Name: GMX governance committee
Wallet Address or ENS: 0x183D275AC4A046d549aD4dc89c41bff49D632Fa3
Tally: Profile URL
What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:
Defi development on Arbitrum
Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
The overall goals for the Arbitrum DAO should focus on achieving a decentralized, secure, and scalable layer-2 solution for Ethereum that enhances user experience and developer engagement. This involves promoting governance transparency, incentivizing community participation, and ensuring sustainable growth through continuous innovation and strategic partnerships.
Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview 1.3k
Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.
Prompts to Answer:
How would you vote?
Against
We would vote against the proposal if it failed to address several critical factors adequately:
- Risk of Underperformance: While the proposed 30% yield target is ambitious, it may not be consistently achievable. If the program fails to meet this target, it could result in insufficient funds to cover bounties and operational costs, ultimately compromising the program’s effectiveness.
- High Operational Costs: The monthly operational costs of $100k-$115k are substantial, particularly given the near break-even margin in Year 1. If the program does not generate the expected yield, these costs could quickly deplete the grant funds, leaving little for actual community incentives.
- Centralization Concerns: The oversight and allocation committees, while intended to provide checks and balances, may introduce centralization risks. The inclusion of Flipside team members on these committees could lead to conflicts of interest, reducing the overall transparency and fairness of the program.
- Program Efficacy: The pilot program’s data is promising, but scaling up to the proposed amounts ($15M in the first year and $10M in the second year) is a significant leap. There needs to be a clear, detailed plan on how the program will be scaled, monitored, and adjusted as needed to ensure it delivers the expected outcomes.
- Community Feedback: If there is substantial opposition or significant concerns from the community that have not been addressed or integrated into the proposal, this could indicate potential issues with the proposal’s viability and acceptance.
Without strong assurances in these areas, the proposal could pose undue risks to the DAO’s assets and governance integrity.
What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
- Alignment with Community Interests: It’s essential to ensure that the program aligns with the broader interests of the Uniswap community. Community feedback and support should be considered to ensure the proposal meets the ecosystem’s needs effectively.
- Alternative Strategies: Exploring alternative or supplementary strategies for deploying the treasury funds, such as direct investments in ecosystem projects or simpler grant mechanisms, might offer a more straightforward and lower-risk approach.
Ultimately, while the proposal has potential benefits, these risks and concerns warrant careful consideration before moving forward with such a substantial financial commitment.
How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
Sample Voting Issue 2:
Issue Overview:
Overview Link 1 3.7k
Overview Link 2 500
FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.
Prompts to Answer:
Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)
Full Reimbursement
No Reimbursement
Split Reimbursement
Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.
We would encourage the DAO to split reimbursement
Reasoning:
- Balancing Fairness and Responsibility: A split reimbursement recognizes the affected parties’ losses while also considering the limitations and responsibilities of the protocol. It acknowledges the community’s obligation to support its members while maintaining financial sustainability.
- Mitigating Moral Hazard: Full reimbursement could set a precedent that encourages reckless behavior, assuming the DAO will always cover losses. A split reimbursement provides support without fully insulating users from the consequences of risky actions, thereby promoting more prudent behavior in the future.
- Community Trust and Support: Offering a partial reimbursement helps maintain trust in the protocol. It shows that the DAO is willing to stand by its users in times of crisis as a supportive community while also being mindful of its long-term health and stability.
In summary, a split reimbursement approach balances the need to support affected users and maintain the protocol’s long-term viability, promoting a fair and responsible community ecosystem.
Languages we speak and write: English
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
The GMX Governance Council is part of the GMX DAO which oversees the GMX Protocol, treasury assets which include interests in other Arbitrum protocols and 8 million ARB tokens.
Such affiliations may pose conflicts of interest