[Constitutional] DVP Quorum for ArbitrumDAO: Implementation & Parameters

[Curia]

We will vote “For” this proposal.

We support the shift to a DVP-based quorum model and believe aligning quorum with delegated voting power is a necessary improvement over the current supply-based system. This change better reflects real participation and helps address the growing liveness risk faced by the DAO.

Based on our prior analysis using historical participation data, percentage-based quorum thresholds in the proposed ranges strike a reasonable balance between governance liveness and meaningful participation. In particular, we found that ranges around 42–50% of DVP for non-constitutional proposals and 48–56% of DVP for constitutional proposals are broadly effective, and the Foundation’s proposed parameters are directionally aligned with these findings.

While we view the parameters as an initial configuration that should be revisited as delegation patterns evolve, we believe this proposal represents a constructive and necessary step forward for ArbitrumDAO’s governance.

@Curia

2. Recommended Percentage of Quorum

To validate the proposed numbers suggested by the Foundation:

@Arbitrum

We recommend the following configuration:

• Non-constitutional proposals. Set at 40 - 50% of total delegated voting power and a minimum fixed voting power of 100m ARB.
• Constitutional proposals. Set at 40 - 50% of total delegated voting power and a minimum fixed voting power of 150m ARB.

We backtested historical voting data against various DVP-based quorum thresholds. Our goal was to find a range that aligns with the historical average participation margin of 20-40% on different time periods (2023–2024, 2024–2025, 2025, and overall). We believed this margin to be a healthy balance, providing a meaningful hurdle for proposals without making them excessively difficult to pass.

Our analysis, which can be viewed in detail in this spreadsheet, yielded the following recommendations, using the 2025 data as our primary benchmark for its relevance to the current state of the DAO:

• For Non-Constitutional Proposals: A quorum between 42–50% of DVP maintains the target 20-40% participation rate against quorum margin.

• For Constitutional Proposals: We believed the ideal range is 48–56% of DVP. We believe the threshold should not exceed 60%, as it would begin to severely restrict the DAO’s ability to pass crucial upgrades.

Based on this data, the Foundation’s proposed range is effective, and we would advocate for values at the lower end for non-constitutional and the higher end for constitutional proposals.

3. Concerns Regarding the Fixed Lower Bound

We understand the rationale for a fixed minimum quorum is to act as a safeguard against governance capture if DVP were to fall dramatically. That said, a static floor, while well-intentioned, introduces its own form of liveness risk. We raised this point during the DVP-Quorum for ArbitrumDAO: Open Discussion community call and wish to elaborate on it here for the broader community.

In a scenario where DVP drops significantly, the fixed lower bound could make it mathematically impossible to reach quorum, effectively freezing the DAO. The table below illustrates this using a 100M ARB lower bound for non-constitutional proposals:

DVP (in millions)	Quorum (40% of DVP)	Effective Quorum (with Lower Bound)	Passable?
300	120 M	120 M	Yes
250	100 M	100 M	Yes
249	99.6 M	100 M	No
80	32 M	100 M	No

While unlikely, this scenario would force the DAO into a difficult position, potentially requiring repeated governance actions to adjust the floor.

We suggest considering alternatives to a static minimum:

1. Remove the fixed lower bound and rely on the percentage-based quorum alone.
2. Implement a dynamic lower bound that adjusts relative to a trailing average of DVP, preventing sudden freezes.

In an extreme edge case where DVP collapses, the Security Council could serve as the ultimate backstop to ensure the DAO remains functional.