Name: Arana Digital
Delegate address: 0x0579A616689f7ed748dC07692A3F150D44b0CA09
Voting Activity: Tally
Areas of interest: Improving Governance, DeFi development on Arb, Supporting infra
Organization Overview:
We are a governance group composed of ex-Michigan Blockchain members. Our team is currently made up of five individuals, all of which are deeply steeped in the crypto space and have multiple years of participation in protocol governance. With delegation history for DEXs, money markets, L2s, liquid staking protocols, and stablecoins, we’re acclimated with a breadth of sectors. We bring a diversity of experience to DAOs–our members have consulted for companies like Immutable and dYdX, worked at crypto investment and trading firms, set up various validator nodes, and run educational events for university students. Our current team led the Michigan Blockchain ARB delegation from the launch of Arbitrum governance till December 2023 and maintained 100% voting participation. Our goal is to continue contributing to the Arb DAO going forward in a more professional capacity by actively imparting our perspective on proposals, helping formalize governance operations, and facilitating the growth/maturation of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Sample Voting Issue #1: Flipside/Uniswap Incentive Program
Vote: For
- Endorsement of Grant-Based System:
- We support a self-sustaining, grant-based system like Flipside’s proposal, which combines analytics development with economic benefits for the protocol, creating a win-win scenario. While Flipside’s tool for calculating and visualizing v3 returns has proven beneficial for many liquidity providers despite occasional inaccuracies, the development of a community-driven ecosystem of analytics tools is crucial due to the complexities of concentrated liquidity mechanisms.
- Proposed Changes to Fund Distribution:
- Instead of exclusively allocating funds to Flipside, we recommend forming a coalition of DAO and treasury service providers. Each member should present their qualifications and experience, ensuring a diverse grant committee and fair compensation for each participant. This approach would enhance the implementation efficiency by giving Flipside a single seat, balancing decentralization for security with centralization for speed.
- Election Process and Committee Structure:
- We believe there should have been a preordained election process where candidates present their credentials in forums, followed by a community vote via Snapshot. Each committee member should represent different organizations, promoting a democratic election process and placing community-elected representatives in charge of the allocated funds. This method negates the need for an oversight committee, as the DAO itself can act as a failsafe. A 7-member committee would ensure a good level of efficiency, much faster than having the entire DAO vote on capital allocation decisions.
Sample Voting Issue #2: FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement
- Reimbursement Considerations:
- When evaluating reimbursement for a hack, it is important to consider both the users’ and the protocol’s perspectives. If users were aware of the risks and had agreed to them, they may not qualify for full reimbursement. Conversely, if the protocol failed to warn users about potential risks, partial or full reimbursement might be warranted. Full reimbursement may not be feasible due to the need for resources to repair the codebase and restore the brand, making a split reimbursement a more viable option. Funds could be pooled into a multi-sig wallet controlled by a community-elected committee and vested over a specific period, allowing the protocol time to recover while ensuring user fund protection.
- Governance Process and Voting Transparency:
- The initial vote approving full reimbursement was a temperature check, a recurring issue seen in other governance processes, such as the Uniswap BNB chain bridge choice. To prevent outcomes from being overturned by new voters in later stages, restricting voting to those who participated in the temperature check or a whitelist would be beneficial. Additionally, the lack of transparency and the bandwagon effect in the voting procedure undermine the independent ethos of decentralization. Implementing a blind voting system, such as the commit-reveal scheme, would mitigate these concerns and ensure a more equitable and transparent governance process.
Languages we speak and write: English, Mandarine
Possible Conflicts of Interest: We are active governance contributors at other DAOs.