Proposal: [Constitutional] AIP: Ratification of Security Council Election Process Improvements
Vote: Against
Rationale:
We appreciate the intent behind this updated proposal, and agree that reducing election frequency and easing key-rotation friction are practical improvements for both candidates and delegates. That said, we think there’s one structural trade-off worth surfacing before this moves to an on-chain vote.
Extending cohort duration from 1 to 2 years meaningfully increases incumbency advantage. Longer tenure gives sitting members more time to build relationships, operational familiarity, and visibility within the DAO, all of which raise the perceived barrier for new candidates considering a run. Over successive cycles, this can compound: fewer challengers enter, incumbents face less competitive pressure, and the overall candidate pool narrows. This is worth taking seriously given that the proposal already recognizes a related risk elsewhere.
Notably, the rationale for omitting the incumbent-bypass mechanism was that “incumbency alone should not substitute for fresh endorsement from the DAO.” We’d argue that same principle is relevant to the cohort duration extension itself, since both changes structurally favor incumbents over new entrants, just through different mechanisms (one procedural, one temporal).
To help mitigate this without giving up the fatigue-reduction benefits of longer cohorts, it may be worth exploring complementary safeguards such as term limits, staggered re-election requirements, or targeted outreach/incentives to encourage new candidates to come forward each cycle.
For these reasons, we don’t think the current trade-off is justified as-is, and we intend to vote against this proposal. A 2-year cohort duration feels too long given the reduced competitiveness it introduces, and we’d rather see these concerns addressed before extending terms this significantly.