Name: 0xAlex_Kleros
Wallet Address or ENS: 0x4D6CAa3E0983fAc7B514D60339EBb538C5A85AAe
X/Twitter: here
Tally Profile: here
Snapshot Profile: here
Karma Profile: here
What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:
- DeFi development on Arbitrum
- Improving Governance participation
- IRL Arbitrum community gatherings
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
In my opinion, a DAO should value above all its capacity to be censorship-resistant, as this is the key characteristic that distinguishes it from traditional companies and corporations. One of the hard challenges is to stay efficient while maintaining decentralisation. In my view, a system where everybody votes on everything is highly inefficient.
That’s why I value a system of committees that incentivizes having the right people in the right places making the right decisions. One aspect that I really like about Arbitrum DAO is its capacity to create some subcommittees for dealing efficiently with specialised tasks: QuestBook, ARDC, GCP, Security Council, etc., without falling into the drawbacks of excessive bureaucracy.
I am eager to contribute to Arbitrum DAO and represent Kleros, a dispute resolution protocol building its v2 natively on Arbitrum. You can find more details about Kleros on Arbitrum in this post as we applied to LTIP a couple of months ago.
I believe that decentralized dispute resolution is essential for both DAOs and Arbitrum projects. It offers a way to leverage a neutral third-party perspective, whether binding or non-binding, to prevent the centralization of power
I’m excited to begin my role as a Delegate. I will always prioritise the long-term interests of the Arbitrum DAO and its ecosystem in my voting.
Sample Voting Issue 1:
- How would you vote?
I would vote AGAINST
- What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
No amendments are necessarily needed for this proposal itself; however, the issue lies in the lack of a procurement process; it is crucial to obtain different quotes from various service providers when large budgets are involved. Moreover, Flipside has too much power by being both in the allocation and oversight committee.
- How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
As I’ve mentioned previously, the formation of specialised committees and agile groups can be considered as a way to solve this dilemma. There’s no benefit in voting on every minor or highly technical decision. Such decisions should be handled by competent individuals who will be held accountable. The DAO should monitor these committees to ensure that their outputs conform to pre-established milestones and setup processes like procurement and RFP.
Sample Voting Issue 2:
Response: FULL REIMBURSEMENT
Reasoning: In my opinion, a DAO should prioritise protecting its users and focusing on the growth of the ecosystem. Hacks are quite common in DeFi and can significantly harm a project; since community support is crucial, reimbursing affected users is often the best strategy for long-term viability.
However, it’s important to consider the specifics of each hack, as situations can be complex. I do not suggest that the Arbitrum DAO should cover losses from a hack affecting one of the DeFi projects unless the DAO itself bears some responsibility for the incident.
Languages I speak and write:
English and French
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
Other than my full-time role at Kleros Cooperative, I do not foresee any COI. Should any potential conflicts arise in the future, I commit to disclosing them promptly.