Name: olimpio (individual)
Wallet address: olimpio.eth (0xF4B0556B9B6F53E00A1FDD2b0478Ce841991D8fA)
Tally Profile URL: Tally | olimpio.eth
Twitter profile: https://twitter.com/OlimpioCrypto
What area are you most interested in contributing to?
- DeFi development on Arbitrum
- Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
- Public Goods funding
Please share your stance on the overall goals for the DAO:
I believe that the overall goals of a DAO should prioritize decentralization, transparency, and inclusiveness in decision-making to ensure that the community’s views are represented. I recognize the importance of Layer 2 scaling solutions for Ethereum’s adoption and advocate for the DAO to support and invest in such solutions. This is why in my opinion, funding public goods initiatives is crucial to accelerate the development of the ecosystem, as seen through the positive impact of the Optimism Grants.
Sample Voting Issue 1
How would you vote?
I would like to provide additional information for readers here in Arbitrum forum about this proposal, as I believe that the description on the first comment in this thread lacks information. In the Flipside<>Uniswap proposal, the Flipside team was asking that:
- A grant of 25M $UNI was given to them so they can LP to the univ3 WETH-UNI pool and generate fees. They would not own these funds, they would just manage them.
- They wanted to split LP fees (estimated in 30% APR) 50% to Flipside for managing the position and creating analytics for uniswap, and 50% to fund “bounties” that would onboard new users to Uniswap. The idea was to capture more users and bring them to the Uniswap ecosystem.
- They proposed the creation of 2 committees to do this, as the original comment describes. In both committees, Flipside would have participation.
I would have voted no to this proposal. Reasons:
- There is a conflict of interest between the committees managing this grant and paying themselves a share to fund their operations
- 50% of management fees seem excessive
- The 30% estimated APR was not clearly explained, and some comments suggested it was not conservative. A good idea would be that they include their models so that people can reproduce them
What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
- Their idea of using Uniswap’s treasury to generate fees and then use those fees to fund operations was very good to me. The issue I would have had was with the relationship between the vendor being contracted (Flipside), the manager of the funds and yield strategy (Flipside) and the company that had the most share of decision power in the committees (Flipside). I would start here when thinking of a change to be proposed moving forward.
- No one can deny the value that something like CEA (Community-Enabled Analytics) (which is what they were proposing to build) would have had in the Uniswap ecosystem, as many people would find it extremely useful. But there were many potential service providers to be considered, and this was unaccounted for when drafting this proposal.
- I also noticed that universities such as the MIT and Upenn voted yes, and apparently they would be getting seats in the committee. In my opinion, this does not look good, at all. The proposal said that the committee would have “2 Individuals from University Blockchain Orgs. To be Identified and Announced Post On-Chain Vote so as to not influence voting.” It seems they voted yes, as it can be seen on-chain.
Sample Voting Issue 2:
Regarding the RARI hack, it’s a complex situation. On the one hand, if a DAO has a sufficient treasury to cover losses from a hack (outside of their own tokens) I would vote immediately in favour to reimbursements. If the DAO has only its own governance tokens, a question might arise: why should holders of the token be punished in the expense of people providing liquidity? Since distributing governance tokens as a reimbursement would most definitively cause sell pressure, this could be seen as going against the interest of token holders. However, another person might answer that the tokens and token holders are directly tied to the protocol, and if the protocol suffers a hack, it’s inevitable that token price will be impacted, one way or another.
In this case, there were many DAOs involved that had a claim on the FEI being distributed. For example, Olympus Finance had a 9M FEI claim on this, FRAX had 12.M. It is also possible that DAOs working together could reach a potential better solution since there’s more ammunition to work with.
My priority when deciding the outcome of this proposal would be to use and deplete as much as possible DAO funds that don’t impact token price first. Then, move with governance tokens and partially team allocations - and try to reach a solution amongst everyone. Regardless, this was an extremely complex situation and there was, in my opinion, not a right or wrong answer. There were many interests involved.
One thing that I am certain of is that I would have considered and researched every interest to the full extent of my capabilities, to try and seek the best solution to cast my vote. Best as in the one that have the most positive impact in the most people possible.
Languages I speak and write:
English, Spanish
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I have no conflicts of interest to being an Arbitrum delegate. I am a delegate in Optimism, Hop Protocol, and StarkNet, and my goal is to help Ethereum Scale. I am a big supporter of all L2 scaling solutions and I will no doubt work for the greater good of the industry as a whole.
Congrats to the Arbitrum team, and excited to see how the ecosystem evolves, especially grants and public funding!
