Delegate Statement Template

Governance Delegate Statements
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1186

Name (individual): Eye State

Wallet Address or ENS: frened.eth (0xb118338458a1bE28a31434f590015F3b380a5c37)

Tally Profile URL: Tally | eye_state | frened.eth

Twitter/X Profile: Twitter/X: @eye_state

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

  • Improving Governance participation
  • Supporting Infrastructure
  • Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
  • IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
I believe that DAOs should prioritize decentralization, supporting specially small delegators to encourage decentralization, giving them visibility to point out the community point of view.

My aim with this profile is to show the opinion of the community that donā€™t want to delegate to the current whale delegators.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

  1. How would you vote?
    Against.
  2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?There is a conflict of interest between the committees managing this grant and paying themselves a share to fund their operationsThe original proposal also establish a very high management fees like 50%. So the money is diluted in too much hands and the funds used to atracting users stay lower than what they could be, because of the interest of a few ones.
  3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?I think the proposal of distributing bounties to attract liquidity was good, but I would make a few changes. First, I would eliminate as many committees or intermediaries as possible, as they mainly absorb the bounty rewards that would have been allocated to users.

I would mainly give users the opportunity to decide how these bounties should be distributed by creating a forum where users can propose how it will work. This way, committees or intermediaries would be minimized, resulting in a larger bounty to distribute.

Sample Voting Issue 2 Rari hack :

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

I think the question is not well-posed. The problem lies in the method of making the refund. If the refund involves affecting the price of the protocol token, it is not a fair refund. This can be profitable for those affected by the hack, but it comes at the cost of subtracting liquidity from the users who support the project by holding its token.

Iā€™d issue a refund using as many funds as possible without affecting the protocol token. This may include solutions like distributing a portion of the dappā€™s profits among hacked users over time as well as utilizing the reserve funds of the protocol, such as stablecoins. This solution may take a very long time, or users might not be refunded 100%, but itā€™s the only way to avoid making others pay for the hack.

Additionally, I think the dapp should prioritize small users, who can be refunded more easily than whales. It may be preferable to make 10,000 people with a $100 deposit happy rather than refunding a whale with $1 million. This method might be unfair to whales, but my thesis in this case is that among these 10,000 people, there are more for whom $100 may be a significant amount of money, so they should get the refund first.

Languages I speak and write:

English and Spanish.

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I donĀ“t have any conflict of interest to being an Arbitrum delegate. Iā€™m just a normal user of the arbitrum chain who would like to make visible the opinion of the smallest chain users like me.

1187

Name: Pedro Breuer

Address or ENS: 0xeB13FD078AB234737cC8621Be00F007cA35bB3c3 / pedrobreuer.eth

Tally Profile URL: pedrobreuer.eth's Delegate Profile

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

  • DeFi development on Arbitrum
  • Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

After a little more than a year of existence, the Arbitrum DAO is at the perfect moment to transition into an organization with a sustainable business model that will enable its growth and long-term success. It is crucial to learn from the results of the past year regarding incentive programs and resource utilization to improve spending efficiency. Allocating time and resources to proper treasury management is essential, allowing us to implement a spending plan that aligns with our long-term vision.

Arbitrum DAO should aim to be the premier Layer 2 solution. Its technology should be licensed and utilized by as many chains as possible. We must strive to build an interoperable ecosystem around Orbit that attracts users and builders through the ecosystemā€™s inherent value.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

  1. I would vote against.

  2. Although they can work together, the allocation committee and the oversight committee shouldnā€™t be composed of the same people.

ā€œLarge votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee.ā€

This may or may not be an issue depending on the perspective, and it is the conflict of interest in voting. Currently, the DAO does not have a definition of conflict of interest to excuse oneself from participating in a vote. On the other hand, I do not believe that having voting power should be a reason to abstain from voting for oneself if one is convinced that the vote is in the best interest of the DAO. Best way to go is full disclosure of COI.

  1. Centralization of power is not the same as assigning tasks for efficient execution. As long as there are checks and balances mechanisms, and this centralization ultimately depends on another decentralized power, I am in favor, because otherwise it is very difficult to execute things efficiently.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

I think that it will depend on the circunstances. I believe the DAO should look out for the interests of the users. If there is a defect in Arbitrumā€™s technology and the DAO can absorb the cost of compensating users who suffered losses, it should proceed in that direction. If it is not economically viable, it should be able to guarantee some form of future compensation. The DAO is not an isolated entity from the chain and its ecosystem; its revenue depends on the activity of the chain. Therefore, user trust should be a priority.

Languages I speak and write:

Spanish & English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

I have non conflict of interests at all. In the event of a conflict of interest, it will be disclosed in a timely and appropriate manner.

1188

Name: LobbyFi

Address: 0x7a45eE0be5C4BdC938A5F00A2AEF393f46502D26

Tally Profile URL: LobbyFi's Delegate Profile

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

DeFi development on Arbitrum
Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

The goal of the DAO is to serve the community and do whatever is best for the protocol, and hence for its ecosystem.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

How would you vote?

In this case, LobbyFi would vote agains by default. In case one of the parties would show up and acquire LobbyFiā€™s voting power, the vote will be cast accordingly to the partyā€™s interest.

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

LobbyFi is impartial in its nature and does not have an opinion on that. It is different for its team members, though.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

LobbyFi is giving the community a tool to fight authority oligopolies first and foremostly. At the same time, we provide a tool to push through important decisions.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

Again, same as in the 1st case, LobbyFi acts homogeneously, whatever the subject of the vote.

Languages I speak and write:
English, German, French, Russian and Ukrainian.

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

LobbyFi is available to anyone and cannot censor vote outcomes.

1189

Name Jana Bertram

Wallet Address or ENS janabe.eth

Tally profile janabe.eth's Delegate Profile

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

  • NFT development on Arbitrum
  • Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO: eg ā€” how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?

Governing Arbitrum means 1. allocating resources to promote ecosystem growth and 2. contributing to the technical product. When assessing investments, we need to look beyond the initial growth and have strategies & programs for retaining projects and users.

Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

Sample Voting Issue 1: Issue Overview 1.3k

  • Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
  • For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
  • This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

  1. How would you vote? Against

  2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any? I would remove Flipside from the Oversight Committee. The Oversight committee needs to be independent from the executor / the allocation committee. By having Flipside on both committee with almost 50% of votes, thereā€™s no real checks and balances against abuse of power and the whole program is de facto centralized.

  3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done? Per above, itā€™s about checks and balances. If one entity allocates/executes, thatā€™s ok, it helps get things done. It just canā€™t be that the same entity is doing oversight.

Sample Voting Issue 2: Issue Overview: Overview Link 1 3.7k Overview Link 2 502

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

  1. Split Reimbursement Iā€™m assuming the hack is substantial and full reimbursement would be more than 25% of the DAO treasury. Then the reimbursement should be partial. A reimbursement is important as it signal user protection and the community assuming responsibility for the product they govern. If the community gets the upsides, e.g. protocol revenue, it also needs to work on improving the product, including security. Hacks indicate a vulnerability which should be the responsibility of those who profit from the protocol.

Languages I speak and write: English, Italian, Czech

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: currently head of strategy at RARI Foundation & zkSync delegate

1190

Name: Goverland

Wallet Address or ENS: goverland.eth

Tally Profile URL: Tally | Goverland

Area of interest:

  • Public Goods funding
  • Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on the overall goals for the DAO:

Attract top talent (builders, influencers, researchers, etc.) by setting an example of being at the forefront of Web3 innovation.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

We would vote against the proposal.

The proposal has several interesting points. It aims to run a program for two years with 15 million UNI allocated in the first year. Flipside would split this allocation to earn yield (estimating around 30% APY), using 50% of the earnings to fund its operations and 50% to finance new user acquisition. However, this proposal raises several concerns:

  • Proposed reward is significantly higher than industry standards: The proposed reward structure offers returns that are at least double what professional treasury management companies typically charge, which is around 0.5% management fee on assets under management and a 10% performance fee. This discrepancy raises questions about the fairness and competitiveness of the proposed terms.
  • Combining treasury yield generation and user acquisition bounties: The proposal combines two distinct activities ā€” treasury yield generation and financing new user acquisition bounties. These activities require completely different skill sets, and merging them into a single proposal may lead to inefficiencies and conflicts of interest.
  • Excessive control by Flipside: Granting Flipside 3 out of 7 seats on the allocation committee and 1 out of 3 seats on the oversight committee centralizes too much power in the hands of a single service provider. This level of control could undermine the decentralization principles of the DAO and favor one service provider disproportionately.

Suggested Amendments:

  1. Separate Treasury Management and User Acquisition:
    • Create distinct proposals for treasury management and user acquisition to ensure each area is handled by specialists, enhancing efficiency and effectiveness.
  2. Implement a Tender-Based Approach:
    • Introduce a competitive tender process, allowing multiple service providers to present their plans. This ensures a fair selection process based on merit and value.
  3. Adopt High-Level Principles:
    a. Inclusive Selection Process:
    - Open the selection process to the Web3 market, inviting all professional treasury management service providers to present detailed plans. Encourage open dialogue between providers and the community, testing small funds with different projects for better insights.
    b. Separation of Powers:
    - Ensure those deciding on funding are not the same as those implementing the work. Hold open votes for committee positions before allocating funds, ensuring only third-party individuals or entities without conflicts of interest are elected.
    c. Decentralized Decision-Making:
    - Embrace decentralized decision-making to foster resilience. Following Nassim Talebā€™s ā€œantifragilityā€ concept, systems should thrive on stress and variability. Avoid centralizing fund control to ensure long-term sustainability.

These amendments aim to balance efficiency with decentralization and fairness, ensuring transparent, inclusive, and resilient DAO operations.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Our choice: Full Reimbursement

As delegates of the Rari Capital community, we would be committed to acting in the best interest of token holders. The primary victims of the hack were the users of the protocol. Failing to reimburse them when the protocol has the means to do so would result in a complete loss of trust in the team and cause devastating damage to the remaining token holders, likely leading to a halt of the protocol. In our opinion, reimbursement in this case is the only viable option to consider.

Languages I speak and write:
English, German, Russian

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
While we may act as delegates, governance participants, and consultants in other L2 protocols, we commit to always acting in the best interest of the Arbitrum community.

1191

Address: 0x56E0aB2eCE2Ef378f59D8Da7e76677cfCf8Bd481
ENS: rickjohanson.eth

Link to Tally Profile: Rick Johanson's Delegate Profile

Other stuff:
LinkedIn: Rick Johanson - Sock | LinkedIn
Telegram: rickjohanson
Twitter: johansonrick
Medium: rick

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

  • Gaming development on Arbitrum
  • Public Goods Funding
  • Close Third - DeFi development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
As a prospective delegate, one of my primary goal is to expand the community and introduce Arbitrum to new and relevant audiences. This is accomplished through thoughtful execution of initiatives that foster long-term growth and development within the ecosystem as a wholeā€¦ Including how the Arbitrum brand is positioned. Arbitrumā€™s strength in the defi sector with minimal branding and marketing efforts provide an opportunity to operationalize more cohesive initiatives to not only enhance our visibility and telegraph trust but to solidify Arbitrumā€™s position as a leader in other categories such as gaming.

Sample Voting Issue 1:
As a delegate, I would oppose the Uniswap proposal. I recognize the potential of bounties in enabling growth, but itā€™s important to maintain diversity within the DAOā€™s governance. In its current form, the proposal undermines the core principles of decentralized governance. I do believe this can be achieved with proper oversight and transparency, but in this case, Flipside on the oversight committee while maintaining control of the allocation could be problematic. I would suggest creating a new oversight framework or propose Flipsite be removed from the committee entirely.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
This is a very sensitive and complicated issue. I believe in prioritizing user trust, and by doing so, there needs to be a clear and transparent method of finding a solution when exploits occur. In this case I would opt for a full refund unless the DAO is financially incapable. Each scenario will require a bespoke approach to earning user-trust, which means conducting thorough post-mortems after any security breach. These post-mortems should involve a comprehensive analysis and what measures can be implemented to prevent similar incidents in the future. Transparency is key and sharing the findings with the community demonstrates accountability and a commitment to improving the ecosystem for the future.

Side note but I also believe that itā€™s important for delegates to abstain when an issue is too technically complex or they lack the expertise to thoughtfully participate. This ensures that decisions are informed by the most qualified delegates and reduces the risk of rushed or uninformed opinions that may impact the integrity of our processes.

Languages I speak: English

My experience:
Over the last six months Iā€™ve been a contributing author to the Gaming Catalyst Program (GCP) and a core member of the GCP Working Group (incredible group of folks) which we recently brought the proposal to a successful Tally vote.

Most recently, I was the Co-Founder and CEO of Sock, a self-custodial finance app that launched on Arbitrum in 2023 which is available in over 70 regions around the world (check out this case study about our brand if you are curious).

I have over a decade of experience working with leading technology and entertainment companies as an early stage employee to exit. Before co-founding Sock, I spent 4+ years at Google spearheading UX operations and design strategy initiatives, including driving several external partnerships, corporate development, and championing product accessibility programs. Iā€™ve also worked at companies such as Lucasfilm, Lucasarts, Zynga, and NerdWallet. Across leadership roles in program management, talent acquisition, even as the senior producer reporting directly to Zyngaā€™s Chief Creative Officer, Tim LeTourneau.

Iā€™m an established investor and advisor for early-stage tech companies focused in Web3, fintech, gaming and AI. I am deeply believe in social impact and serve as a board member of Creativity Explored, an organization that supports artists with developmental disabilities and is actively involved with initiatives that advance UX education at historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs).

1192

Name: Arana Digital

Delegate address: 0x0579A616689f7ed748dC07692A3F150D44b0CA09

Voting Activity: Tally

Areas of interest: Improving Governance, DeFi development on Arb, Supporting infra

Organization Overview:
We are a governance group composed of ex-Michigan Blockchain members. Our team is currently made up of five individuals, all of which are deeply steeped in the crypto space and have multiple years of participation in protocol governance. With delegation history for DEXs, money markets, L2s, liquid staking protocols, and stablecoins, weā€™re acclimated with a breadth of sectors. We bring a diversity of experience to DAOsā€“our members have consulted for companies like Immutable and dYdX, worked at crypto investment and trading firms, set up various validator nodes, and run educational events for university students. Our current team led the Michigan Blockchain ARB delegation from the launch of Arbitrum governance till December 2023 and maintained 100% voting participation. Our goal is to continue contributing to the Arb DAO going forward in a more professional capacity by actively imparting our perspective on proposals, helping formalize governance operations, and facilitating the growth/maturation of the Arbitrum ecosystem.

Sample Voting Issue #1: Flipside/Uniswap Incentive Program

Vote: For

  • Endorsement of Grant-Based System:
    • We support a self-sustaining, grant-based system like Flipsideā€™s proposal, which combines analytics development with economic benefits for the protocol, creating a win-win scenario. While Flipsideā€™s tool for calculating and visualizing v3 returns has proven beneficial for many liquidity providers despite occasional inaccuracies, the development of a community-driven ecosystem of analytics tools is crucial due to the complexities of concentrated liquidity mechanisms.
  • Proposed Changes to Fund Distribution:
    • Instead of exclusively allocating funds to Flipside, we recommend forming a coalition of DAO and treasury service providers. Each member should present their qualifications and experience, ensuring a diverse grant committee and fair compensation for each participant. This approach would enhance the implementation efficiency by giving Flipside a single seat, balancing decentralization for security with centralization for speed.
  • Election Process and Committee Structure:
    • We believe there should have been a preordained election process where candidates present their credentials in forums, followed by a community vote via Snapshot. Each committee member should represent different organizations, promoting a democratic election process and placing community-elected representatives in charge of the allocated funds. This method negates the need for an oversight committee, as the DAO itself can act as a failsafe. A 7-member committee would ensure a good level of efficiency, much faster than having the entire DAO vote on capital allocation decisions.

Sample Voting Issue #2: FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement

  • Reimbursement Considerations:
    • When evaluating reimbursement for a hack, it is important to consider both the usersā€™ and the protocolā€™s perspectives. If users were aware of the risks and had agreed to them, they may not qualify for full reimbursement. Conversely, if the protocol failed to warn users about potential risks, partial or full reimbursement might be warranted. Full reimbursement may not be feasible due to the need for resources to repair the codebase and restore the brand, making a split reimbursement a more viable option. Funds could be pooled into a multi-sig wallet controlled by a community-elected committee and vested over a specific period, allowing the protocol time to recover while ensuring user fund protection.
  • Governance Process and Voting Transparency:
    • The initial vote approving full reimbursement was a temperature check, a recurring issue seen in other governance processes, such as the Uniswap BNB chain bridge choice. To prevent outcomes from being overturned by new voters in later stages, restricting voting to those who participated in the temperature check or a whitelist would be beneficial. Additionally, the lack of transparency and the bandwagon effect in the voting procedure undermine the independent ethos of decentralization. Implementing a blind voting system, such as the commit-reveal scheme, would mitigate these concerns and ensure a more equitable and transparent governance process.

Languages we speak and write: English, Mandarine

Possible Conflicts of Interest: We are active governance contributors at other DAOs.

1193

A. Name: Farstar (Organization)

B. Wallet Address or ENS: 0x820b2872ad423C0B1223E5A0a6C1167758174023

C. Tally Profile URL: Tally | @Farstar

Team members on the forum: @ana.vc @lino

D. What area are you most interested in contributing to?

  • Public Goods funding
  • IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

E. Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
Arbitrum DAO is championing progressive decentralization which heavily resonates with Farstarā€™s approach and ethos. We believe the DAO is well-positioned to integrate community-driven initiatives and support on turning them into highly impactful programs. Our stance on the overall goals for Arbitrum DAO include the following suggestions that we believe should be a priority:

  1. Pragmatic approach to problem definition and implementing solutions. Progressive decentralization comes with its own coordination challenges and approaching complex situation with a healthy dose of pragmatism should be the DAOā€™s default mode of operation.
  2. Implementing robust sustainable incentive mechanisms with a long term outlook on ecosystem growth to ensure that the DAO community is enabled propose and actively work on various strategic initiatives.
  3. Fostering a strong culture of collaboration to leverage the collective strength of Arbitrumā€™s community.
  4. Developing a dynamic venture ecosystem that supports the ecosystem expansion and enables the increased revenues for the DAO by supporting strategic use cases and unlocking markets for long-term network growth.

Arbitrum DAO should be a key enabler of growth, support and collaboration enabling the community to have a meaningful role in the future of Arbitrum chain.

F. Sample Voting Issue 1:

  1. How would you vote?
    Against

  2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
    We would propose reducing Flipsideā€™s seats on the allocation committee and structuring the oversight committee as a governing body (a board) with 5 seats (Flipside retains 1) to ensure balanced representation without unilateral influence. All seats should be elected and rotated to ensure that the community has the right to reassess and remove members as needed.

  3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
    Speed of execution and ability to get things done is crucial in our industry, however, this should never be done at the expense of centralization that has enormous long term implications. Introducing org design where working groups can dynamically form around defining a problem and actively working on a solution that can then dissolve once the issue is resolved is crucial. This can be enhanced with layers of delegation and periodic elections.

G. Sample Voting Issue 2:
Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
Full Reimbursement. DAOā€™s votes set precedents and they should be consistently implemented once theyā€™ve been ratified. DAO voting is an activity that carries massive responsibilities for the entire ecosystem and if votes cannot be consistently implemented once ratified this would introduce a lack of trust in the system that would only open up the DAO to further attacks. While early supporters should be protected, itā€™s vital to create a shared understanding of the risks involved. A reimbursement campaign that cannot be issued without compromising the stability of the organization can be restructured with the implementation of compensation mechanisms delivered over time ensuring long-term alignment.

H. Languages I speak and write: Our core contributors are fluent in English and Bulgarian, and Farstar as organization has a network of 100+ contributors globally.

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
Farstar is an organization committed to progressive decentralization with foundational commitment to Arbitrum. Alongside Arbitrum DAO, we have been contributing to RnDAO, an organisation historically aligned with Arbitrum. Our core contributors are currently active only in the governance of RnDAO and Arbitrum DAO. We are committed to alerting the community prior to any changes to this.

1194

Name: Angela O (@ocandocrypto)

Wallet Address or ENS: ocandocrypto.eth (0xa19a11CB5928Bf07B5B6aBa256F63142343A59bc)

Tally Profile URL: Tally | ocandocrypto.eth

X/Twitter Profile: @ocandocrypto

Interests:

  • Ecosystem Growth (Public Goods Funding and Community Outreach)
  • Governance Participation (Working Groups)
  • Long-Term Sustainability

Arbitrum DAO Statement:

My vision for the ecosystem is the application of infrastructure through end products that can impact millions of users in the coming decade. A robust infrastructure ecosystem like Arbitrum is key to achieving this, and this is why I have been committed to being a part of it in recent months.

Decentralization, ecosystem growth and sustainability are my primary focuses. Additionally, I value experimentation and the push towards metrics that allow us to make data-driven decisions. Community efforts are essential, and when it comes to infrastructure changes, I will make my best effort to analyze them. However, I will abstain from voting in cases where I do not feel sufficiently informed, always prioritizing the common good of the ecosystem and the trust of those who delegate to me.

I am committed to transparency and driving results, metrics, failures, and through them, learning that allows us to iterate and grow faster.

Languages I Speak and Write:

Spanish and English.

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

None. My work as a core contributor and researcher at Web3 Citizen involves studying different niches, projects, and ecosystems, but my current governance commitment is 100% focused on Arbitrum DAO.

1 Like
1196

Name: VoiceDeck (Organization)
Delegate Representative in Arbitrum: Devansh Mehta
ENS : devansh.voicedeck.eth
Twitter: https://twitter.com/TheDevanshMehta
Website: voicedeck.org
Tally Profile

Areas of Interest

Public Goods Funding
Improving Governance Participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

  • Arbitrum DAO is one of the few to move past governance theater and enable genuine permissionless contributions from strangers on the internet. I am personally an example, coming out of nowhere to shepherd the 35 million ARB STEP proposal to grow the RWA ecosystem on Arbitrum while diversifying 1% of our treasury. Before anything else, I would strive for us to maintain this ethos.

  • I am an investigative reporter by background, and my personal values are speaking truth to power and giving a voice to the voiceless. These beliefs serve me well as a delegate in giving impartial reviews on proposals, empathizing with ARB stakeholders who are not active in governance and voting freely without favors or influence.

  • My focus for Arbitrum DAO currently is how we can enable ecosystem growth via treasury diversification. My conversations with protocols building on Arbitrum lead me to believe that the best teams do not want grants, so much as the DAO to be a customer or participant in their ecosystem. The STEP proposal and token swaps are examples of how we can be sustainable and smart in the way we do ecosystem support.

Languages I speak and write:

English, Hindi and Gujarati

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

I am a council member for Gitcoin and Octant. I was also selected as the 2023 next billion fellow by Ethereum Foundation for piloting journalism impact certificates through VoiceDeck, which is launching on OP Mainnet.

1 Like
1197

Name: Avantgarde (organization) gov.avantgardefi.eth

Delegate representative in Arbitrum: @justErik

Telegram: @erikbrinde

Website: https://avantgarde.finance

Tally profile

Avantgarde is a crypto native asset management, DAO advisory & research firm.

We have conducted work for leading protocols including Uniswap, The Graph, Nexus Mutual, Paraswap, Enzyme and others. Arbitrum DAO can leverage Avantgardeā€™s combined expertise in protocol development and onchain asset management for developing strategies to improve treasury sustainability. Weā€™ve been long term contributors to Arbitrum, in particular we produced a research report for Arbitrum on DAO treasury risk reduction, which led to creation of the STEP program.

Areas of Interest

  • Improving governance participation
  • Working towards developing a holistic vision for financial sustainability within the DAO

Please share your stance on overall goals of the DAO

  • We believe in implementation of a holistic approach towards the DAOā€™s long term sustainability, where all DAO activities are considered for strategic decisions on long term capital allocation. As a delegate we can offer unique perspectives on integrated financial planning and strategic treasury management to improve long term sustainability of the DAO through institutional grade processes and research.

  • In our opinion the finance function should be at the center of decision making within the DAO, given the long term ambitions of the Arbitrum community and the multi-period nature of strategic financial planning. This needs to be balanced with the impressive levels of decentralization the Arbitrum DAO has managed to achieve to date. Our longer term vision is to structure the finance function to mitigate the well known inefficiencies that come with DAO governance whilst maintaining the values of decentralization.

  • Our vision has always been to advocate transparency, diversification, and decentralization. We apply these crypto native values with best practice from traditional finance and asset management. We believe that evidence based decision making, driven by data and rigorous research, produces the outcomes over the longer term. Our team is uniquely positioned at the intersection of traditional finance and DeFi to promote these values within the DAO community as the two worlds converge.

Language we as a team speak and write

English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

We are not currently aware of any conflicts of interest and we are happy to disclose any, should they arise in the future.

1 Like
1198

Dropping here my delegate submission! Excited to participate more in ARB Governance!

Personal Information

  • Name: Sov
  • ETH Address: sovereignsignal.eth
  • Discord: SovereignSignal
  • Twitter: @sovereignsignal
  • Verification: Tally | Sov

Delegate Statement

I am excited to apply as an Arbitrum Delegate, bringing my experience around grant programs, ecosystem development, and community engagement.

For the past several years, I have immersed myself in the world of crypto grants, transforming what began as a bear market hobby into a full-fledged passion and expertise that I believe can significantly benefit Arbitrumā€™s growth and systems of governance.

Background and Qualifications

  • Grant Program Management: Head of Grants at Gitcoin. Leading BD, Partnerships, and Grant Ops.
  • Web3 Project Management: Decade plus of experience running a systems integrator before transitioning to Web3.
  • Non-Profit Experience: Former Board President at a Innovative 501c3 Food Bank.
  • Web3 Grant Platforms: Creator of LlamaoGrants, Blockworks Grantfarm, Crypto Grant Wire, and Sovā€™s Compendium.
  • Grantee Experience: Secured funding from Polygon, Aave, Ethereum Foundation, and Uniswap.

Vision for Arbitrum

As an Arbitrum Delegate, I aim to help with:

  1. Strategic Resource Allocation: Leverage my expertise to help advise on best practices and evaluation frameworks for proposed initiatives.
  2. Transparency and Accountability: Advocate for clear reporting mechanisms and regular updates on funded initiatives.
  3. Ecosystem Growth: Support Arbitrumā€™s long-term goals and drive collaboration between teams within the ecosystem.

Governance Approach

Balanced governance considering short-term objectives and long-term vision. Focus on informed decisions benefiting the entire Arbitrum ecosystem, emphasizing sustainable growth and innovation.

Commitment

Prepared to dedicate necessary time for active participation in governance discussions, voting, and community engagement.

1199

Name: Charles Freeborn (individual)
Wallet Address: 0x053849fECFFb84aDdee59653755B5cd0f1FB0354
ENS: charlesfreeborn.eth
Twitter
Website: Freeborn Charles Blog and Medium
Tally Profile

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

  • Improving Governance participation
  • Public Goods Funding
  • IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

  • Improving Governance participation - I am bringing into the Arbitrum DAO as a delegate, a diverse voice from Nigeria (Africa). Leading to a stronger decentralization in decision-making within the DAO.
  • As a beneficiary of the Arbitrum DAO through the QuestBook grants progam, one of the things I wish to achieve as a delegate is to critically review proposals and vote on these proposals with all fairness.
  • Public Goods Funding: The adoption of Arbitrum and the growth of the Arbitrum ecosystem will be shaped by communities dedicated to public goods initiatives.
    Ecosystem growth through communities.
    Languages I speak and write:
    English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
None. It bears stating though that I am the founder of web3 Warri - a community of (and for) blockchain developers, smart contract developers, builders, technical writers, open-source contributors, and tech enthusiasts interested in building the next generation of the internet through collaborative learning, meetups, workshops, hackathons, and conferences.

My interest in the larger web3 ecosystem is to scale Ethereum.

I am also make periodically open source contribution to the Ethereum dot org contents website.

1200

Name: Paulo Fonseca (individual)
Website: paulofonseca.com
X/Twitter: @paulofonseca__
Wallet Address or ENS: paulofonseca.eth
Tally Profile: paulofonseca.eth on Tally
Karma Profile: paulofonseca.eth on Karma

Areas of interest:

  • Improving Governance participation
  • Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
eg ā€” how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?

Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview

  • Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
  • For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
  • This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.
    Prompts to Answer:
  1. How would you vote? Against
  2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any? No amendments to this proposal. There should have been an RFP process for this.
  3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done? DAOs are not supposed to be efficient organizations. They are supposed to be resilient and capture resistant. Thatā€™s more important.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
Issue Overview:
Overview Link 1
Overview Link 2

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)
No Reimbursement
Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.
It depends on the circumstances of each hack. Letā€™s just says that I think that The DAO hard fork should not have happened even though at the time, I was able to recover my investment on it.

Languages I speak and write: Portuguese and English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
Iā€™m currently building proposals.app and will abstain from votes that would directly benefit proposals.app

1201

Name (organization or individual): Alice Corsini

Wallet Address or ENS: 0xb48f869838C2279173df54cFd5AdE888303b26ad

Tally Profile URL (create a profile here ): Tally | 0xb48f...26ad

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

  • DeFi development on Arbitrum

Languages I speak and write: English and Italian

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: I am affiliated with karpatkey

1202

Name: ChamaDAO (Organization)

Wallet Address or ENS: chamadao.eth

Tally Profile URL: ChamaDAO on Tally

Areas of Interest:

  • Improving Governance Participation
  • Supporting Infrastructure
  • DeFi development on Arbitrum
  • Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
  • Supporting Infrastructure

Our Vision for the DAO:
At ChamaDAO, we believe in the power of decentralization to drive meaningful change. The Arbitrum DAO should focus on being inclusive, innovative, and secure, helping everyone in the community to grow. Weā€™re big on improving how governance worksā€”making sure everyoneā€™s voice gets heard and that the infrastructure supporting Arbitrum stays strong. We think long-term and hope to support proposals that benefit developers, users, and the broader ecosystem.

Stance on Some Key Issues:
Sample Voting Issue 1: Uniswap-Flipside Bounty Proposal
How weā€™d vote: Against
Why? Giving one service provider too much control over funds and decision-making in a DAO defeats the purpose of decentralization. This proposal felt a little unbalanced, especially when it comes to oversight. Weā€™d prefer to see a wider range of voices involved in such decisions. Diversity in decision-making leads to better outcomes ā€”this is something we care deeply about.

Changes weā€™d suggest: Weā€™d propose including more stakeholders on the committees and ensuring that no single provider has excessive control over resources.

Centralization vs. Getting Things Done: While we get the need for efficiency, decentralization is a core value we canā€™t compromise. The challenge is to build processes that are efficient but still spread authority across the community.

Sample Voting Issue 2: FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement
How weā€™d handle it: Split Reimbursement
Weā€™re all for helping the community, but we also believe that shared responsibility is key. Covering the entire amount might create the wrong incentives for future security practices. A split reimbursement shows we care about the community and its trust while balancing financial responsibility. It also sets a strong precedent for better security measures moving forward.

Languages We Speak:

  • English
  • French
  • Swahili
  • Arabic

Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest:
We are fully committed to acting in the best interest of the Arbitrum ecosystem. ChamaDAO does not have any conflicts of interest that would affect our decision-making. We believe in operating with transparency and integrity.

1203

Name: 0xAlex_Kleros
Wallet Address or ENS: 0x4D6CAa3E0983fAc7B514D60339EBb538C5A85AAe
X/Twitter: here
Tally Profile: here
Snapshot Profile: here
Karma Profile: here

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

  • DeFi development on Arbitrum
  • Improving Governance participation
  • IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

In my opinion, a DAO should value above all its capacity to be censorship-resistant, as this is the key characteristic that distinguishes it from traditional companies and corporations. One of the hard challenges is to stay efficient while maintaining decentralisation. In my view, a system where everybody votes on everything is highly inefficient.

Thatā€™s why I value a system of committees that incentivizes having the right people in the right places making the right decisions. One aspect that I really like about Arbitrum DAO is its capacity to create some subcommittees for dealing efficiently with specialised tasks: QuestBook, ARDC, GCP, Security Council, etc., without falling into the drawbacks of excessive bureaucracy.

I am eager to contribute to Arbitrum DAO and represent Kleros, a dispute resolution protocol building its v2 natively on Arbitrum. You can find more details about Kleros on Arbitrum in this post as we applied to LTIP a couple of months ago.

I believe that decentralized dispute resolution is essential for both DAOs and Arbitrum projects. It offers a way to leverage a neutral third-party perspective, whether binding or non-binding, to prevent the centralization of power

Iā€™m excited to begin my role as a Delegate. I will always prioritise the long-term interests of the Arbitrum DAO and its ecosystem in my voting.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

  1. How would you vote?

I would vote AGAINST

  1. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

No amendments are necessarily needed for this proposal itself; however, the issue lies in the lack of a procurement process; it is crucial to obtain different quotes from various service providers when large budgets are involved. Moreover, Flipside has too much power by being both in the allocation and oversight committee.

  1. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

As Iā€™ve mentioned previously, the formation of specialised committees and agile groups can be considered as a way to solve this dilemma. Thereā€™s no benefit in voting on every minor or highly technical decision. Such decisions should be handled by competent individuals who will be held accountable. The DAO should monitor these committees to ensure that their outputs conform to pre-established milestones and setup processes like procurement and RFP.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Response: FULL REIMBURSEMENT

Reasoning: In my opinion, a DAO should prioritise protecting its users and focusing on the growth of the ecosystem. Hacks are quite common in DeFi and can significantly harm a project; since community support is crucial, reimbursing affected users is often the best strategy for long-term viability.

However, itā€™s important to consider the specifics of each hack, as situations can be complex. I do not suggest that the Arbitrum DAO should cover losses from a hack affecting one of the DeFi projects unless the DAO itself bears some responsibility for the incident.

Languages I speak and write:

English and French

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

Other than my full-time role at Kleros Cooperative, I do not foresee any COI. Should any potential conflicts arise in the future, I commit to disclosing them promptly.

1204

Name: Tory Dom
Wallet Address or ENS: 0x950889F54c44548647825A58DA377074Ca5b5475
Tally Profile URL: Profile - ToryDom - Arbitrum

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

  • Public Goods funding
  • Improving Governance participation
  • Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
  • IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO: I believe that a truly decentralized ecosystem is built by fostering active and diverse inclusion in decision-making and by creating a vibrant community that goes beyond digital spaces to include in-person gatherings. I will continue to lead in improving protocol decentralization, driving both autonomy and community growth to build a more equitable and accessible future for all.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

Proposed amendments:

I would vote: For:

  1. Regulate the assign founds, also to balance the control of over allocation committee to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
  2. To include the other analytics service providers were involves in the proposal in order to made more balance not only the knowlange also the point of view and made a balance between the team.
  3. Open a new time to share the new improvements and vote again to stablish the best practices possible for each instance.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

I would vote: Full Reimbursement

ItĀ“s clear that the DAO decided previously and if we take the opposite would doesnĀ“t match with the mesaage that the DAO needs and believe, and in the future will be seen more problems and lack of response assertively. Also we need to consider that always we are in different kind of situations and we need to keep in mind to avoid to impact the investors/users/community with bad/impulsive bad decisions that affects the image and reliability of the DAO.

Languages I speak and write: English, Spanish, Portuguese, Korean (basic)

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

I am delegate and governance participants in other protocol in the L2 space (Scroll)