Delegate Statement Template

[Hache]

Name: Arth (Individual)

Wallet Address or ENS: arthz.eth

Tally Profile URL: Tally | @ArturoDj30

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• Gaming development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?
In my opinion, liquidity mining should not be too aggressive since it would lead to increasing the risk and volatility of the token but it would also attract a greater number of large and small users, which would be good for the ecosystem. But on the other hand, it is known that the vast majority of users, with greater short-term profits, begin to get rid of or sell their assets, causing selling pressure. It would be better to impose a decreasing medium-term mining in the long term.

The objective of a DAO is the decentralized and healthy growth of the project, it is to obtain the best innovative, objective ideas that allow us to incorporate and improve the usefulness of the project and determine a decision between everything in a decentralized way.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. How would you vote?
   For

2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
   The task I would make is to integrate a longer vesting for the subsidies and a cliff of approximately 6 months followed by an unlocking every 2 months.

3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
   I have been in cryptography since 2017 and it is inevitable to at least have centralization in the DAO since the largest holdings on many occasions push the balance towards their side or towards their interests due to the voting power they entail, but on the other hand the largest holders are Those who also support the ecosystem, have broader knowledge and are more faithful to the objective of the project. In conclusion, the DAO is well established.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

1. Full Reimbursement
   I am inclined towards a full refund because the trust of the community is paramount in any project, apart from that the community members are contributing great value to the project ecosystem by providing the trust and continuity of the project, in case the hacked value can be recovered and In the event that it cannot be recovered or a part of the stolen value can be recovered, a long-term refund would be made with a delivery in years or with a vesting.

Languages I speak and write: Spanish and english

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I am an honest person and I confirm that I have no conflict of interest.

[karpatkey]

A. Name (organisation or individual): karpatkey (Organisation)

B. Wallet Address or ENS: 0x583E3EDc26E1B8620341bce90547197bfE2c1ddD

C. Tally Profile URL: Tally | governance.karpatkey.eth

D. What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• Improving Governance participation

E. Stance on “Overall Goals for the Arbitrum DAO”:
We are happy to see the current programs, such as the Short Term Incentives Program (STIP) and Uniswap-Arbitrum Grants Program (UAGP), and we believe the engagement from both individual community members and organisations during events, such as the DAO Day calls, has been high. The Arbitrum DAO is well-positioned to lead by taking community-driven governance initiatives and turning them into highly impactful programs that strengthen the protocol’s future.

Our stance on overall goals for the Arbitrum DAO includes the following ideas that we believe should be a priority:

1. Developing and implementing a robust treasury management framework that aligns the DAO’s strategic goals with the actions and decisions of those responsible for managing the treasury.
2. Creating a responsible Treasury Diversification plan, such as developing best practices to make the DAO sustainable and able to support public goods initiatives.
3. Developing a dynamic and prosperous DeFi ecosystem that nurtures the network’s expansion, ultimately translating into increased revenue for the DAO.
4. Further fostering programs that maintain healthy voter participation levels and representation that enhance the DAO governance.

F. Sample Voting Issue 1:**

Issue Overview 1.3k

Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralisation of power and favor of one service provider.

How would you vote?
We would vote Against it due to concerns about the centralisation of power around the oversight of the bounties program.

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
There are two issues here. This creates a skewed power distribution, and critical delegates overlook this issue for their benefit. To help solve this, the following could be amended:

• The allocation committee could be restructured to remove some representations by Flipside.
• The proposal should mandate that those who would benefit from a seat on the allocation committee must abstain from voting.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralisation of authority and the ability to get things done?
We recognise that these mistakes can be unintentional and that some of the most valuable DAO members are active across many initiatives. With this in mind, our approach would be to ensure that a culture and formal rules remain in place that promote active DAO members to uphold many roles but disclose conflicts of interest. Members with conflicts of interest should recuse themselves from voting or decision-making.

G. Sample Voting Issue 2:

Issue Overview:
Overview Link 1 3.6k
Overview Link 2 497
FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022, Rari was hacked for 80M, and a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then, in May 2022, another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward. This time, it was not passed.

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
Split Reimbursement

Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.
A refund is appropriate where errors have been made that are not the fault of the depositors, but only if the longevity and sustainability of the protocol are maintained.

• A refund that can not be sustainably issued due to the size should be restructured, delivered over time, or reconsidered to ensure it does not undermine the protocol’s long-term health.

H. Languages we Speak and Write:
Our team has native speakers of English, Portuguese and Spanish.

karpatkey’s Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest Answer:
We are active contributors to the governance of other protocols, such as AAVE, Uniswap, and Safe. We also manage treasuries or serve on treasury committees for protocols such as Balancer, GnosisDAO, and ENS, and we hold multiple crypto assets in our treasury. Please check our treasury reports for more information.

[Vertex_Protocol]

Name: Vertex Protocol

Wallet Address or ENS: vertexdao.eth (0x9D64c41eC3a1f49952dE2E16EBB0723022f75008)

Tally Profile URL: Tally | VertexDAO

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

We believe that the Arbitrum DAO has two main duties in relation to acting as stewards for the chain:

• The DAO must ensure the integrity of the chain on a technical level. This means engaging experts to help make decisions which maintain the security of the chain and safety of its users while maintaining core values such as decentralization.
• The DAO should facilitate the growth of Arbitrum by attracting and supporting projects who choose to build here. In practice, this can range from calculated liquidity mining programs to efforts cultivating and maintaining a unique sense of Arbitrum culture among users and builders.

These are wide ranging and complex tasks, which makes a healthy governance system all the more important. Through a strong collection of delegates working together, we believe the DAO can guide Arbitrum in maintaining a healthy and ever-growing ecosystem. As Vertex comes close to the end of its first year of operation on Arbitrum it ranks #2 in average daily volume amongst derivatives DEXs in DeFi, positioning itself as a leading protocol whose experience can help shape the path Arbitrum takes into a fruitful one.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

How would you vote?

We would vote against this proposal, but would support a revised version or similar efforts.

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

We support gathering more analytics, we believe that having access to more data in various ways is beneficial to the DAO. We also support the idea of funding grant programs through the yield of managed strategies, as it saves the DAO money.

However, there are several issues that we would want to see addressed before voting yes on this proposal. There are two distinct services being provided in this proposal. The first is the management of a UNI loan to generate yield, the second is what is funded with that yield. We believe that when the DAO engages a service provider, it should be through a process where multiple service providers are evaluated for a task. In this scenario, there is no guarantee that the same entity that can manage yield can also create quality analytics or vice versa. Therefore, we would like to see a process that separates these two tasks and independently selects teams to perform either one. This isn’t to say that a particular team could not do both, but that the community would need to support them in both categories.

Another aspect of the proposal we would want changed is the timeline. The proposal suggests a 3 year term, which we feel is too long for a proposal that includes a yield generating strategy which has not been proven to be sustainable. We would suggest shortening the length of this term to 1 year with quarterly evaluation periods.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

In respect to the makeup of the oversight committee, we believe that a standard should be set such that an committee does not contain members of the group it is overseeing. In contrast, we would support the service provider selected to perform management of the funds having a significant, but minority, presence on the allocation committee. This allows for their expertise to be used properly in timely maintenance of any yield producing strategies.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Issue Overview:

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

Full Reimbursement

We believe that if a protocol suffers losses through an exploit, it should do its best to make users whole through full or partial reimbursement depending on the situation. While we operate with trustless technologies, trust remains crucial when a user chooses to interact with a protocol at all. If DeFi is to grow, it remains critical that end users are offered reasonable protections that allow them to leave the traditional finance world without fear of a total loss of assets. In this particular scenario, while all procedural and technical measures were followed, we believe that there were several business decisions that resulted in loss of trust from users. It is of course easier in retrospect to see where mistakes were made but we think that stronger communication between all parties could have resulted in a smoother process that would leave users in the best spot possible.

Languages we Speak and Write: English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: None, though Vertex will be active in governance on multiple chains.

[danimim]

Name: danimim.eth | Blockful

Wallet address: gov.blockful.eth (0x1F3D3A7A9c548bE39539b39D7400302753E20591)

Tally Profile URL: Tally | gov.blockful.eth

Twitter profile: x.com

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

• Public Goods funding
• Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

About Blockful

We are a company focused on creating tools that help improve coordination between human beings in society. We use lines of code to reduce friction between people and increase the efficiency of social interactions.

In recent years, we have leveraged our expertise to contribute to the growing ecosystem of decentralized organizations. As a service provider for DAOs such as ENS DAO and Shutter DAO 0x36, we also participate in ecosystems like Optimism and Arbitrum. Additionally, we are Uniswap grantees, focusing on developing tools that enhance their governance.

Our aim is to understand the model, culture, and structure of each DAO so that we can contribute in the best possible way.

A Security-Oriented Approach

Blockful is constantly working to make DAO governance more secure.

We’ve seen a number of attacks on decentralized organizations due to problems in the structure of DAOs.

At first, these may be simple concerns, such as low participation in delegate governance. But they have the potential to bring about the end of the protocol - by stealing money from the treasury, exploiting a vulnerability in the protocol or even forcing the organization to dissolve.

Our goal in governance is always to think about Arbitrum’s security. Not just profitability or financial efficiency, but asking ourselves: is this a new risk vector for the DAO?

With the answers, we can help not only to vote, but to contribute to the development of safer governance in the organization.

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

The DAO should serve as the point of contact for funds and ecosystem growth, while also ensuring secure and beneficial enhancements and updates across the entire Arbitrum ecosystem. Funds should be allocated to incentivize the development of unique products and ideas within the ecosystem. A DAO responsible for advancing Arbitrum must also remain vigilant and collaborate closely with Ethereum to maintain alignment with the core vision of the Ethereum ecosystem. Therefore, the DAO should prioritize: 1) maintaining decentralized, secure, and effective governance to ensure economic sustainability; 2) continuing to stimulate Arbitrum’s growth by incentivizing builders and protocols that strengthen the Arbitrum ecosystem and value; 3) staying aligned with Ethereum’s core principles as an L2 solution that provides benefits to the decentralized ecosystem as a whole.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

• How would you vote? Against
• What amendments would you make to the proposal if any? Alter the allocation committee to 1/7 instead of 3/7 as proposed by Flipside. I would simply vote against it and outline my reasoning. There are countless alternative methods to increase user engagement.
• How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done? I see a problem with this proposal because, although committees or delegates fulfill the vital function of representing the voices of many in order to optimize governance processes, a DAO shouldn’t put governance or decentralization at risk in exchange for more users. We can explore other avenues to achieve this. While users are a crucial part, governance encompasses the entirety, and when governance is jeopardized, the treasury is at stake, which could be irreversible. The involvement of only one service provider in this also indicates a selective decision-making process. Other service providers may wonder why they were not included in these seats with the same impact, undermining the credibility with those who are investing effort, time, and work into the DAO. This kind of movement, granting seats to university clubs, sounds like a bribery system, where someone votes in a particular interest and receives something in return. Cancelling this proposal would prevent community problems and discussions and would not bring the centralization/decentralization problem into question. The slight discrepancy also suggests a political agenda rather than a community-driven one. Would the voting result be the same if Uniswap implemented a private voting system?

Sample Voting Issue 2:

The full reimbursement in this case will almost always be assured, as the major voters can also be the DAOs involved, primarily due to their potentially greater voting power. The DAO’s objective should be to foster consensus among all parties involved. It’s worth noting that this differs from the previous scenario, where there wasn’t an almost bribery-like system at play; here, those directly affected are voting, rather than a political outsourcing based on seat gains.

Failure to reimburse in this case could result in a loss of reputation within the ecosystem and potentially lead to a protocol crash, especially worse following a hack.

In my opinion, it’s preferable to reimburse and begin developing alternative economic mechanisms to safeguard this value as soon as possible, or to implement a reimbursement system that occurs gradually over time to mitigate any impact on token price.

The hacker exploited a reentrancy vulnerability within Rari’s Fuse lending protocol. Nevertheless, it’s crucial to recognize the complexity of this situation. From my perspective, there isn’t a definitive right or wrong answer, given the multitude of interests at stake.

Languages I speak and write:

Portuguese, English, Spanish, Russian and French

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

I am a Balancer Community Moderator, but I vote, speak and take decisions aligned with my team’s perspective at blockful, whom I am representing here.

My team’s technical knowledge and market vision also reflect my own views.
This means I am bringing with me the valuable background of my team in the decisions.

[HMXorg]

Name (organization or individual): HMX.org

Wallet Address or ENS: 0x8f27186818939f3292149983A86981582AaD0BAf

Tally Profile URL: Tally | HMXorg

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• Improving Governance participation
• Supporting Infrastructure

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

The goal of the DAO at Arbitrum is to build a healthy and sustainable ecosystem through a decentralized governance mechanism. This approach empowers builders and contributors to actively participate and shape the strategic direction of the Arbitrum ecosystem. Our DAO’s goals span in multiple dimensions:

1. Technical Innovation: At Arbitrum, we need a rollup which has the security, efficiency, and privacy for the ecosystem, ensuring that the infrastructure is robust and reliable for all users.
2. Business and Ecosystem Growth: The expansion and utilization of the ecosystem, including ARB tokens, are central to our objectives. We aim to enhance the utility and adoption of the ecosystem, driving both growth and value creation.
3. Inclusive Governance: Unlike traditional corporate structures, the DAO emphasizes democratic engagement, allowing every member’s voice to be heard. DAO’s goal is to encourage open discussions and collective decision-making, ensuring that all viewpoints are considered in shaping the future of the DAO.
4. Long-Term Sustainability: Our ultimate goal is to establish an ecosystem that is not only effective in the short term but also viable and resilient over the long haul. The DAO should committed to aligning all stakeholders with the shared vision of a robust and flourishing DAO.

These goals also outline our commitment to transforming how decisions are made and executed within the Arbitrum ecosystem, ensuring it remains forward-thinking and adaptive to the needs of its community.

Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview 1.3k

• Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
• For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
• This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

1. How would you vote?
   I would vote against this proposal. While the initiative to attract new users through bounties is commendable, the structure of the proposal gives a high power to Flipside Crypto, particularly in terms of bounty allocation and program oversight. This concentration of power compromises the decentralized ethos of the DAO.

2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
   To improve the proposal, I recommend broadening the composition of both the allocation and oversight committees to include a more diverse range of participants. This could involve inviting other analytics service providers and ensuring that no single party holds a disproportionate vote. A predefined structure for committee creation, aimed at enhancing diversity and reducing conflicts of interest, should be established right from the start.

3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
   Balancing centralization and the efficiency of operations is inherently challenging. While decentralization may complicate decision-making processes due to the involvement of multiple parties, it is essential for maintaining the integrity and democratic nature of a DAO. Emphasizing transparency and open dialogue can mitigate these complications. It’s important that all contributors align towards the collective goals of the DAO, ensuring that the focus remains on the community’s interest rather than individual gain. This approach fosters a more collaborative environment and ultimately drives more effective and equitable decision-making.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Issue Overview:
Overview Link 1 3.6k
Overview Link 2 498
FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

In response to the FEI RARI Hack, I suggest a Split Reimbursement strategy. This approach offers partial compensation to those affected, which helps preserve the DAO’s financial reserves while still supporting community members. It also mitigates the risk of moral concerns by emphasizing shared responsibility between the platform and its users. Additionally, involving the community in the decision-making process ensures transparency and aligns with collective interests. Establishing a consistent policy for partial reimbursements also sets a sustainable precedent for managing similar situations in the future, ensuring the ecosystem remains resilient.

Languages I speak and write: English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I am a team member at HMXorg, a perpetual protocol operating on Arbitrum. Our goals align with the growth and enhancement of our product, which directly contributes to the development of the Arbitrum ecosystem.

[WintermuteGovernance]

Name: Wintermute Governance

ENS: wintermutegovernance.eth

Tally Profile URL: Tally | Wintermute Governance

Hi Arbitrum Community,

We are excited to publicly announce our Arbitrum Delegate Platform and begin supporting the Arbitrum ecosystem in our fullest capacity! We have been an early user and supporter of Arbitrum and our Delegate Platform represents our ongoing efforts to empower Arbitrum’s decentralization and growth.

At Wintermute, we believe that a decentralized world needs robust and progressive governance systems. Our goal is to support DAOs along their journey towards such a state through objective, long-term value-add decision-making.

Our Core Values:

Long-term value creation over short-term opportunism.

For example, we do not support short-term rent-seeking token distribution programs; or the redistribution of tokens that carry no positive second-order effects.

In contrast, we do support and encourage purpose-driven mechanisms that incentivize positive behaviour and are value-maximizing; or that improve alignment between token holders and the protocol.

Transparency, alignment, and proactivity.

We are proactive in providing clear and consistent reasoning behind our decision-making and proposals, ensuring the protocol’s sustainability is at the heart of all governance discussions.

Objective data-driven decision-making.

We use data and research to ensure our final decision is objectively value-accretive for the protocol.

By becoming a delegate we hope to support Arbitrum and have an impact in fostering a user-focused, neutral, sustainable, and inclusive ecosystem.

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• Improving Governance participation
• Supporting Infrastructure

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

• Fostering Innovation, Human Capital & Ecosystem Growth (i.e., Empowering Decentralization!)

The Arbitrum Community has done a fantastic job at cultivating an ecosystem of diverse contributors that are hungry to provide value to the DAO. Such efforts have transpired into successful growth and development programs and we feel its extremely important for the DAO to remain vigilant in finding and supporting great human capital and providing them with the resources they need to innovate and grow.

• Safety, Security, and Inclusiveness of Users & Developers

Users & Developers are the lifeblood of the Arbitrum ecosystem and great emphasis should be placed on creating an inviting and safe environment.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

Vote: Against

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

The proposal suffered from a myriad of misalignments and unnecessary complexity and overhead. We’d recommend the following amendments:

• Eliminate any form of active fund management

We understand the appeal to try and offer cost-free grants through yield-generation strategies, however, it introduces much more complexity, smart contract risk, and price risk which could all lead to adverse situations leaving the DAO with fewer funds.

• Eliminate the Oversight Committee

We agree that there is a clear conflict of interest with Flipside being on the Oversight Committee, but, in all honesty, 3 members should not be making a $10M decision on behalf of the DAO. Instead, the proposal should have aimed to request renewal from the DAO after 1 year assuming the program was successful.

• Reduce the number of Flipside Allocation Committee members to 1

One Flipside member would be sufficient for the Allocation Committee, this would’ve provided them with a way to tee up transactions and then have the remaining Committee members approve it if it’s in line with the intended purpose of the proposal.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

Centralization of authority is not necessarily a bad thing as we have noticed great success come from working groups. It ultimately comes down to the DAO trusting the relevant parties and the size of approved funds will simply be a function of this. Trust is built through reputation, relationship, and context, and it’s very unlikely that less reputable actors will be trusted with large amounts of DAO funds.

In saying this, we always think it’s a good idea (where possible) to implement a mechanism for the DAO to claw back funds if necessary.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

Vote: Full Reimbursement

If possible, users without a doubt should be offered full reimbursement. Partial reimbursement can be offered alongside for users who want to increase their stake in the future of the protocol and have the belief that the protocol can recover from the hack.

Languages I speak and write:

English, Spanish, Russian, and many more.

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

Wintermute is an investor and user of many DeFi-related products and protocols that pose potential conflicts of interest. We aim to make appropriate disclosures and remove ourselves from certain decision-making scenarios where necessary.

[Argonaut]

Argonaut

0x21b3B193B71680E2fAfe40768C03a0Fd305EFa75

Tally URL

• Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
• Improving Governance participation

I’m excited to run for a delegate position on Arbitrum. I’m all about pushing for a truly decentralized Arbitrum, focusing on security, fairness, and innovation. Let’s make Arbitrum even better!

Voting Issue 1:
Against

Proposed Amendments: Increase Uniswap community representation by adding more seats to the committee. Introduce a range of analytics providers to enhance competition and innovation.

Authority vs. Efficiency: Balancing central authority with operational efficiency is crucial. For Uniswap, prioritizing decentralization and community governance is key, ensuring decisions remain transparent and inclusive.

Voting Issue 2:
Advocate for a split reimbursement strategy where affected users receive a portion of their losses, balancing reparative needs with financial sustainability.
This model considers the extent of damage and hack specifics to determine fair compensation, promoting system integrity without incentivizing risky behavior.

Languages I speak and write: English, Spanish

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: Will be informed if any, there is no conflicts of interest at the moment.

[jwindawi]

Name: JasonW

Wallet Address or ENS: 0xfe8a5765bDdA3A31801E89d4d183d30555B5F4e4 (jwindawi.eth)

Tally Profile URL: Tally | jwindawi.eth

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

My focus in governance is on building a sustainable future for Arbitrum DAO. I’ve worked as a governance lead for a DeFi DAO as well as being a governance-focused protocol specialist for Alchemy. Prior to that, my background is in institutional tradfi investing and governance, as well as a stint in academia as an organizational sociologist studying blockchain projects. I’ve become an Arbitrum delegate because I believe in the tech and in the community and am looking forward to building together. Specific areas I’m in interested in include:

• Supporting Infrastructure
• Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
• Improving governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO

As the author of AIP-2, I’ve seen firsthand how the Arbitrum DAO has grown since its earliest days to become one of the most innovative community governance structures in the ecosystem. This growth has been strongly aligned with the community values in Section 6 of the DAO’s Constitution, and I’m excited to contribute to the DAO’s continued evolution along those lines.

Within that context, there are several areas I see as critical to the DAO’s future:

1. Growing the ecosystem sustainably. Arbitrum operates in a highly competitive space and needs to continue to excel at capturing mind and market share. At the same time, the DAO Treasury is not infinite, and funds need to be spent with a long term view. This means that transparency, accountability and demonstrated benefits need to increase jointly with the amount of ARB spent on any single initiative.
2. Funding innovation. Offchain Labs continues to contribute leading technology for the space and for Arbitrum. The DAO can also contribute by directing funds to projects with the potential to accelerate the development of Arbitrum’s stack.
3. Expanding DAO participation. The DAO Constitution defines social and technical inclusivity as core community values, and they should both be kept in focus as core goals. The DAO should play an important role in meeting these goals by continuing to invest in programs that give motivated community members ways to contribute beyond governance and code development.

Sample voting issue 1

I would vote against this proposal, while acknowledging the improvements made to it by Flipside over the course of its development as well as the fundamentally attractive concept of “no negative net UNI”.

Proposed amendments

The core of my objection to this proposal as presented is that it bundles two complex proposals into an even more complex one. This bundling compounds the related issue of centralizing both benefits and control around Flipside. Because of this, the proposal would benefit from splitting the grant program from the funding/investment components into their own proposals, each of which could then be crafted to be more compelling.

The first component would remain the ecosystem activation and retention via bounties, though with a more explicit commitment beyond that stated in the proposal to fund bounty programs to be managed by other providers. This part of the grant would also benefit from some form of multi-stakeholder oversight along the lines of the original Allocation Committee, though with an explicit mandate to ensure that bounties are distributed and measured effectively.

The second component would be the investment mandate to fund the bounty program. There are a number of areas for improvement in the program as proposed, not least of which is the projected yield of 30%. The absence of a performance track record makes this impossible to evaluate, which is unfortunate given the vulnerability of the bounty program’s funding to fluctuations in this yield. Charging what amounts to 50% fees for this yield would also be far outside of tradfi standards for such a strategy, and would surely eat into the yield on a net basis. The DAO would be better served by opening this component to competitive bids that would add price discipline and pressure for more transparency around the projected sources of yield and their sustainability. The proposed Allocation Committee could then oversee the selected vendor, eliminating the need for the Oversight Committee.

Centralization vs. efficacy tradeoff

Decentralization isn’t an a priori good in all cases - there are times when centralization can allow a project to go farther, faster. That said, this proposal illustrates a few possibilities for adjusting the balance between centralization and decentralization to be more effective.

One of these is through competition, which is to say, by decentralizing at the start of the process in order to get to the best possible provider(s) for each part of the proposal, so that whoever is selected has the DAO’s trust to operate regardless of how centralized they are. Another is the path followed by Flipside in terms of opening participation to multiple projects in its revised proposal, as well as in its proposal of oversight committees with broad stakeholder representation.

Sample voting issue 2

My vote in this case would be for full reimbursement - the funds were owed to retail users as well as (ultimately) the members of other DAOs, and there was no possibility of the hacked DAO moving forward to justify keeping any funds in the treasury.

Conflicts of interest

I have no current conflicts of interest, and will revise my profile to disclose any future conflicts should they arise.

[EzR3aL]

Name EzR3aL

Wallet Address or ENS: ezr3al.eth or 0x8659D0BB123Da6D16D9394C7838BA286c2207d0E

Tally Profile URL ezr3al.eth’s Delegate Profile (tally.xyz)

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
DAOs are a great way to push projects further without the burden of being a registered company. My goal for the ArbitrumDAO is a great collaboration between other DAOs like Aave, and to setup a fixed budget plan for the ArbitrumDAO, as I think currently the DAO spendings are too high and aren’t tracked properly.

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview

• Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
• For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
• This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

1. How would you vote?
   Against
2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
   I would have suggested to include other analytic service provider, to reduce centralized power.
3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
   Setting up a team/commitee out of different member of analytic SP would probably solve the problem and get things done and it would make sure there is no centralisation.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
Issue Overview:
Overview Link 1
Overview Link 2

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

3. Split Reimbursement
   It depends on what caused the hack. If it was a bug by design, straight from the beginning it only makes sense to make user whole. If it was implemented by a third party it should be an effort by both teams. Its very important to involve the right SP to analyze the situation and make right decisions. But to satisfy user there should be at least a quick and small solution to show dedication to the user that its being worked on.

Languages I speak and write:
german, english

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
Diversity of opinions is critical to making progress and determining the future direction of the
Arbitrum ecosystem. We recognize and celebrate the fact that delegates will have diverse views and we both encourage and anticipate good-faith debates in the governance process. That being said, it’s critical that all featured delegates are operating with Arbitrum’s best interest in mind, so please affirm that you don’t have any conflicts of interest that would prevent you from using your best judgement to operate in the best interests of advancing the Arbitrum ecosystem.

[Dspyt]

Name (organization)

DSPYT (dspyt.com)

Wallet Address

0x4C11BA2ed1D936d769d0cce34CbC7Ea1E85182d0

Tally Profile URL

@dspytdao's DAO Profile

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

Improving Governance participation

Supporting Infrastructure

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

We are committed to enhancing the effectiveness and inclusivity of governance processes. By increasing participation and supporting essential infrastructure, we aim to help build a more resilient and responsive DAO. We believe in fostering a decentralized and transparent governance model that empowers all community members.
Our focus is on ensuring the long-term sustainability and success of the Arbitrum network through active community involvement and robust infrastructure development.

The primary goal of the DAO should be to build sustainable value and utility in the network rather than merely attracting short-term speculative interest. Therefore, our strategy would involve selective and strategic use of liquidity mining, aligned with the broader objective of long-term network growth and stability.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

How would you vote?

Against

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

We would suggest revisiting the proposal to ensure it aligns better with the principles of decentralization and community participation. Specific amendments could include:

Ensuring the Oversight Committee is run by reputable and independent DAO members to maintain a system of checks and balances. The party being overseen should not have a vote on its own Oversight Committee, as this compromises the integrity of the oversight process. For example, in a past proposal, one of the committee votes was held by an individual whose venture capital firm was an investor in the program being overseen. This type of conflict of interest should be avoided.

Creating a service provider-neutral framework to avoid favoritism and ensure that a wide range of analytics providers can compete fairly. This approach was suggested by Dune Analytics in a similar context and aligns with our goal of inclusivity and fairness.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

While centralization can sometimes expedite decision-making, it often undermines the core values of a DAO. We advocate for a balanced approach where efficient governance structures are in place, but not at the expense of broad community engagement and representation.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

Split Reimbursement

We believe that a split reimbursement approach is the most balanced and fair way to address such situations. Full reimbursement can create a moral hazard, encouraging less diligence in security practices if parties expect to be fully bailed out, the position of the DAO would be weakened. Conversely, no reimbursement at all can be excessively punitive and harm the trust and engagement of the community.

Instances When Reimbursement is Appropriate:

Severe Exploits with Broad Impact: When an exploit significantly affects a large number of users and the overall trust in the network, partial reimbursement can help restore confidence and support community stability.

Clear Governance Failure: If the exploit occurred due to a clear failure in the DAO’s governance or security protocols, partial reimbursement acknowledges the shared responsibility.

Instances When Reimbursement is Not Appropriate:

Negligence or Malpractice: If the exploit resulted from negligence or malpractice by specific parties, reimbursement should be withheld to emphasize the importance of best practices and accountability.

Minor or Isolated Incidents: Smaller exploits affecting a limited number of users may not warrant reimbursement, particularly if the cost of reimbursement would disproportionately burden the DAO.

Languages I speak and write: English, Russian, Spanish a bit

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

No conflicts of interest to disclose

[kuiclub]

Name: Kuiclub

Wallet Address or ENS: kuiclub.eth

Tally Profile URL: [亏club's Delegate Profile)

What area are you most interested in contributing to? (choose up to two tags):

• Public Goods funding

• Supporting Infrastructure

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

The goal of the DAO should be to foster a vibrant and sustainable ecosystem that prioritizes innovation, decentralization, and community engagement. We should be proactive in funding public goods and infrastructure projects that benefit the entire Arbitrum network. Liquidity mining should be balanced to incentivize long-term participation without creating unsustainable short-term spikes.

Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

Sample Voting Issue 1:

Issue Overview:

Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program. For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal. This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

How would you vote?

Against

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

I would propose diversifying the seats on the allocation and oversight committees to include representatives from multiple analytics service providers. This would mitigate the risk of centralizing power and ensure a more balanced and fair allocation of resources.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

While centralization can sometimes expedite decision-making, it is crucial to maintain a balance that prevents any single entity from having disproportionate control. Decentralized decision-making processes might take longer but they ensure fairness, transparency, and broader community trust.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Issue Overview:

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

Split Reimbursement

Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.

Reimbursement should be considered on a case-by-case basis. In cases where negligence or mismanagement by the protocol team is evident, full reimbursement might be justified. However, if the exploit was a result of unforeseeable circumstances despite best efforts to secure the protocol, a split reimbursement could be a fair approach. This balances compensating affected users while maintaining the financial stability of the project.

Languages I speak and write:

• English

• Chinese

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

I affirm that I don’t have any conflicts of interest that would prevent me from using my best judgement to operate in the best interests of advancing the Arbitrum ecosystem. Diversity of opinions is critical to making progress and determining the future direction of the Arbitrum ecosystem. I recognize and celebrate the fact that delegates will have diverse views and I both encourage and anticipate good-faith debates in the governance process.

Twitter: @kuiclub x.com

[George_WG]

Name: WOOFi (Organization)

Wallet Address: 0x0a9eeddaa65546ad35d3f0ac9e6f09575e4c9297

Tally: Profile URL

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• Improving Governance Participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

• Fund innovation and the public good using the Arbitrum tech
• Distribute the governance power in the hands of stakeholders crucial to the ecosystem growth
• Uphold Arbitrum’s ethos as an open-source, decentralized and censorship-resistant platform to scale Ethereum and foster borderless dApps for the next billion users

Sample Voting Issue 1 - UniSwap/Flipside Bounty

1. Against
2. To ensure fairness, an open tender should be put out so that any organization can apply it to ensure competitiveness and fairness. There should be no more than one seat per analytics vendor on the allocation committee, and at least two seats should be reserved for independent personnel. Additionally, Flipside should not have a seat on the oversight committee. Furthermore, to avoid relying on a single entity to safeguard the assets, a decentralized Uniswap v3 LP position management solution (e.g. Arrakis Finance) should be implemented.
3. To strike a balance between efficiency and decentralization in DAO governance, a top-down approach is necessary to distribute the decision-making power. This can be achieved through the following steps:

• Establish special workforces in sectors that matter the most to the DAO.
• Select subject matter experts to run the workforce within the limitations set by the DAO, including budget and individual allocation size.
• Leave decisions on matters outside of the limitations to be decided at the DAO level, and provide the option for the DAO to replace the workforce leads if enough consensus is reached.

Sample Voting Issue 2 - FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement

3. Split Reimbursement

First and foremost, governance decisions are final unless new material information comes to light, in which case a new proposal can be made regarding the same decision

In an ideal world, full reimbursement is the gold standard whilst also allowing the protocol to continue running. However, the FEI RARI hack was so large that a full reimbursement essentially means that the project can’t continue. Given FEI RARI’s great product-market fit, I would suggest a split reimbursement to keep the project running and position it for potential hypergrowth in the next cycle to make victims more than whole.

The split reimbursement mechanism compensates users in part with liquid assets held in the protocol’s treasury and in part with vested governance or debt tokens. Additionally, the team’s allocated tokens should be locked up and only vested if certain milestones, such as making victims whole, are met. This solution keeps the operation running, motivates the team to keep building, and creates a vested interest for both the team and users in the project’s success. It potentially gives more upside to the users.

[Entropy]

Name: Entropy Advisors (Organization)

Wallet Address: 0xb4c064f466931B8d0F637654c916E3F203c46f13

Tally: Profile URL

What area are we most interested in contributing to?

1. Improving Governance participation
2. Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

At Entropy Advisors, our primary objective for the Arbitrum DAO is to ensure that the Arbitrum tech stack becomes the most widely adopted infrastructure in the entire blockchain ecosystem. We envision a world where investors, users, and developers focus on contributing to the Arbitrum ecosystem without even making the conscious decision to do so, primarily because the network effects have grown so exponentially that “Why Arbitrum?” is no longer a question being asked. We believe the Arbitrum tech speaks for itself in practice, and that with proper stewardship and contributions to the Arbitrum DAO, the aforementioned question will turn into “Why not Arbitrum?”.

We are interested in contributing to all areas of the Arbitrum ecosystem as needs arise, but will be focusing on improving governance participation as well as tooling and protocol decentralization. The Arbitrum DAO is Entropy Advisors’ only customer, which is not something many other Arbitrum delegates can tout today. Our employees have extensive experience in research and have been active across numerous DAOs in the past, but have identified Arbitrum as the most promising technology stack and want to put all of our time, effort, and collective brainpower into ensuring the sustainable growth of the ecosystem – powered by the Arbitrum DAO.

Put simply, we believe in a diverse and highly capable delegate base, a DAO that is sustainable through diversified and robust revenue streams, responsible and carefully calculated spending that encourages the growth of the ecosystem, a highly intellectual group of service providers that can effectively execute on tasks on behalf of the DAO, and measures for accountability/processes that can stand the test of time.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

Issue Overview: Uniswap X Flipside

Our Take:

Against

In our view, this proposal gives too much power to Flipside as the primary allocator of the UNI being spent by the DAO, and also unfairly entrenches a data provider into the Uniswap ecosystem. To the former point, we do not believe it makes sense to give Flipside such a significant amount of power over which projects and metrics should be analyzed. These are ultimately meant to be community tools, so why would the broader community not have some representation/voice in what activities are incentivized? To the latter point, $25M is a lot of money. We believe that Uniswap would make a better impact with a program of this size by running an open bounty program available to all data providers, with no conflicts of interest on the council allocating funds. Companies like Dune, Artemis, Nansen, etc. would likely be interested in building out some of the things being proposed, and we believe that more competition often leads to better results. The conflict of interest that Flipside presents makes this proposal difficult to support. We would recommend Flipside removing themselves from the decision making process, thus creating a level playing field for all data providers.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Issue Overview: FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement

Our take:

Full Reimbursement.

We believe that in most cases, one of the DAO’s primary responsibilities is to ensure the safety of its members. This was an unfortunate situation where millions of dollars of innocent users’ funds were stolen due to an exploit, and the DAO had enough assets to fully reimburse the users who were affected. It could also be worth looking at other opportunities available to the DAO and whether the reimbursements should be made today versus in the future. While every hack has its own nuances and needs to be evaluated in isolation with all of the relevant facts, we believe that in this scenario all users should be reimbursed with idle funds.

Languages we speak & write: English, Finnish, Swedish

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

We work with Arbitrum, meaning that conflict of interest situations could potentially arise in the future. In any such cases, we pledge to abstain from voting and clearly divulge any COIs in the forum.

Twitter/X:

@EntropyAdvisors

[Djinn]

Djinn

0xBF122Ac9eE2cDd537fe404ADe218159051Ba9455

Djinn's Delegate Profile

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• Gaming development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

#1 Equipping the DAO with an overall vision and strategy, while remaining decentralized

I believe that the best path forward for Arbitrum’s DAO to become a leader in governance, sustainability, and network market share is to equip the DAO and stakeholders with the right processes and frameworks to pursue a unified vision + strategy. However, this may require forms of centralization that tend to conflict with the decentralized upside we see from our current DAO structure.

It’s an interesting challenge, and something that I believe will be a key differentiator among competitors.

#2 Creating a culture that supports innovation and collaboration

DAOs are chaotic, and often come with the potential to fragment among members across philosophical, business objective, and other differences.

I strive to help contribute to the DAO so we can create a culture that can enable curiosity, logical critique, and excellence across the many academic, technical, operational, and strategic initiatives that we pursue now and into the future.

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview

• Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
• For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
• This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

1. How would you vote?
   Against
2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any? I would ask to remove all but one of Flipside’s allocation seats and remove Flipside from all oversight capabilities.
3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done? I think this issue is more about conflict of interest, but it is ultimately up to the DAO to come to an agreement on our overall stance between centralization and output.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
Issue Overview:
Overview Link 1
Overview Link 2

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

1. Full Reimbursement
2. No Reimbursement
3. Split Reimbursement

This is tough. I would lean towards Full Reimbursement, to remain consistent with the temp check. However, long term wise, we need to decide on policy and precedent on hacks / exploits and how to address the issue at hand. We need to avoid one off solutions and carefully evaluate impacts / risks / opportunities that come from our decided actions.

Languages I speak and write: English, Chinese

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I am currently involved with the following protocols and initiatives:

• Vela Exchange (Advisor, co-founder)
• GCP (working group)
• Umoja (Advisor)
• Mainline Intelligence (Advisor)

[Bernard]

Name: Areta (Organization)

Wallet Address or ENS: aretagov.eth / 0x8b37a5Af68D315cf5A64097D96621F64b5502a22

Tally Profile: Areta Governance Profile URL

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

• 1. DeFi development on Arbitrum
• 2. Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

As DAOs emerge from their infancy, their structures have proven powerful tools for enabling decentralisation and autonomy. We view a well-designed governance system as a critical enabler for decentralised projects to allow them to leverage decentralisation as a strategic advantage, rather than treating it as an inconvenient necessity (where most of the market is currently at).

Arbitrum DAO, like many others, still encounters challenges in maintaining the organisation, highlighted by governance issues such as non-effective capital allocation, difficult contributor onboarding, and delegate decision-making overload. This scenario has highlighted areas where Arbitrum DAO can improve in establishing structured processes for better collaboration and is open to further strengthening against inefficiencies.

In our opinion, the primary goal of Arbitrum DAO should be to sustainably steward the Arbitrum protocol and ensure its long-term growth and prosperity. This should be done while ensuring that:

1. DAO members work towards commonly aligned longer-term objectives;
2. Contributors are well-equipped to come up with ideas and initiatives that improve and grow the ecosystem;
3. The ecosystem can grow organically within the right structure, including using the ARB token as an advantage.

Arbitrum DAO, moreover, should strive to be both sufficiently decentralised and ensure that contributors are able to operate efficiently in a well-defined and outlined organisational structure. Arbitrum DAO, at the end of the day, should be an organisation that has a clear vision and strategy, clear operational processes, capital allocation and budgeting model, and diversified and sustainable revenue streams. The Arbitrum community, in such a structure, should ideally be well-positioned to work towards this goal together, harnessing the ideas and brainpower of the entire collective to be greater than the sum of its parts.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

Issue Overview

• Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was sufficiently detailed out, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
• For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
• This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

1. How would you vote?

   Against

   There is a tricky trade-off to achieve between decentralisation and efficiency. Voting for or against would depend on the circumstances of the proposal. For example, if the proposal allocated a large amount with little oversight over the program manager and a relatively long engagement period, then voting against would be the sensible option. If the funding amount was reasonable, and the program outline also made sense, then voting in favour would ostensibly be a vote to enable efficiency and speed and reduce any unnecessary delays.

   However, there is a need to avoid conflicts of interest in these cases at all costs, especially in competitive environments where there are multiple interested parties (including other analytics providers). Here, the fact that Flipside had a position on the allocation committee and the oversight committee is a clear conflict and could lead to significant bias in the decision-making. While all other aspects of the proposal seem to make sense and are in line, it is this very obvious conflict of interest that we would like to avoid and would therefore vote against in order to, at the very least, set a precedent for DAOs and committees going forward. Even though we are strong believers in optimising for efficiency and being measured about the decentralisation vs. efficiency trade-off, it is crucial to avoid conflicts of interest in any situation.

2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

   In such a case, we would institute a staged disbursal of funds over ‘staged’ time periods, for example, once every 6 months. KPIs would be set (though would not be too rigid to not enable any unforeseen circumstances or situations) and if an oversight committee composed of a maximum of 3 individuals judged the KPIs to have been met over the quarter, funding for the next phase would be released.

   Depending on the total funding amount, length of the program, and plans to extend the program over a longer time, we would also prefer to have a procurement process for an analytics provider through an RFP. This would ensure standardisation of prices and a more consistent and fair process, and would make sure that there are no claims of favouritism. It would also make sure that the selected provider is the most fit-for-purpose.

   Lastly, and most importantly, we would make sure that there is no overlap between oversight and allocation committee members and, in the best case scenario, allow for one seat from one entity only (i.e., each member of the allocation committee has to be from a different entity and even two of them cannot be from Flipside).

3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

   It has been established that there is a trade-off between efficiency and decentralisation. For us, the most critical form of decentralisation is in the tech stack where there is the option to switch and build permissionlessly without censorship. For the Arbitrum protocol itself, this is paramount.

   Decentralisation in governance is indeed important, but we do not see it as the be-all-or-end-all. Instead, we think there has to be a certain balance that has to be found since a DAO is, at the end of the day, an organisation composed of a community that still needs to be profitable, steward the growth of the protocol and its treasury well, and ensure that the protocol remains attractive and lasts over the long run.

   As such, we think centralised points of efficiency are necessary even in a DAO, but it is critical for these points to be surrounded by utmost transparency, oversight, and regular reporting and accountability to the DAO. It is also important for there to be ‘term limits’ or ‘succession plans’ in these centralised points to minimise any entrenchment of power, and there need to be checks and balances as well. However, there should be a level of autonomy for individual parties within the DAO to be able to execute on decisions without constant check-ins and approval required, and they should be allowed to be judged on their performance over a certain time period.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Issue Overview:

Overview Link 1

Overview Link 2

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation, i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.

Split Reimbursement

We would choose to reimburse hacking victims to a certain number of cents on the dollar. The crux of the matter is that DeFi is permissionless and smart contract code is always liable to be hacked. Even in a security audit, it is almost close to impossible to patch all vulnerabilities, and all it takes is one small attack vector to hack a smart contract. It is for this very reason that 1) security is paramount, and 2) we are still very early in this space. As such, the motto of crypto and DeFi especially is more akin to ‘buyer beware’. Given that most DeFi participants are aware of this maxim, it would not be sensible to set a precedent and reimburse the entire amount.

However, there is a spectrum of risk and crypto marketing also tries to attract ‘regular’ users who are not as aware of the risks as DeFi natives. Moreover, these users trusted the smart contracts built by Rari, and if protocols try to say that it is all buyer beware and there is no recourse whatsoever for users, usage of protocols will drop precipitously. Therefore, to have a balance, a split reimbursement would make most sense to send the right signal.

In a situation where the protocol is fighting for its survival, then a reimbursement of any kind may not make any sense and the protocol has to optimise for it staying alive. However, on the flip side, if a protocol is relatively profitable, then a higher reimbursement may allow it to restore its image and be more trusted by users, potentially even attracting new users. Therefore, it depends on the state of the protocol’s finances as to the level of reimbursement that is instituted.

Languages we speak and write: English, German, Spanish, Mandarin, Hindi

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

Areta currently does not have any material conflicts of interest. We do not hold any other cryptocurrencies.

We are currently involved with the following initiatives:

• Arbitrum: ADPC (Procurement Committee), M&A Pilot Phase, RWA Innovation Grants Program
• Aave: Top 5 Delegate (profile here)
• Safe: Contributors
• Uniswap: Running the Uniswap-Arbitrum Grants Program (UAGP)
• dYdX: Trust Member of Operations Sub-DAO

Given our Arbitrum initiatives, conflict of interest situations could occur in the future. In these cases, we pledge to abstain from voting and divulge any conflicts publicly.

[TokenGoUp]

Delegate statement

Instructions:
Name (organization or individual)

TokenGoUp

Wallet Address or ENS

tokengoup.eth

Tally Profile URL

TokenGoUp's DAO Profile

Areas of interest:

1. Improving governance participation
2. IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

1. Make Token Go Up

2. Greater vision of the DAO should be to grow Arbitrum, drive adoption of the blockchain and create long term growth and value for not just the token but all impacted users/stakeholders in the Arbitrum ecosystem.

shareholders while enabling people to govern themselves and work towards a common mission without hierarchies.

2. The goal of the DAO should be to be dynamic, adaptable and flexible to remain relevant and effective, we should not be afraid of making mistakes as long as we keep learning from them. The DAO should iterate on the decentralized governance approval and gather inputs from all members regularly.

3. ⁠DAO should be able to deal with the complexity of the core protocol, the new businesses (GCP etc) and all activities it undertakes. Sometimes complex issues and decision making structures needed to solve them cannot be represented in a smart contract. Decentralised approach does not mean one size fits all. Complex decisions leading up to a vote while off-chain should still be transparent and widely accessed, to avoid centralized decision making structure. We need to develop structures that can handle this complexity.

4. ⁠The DAO should aim at providing accessibility to one and all, millions of users from all walks of life and varied backgrounds whether they are programmers, creative artist, an analyst, or something else entirely, there should be a place for them on the blockchain, providing them innovative opportunities and financial freedom with 100% transparency and security especially in more developing economies where gender and all social classes are not equitably represented.

I am at a stage in my life, where simply put I’m looking for something more, a way to again impact the world and bring a positive change. As an Architect and City planner, I’ve spent my entire professional life building social communities, physical landscapes and democratic spaces which are spaces of trust, built for everyone and built by everyone. Translating the same to digital spaces, I am interested in improving access and trust of users with enhanced security of the blockchain through on and off chain (IRL) community participation.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

How would you vote?

• Against

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

• The proposal should be amended or adapted to ensure the oversight committee and allocation committee are well separated to avoid a conflicts of interest. The process for selecting vendors should be public and verifiable with a mechanism for the DAO to review such decisions (either explicitly or via optimistic governance)

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

• Centralization of decision making can surely speed up moves but if it comes at the cost of the protocol being compromised on ethical grounds or negligence of security issues then caution is needed.

  Sample Voting Issue 2:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

The parties should be reimbursed fully if the protocol is in a position to, but those receiving compensation should also be mindful that if the cost of doing so is so onerous that the protocol is abandoned means that everyone is worse off.

Just as the returns from successful protocols are shared in part by all, so must the pain when they fail to perform.

Languages I speak and write: English, Hindi

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: None

[Saurabh]

Name: GMX governance committee

Wallet Address or ENS: 0x183D275AC4A046d549aD4dc89c41bff49D632Fa3

Tally: Profile URL

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

Defi development on Arbitrum
Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

The overall goals for the Arbitrum DAO should focus on achieving a decentralized, secure, and scalable layer-2 solution for Ethereum that enhances user experience and developer engagement. This involves promoting governance transparency, incentivizing community participation, and ensuring sustainable growth through continuous innovation and strategic partnerships.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

Issue Overview 1.3k

Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.

For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.

This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

How would you vote?

Against

We would vote against the proposal if it failed to address several critical factors adequately:

1. Risk of Underperformance: While the proposed 30% yield target is ambitious, it may not be consistently achievable. If the program fails to meet this target, it could result in insufficient funds to cover bounties and operational costs, ultimately compromising the program’s effectiveness.
2. High Operational Costs: The monthly operational costs of $100k-$115k are substantial, particularly given the near break-even margin in Year 1. If the program does not generate the expected yield, these costs could quickly deplete the grant funds, leaving little for actual community incentives.
3. Centralization Concerns: The oversight and allocation committees, while intended to provide checks and balances, may introduce centralization risks. The inclusion of Flipside team members on these committees could lead to conflicts of interest, reducing the overall transparency and fairness of the program.
4. Program Efficacy: The pilot program’s data is promising, but scaling up to the proposed amounts ($15M in the first year and $10M in the second year) is a significant leap. There needs to be a clear, detailed plan on how the program will be scaled, monitored, and adjusted as needed to ensure it delivers the expected outcomes.
5. Community Feedback: If there is substantial opposition or significant concerns from the community that have not been addressed or integrated into the proposal, this could indicate potential issues with the proposal’s viability and acceptance.

Without strong assurances in these areas, the proposal could pose undue risks to the DAO’s assets and governance integrity.

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

1. Alignment with Community Interests: It’s essential to ensure that the program aligns with the broader interests of the Uniswap community. Community feedback and support should be considered to ensure the proposal meets the ecosystem’s needs effectively.
2. Alternative Strategies: Exploring alternative or supplementary strategies for deploying the treasury funds, such as direct investments in ecosystem projects or simpler grant mechanisms, might offer a more straightforward and lower-risk approach.
   Ultimately, while the proposal has potential benefits, these risks and concerns warrant careful consideration before moving forward with such a substantial financial commitment.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Issue Overview:

Overview Link 1 3.7k

Overview Link 2 500

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

Full Reimbursement

No Reimbursement

Split Reimbursement

Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.

We would encourage the DAO to split reimbursement

Reasoning:

1. Balancing Fairness and Responsibility: A split reimbursement recognizes the affected parties’ losses while also considering the limitations and responsibilities of the protocol. It acknowledges the community’s obligation to support its members while maintaining financial sustainability.
2. Mitigating Moral Hazard: Full reimbursement could set a precedent that encourages reckless behavior, assuming the DAO will always cover losses. A split reimbursement provides support without fully insulating users from the consequences of risky actions, thereby promoting more prudent behavior in the future.
3. Community Trust and Support: Offering a partial reimbursement helps maintain trust in the protocol. It shows that the DAO is willing to stand by its users in times of crisis as a supportive community while also being mindful of its long-term health and stability.

In summary, a split reimbursement approach balances the need to support affected users and maintain the protocol’s long-term viability, promoting a fair and responsible community ecosystem.

Languages we speak and write: English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

The GMX Governance Council is part of the GMX DAO which oversees the GMX Protocol, treasury assets which include interests in other Arbitrum protocols and 8 million ARB tokens.

Such affiliations may pose conflicts of interest

[whizwang]

Name: Liz (Head of Growth at Azuki; Contributor to AnimeChain)

Wallet Address or ENS: whizwang.eth

@whizwang's Delegate Profile

What area are you most interested in contributing to? Choose up to two tags:

• NFT development on Arbitrum
• Public goods funding

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

My name is Liz, and I am the Head of Growth at Azuki and a contributor to the AnimeCoin Foundation, which is partnered with Azuki. I am looking to contribute to growing and nurturing the consumer crypto vertical within the Arbitrum ecosystem.

Here are my goals in terms of what I’d like to contribute to the DAO:

1. Foster Consumer Use Cases: To ensure Arbitrum DAO remains the leading Layer 2 Ethereum ecosystem, it’s essential to nurture and attract diverse, robust use cases beyond DeFi. While Arbitrum excels in gaming and art, sustaining our dominance requires clear support for consumer crypto apps to onboard millions of users into the Arbitrum ecosystem. This entails creating a framework to provide tactical and strategic support to consumer-oriented builders.
2. Promote Arbitrum Technology to Consumer Builders: Help market Arbitrum technology to developers and entrepreneurs, sparking interest to adopt or migrate their apps/chains to Arbitrum
3. Advocate Arbitrum Technology to Major Web2 Corporations: Create a systematic approach within the DAO to help educate large companies about the Arbitrum ecosystem, sparking their interest in our technology (note: this is not BD, more top-of-funnel & educational)

Here’s some information about Azuki and AnimeChain, who I represent:

Azuki’s mission is to transform the anime industry through crypto technology for both fans and creators. We create stories, products, and experiences that enrich the fan experience through our collections Azuki, BEANZ, Elementals, and Bobu the Bean Farmer (community-driven IP). We have generated $70M in primary sales and over $1B in secondary trading volume. With 28,000 holders worldwide and over 1,000,000 social media followers, most of whom are unaware we are a crypto project, we have successfully onboarded web2 users into web3.

Our partnerships include household names such as the F1 team Red Bull Racing, LINE FRIENDS (mascots of the LINE messaging app with 200M MAUs), Bilibili (YouTube of China), and AMBUSH (Japanese streetwear brand). Azuki visuals have been featured at Coachella, and we even sent one of our NFTs into space on a SpaceX rocket during a NASA mission. Our proven track record in onboarding web2 into web3 positions us well to lend our expertise to the Arbitrum ecosystem.

Azuki is partnered with the AnimeCoin Foundation, which is launching AnimeChain, an appchain offering a modern, streamlined, unified experience for anime fans. As a contributor to the AnimeCoin Foundation, I helped conduct due diligence to choose Arbitrum as the tech stack for AnimeChain due to the builders’ ethos and community passion within the Arbitrum ecosystem.

Recently, I participated in GovHack during EthCC (where my team placed in the finals) and spoke at Arbitrum Day. I am proud to represent the consumer crypto vertical via AnimeChain in the Arbitrum ecosystem and hope to lend my experience to help other consumer-oriented projects thrive.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

Issue Overview

• Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
• For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
• This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

1) How would you vote?

Against

I would vote against this proposal because there is a clear conflict of interest in Flipside having a voice on both the allocation committee, as well as the oversight committee. Typically, to ensure proper checks and balances, the individuals/party overseeing a committee should not also comprise the same committee. In addition, there are no other analytics service providers who are part of the proposal, ensuring a monopolistic approach toward this program, which is a clear risk vector inherent in the design of the program.

2) What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

There are some amendments that would improve the design of the stated program:

1. Better Governance Design: Flipside should reduce the number of seats on the allocation committee, and replace their seat on the oversight committee. Ideally, only one seat would be assigned to any one individual/party on both committees.
2. Competitor Checks and Balances: There should be the presence of a competitor analytics service provider, either on the allocation committee or the oversight committee to ensure that an expert voice is in the room representing different interests than Flipside.
3. Gated Disbursement of Funds: Disbursement of funds should be periodic and contingent upon meeting pre-defined KPIs.

3) How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

There is an inherent tradeoff between centralization and efficacy, and the priority depends on the specific goals. If a program involves urgent or time-sensitive tasks, expediency might take precedence. However, in the case of the Flipside program, which deals with the disbursement of funds and is not time-sensitive, it is more important to ensure proper program design and the existence of robust controls.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Issue Overview:

Overview Link 1

Overview Link 2

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

Full Reimbursement

The objectives of a DAO are: 1) ensure fair and decentralized coordination; 2) uphold the will of the people; and 3) protect the safety of its members. I believe that once the vote was passed to reimburse those impacted by the hack, it should not have been possible to walk that back with a second vote. I see parallels with the concept of double jeopardy – you cannot keep putting forth proposals until interested parties looking to sway the vote get the result they want. This is contrary to the principle of decentralization that is core to a DAO.

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: I lead Growth at Azuki, and I’m a contributor to AnimeChain (Arbitrum Orbit L3 being launched by AnimeCoin Foundation)

[Tane]

Name

Tané (Organization)

Wallet Address or ENS

tanegov.eth | 0xB79294D00848a3A4C00c22D9367F19B4280689D7

Tally Profile

https://www.tally.xyz/gov/arbitrum/delegate/0xb79294d00848a3a4c00c22d9367f19b4280689d7

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

• Improving Governance participation
• Supporting Infrastructure

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO

Intro to Tané

Tané is formed with a group of crypto-native product builders, based in Tokyo, Dubai and New York. We are backed by SoftBank, and Japanese tech giants like DeNA, GREE, MIXI, and closely work with the big Japanese enterprises and have great relationship with Japanese crypto communities.

Our investment arm has invested in and supported various innovating projects that contribute to the decentralized society enabled by the new blockchain technology. Our network operation entity started directly contributing to the ecosystem by being validators for the core infrastructures and protocols that make Web3 move forward and contributors to the DAOs that manage them.

Why we chose to be an Arbitrum delegate

There are many users and traders using L2 chains in Japan, but there are no prominent delegates who actively participate in and contribute to DAO governance from Japan yet. We are aiming to be the one who represents the Japanese users and token holders by being active in the governance, leveraging the partnership with Japanese enterprises and making meaningful impacts on the protocols and the ecosystem.

We have also believe that our unique experience and expertises outlined below should contribute to critical feedback and comments on technical upgrades and issues to be discussed and implemented by collaborating with Offchain Labs and other development contributors.

Our skills and areas of expertise

We are a group of crypto-native product builders and entrepreneurs who have experienced in building products as well as being in the crypto space long enough to understand the importance of building great products and achieving the decentralization and empowerment of individuals.

• Takeshi, Head of Network Operations, who worked for Twitter as a software engineer and for SmartNews, a Japanese unicorn startup that provides a news aggregation mobile app with 30M MAU as a product manager.
• Ikuma, CEO, who was 2x serial entrepreneur in Web2, investment & financing at SoftBank, and actively investing in the crypto since 2014.

Sample Voting Issue 1

Issue Overview: Uniswap X Flipside

Prompts to Answer

How would you vote?

We would vote AGAINST the proposal because too many seats are occupied by Flipside, but we would admit that Flipside would have one seat in the allocation committee or the oversight committee. If the # of seats for the oversight committee is increased to 5 or more, it would be acceptable but generally, the DAO should avoid the structure with the clear conflicts of interest at any cost.

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

Before making any amendments from our side, “This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated.” this indicates that the DAO didn’t go through enough discussions to reach the consensus on the right structure and limitations that needed to introduce. All active delegates should be responsible to make proposals have enough attentions, discussions and feedback before moving into a vote.

We would suggest that the program starts with its pilot phase as a number of programs in the Arbitrum DAO do; 6-months period, a minimum budget, experimentations on KPIs and program management and a clear feedback period to make the program official with much more contexts for potential contributors to be attracted into the program.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

We would rather allow centralization to achieve goals quickly than perfecting decentralization of DAO’s structure. For example, in the above example, we would accept that no oversight committee is established in the pilot period. The DAO can evaluate the program itself and also the suitability of Flipside and other contributors; with the official program, who should be in the operational committee, oversight committee, program management party etc.

Sample Voting Issue 2

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement

Prompts to Answer

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation? Split Reimbursement

Protocol exploits are definitely unfortunate events to the protocol and its users, but, the softwares can’t be bug-free and we believe this is a risk that the users have to acknowledge. Though it depends on the DAO’s governance process, Snapshot should be generally used for temperature checks, not the actual binding decisions. Thus, we would consider it acceptable to be flipped and the DAO should decide on the reimbursement details, either full or how much fund to be reimbursed if not full.

Languages we speak and write

English, and Japanese

Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest

Our investment arm has invested in a number of crypto startups but as of the time of writing this profile, we don’t believe there are clear COIs in terms of contributing to Arbitrum. We are also active in the other DAOs, Optimism (S6 Grants Council member), Lido, and Uniswap.

[KlausBrave]

Name (individual)

Klaus Brave - Hack Humanity

Wallet Address or ENS

klausbrave.eth

Tally Profile URL

klausbrave.eth

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

• Improving Governance participation
• IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

I wish Arbitrum DAO to be the leading pioneer in decentralised governance and decentralised technology.
For Arbitrum DAO to become an effective and sustainable entity for decentralised work.
To make Arbitrum DAO the most highly engaged DAO in the world.

I’ve been deep diving near full time with Arbitrum since December 2023, seen the governance process from different perspectives, a newbie, to grantee, to passing a full proposal to the DAO, now having designed and run GovHack ETHDenver and GovHack ETHcc I’ve onboarding over 250+ new people, 48 teams and 48 new proposals to the DAO using this format.

I have a good understanding of what works and doesn’t work in the DAO and will advocate for DAO operational efficiency, easing friction for new comers and fair sharing of power amongst delegates, as well as attracting new delegates.

I’m a software developer, product manager, been a consultant and facilitator at fortune 100 companies and happy to bring these diverse competencies to Arbitrum DAO.

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview

Prompts to Answer:

1. How would you vote?

Against

2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

Remove Flipside from the oversight commitee, it’s a clear conflict of interest being in oversight of your own allocation.
Set a max 2 seats per oganisation, reduce the number of people flipside has to 2 in the allocation commitee.
Open the process for multiple other providers like Dune to participate thus sharing the responsibility and benefits.

3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

Start small and build trust with new entities particpating in the DAO with a tight, timebound first objective, once competency is demonstrated, reward good actors with increased scope and trust.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

1. Full Reimbursement

Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.

The protocol voted to return the funds the first time around that will of the people should be honoured, it’s part of a protocols responsibility to secure people’s funds and make them whole when this is breached.

Languages I speak and write:

English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

Affiliation: Founder of Hack Humanity - creator and organiser of the Arbitrum GovHacks.
I don’t see this as any conflict of interest to being a delegate, I will abstain voting on any related proposals I put forward with Hack Humanity to the DAO.