Name: blockful
Delegate Address: 0x1F3D3A7A9c548bE39539b39D7400302753E20591
Delegate ENS Address: gov.blockful.eth
Forum Username: blockful
Website: blockful.io
Twitter: @blockful_io
Introduction
blockful improves DAO governance by focusing on security risks.
We specialize in risk management for governance, with and beyond code, analyzing social, governance, and political layers. Our tools are designed to reduce friction, enhance coordination, and improve decision-making in complex systems.
How we act in governance
We stand for more efficient, equal, agile, and creative governance.
We know how difficult it is for DAOs to bring in more people to participate in their votes and for everyone who is already there to coordinate to improve the organization.
Here’s a brief overview of our work:
- A research on ENS governance, where blockful identified and addressed a potential governance risk within the ENS DAO
- A research focused on Compound governance
A Security-Oriented Approach
blockful is constantly working to make DAO governance more secure.
We’ve seen a number of attacks on decentralized organizations due to problems in the structure of DAOs.
At first, these may be simple concerns, such as low participation in delegate governance. But they have the potential to bring about the end of the protocol – by stealing money from the treasury, exploiting a vulnerability in the protocol or even forcing the organization to dissolve.
Our goal in governance is always to think about Arbitrum’s governance security. Not just profitability or financial efficiency, but asking ourselves: is this a new risk vector for the DAO?
With the answers, we can help not only to vote, but to contribute to the development of safer governance in the organization.
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
The DAO should serve as the point of contact for funds and ecosystem growth, while also ensuring secure and beneficial enhancements and updates across the entire Arbitrum ecosystem. Funds should be allocated to incentivize the development of unique products and ideas within the ecosystem. A DAO responsible for advancing Arbitrum must also remain vigilant and collaborate closely with Ethereum to maintain alignment with the core vision of the Ethereum ecosystem. Therefore, the DAO should prioritize: 1) maintaining decentralized, secure, and effective governance to ensure economic sustainability; 2) continuing to stimulate Arbitrum’s growth by incentivizing builders and protocols that strengthen the Arbitrum ecosystem and value; 3) staying aligned with Ethereum’s core principles as an L2 solution that provides benefits to the decentralized ecosystem as a whole.
Sample Voting Issue 1: How would you vote? Against What amendments would you make to the proposal if any? Alter the allocation committee to 1/7 instead of 3/7 as proposed by Flipside. I would simply vote against it and outline my reasoning. There are countless alternative methods to increase user engagement. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done? I see a problem with this proposal because, although committees or delegates fulfill the vital function of representing the voices of many in order to optimize governance processes, a DAO shouldn’t put governance or decentralization at risk in exchange for more users. We can explore other avenues to achieve this. While users are a crucial part, governance encompasses the entirety, and when governance is jeopardized, the treasury is at stake, which could be irreversible. The involvement of only one service provider in this also indicates a selective decision-making process. Other service providers may wonder why they were not included in these seats with the same impact, undermining the credibility with those who are investing effort, time, and work into the DAO. This kind of movement, granting seats to university clubs, sounds like a bribery system, where someone votes in a particular interest and receives something in return. Cancelling this proposal would prevent community problems and discussions and would not bring the centralization/decentralization problem into question. The slight discrepancy also suggests a political agenda rather than a community-driven one. Would the voting result be the same if Uniswap implemented a private voting system?
Sample Voting Issue 2: The full reimbursement in this case will almost always be assured, as the major voters can also be the DAOs involved, primarily due to their potentially greater voting power. The DAO’s objective should be to foster consensus among all parties involved. It’s worth noting that this differs from the previous scenario, where there wasn’t an almost bribery-like system at play; here, those directly affected are voting, rather than a political outsourcing based on seat gains.
Failure to reimburse in this case could result in a loss of reputation within the ecosystem and potentially lead to a protocol crash, especially worse following a hack.
In my opinion, it’s preferable to reimburse and begin developing alternative economic mechanisms to safeguard this value as soon as possible, or to implement a reimbursement system that occurs gradually over time to mitigate any impact on token price.
The hacker exploited a reentrancy vulnerability within Rari’s Fuse lending protocol. Nevertheless, it’s crucial to recognize the complexity of this situation. From my perspective, there isn’t a definitive right or wrong answer, given the multitude of interests at stake.
Languages I speak and write: Portuguese, English, Spanish, Russian and French
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: At blockful, we are committed to transparency and integrity in all our actions. While we actively participate in various ecosystems, we currently see no conflicts of interest that impact our work. We remain vigilant and will disclose any potential conflicts should they arise. Our priority is to ensure that our contributions align with the best interests of the Web3 community and the ecosystems we support.