We support the shift to a DVP-based quorum model and believe aligning quorum with delegated voting power is a necessary improvement over the current supply-based system. This change better reflects real participation and helps address the growing liveness risk faced by the DAO.
Based on our prior analysis using historical participation data, percentage-based quorum thresholds in the proposed ranges strike a reasonable balance between governance liveness and meaningful participation. In particular, we found that ranges around 42–50% of DVP for non-constitutional proposals and 48–56% of DVP for constitutional proposals are broadly effective, and the Foundation’s proposed parameters are directionally aligned with these findings.
While we view the parameters as an initial configuration that should be revisited as delegation patterns evolve, we believe this proposal represents a constructive and necessary step forward for ArbitrumDAO’s governance.
At a high level, it just makes sense. If surplus stablecoins from concluded programs are sitting idle, they should be put to work generating yield through the ATMC rather than remaining unused. We also think it’s reasonable to avoid running a full governance vote every single time funds need to be swept, especially when the DAO has bigger decisions that deserve delegate attention.
The timing concern raised by @JoJo and @SEEDGov was valid, but we think @Entropy ’s clarification addressed it well. Only S2 surplus funds would be moved right away, while the currently active D.A.O. Grant Program funds would remain untouched until that program actually concludes. Just as importantly, the DAO still retains clawback rights at any time, so governance control is fully preserved.
Overall, this feels like a practical operational improvement that makes treasury management more efficient without weakening oversight, and we’re happy to support it.