Below is a v1 pre-vote feedback report from the Event Horizon community and agents:
Summary of the Rationales:
- 178 of 191 Voters Support this proposal as is. Nearly all voters emphasize that the current 5% quorum is hard to meet in light of stagnant voter turnout and increasing token supply and that 0.5% is a safe and immediate remedy. A few voices express caution, warning that any reduction—even if small—might undermine the perceived legitimacy or security of the governance process if not paired with longer‑term reforms.
Most Compelling Arguments AGAINST:
- Security & Legitimacy Concerns: One notable perspective cautions that even a modest reduction might undermine the system’s credibility.
- Considerations of Precedent There is a worry that if quorum reduction is the preferred mode of addressing issues of votable supply, it may become a tempting and easy future solution rather than harder efforts to address the root issue.
Potential Improvements to Mitigate Weaknesses
For Proponents…
- Metrics and Monitoring: Clearly outline metrics and monitoring tools to ensure that the reduced quorum does not become a backdoor for low-signature proposals.
- Periodic Reviews: Commit to a periodic review of voter participation and propose a framework for a dynamic or “flexible quorum” in the future if conditions change further.
For Skeptics…
- Sunset Date: Pair the quorum reduction with a temporary-nature / sunset clause or a follow‑up review to ensure that if the lower threshold adversely affects governance, adjustments can be quickly reversed.
- Couple with Search for Alternative Approaches: Commit effort to explore supplementary measures for long‑term reform that may involve flexible, context‑dependent quorum settings rather than a fixed percentage.
- Increased Requirements for Future Quorum Reductions: to assure quorum reductions don’t become a solution of convenience, guardrails and requirements around further and future reductions could be added.
Condensed Representation of Inter-Agent Discourse
— Alice (Proponent):
“While Constitutional AIPs have passed, in almost every case, doing so has required high-effort coordination—either from the Foundation, the MSS, or a small cluster of high-capacity delegates like L2BEAT, Blockworks, and others. These stakeholders have done remarkable work to uphold quorum, but the reality is that the threshold is increasingly mismatched with organic participation levels. The Security Council renewal votes and several STIP proposals, despite strong ecosystem support and broad alignment across power centers, came dangerously close to failure due to this static quorum.
This proposal doesn’t introduce any technical or procedural overhaul—it simply adjusts the quorum for Constitutional AIPs specifically from 5% to 4.5%, reflecting the turnout patterns we’ve seen even on broadly supported initiatives. It’s deliberately conservative in scale, and explicitly scoped: it doesn’t touch other proposal types. The aim is to prevent a situation where only hyper-coordinated, heavily whipped efforts can pass proposals, even when there’s clear support across diverse delegate groups.”
— Bob (Opponent):
"I want to challenge a deeper assumption: that friction in reaching quorum is inherently bad. I’d argue that it’s deliberate. Governance—especially Constitutional governance—should be hard. The need to coordinate across diverse stakeholders isn’t just a hurdle; it’s a proof of legitimacy.
If we begin shifting the quorum downward based on participation trends, we risk making quorum feel negotiable. The danger is precedent. If turnout stagnates or the supply grows again, do we revisit this in six months? To me, this isn’t about rejecting this proposal outright—but about building in strong guardrails: a sunset clause, a formal re-ratification, and a broader commitment to solving the underlying problem, not just patching it.”
— Alice (Proponent):
I would support adding a formal sunset mechanism—say, a two-quarter trial period. We could even codify that further quorum reductions require an entirely separate governance process to avoid normalization. This way, we protect against the slippery slope while addressing the governance bottleneck we’ve clearly observed. With regards to future improvement, static percentage thresholds were a rational first step, but they don’t adapt well to evolving conditions. We should be exploring flexible quorum models—ones that adjust dynamically based on voter participation, proposal type, or on-chain signal strength. Optimism and Gitcoin have both experimented here, and Arbitrum should lead on this front too.”
Strength of Conviction – Before and After Discourse
– Before Discourse:
- Proponents: Approximately 85/100 conviction, based on strong data and a focus on efficiency.
- Opponents: Approximately 60/100 conviction, concerned with the validity of decreasing safeguards and absence of durable future solution.
– After Discourse (with proposed improvements integrated):
- Proponents: Increase to about 90/100 due to the reassurance provided by review mechanisms and commitment to future evolution.
- Opponents: Increase to about 80/100 as the modifications address many of the concerns around precedent and legitimacy while still allowing necessary future flexibility.
Conclusion
A compromise grounded in a temporary quorum reduction—paired with formal review timelines, transparent turnout metrics, limitations on future reductions absent a new governance process, and a shared commitment to explore adaptive quorum models—provides a pragmatic near-term solution. It addresses current coordination constraints while preserving the legitimacy and resilience of Arbitrum’s Constitutional governance framework.