making process.

Based on this proposal and my napkin math, a DIP participant around 50k Voting Power, a perfect voting record and no additional bonus points except perfect meeting participation, will require at least a 14.6 Delegate Feedback score.
On the surface this may sound doable, reading the first few paragraphs of the Delegate Feedback scoring, but in practice for the most recent set of results only ~12% of all DIP participants, 8 out of 66, achieved this feat.

This proposal now sets out to make the Delegate Feedback scoring done “more … stringently”, which appears to mean “consider far fewer comments”. It seems like an obvious consequence of this will be on average lower DF scores across the board.

Napkin: 65 - ((15 + 20 + 25) * 0.8 * 1.05) = 14.599999999999994

I think this change should be outright stricken, and if anything feedback grading should be made more permissive, not less. This proposal posits less need for future delegate engagement due to upcoming organizational changes. If this is true, DIP Program Manager workload should also be reducing proportionally, enabling them to continue, at minimum, with Delegate Feedback grading as-is now, instead of needing to further reduce the set of comments considered.

Instead of this, I think a worthwhile improvement to the DF category is to normalize all Delegate Feedback scores proportionally to the highest-scoring DF for each month, such that the highest score is normalized up to the maximum score (40) and all others are scaled up proportionally. This naturally compares each delegate’s feed to the Best Possible Delegate for that month, instead of an unobtainable Perfect Ideal Dream Delegate.

If this category is kept as-is in the proposal, I think this paragraph should be updated as it no longer captures the essence of what Delegate Feedback does. Perhaps a new rubric could instead be something like this:

DI (Delegate Influence Score)

Assesses the influence a delegate has over proposals, by assessing only delegate feedback, be it public or private, that lead to tangible proposal changes. That feedback is then judged using a rubric with five criteria (e.g., clarity, depth, relevance).

When summarized in this way it seems logical that this update will incentivize delegates to early and eager involvement in proposals specifically for the purposes of getting mentioned by the proposer as a significant contributor, but at the cost of reduced incentive for DIP Participants to engage with proposals that are further along in the process. I don’t think that constitutes an improvement over the current process.

SEEDGov · July 24, 2025, 9:04pm

Hey everyone!

First and foremost, we want to thank the delegates for their valuable feedback, both here in the thread and during yesterday’s Community Call.

Summary of Changes - July 24th

To provide clarity and reassurance to all delegates and stakeholders, we confirm that the following changes have been made:

The proposal will not be submitted for a vote today. We will allow at least one more week to continue collecting feedback from the community.
There will be no retroactive changes for July. However, we want to be clear that if the proposal is approved during the first half of August, the changes will apply to that month, as delegates will have already been informed of the potential updates in advance.
We are still open to making changes throughout the week, so we will be waiting for more feedback from the delegates.

Maxlomu

maxlomu:

In anticipation of v2, I am looking forward to a mindset change from “delegates discuss in the forum and vote” to “delegates are contributors”.

I suggest (on the lines of what I wrote in the past):

— Min flat compensation for voting on snapshot and tally: the number of votes required will be much lower going forward.
— Structure and entry points for delegates to contribute, even if not full time / involved in the AAEs. There’s demand for activities like project support, mentorship, events, and new initiatives: delegates should be encouraged to plug into these. I’ve spoken to projects actively looking for this kind of help, and the DAO could fill that gap.

— Reward exclusivity. It still puzzles me how we treat the same people who work only for Arbitrum and people who also work for Optimism, zksync ecc.. Their opinion cannot be unbiased and fully committed to the success of Arbitrum.

— Mix USDC and ARB payment. We must share in the success and downsides of our own economy

Thanks for the thoughtful feedback—we’ll certainly take it into account as we look toward v2.0.

Regarding your first two points, we’re fully aligned. This is exactly why we believe the upcoming Contributors Program will be a key entry point for new contributors to Arbitrum DAO.

On the topic of exclusivity, we understand your concerns. It’s a sensitive matter that will likely need broader discussion during the design phase of v2.0.

Finally, on compensation: we agree that it would be interesting to explore a structure that guarantees a fixed USD-equivalent base (regardless of the asset used for payment) along with fixed amounts in ARB. We’re aligned with this direction.

Jean (Mux)

Thank you for the support! At this stage, we believe the 40% reduction is backed by strong data and reflects the DAO’s evolving context—but we’re still actively seeking more feedback from other delegates on this point.

Curia

Thanks so much for the thoughtful and in-depth feedback — we’ll go point by point:

Curia:

First, regarding the introduction of Tier X, we understand and appreciate the intent to improve quorum by encouraging more participation from high-VP delegates. That said, we are not entirely confident that rewarding voting alone, without any expectation for broader engagement, will lead to long-term value creation for the DAO. There is a possibility that some delegates may simply vote in order to receive compensation, while others who regularly contribute to discussions, attend governance calls, and help shape proposals are held to higher expectations. This could discourage smaller but highly engaged delegates who have consistently added value. We are also curious whether there has been any outreach or analysis to better understand why many high-VP delegates have chosen not to participate to date. If these delegates have not clearly expressed interest in joining under easier terms, it may be worth exploring other ways to encourage meaningful engagement or to incentivize further delegation to already active contributors.

Regarding Tier X, the proposal states:

In other words, delegates eligible for Tier X still have incentives to go beyond just voting, as they can level up to higher tiers through meaningful contributions.

One of the main goals of this new tier is inclusion — to recognize big delegates who have consistently voted but haven’t received any acknowledgment due to their limited bandwidth to contribute beyond voting.

On the concern about discouraging smaller delegates: we respectfully disagree. The program already expects smaller delegates to contribute beyond voting to receive incentives, given that the voting power they bring to the DAO does not carry the same weight as, say, a 5M ARB delegate. We believe this distinction is reasonable.

Curia:

Second, regarding the proposed reduction in delegate compensation, we see the logic in aligning rewards with a lighter overall workload. At the same time, we believe it is worth considering whether this same principle could be extended to other roles in the program. As proposal volume, dispute rates, and subjective evaluations decrease, it seems that the responsibilities of the Program Manager may have also been reduced. If efficiency and fairness are important goals of this update, it may be valuable to revisit whether current administrative compensation still reflects the level of ongoing effort. More broadly, we would also note that the drop in proposal activity is not solely the result of streamlined processes. It also reflects a need for greater support of the delegates who continue to take initiative and contribute to proposal development. Ensuring that these contributors remain incentivized feels especially important for the health and sustainability of the DAO.

To clarify:

The subjective evaluation process has not been reduced, but rather strengthened. The Program Manager is now expected to engage with key DAO stakeholders to assess the value of participants’ contributions in a more robust and consensus-driven manner.
The time currently spent resolving disputes will be reallocated to new responsibilities — particularly, proactive business development to onboard inactive delegates with significant voting power. This goes beyond DMs and includes conducting calls, offering mentorship, and building tailored onboarding paths.
We do not believe our responsibilities have decreased — quite the opposite. We’re also committing to a sensitive and high-stakes role: enforcing the Terms and Conditions and mediating conflicts between DIP participants and contributors. This responsibility has reputational implications for SEEDGov and is aligned with the Code of Conduct that is currently up for vote:

Updating the Code of Conduct & DAO's Procedures

Enforcement & Appeal Process

All contributors are expected to abide by the Code of Conduct. Enforcement will take place through any program that financially compensates performing governance activities, such as rewards for voting/forum activity, or participation in DAO-approved programs where contributors are directly elected to facilitate the programs.

The program manager, council, or comparable facilitator in charge of the program is the one responsible for determining violations of the Code of Conduct and reserves the right to take what it deems as appropriate action, which may include but is not limited to, issuing a warning, suspension, or removal from the program. Any community member can raise a concern to the party responsible for managing the program with respect to a contributor failing to uphold the Code of Conduct. While the responsible party is required to acknowledge receipt of the concern and investigate the matter, the final determination and resulting course of action, which may include dismissing the concern, will depend on the underlying program’s structure.

If there are contradictions between the Code of Conduct and the specific program that is compensating a contributor, then the policies of the program shall take precedence. It is assumed that a program will define its own appeal process, but if it does not, then the conflict resolution section (next) will be the default appeal approach.

On this point, we’d like to highlight this section of the proposal:

We believe that with the proposed upgrades — especially involving third-party feedback — the assessment process will become significantly more robust. While subjectivity won’t disappear entirely, the absence of recognition from any relevant stakeholder (including the Program Manager, AAEs, proposers, and high-VP contributors) indicates that a contribution likely lacks sufficient merit to qualify for rewards. In such cases, disputes would become redundant.

cp0x

Thank you for the detailed and thoughtful feedback. As we did with Curia, we’ll go point by point:

We completely agree with this point and confirm that the proposal will not be put up for a vote today. We’ll provide at least one more week to gather additional feedback from the community.

Our intention was never to rush the process or ignore delegate input. Rather, we aimed to keep the process as fluid as possible so that changes could be implemented promptly — something we believe would ultimately benefit the DAO.

We’ve heard similar concerns from other delegates and stakeholders. To clarify, there will be no retroactive application of changes for July. However, if this proposal is passed in early August, then it will be effective for that month, since the delegates will have been aware of the proposed changes in advance.

There may have been a misunderstanding here. On the call, we specified that large delegates — not small ones — should face lower barriers to participate in the program.

The goal of raising the threshold to 500,000 ARB is not to reduce admin workload, but to improve economic efficiency, particularly with regard to incentivizing voting behavior. As outlined in the proposal:

SEEDGov:

Inefficiency in rewarding small delegates’ voting activities: Economic analysis in our last report shows that incentivizing voting participation from delegates with >500K ARB is 47 times more efficient than incentivizing those in the 50K–500K ARB range.

This figure is enlightening regarding how cost-effective it is to incentivize small delegates’ voting activity. While this was a deliberate approach during the early phase of the program—to attract talent and enrich the DAO with greater pluralism and human capital—this “investment” should naturally be scaled down over time as these smaller contributors are successfully onboarded into full-time DAO roles (as occurred with Pedrob and the OAT, for example). It’s important to mention that these onboardings are, of course, based on the merit of the contributor, and not every participant in the program will necessarily end up working full-time for an AAE or any other DAO initiative.

The 500K threshold is directly related to the voting power that a cluster of delegates can contribute. Initially, we considered incentivizing only the Top 50 delegates within Tier X — this cutoff was somewhat arbitrary. However, when we looked at the next 15 delegates (ranked 51–65), we found they collectively hold just over 10M VP. While the “ROI” (in this case, ARB per USD Spent actively voting) of incentivizing voting activity from these 15 delegates is lower than that of the Top 50, 10M VP is a significant figure that shouldn’t be overlooked.
Our goal is to identify and support the cluster of delegates holding the largest amount of VP. Based on current data, there are approximately 65 delegates with 500K VP or more. Below that point, the VP per delegate drops steeply. As such, the “ROI” of incentivizing delegates beyond the Top 65 declines sharply, along with the additional amount of VP being incentivized.

cp0x:

Tier X incentivizes low-effort participation and system abuse
Tier X encourages delegates to accumulate 500,000 ARB and then do nothing beyond voting — yet still receive $1–1.5K. Worse, large delegates can split into multiple 500K wallets to farm rewards, earning far more than an active 2M ARB delegate who contributes meaningfully.
On the call L2beat said that everyone goes through KYC and it is not a problem to gather 4 friends just to get money 4-6k just for 2M quorum.
Ministro said that a situation where a lot of 500k delegates will go through Tier X is unlikely. But above I just described a situation where previously non-participating users will make several 500k delegates.
This Tier does not help in any way with the main purpose of this program.
Suggestion: Remove Tier X — it creates opportunities for abuse and undermines the value of substantive contributions

We respectfully disagree. In fact, removing Tier X would be counterproductive, as it is meant to bring in consistent voters who may not have the bandwidth to contribute more deeply.

We don’t see a high risk of farming:

KYC is required for getting rewards
All on-chain activity is traceable (for example, delegations)
As Program Managers, we can easily detect patterns of behavior suggesting vote farming or wallet splitting
If abuse occurs, we will take action accordingly

cp0x:

Voting Power Multiplier (0.8) unfairly penalizes smaller delegates
When combined with 30 points of subjective scoring, this multiplier can effectively block smaller delegates from qualifying. Since the subjective scores will not be debated, the operator alone decides whether a small delegate gets paid.
The new rule itself that it will be impossible to debate 30% of the points is simply unfair and only says that the operator is tired of debating, but it has not yet been possible to build a system where this is excluded. If such disputes exist, there is a problem, and you are not planning to eliminate the problem, but simply to force them to remain silent about it.
Suggestion 1: Remove the multiplier entirely. Instead, apply the multiplier to payment amounts, not to eligibility. For example, set a base reward of $Х,ХХХ and scale it with the multiplier — this would be fairer and still acknowledge delegation size without excluding anyone
Suggestion 2: Reduce subjective score influence to Tier 1 only, with a 10-point maximum — higher tiers should rely only on objective criteria

We appreciate your view, but this element is not part of the proposed changes — it was introduced earlier and we believe it continues to function as intended.

The multiplier was designed to reward proportional impact fairly and transparently. As we’ve previously communicated, its purpose is to strike a balance between effort and influence. At this time, we see no compelling reason to change or remove it.

As we discussed with Curia and on the Community Call, there are a few key points to clarify here:

We are assuming new responsibilities, including enforcement of the Terms & Conditions and the potential Code of Conduct, as well as business development efforts to onboard inactive high-VP delegates. The last one requires significant time and interaction with contributors and stakeholders.
Comparing the admin budget only to the incentive distribution seems reductive. The value of the program lies not just in payouts, but in its overall impact — improving quorum, onboarding contributors, and strengthening DAO governance.
The current clause on reevaluating admin compensation (after reaching 65+ registered delegates) was previously approved. That threshold has been exceeded for some time, but we waited to introduce this update until we had the 1.7 ready.
Finally, we expect the v2.0 of the program to be simpler, improving operational efficiency. For now, however, SEEDGov continues to evaluate hundreds of comments from over 65 delegates, engage in stakeholder feedback loops, handle disputes, and guide participants. These activities require full awareness of nearly all governance activity within the DAO — not a trivial task.

cp0x:

In addition to the comments on the presented version, I have additional thoughts on improving the program:

It would be important to introduce clear KPIs for the program operator’s performance, such as:

Monthly reports must be submitted on time without exception

Monthly reward distributions must be executed strictly on schedule

Anonymous monthly or quarterly evaluations of the operator’s performance should be collected

The operator should respond to all forum messages from delegates related to the program

Biannual reports on overall progress and execution should be published

Based on these KPIs, the monthly compensation for the program operator should be determined

At last, linking the operator’s KPI to payments should be excluded so that the operator is not interested in specific reductions for specific delegates in accordance with the KPI

We think we already addressed this in a prior post. A few thoughts:

We are humans, and exceptions do occur — particularly with regards to the timing of monthly reports. When initially defining timelines in DIP 1.5, we may have been overly optimistic. However, these were always framed as expectations, not hard deadlines.
Monthly payments do not depend solely on the Program Manager, which makes hard deadlines for distribution unrealistic.
Biannual reports already exist — the latest was published here.

We do appreciate the suggestion for anonymous evaluations and are open to further exploring this in the v2.0 design phase.

Hawheik

Thank you for the detailed and thoughtful feedback.

We believe this can be addressed. What do you think about adding: “The Program Manager reserves the right to apply exceptions regarding this rule, as long as it provides a rationale for this decision”?

This way, if there is a force majeure situation (verifiable) that prevents a contributor from maintaining their on-chain voting activity above 75%, a grace period could be granted.

Indeed, it is subjective, and that’s why there is the possibility to appeal our decision to the Arbitrum Foundation:

Regarding the assessment of DF, if we implemented this, we would end up over-compensating every month. Not every month has comments that deserve the maximum score; the level and quality of activity vary, and certainly not every comment adds value.

That said, there have been delegates who received the maximum score, and during those months, it was easier to “normalize” proportionally for the rest using those comments as a benchmark.

Finally, with the new system, if a contribution brought value to the discussion, it is very likely that a relevant stakeholder will highlight it — it will no longer depend solely on our criteria. Therefore, we believe that instead of being more “restrictive,” it could actually be more inclusive, as we are incorporating different perspectives into the assessment.

Hawheik · July 24, 2025, 9:46pm

In my opinion, adding more layers of subjective judgement that requires disclosure of potentially highly personal information for DIP Participants for the chance to throw themselves at the mercy of the DIP Program Managers, is the exact opposite of what I would like to see. Perhaps it’s a geo-social difference or something, but I personally find that idea to be offensive.

I think a more permissive system, applied to all DIP Participants equally, is the way to go.

I don’t think this holds up, logically speaking. The existing criteria applied by SEEDGov still remains, but now it is behind an additional sieve in that it has to fulfill additional criteria to even be considered. This is as opposed to the current situation, where all feedback should be considered.

If less feedback is considered, but is judged using the same criteria that is already applied currently, it only seems possible for overall net scores to go down, not up.

This is unless the judgement criteria becomes more permissive, but I didn’t see any mention of that and it seems contrary to the stated objective for DF to be evaluated “more … stringently”.

0xDonPepe · July 28, 2025, 2:18am

Hey everyone, I wanted to share some thoughts, especially around the proposed changes to Delegate Feedback (DF) and how the scoring math shakes out for smaller delegates.

DF Thresholds in Practice

@Hawheik already did the math in a previous comment, but it really hit me. If you’ve got around 50k voting power, a perfect voting record, and show up to every call (getting that 5% bonus), you’d still need to score at least 14.6 points in Delegate Feedback to qualify for Tier 3.

Now, on paper that might seem doable. But in reality? Only about 12% of delegates managed to pull that off in the last round. That’s 8 out of 66 people. And now the proposal suggests grading DF even more stringently, narrowing the pool of comments that count, and only giving credit to stuff that has some kind of external validation or clear “impact.”

I get where that’s coming from (we want quality over quantity) but if we’re already at just 12% of people passing that DF bar, making it even stricter is just going to filter out more small but active delegates. That’s not the direction we should be heading in.

DIP is the last open door

Here’s the bigger picture. With OpCo becoming more involved and AAE’s managing most of the DAO stuff, things are naturally getting more centralized. That’s not necessarily evil, sometimes you need structure. But it also means that fewer and fewer people are in charge of more and more of what happens.

And that’s where DIP comes in. The DIP program is honestly one of the last open spaces in the DAO where new, small, or independent delegates can actually participate, get recognized, and be rewarded. If we now make DF harder to earn and gate everything behind a Voting Power multiplier that’s applied to the eligibility formula, we’re basically slamming the door shut on everyone who doesn’t already have big bags or institutional backing.

A few suggestions

If we want to keep things fair and avoid concentration, here’s what I’d propose:

Don’t tighten DF scoring further. If the proposal volume is going down, then there’s no real reason to be stricter with feedback grading. If anything, it could stay as-is or become more inclusive.
Normalize DF scores every month. Take the highest DF score, scale it to 40, and adjust everyone else proportionally. That way, you’re not grading against some “perfect delegate” ideal, just against the best performer in any given month.
Move the Voting Power multiplier to the payouts, not eligibility. VP should impact how much you earn, not whether you qualify at all. Right now it’s acting like a gatekeeper.
If none of that works, at least lower the threshold (e.g. Tier 3 from 65 to 60) or let the call bonus go higher than 5%.
Finally, I’d love to see some decentralization metrics tracked over time: like how many <100k VP delegates qualify each month, or how much influence small feedback actually has on proposals. Give us something to measure progress (or regression).

At the end of the day, I do see where SEED is coming from: the rewards need trimming, and the system needs to be fairer. But we shouldn’t fix one problem by creating another, especially if that problem is pushing out the exact kind of people we need more of.

Let’s not forget what made this DAO strong in the first place: people showing up, giving feedback, asking dumb questions (guilty), and building legitimacy from the ground up.

TodayInDeFi · July 29, 2025, 2:48am

We dont have a huge pushback on this, (although it would be good to keep having a mechanism for smaller delegate participation, either through DIP or an alternate mechanism)

But we wonder if retroactive activation is necessary?

if there is a vote for DIP 1.7 and that vote retroactively determines if August is 1.6 or 1.7, that changes the participation criteria for August drastically, based on a vote which is concluding in august.

It’s an extremely strange situation that is hard for Delegates to adapt to and is not how laws work or are passed normally.

Why not simply make the DIP vote apply on the next month? this is how normal laws apply: after the vote concludes not retroactively, making it difficult or impossible for the people affected to adapt.

LujanOdera · July 29, 2025, 5:39pm

Thank you for this contribution and the explanations offered. I support the proposal. I just have a small contribution on this:

As discussed on the call on July 29, 2025 - Open Discussion of Proposals Governance Call, having vote-buying platforms in the program may be beneficial if they align with the DAO’s wants. However, clear structures and criteria should be put in place (like a set of rules) to ensure that proposals are not only decided exclusively by vote-buyers but by the community as a whole. (Maybe put a cap on the % vote buyers can be incentivized with)

It would be disadvantageous for the DAO to lock these platforms from the incentives if they can show tangible (or in other cases “invisible”) contributions in governance issues.

lobbyfi · July 29, 2025, 9:10pm

First, we want to acknowledge the effort that has gone into this proposal. We’ve previously shared our concerns about point Nr. 7 directly with Gianluca from @SEEDGov in private, and we appreciate the dialogue. However, unfortunately, our feedback has not been reflected in the current version of the proposal.

Our primary concern is the proposed ban on so-called “vote-buying” services from the delegate incentive program, i.e. LobbyFi, the only service of this type operating on Arbitrum as of now. We believe this measure will not produce any positive outcomes for the Arbitrum DAO. On the contrary, we feel it may be counterproductive.

One of the key goals of the original Delegate Incentive Program was to increase governance engagement and (!) participation . Over the past year, LobbyFi has actively contributed to achieving these very goals, albeit without receiving any incentives to date. We have worked to align our protocol with the long-term health and security of the DAO, and have done so voluntarily, not obtaining a single penny from the DAO to date.

Banning our protocol at this stage feels like a punishment for good-faith participation. LobbyFi has operated within the Arbitrum ecosystem for over a year without attempting to manipulate the DIP. This decision would set a discouraging precedent for any similar service in the future that wishes to operate transparently and in alignment with the DAO. Echoing the sentiments of other delegates, we do not see how this encourages positive and aligned behaviour.

Regardless of whether or not this clause is included in the final proposal, LobbyFi remains fully committed to acting in alignment with the Arbitrum DAO. At the same time, this clause does not appear to have any bearing on the financial aspects of the program (since LobbyFi has not been getting any payments through DIP anyway), and we cannot see any benefits of having it in, while the downsides are evident. Hopefully, this point can be reconsidered.

Topic		Replies	Views
Proposal - Delegate Incentive Program (DIP) Finalized AIPs	157	4049	July 9, 2025
[DIP v1.6] From Engagement to Rewards: A Comprehensive Analysis of the Delegate Incentives Program Delegate Incentives Program (DIP)	6	470	July 9, 2025
[DIP v1.60] Updates Thread Delegate Incentives Program (DIP)	2	552	February 12, 2025
Proposal: Revert the Delegate Incentive Program (DIP) to Version 1.5 Proposals	49	1596	October 16, 2025
[DIP v1.6] Delegate Incentive Program Results (February 2025) Delegate Incentives Program (DIP)	18	654	April 14, 2025