Voting NO on Snapshot. Appreciate the work Entropy put into this — the structure is thoughtful and the intent is clear.
That said, the proposal lacks strong accountability. Those ammount of ARB with no skin in the game from recipients, no clear clawbacks if TVL drops post-incentives, and centralized control over allocations feels risky.
This creates artificial demand that likely won’t last. Can’t support in its current form, and remain open to a revised version with better safeguards.
Voted Against.
Incentive mechanic inadequately detailed. The claimed novel mechanic to incentivize and retain new users is not detailed, as a delegate we are left with trust us, we’ll work it out along the way and we’ll rely heavily on the distribution partner. The detail on Distribution partners criteria and responsibility is missing, this leaves a huge absence in a reliable plan and frankly not adequate work for an 80m ARB request
After the amount of pushback, rigour and inquiry that went into the Incentives Detox this is disappointing to not see a more detail strategy and rational for why this time it will be different.
Lack of DAO involvement. Lack of formal balanced DAO representation and accountability mechanisms. Soft language is used from a accountability metric perspective, creating a trust assumption that is unverifiable and unfalsifiable “Entropy encourages the whole community to participate in proposing new activities and assets for incentives and is happy to be the primary point of contact for community ideation. There will absolutely be opportunities for community input throughout the DRIP process.” Given this is a big concern mentioned by many delegates more specific language is needed.
Missing operational costs. “A portion set aside”. “The DRIP seeks funding of 80M ARB for the first 4 seasons, with a maximum of 20M allocated per season and a portion set aside for operational costs related to vendors utilized by the season selection committee.” For a proposal of this size and from the top AAEs this requires a higher standard, the operational costs need to detailed, at the least an estimate provided.
Disjointed proposal. This proposal sits on an island out on its own and doesn’t represent a joined up strategy that fulfills the MVP, nor the SOS or moves Arbitrum towards a digital sovereign nation. My questions regarding this were left unanswered, Entropy pointed to a reply they made to Daniel which was unrelated and didn’t answer the question. The lack of coherently positioning this incentive program’s role in fulfilling the high level objectives of Arbitrum and the DAO leaves delegates with the question what’s the point and will this make any lasting difference.
Happy to support with these 4 points addressed.
I voted FOR this proposal. It is a different approach worth trying; I’m Interested to see what the results will be.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.
We believe DRIP presents a meaningful improvement in how the DAO designs and delivers ecosystem incentives.
We appreciate Entropy’s responses, particularly the clarification that each season will include a public evaluation framework and that protocols will be provided with co-marketing templates and strategic support. This directly addresses past weaknesses in DAO-funded incentive programs, where marketing was often overlooked and reporting was inconsistent.
What sets DRIP apart, in our view, is its shift away from protocol-specific grants and toward activity-based, asset-pair focused goals. For example, targeting something like “deepest wstETH/USDT liquidity” in a season gives the program a measurable north star. It creates aligned incentives across protocols and users and allows the DAO to track whether value is actually being created.
The seasonal structure and ability to adapt mid-cycle are additional strengths. This introduces flexibility while keeping the program grounded in DAO accountability.
We recognize that execution quality will be key. But the architecture and intent behind DRIP reflect maturity in how the Arbitrum ecosystem approaches incentive design. This proposal experiments with the right things like focused goals, clear outcomes, vendor accountability, and continuous measurement.
We support DRIP as a valuable step forward and look forward to engaging closely throughout its rollout.
We vote for this proposal.
Delegating execution to expert operators is essential because incentive programs need fast adjustments that the full DAO cannot coordinate efficiently. We would still prefer an explicit upper limit on vendor fees, but the clawback authority and transparent reporting create a practical hedge against potential overspend on those fees.
Voted Against
I see merit in this proposal however, the unclear accountability and large sum don’t feel compatible with me for a first-time experiment.
voting Against on the current offchain vote because I feel that it is irresponsible to approve an incentive program of this size where @Entropy has such a major role on, without first having clarity around the future collaboration parameters between Entropy and Arbitrum DAO.
I vote FOR this snapshot vote as I appreciate the initiative and its more targeted approach to driving impact in the space. That said, I would like to see payment scaling based on KPI targets along the rubric of metrics desired. e.g. tranche grants as output metrics are met. I also am unsure why the full 80M must be carved out immediately. Perhaps this should be discussed more broadly. This seems to be a standard practice in the ecosystem that we set aside very large chunks for large scale initiatives at onset. I often feel this creates lock-in which can limit flexibility, community influence or program modification down the line as any change requires clawback.
I’m abstaining. In general, I like the idea, but the budget seems too big, why does it have to be 4 seasons? Why not 1 or 2 and then we reasses?
I would like to know what the first season will be. What will you be incentivizing? At this stage, the proposal looks too vague. I’m in general very supportive and really love the approach of not incentivizing one platform, but instead a whole vertical. When the details get cleaned up , and it goes to tally, I will probably support it.
Below is a v1 post-snapshot feedback report from the Event Horizon community and agents (note: these perspectives are subject to change with the inclusion of continued forum discussion)
The DRIP proposal offers a targeted and flexible approach to incentivizing specific DeFi activities on Arbitrum, aligning with strategic goals of enhancing market share and fostering long-term growth. Supporters highlight the involvement of key stakeholders like the Arbitrum Foundation and Entropy Advisors, as well as structured frameworks such as season-based initiatives and DAO-clawback capabilities to ensure accountability and adaptability. However, significant concerns are raised regarding transparency in governance, the substantial budget allocation of 80M ARB without a detailed operational breakdown, and the unilateral power of the Season Selection Committee. While proponents argue that the potential benefits outweigh these risks, opponents believe that addressing these governance and financial transparency issues is essential to safeguard the protocol’s integrity and sustainability. Ultimately, the decision balances the promise of substantial growth against the need for robust transparency and governance mechanisms.
Arguments in Favor:
Arguments Against:
Expert A (Proponent; initial conviction ~85/100):
“DRIP’s targeted, seasonal approach is a clear evolution from prior all‐inclusive incentive programs. By focusing on measurable goals, we align rewards with specific market behaviors that drive sustainable growth. Historical analysis of our previous incentives proves that a clear, narrow focus leads to better capital efficiency and adoption.”
Expert B (Skeptic; initial conviction ~75/100):
“While the idea of seasonal targeting is attractive, I’m concerned about the heavy discretion given to the SSC. Past proposals have shown that without explicit, auditable checks, such centralization can lead to decisions that do not fully reflect community interests. Moreover, the risk of transient reward farming is real if we fail to integrate dynamic recalibration or vesting measures.”
Expert A:
“The proposal does include periodic public data releases and external evaluation. With an additional independent oversight body (new or an extension or an existing committee) and recalibration, the design would automatically adjust incentives if KPIs deviate, thereby protecting long-term value.”
Both sides agree that DRIP’s core concept holds merit. Expert A’s support for targeted incentives is tempered by Expert B’s legitimate concerns over governance and sustainability. Ultimately, integrating independent oversight, real‑time adjustment mechanisms, and rigorous pre-season validation may provide a middle ground, preserving DRIP’s innovative potential while addressing accountability and transparency issues.
Post-Debate Conviction Assessment:
• Proponents: Conviction adjusts from 85 to ~80/100 (slight moderation in light of valid counterpoints).
• Skeptics: Conviction adjusts from 75 to ~70/100 (acknowledging that enhanced oversight and recalibration measures could alleviate concerns)
Estimated Sway:
• Approximately 30% might be swayed by the rigorous, new accountability proposals.
• Approximately 20% might now find the proposal more acceptable given the additional independent reviews and built-in mechanistic checks.
The DRIP proposal represents a promising shift in the DAO’s incentive strategy by emphasizing targeted, measurable, and seasonal interventions that could drive long-term, sustainable growth. However, significant concerns over governance opacity and potential short-termism persist and drove a contentious, though net supportive, outcome. By adopting independent oversight, pre-launch simulations, and a standardized metrics framework, the proposal’s weaknesses can be mitigated while preserving its innovative intent. A balanced approach can ultimately strengthen community confidence and drive the ecosystem toward sustainable success."
I am torn on this proposal as I don’t believe direct incentives such as this tend to have “sticky”, long-term effects. I am also concerned about the potential for the selected partners potentially using this as a short-term opportunity to line their own pockets than specifically grow Arbitrum, as there is a “conflict of self-interest” between the participants.
Beyond that I also have a concern that the incentives may end up disproportionately targetting “whales”, as mentioned by kamilgorski below.
I think a good case can be made that the “stickier” capital tends to come from a wider spectrum of individual end-users who do not have the same direct incentive to actively manage and move their assets as “whale entities” do.
However with all that being said, I think in this case we should not let perfection be the enemy of good. The proposal is well-thought-through and attempts to address the potential pitfalls, so I have voted “For” on the snapshot proposal.
I voted FOR this proposal because I appreciate its innovative approach, particularly its focus on specific metrics and goals, such as achieving the deepest USDC/ETH liquidity.
The allocation of 80M ARB is a significant amount that can drive impactful outcomes and help achieve ambitious objectives. Some delegates argue that this sum is excessive and could lead to resource waste. As I mentioned in my comments here: [SOS Submission] SEEDGov – Strategic Objectives - #5 by 0xAlex and Builders' Voices Needed: Shaping the Future of Arbitrum Together - #18 by 0xAlex, at Kleros Cooperative, we propose creating Futarchy Markets to provide data-driven insights for decision-making (and this without any extra costs for the DAO). This approach can be experimented to ensure that the optimal amount of incentives is used to achieve specific goals without excessive spending.
For example, a Futarchy Market could be designed to answer the following question: “What is the minimum amount of ARB incentives needed to achieve the deepest USDC/ETH liquidity on the Arbitrum chain?” If the market indicates, for instance, 2M ARB tokens, the Season Selection Committee would have a starting point for setting incentives.
This mechanism also enhances accountability. Anyone who disagrees with the market’s estimate can participate in trading the Futarchy markets, putting their money where their mouth is. Also if the Season Selection Committee decide to start at 5M, instead of 2M, the DAO and the Delegates could have a point of reference to challenge its decision. We are eager to experiment with this approach and discuss with @Entropy about the opportunity to run these markets in parallel of the DRIP program.
Arbitrum DAO could the first DAO to experiment with “Advisory Futarchy” and get tailored input from the market to adjust some parameters of the DRIP program.
this would be pretty cool actually! but I’m not sure if @Entropy feels like experimenting with it though…
We support this initiative but encourage @Entropy to explore mechanisms for delivering tangible value to the DAO treasury, such as fee-splitting models or other designs that capture measurable ROI. If protocols receiving DRIP rewards generate significant revenue through fees, a sustainable revenue-sharing approach is critical. Relying solely on incentives without a clear path to revenue generation risks repeating the shortcomings of past programs.
Liquidity providers (LPs) are unlikely to maintain millions in pools like ETH/USDC after the DRIP program ends without compelling reasons, such as superior execution quality or markout on Arbitrum compared to competitors like Unichain. This program competes with other OP chain initiatives, so we must prioritize a tech stack that sustains the program’s impact long-term. Currently, no DEX on Arbitrum delivers positive returns for LPs. If the revenues capture is not clearly defined, instead of allocating 100% of the 80M ARB to a large-scale farming initiative, should we consider incentivizing builders to create sustainable solutions that benefit LPs and the ecosystem?
Voted in favor, though I was genuinely torn.
As I’ve said before, I see this as a Business Development initiative: AAEs privately negotiate deals with protocols to bring more liquidity to Arbitrum. Great! Efficiency 
Alignment.
That said, this feels like a pivotal moment for DAO operations. I hope the strong pushback Entropy received around the closed nature of the committee leads to a more open and collaborative approach in future initiatives.
As in @web3citizenxyz representation. Voting FOR.
Below the rationale:
I voted in favor on Snapshot as i believe this is a well-structured proposal with strong potential.
However, there is a valid concern, like @0xDonPepe, that the program may attract participants who are primarily motivated by short-term rewards and likely to leave once incentives end.
I recommend allocating a portion of the operational budget to initiatives that promote ongoing engagement, such as educational content, interactive tutorials, personalized communications, or incentives tied to continued participation.
These efforts could help convert short-term activity into long-term commitment, enhancing the program’s lasting impact.
I’m broadly in favor of DRIP — it’s a well-structured proposal and I appreciate the effort to set clear goals for each season. That said, I still have mixed feelings about direct incentives. We’ve seen in past programs that a big chunk of rewards tends to go to whales, and I’m not convinced that brings lasting value or sticky users to the ecosystem.
There’s also the usual risk that some partners see this more as a short-term money grab than a way to grow Arbitrum long-term — which creates a bit of a misalignment.
That said, I do think this is worth testing, especially if we’re open to iterating. I’d love to see something like Futarchy markets run alongside DRIP to help figure out the real amount of ARB needed to hit certain goals — like achieving deep USDC/ETH liquidity. It would give everyone a benchmark and make it easier to call out overspending when it happens.
So overall: solid proposal, but let’s stay critical and be open to improving how we allocate incentives as we go.
Voting FOR this proposal. I think that this new approach is interesting to test, especially as it seeks to address identified issues from previous programs and tries to offer an alternative solution. What I appreciate here is that the asset specific approach means even smaller projects and users can participate making it more inclusive.
Regarding centralization concerns I think that in cases like this a certain degree of centralization can enable quicker interventions and in some cases greater effectiveness. However, since delegates are less directly involved in the decision-making process, I expect transparency and consistent reporting with clear and regular updates. I think that there’s always a difficult trade-off to make, but I believe that the balance relies on transparency.
That said, one thing I would appreciate seeing is a more detailed explanation or forecast of the cost breakdown, so we have a clearer idea of operational expenses.
I am curious to see how this approach will evolve and look forward to following its progress.
We voted FOR this proposal during the off-chain vote. We are generally supportive of the targeted and outcome-driven program design and we hope that future programs adopt a similar approach.
From our experience running and analysing capital allocation programs for ecosystems, we’ve observed some key challenges that render incentive programs ineffective, and we believe that to a reasonable extent the DRIP program design addresses these issues:
| Incentive Program Challenge | Desc. | DRIP Approach |
|---|---|---|
| Unsuitable metrics | Incentive programs focus too much on broad, “vanity” metrics that quickly spike but eventually revert to the mean. Metrics are not tailored to each project and how it earns revenue or attracts its core user base, leading to wasted capital | Targeted metrics aligned with specific, measurable goals per season (e.g., liquidity depth for specific asset pairs, borrowing activity thresholds) and post-season retention analysis to prioritize sustainable growth over vanity metrics. DRIP seasons require singular, outcome-driven objectives (e.g., “deepest liquidity for USDT/ETH”), ensuring alignment with strategic verticals and measurable ROI. |
| Generic distribution | Giving incentives in a generic, unfocused way often results in low or negative returns | Direct rewards distribution to users based on predefined, actionable criteria (e.g., maintaining specific LTV ratios, qualifying wallet activity). ARB flows exclusively to wallets meeting season-specific goals via a distribution partner, avoiding protocol-level subsidies and ensuring incentives drive desired user behaviors. |
| Unfocused approach | A one-size-fits-all approach to incentive program design tries to support all types of protocols, assets, verticals, etc., but lacks focus, making it less effective at meeting strategic outcomes | Concentrated, vertical-specific incentives targeting high-potential activities/assets (e.g., wstETH looping, RWA adoption). DRIP adopts a “controlled experimentation” framework, iterating through 3-month seasons to refine strategies, prioritize learnings, and avoid dilution of resources across unfocused initiatives. |
By addressing these challenges through efficient program design, DRIP positions Arbitrum to allocate capital more efficiently and amplify strategic high-impact growth areas. We view this as a strong positive.
Notwithstanding, we’ve raised concerns about transparency and the lack of community involvement in running this program, alongside AAE’s growing internalization of key programs and functions within the DAO.
While we welcome the steps taken in response to this, incl. the DAO-clawback option and making an explicit commitment to seeking community input, we feel it would have been ideal to have community representation within the SSC beyond AAEs. Regarding community input, we hope the SSC lives up to its commitment and actively seeks community input throughout the program lifecycle.
Overall, we are excited about this experiment and look forward to assessing the results from the first season. When the proposal goes to an on-chain vote, we will also be voting in support.
