I support lowering the constitutional quorum threshold as a necessary short-term fix. Without this adjustment, we risk slowing down governance and potentially blocking valuable proposals simply because they can’t reach quorum. In the current environment, this change is much needed to keep the governance process functional.
However, it’s clear that a longer-term solution is also needed. Even with strong participation from the most active delegates - such as those in the DIP program, who together represent 61% of the 5% quorum as of March 2025 - a significant portion of voting power remains inactive. This is a common challenge for DAOs: most token holders simply don’t participate in governance, and realistically, it is extremely difficult (if not impossible) to change this behavior.
In my view, redelegation is the only way to realistically address this problem. Since we can’t expect passive holders to suddenly become active, the best path forward is to make it easy and rewarding for them to redelegate their tokens to engaged delegates. The ARB Staking proposal was designed to do exactly this, requiring holders to delegate in order to earn yield and I think that this is exactly the kind of approach we need. Unfortunately, there haven’t been updates or concerning ARB Staking to date and, as things stand, I don’t see any other solution being put into practice.
Beyond the quorum issue, I believe this problem highlights a broader challenge: declining participation is a symptom of waning interest in the DAO itself, which if left unaddressed, could threaten both its effectiveness and long-term viability.