We’re voting FOR the proposal on Snapshot following @Entropy’s clarification on how the program will be operationalized. This addresses some of the concerns we raised previously in our earlier comment on the program.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.
We are voting FOR the proposal.
In our previous comment, we raised some concerns regarding the proposal and the information available. Although not all of our points were addressed, we support moving the proposal forward and continue ironing out the details before it goes to an onchain vote.
The two things we’d like to have some clarity on are:
- Measure of success.
We understand having flexibility to adjust seasons and their goals, and by extension the relevant KPIs, but right now there’s literally no way for us to know ahead of time what success is going to look like, or how we could track it.
- DAO involvement.
Even with the amended language, it’s still not clear how the DAO can get involved with the program, and particularly with its oversight. While we understand that, in theory, anyone can reach out to Entropy to offer suggestions, it’s not specified how the DAO can act in case the program is not delivering expected results.
We hope for those two things to be clarified before we move to the onchain vote, but we don’t feel it is blocking at this stage for temperature check.
Entropy recognizes as the author of DRIP that a conflict of interest exists given our position on the committee and as the party responsible for the program. We are disclosing this conflict before voting FOR the creation of DRIP on Snapshot. We will address some of the above questions in a separate reply to this forum post thread before moving to Tally.
I will be voting “For” at the temp check stage of the program.
The detox period has concluded and its worth trying to address the next set of incentives. For now I’m voting for to keep momentum going on this. At it’s core, it seems to be thought out and addresses feedback from delegates. I do believe there should be more refinement before Tally, but I do want to show support for this in the interim.
Something I’d like to see is a commitment to have more emphasis put on getting money back to the DAO. It’s been a long-time complaint of mine that almost all our projects are just giving out funds with no expectation of tangible return. While we may not have broken past the tipping point yet, I think treasury health is important long term and without some partial fee return model its only going to get worse.
I’m not sure if others have mentioned it, but I’d like to see some type of commentary on this before Tally.
@Bob-Rossi yes I’ve mentioned it as one of the core reasons I voted against, see my comment above
The problem with DRIP is that the idea of it cannot really be rejected. This is because its outcome relates to the fundamental truth of how businesses work.
For example, buyers always want to buy low; sellers want to sell high; businesses would always want to grow users and revenue. Since DRIP aims to increase activity/market share, this makes a FOR vote obvious. Because, after all, who can say, “No, I don’t want to increase activity”?
This means the reasons for rejection or acceptance of this proposal must stem from its mechanism. You can’t vote FOR simply because you want the outcome (make Arbitrum the best at [activity]). The outcome is obviously what should happen, and what every business strives for. There is nothing to really vote on, as it is a fundamental truth.
Hence, the next point of discussion is the mechanism. I can’t see why a FOR vote should be made, given:
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There are no discussions or thoughts on how strategies are selected and prioritized. This also means there is no careful thinking on how trade-offs and implications from a particular incentivized area are made.
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There are no evaluation strategy and design in place. KPIs are not an evaluation strategy, but part of it. The lack of a discussion on evaluation implies that no one knows what success looks like except for a KPI pump. Evaluations are very important to be performed upfront because they act as a test to determine if the manager has thought through what they want to achieve, the performance of the activity, and whether the activity trickles down to the end goal.
Maybe this response is a little too ahead of itself at this stage, but I think Entropy and other larger voters should consider thinking about
No you are bang on. Well articulated. Specifics of the mechanism, criteria, selection process have been ask for by myself and others and are as yet unanswered.
There is a huge risk in this going forward, with no detail there is nothing to hold accountable.
Level K voted FOR this proposal on snapshot.
We welcome the collaboration of the AF, OCL, and Entropy. We think this partnership is positive for Arbitrum, and we look forward to reports from the committee. We believe this team is well-positioned to help Arbitrum further strengthen its position.
As mentioned by KlausBrave, this is a shift from previous proposals, but not unexpected after the A Vision for the Future of Arbitrum announcement from the AF. That said, we believe there are particulars about DAO involvement that need to be worked out, as mentioned by L2beat. This is important as it will likely set a precedent for future proposals that utilize AAEs.
As for concerns that the DAO lacks input or oversight in the execution of this proposal, we lean towards the DAO putting trust in AAEs to execute with the goal of giving Arbitrum a competitive edge.
We do recognize that this move could lead to the consolidation of the influence of incumbents within DAO. We hope that the dedicated delegates of the DAO will find a way to balance the competitive edge provided by giving influence to a select few, with the decentralized voice of the DAO being heard.
One point of clarification. Entropy mentions several times that they are the point of contact for all concerns/feedback regarding the proposal. What is the best way to get in contact with Entropy for those who do not have existing lines of communication?
Though not necessary, we do welcome direct communication from OCL and the AF.
Thank you @Entropy for taking DRIP through the entire proposal process. We agree on the importance of the incentivizing new assets, and we support the program targeting the growth of LSTs, Commodities, and RWAs on Arbitrum. We are eager to integrate these assets into GMX.
Whilst we understand the goal of DRIP in itself, we believe there is a need to also focus on existing Arbitrum products that have PMF already.
Let’s ensure Arbitrum’s growth and incentivization strategy is two-fold:
- Attracting new protocols and new assets in underserved verticals.
- Ensuring existing Arbitrum winners continue to win by channelling these new assets and users into their arms.
I voted For this proposal as the DRIP is hopefully able to help arbitrum becoming a major L2 in terms of DeFi activity. In my opinion is has been designed better and more carefully than other initiavites in the past. This seems like a longer lasting program which should be able to capture good amounts of liquidity paired with strong DeFi partner.
As the ITU Blockchain delegation team, we are in favor of this proposal because we believe that implementing the DRIP program presented here will solve many problems in the Arbitrum ecosystem and particularly contribute to the pools that are currently facing issues.
When I first read this proposal, I very much liked where it was headed. Given the huge amount of competition from other chains and L2s (unichain incentives, BERA, Sonic gems, etc) staying competitive means undoubtedly incentivizing DEFI activity. I also have strong feelings about giving the incentives directly to the protocols, which as we already know from past experience could not spend these funds wisely, or at all, and with little to no accountability. So this approach (and the use of a SP like royco or merkle) makes a lot of sense to me to try.
This may not be a very cypherpunk take, but I do think a little of “centralization” is needed on these sort of large scale incentivization programmes. I wouldn’t go as far as having both the Foundation and Offchain Labs as a 2/3 signature -in practice, I’d say they are one single entity and not two independent ones, that’s a whole different discussion, but at a minimum I’d think we can agree that they have sufficiently close ties to be a concern here- but we’ve already tried 100% decentralized DEFI / NFT / onchain incentivization here on Arbitrum and I believe it’s a good idea to attempt it the other way.
I am comfortable with delegating the decision of exactly what activity is going to be motivated/rewarded to the committee, given that it makes sure to explicitly post rationale and the decision making process followed, even after the fact. For the Tally vote, my suggestion would be to either incorporate 2 more committee members so that’s x/5, or replace one of the Arbitrum’s one for another party.
I also want to highlight this comment, great feedback:
My last suggestion before on-chain vote is to add an option for the DAO itself to kill this via vote. As it is, this authority is granted to the committee, but not the DAO.
Hope Entropy and Arbitrum can take this feedback and think of incorporating some of it; I like where this is headed and the suggestions were made with both the success of the chain and the balance of (imo a needed) a sort of centralization in mind.
Voted FOR
Hi all,
Confirming the AF address as 0xef297424bbC64B21fB405532b58fe77299f1e1F4 for receiving the funds.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation decided to vote “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
Rationale
SEED has voted FOR this proposal because we think it is designed to stimulate sustainable DeFi growth on Arbitrum by targeting specific liquidity and user engagement goals rather than granting funds to individual protocols. Its seasonal structure allows for adaptability, while being protocol-agnostic fosters broader participation across the ecosystem.
We have not noticed considerable changes in the version uploaded to Tally, so in this case, we will probably maintain this position in that instance.