Delegate Statement Template

Governance Delegate Statements
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209

Name: Summoner DAO Foundation (organization)

Website: summonerdao.org
Wallet address: SummonerDAO.arb, SummonerDAO.eth

Tally Profile: here

Contribution interests:

  • IRL Arbitrum Gatherings (2/quarter Globally)
  • DeFi development on Arbitrum.

Summoner DAO Foundation is a DAO focused on the procurement of ideas of opportunity for the community. It is fully registered and actively banking in the United States with a decentralized treasury. Summoner DAO is one of the few DAO’s in crypto that is natively deployed to Arbitrum with it’s governance token, SMNR, having been deployed to the network in late Fall of 2022.

Delegate voting goals:

In support of the Arbitrum Network and participants/holders, the DAO intends to vote towards proposals which enhance the development of innovative decentralized finance on Arbitrum, Arbitrum community events, encouragement of Arbitrum related sub-DAOs which will further grow the ecosystem outside of the participation of off-chain labs, and good governance enhancement to the DAO like quadratic voting.

Technical Voting Scenarios:

  1. Uniswap concentrated voter authority in grant distribution.

Overconcentration of grants in a later stage token project can be catastrophic to the organization, however well-intentioned the proposal can leverage significant adoption and minority alignment can be efficient to productivity. On chain monopolies can fester the core of a DAO and be a long-term detriment to ecosystem growth.

Solution: Against but amend the proposal. I would adjust the proposal to restrict Flipside Crypto’s weight to one vote, and pull 2 other analytics firms to the seats to enable better industry participation. The purpose of this change is to maintain minority composition of the grant committee outside of a supposed oligopoly, but also also for rich sophistication and precision in grant distributions to best grow the ecosystem.

  1. Solving for the FEIRARI reimbursement.

Issue: How to solve for two separate votes on the same issue including the morality of the question resolved.

There is no simple solution to this one. On one hand, the DAO should have the property of it’s voting power protected. If a centralized organization were to go against the wishes of a DAO to refund the token holders, it would diminish the value of the voting rights in the DAO. In other instances, it is amoral, can damage the brand, and may carry legal ramifications for an organization to not reimburse exploit victims. Ultimately, the best solution to avoid moral hazard in voting is to leverage a delegated voting system (like the one Arbitrum is using) to maximize the tradeoff between populism and needs of the greater DAO. Users need to be reimbursed for executions with a smart contract that penalize them and are not within the advertised intention of the contract. The responsibility should be held by token holders if equity is not present to distribute. If there is equity to distribute a join responsibility should be held by both parties. Summoner DAO would vote yes to a refund.

Languages the DAO member(s) speak:

  • English
  • Spanish
  • Portuguese
  • Russian
  • German
  • Arabic
  • Mandarin

Conflicts of interest:

The are members of the DAO who will vote in the best interest of the Arbitrum community and value decentralization broadly. Membership is selective upon owning of SMNR token and acceptance in a plurality of participants voting. That being said, some members have links to registered investment advisors, others have links to permissioned companies in web3, however no individual investment management company, DAO or foundation holds a controlling share of the tokens or participating in any verified voting decision on behalf of the DAO. All members are publicly available.

4 Likes
210

**Name: zxuc10712(Individual)

***Wallet Address: 0x4fB9FF3F8Ea27c398F7A6eC76370BB25a03F8D6a

**Tally Profile URL:Tally | @zxuc10712

**Areas of interest: * Improving Governance participation
* IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

**Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:More powerful DAO have more wonderful idea I think all ARB holder has one vote to decicion every issues

Sample Voting Issue 2:
I also agree this answer by Diego Ortiz
Split Reimbursement
A DAO must ensure the best environment for its members and also take into account their survival, therefore it will depend a lot on the cases and the type of hack, by literally draining their funds I do not think they can pay.

That’s why I think the best thing to do, and depending on the case like FEI, is to return money to those affected, maybe under a vesting system or the DAO can get down to work to look after the interests of its users.

**Languages I speak and write:chinese and learing english

**Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:no conflicts of interest

2 Likes
211

Name: Farshad

Tally: 0x8833De64c0e57Df66BdE59BC9d18De1C9BaAda69
Email: Farshad.ja9055@gmail.com

Wallet address:
0x8833De64c0e57Df66BdE59BC9d18De1C9BaAda69

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up tot wo tags:

Public Goods funding
DeFi development on Arbitrum
NFT development on Arbitrum

Language I speak: English

I hope this project works efficiently.

My twitter:
https://twitter.com/Ramiz62032027?t=1qQEOvAhm2Pihxc3E7M8_g&s=09

Thank you.

3 Likes
212

Name: Rustam (Individual)

ENS: Mrredl.eth

Tally: MrRedl | Mrredl.eth

Areas of interest:

  • Public goods funding
  • DeFi development on Arbitrum
  • Gaming development on Arbitrum
2 Likes
213

Name (organization or individual): Crypto A S, Growth & Ops at the Byte Masons

Wallet Address or ENS: 0x406eb55a7636cd2782fcdfad8df6bd767d13cbf1

Tally Profile URL Tally | Crypto A S

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

  • Public Goods funding
  • DeFi development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

  • Building a passionate community by setting up easy-to-use communication platforms, ensuring fair and transparent decision-making, and encouraging community-driven projects
  • Creating innovative solutions by identifying market gaps and building new products or services, fostering experimentation while thinking outside the box, and collaborating with other experts and projects to find synergies / integrations that push the boundary of the industry
  • Focus on long-term success and growth by establishing and refining the governance model to remain inclusive and transparent while forging partnerships with other projects and organizations to expand reach /impact
  • Implementing an effective liquidity mining initiative for network growth and adoption is critical to driving user adoption, however, it requires consistent reviews to ensure balance is achieved between a reward system that drives long-term commitment / usage and ensuring the focus of users doesn’t stray from the primary missions / goals of the DAO. I’m of the opinion that liquidity mining initiatives should act in waves to move from an aggressive position, to one where the effectiveness of that stance is measured, then adjusted moving into the next phase.

I’m not sure that any particular DAO has achieved an optimal model yet but we need to continue to push the industry status quo until we get it right.

Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview 109

  • Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
  • For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
  • This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

1. How would you vote? Against

2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any? If the proposal passed, Flipside should only have 1 seat on the Allocation Committee and zero on the Oversight Committee to avoid conflicts of interest.

3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

Striking the right balance between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done is crucial for any organization but especially critical in the context of a Web3 DAO (there have been plenty of examples for both arguments from the last couple of years). In my perspective, a successful approach involves progressive decentralization, starting with a more centralized structure for rapid decision-making and development, and gradually shifting towards decentralized governance as the DAO matures and users become bought into the success of the DAO (not always easy to achieve). Establishing a clear governance structure and designing a tokenomics model that aligns stakeholders’ interests ensures the effective functioning of both centralized and decentralized components.

I’m of the opinion that DAOs should utilize a hybrid decision-making model that combine centralized and decentralized processes in ways that actually make sense. It should facilitate effective communication between all parties however possible and provide a path forward to full decentralization. There should also be periodic evaluations and adjustments of the governance model to allow the organization to adapt to changing market conditions. This will also ensure both efficiency and inclusivity in decision-making while not sacrificing how long it takes to reach social consensus.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
Issue Overview:
Overview Link 1 384
Overview Link 2 47

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

Full Reimbursement, if there were no issues with the vote then the first vote should have been honored.

Languages I speak and write: English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: I have voted in DAOs governance votes in the past but otherwise have no conflicts of interest.

Diversity of opinions is critical to making progress and determining the future direction of the
Arbitrum ecosystem. We recognize and celebrate the fact that delegates will have diverse views and we both encourage and anticipate good-faith debates in the governance process. That being said, it’s critical that all featured delegates are operating with Arbitrum’s best interest in mind, so please affirm that you don’t have any conflicts of interest that would prevent you from using your best judgement to operate in the best interests of advancing the Arbitrum ecosystem.

1 Like
214

Name: Serhii (Individual)
Address: 0x6172D8B98FdeE4a687949e0dFde5C0d4675ec1Bd
Tally:https://www.tally.xyz/profile/0x6172d8b98fdee4a687949e0dfde5c0d4675ec1bd

Areas of interest:

DeFi development on Arbitrum
NFT development on Arbitrum
Gaming development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

We aim to create an ecosystem which is fair, open, and expansive - activating the growing community and technology which is unique to Arbitrum.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

  1. Against
  2. No amendments, just cancel it altogether.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
It would depend on the specific circumstances of the hack and the impact on the affected parties. In general, it is important to balance the needs of the affected parties with the overall health and sustainability of the project. Full reimbursement may not always be feasible or sustainable, but partial reimbursement or other forms of compensation may be appropriate in certain cases.

Languages I speak and write:

Ukrainian,English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

no conflicts of interest

1 Like
215

Name twitter : @evilpax1
Wallet address : 0x4eDc47Af2e55e10AEAd73488e228B78fD45EFA2F

  • NFT development on Arbitrum
  • Gaming development on Arbitrum

my stance on these issues is guided by a commitment to transparency, inclusivity, and responsible stewardship of the resources and assets entrusted to the DAO. As a delegate

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Against

Sample Voting Issue 2:
Full reimbursement
when the hack has already severely impacted the protocol

Languages I speak and write:

  • English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

no conflicts of interest

2 Likes
216

Lolitslame individual

0x89B6DEce313A96780A79D165C0b2572e934d93eb

Tally | Lolitslame**

**I am interested in contributing to((

  • Public Goods funding
  • DeFi development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
The goal of DAO should be improve a better user experience on layer 2, so more builders can build a better user experience app that can pull more new users into web3

Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview

  • Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
  • For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
  • This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

  1. How would you vote?
    For
  2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
    No
  3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
    There would still need to have a balance between centralization and ability to get things done. However, ‘get what things to be done’ is the most crucial question on to be ask. General direction can be decide via Voting, however, down to the granular execution task can have a centralization authority to execute it where it shall be align to the objective of the general direction.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
Issue Overview:
Overview Link 1
Overview Link 2

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

  1. Split Reimbursement
    Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.
    Depend on the individual wallet severity, fully reimburse would be causing issue on the operation and would be harming the ecosystem. Thus the most severe from the incident can be reimburse first while others can reimburse by stages until the macro outlook on the ecosystem become better.

Languages I speak and write:
Chinese, English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
Diversity of opinions is critical to making progress and determining the future direction of the
Arbitrum ecosystem. We recognize and celebrate the fact that delegates will have diverse views and we both encourage and anticipate good-faith debates in the governance process. That being said, it’s critical that all featured delegates are operating with Arbitrum’s best interest in mind, so please affirm that you don’t have any conflicts of interest that would prevent you from using your best judgement to operate in the best interests of advancing the Arbitrum ecosystem.

3 Likes
217

Name: Mike Griff

Adress: mikegriff.eth

Areas of Interest:

  • Public Goods funding
  • DeFi development on Arbitrum
  • Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
The DAO should take a long-term view of growth and development to further Arbitrum specifically and the growth and usability of the Ethereum ecosystem overall. The DAO should encourage and incentivize real ecosystem usage and adoption as well as further growth of new protocols.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

Prompts to Answer:

  1. For
  2. I would add in a trial period, during which governance had the authority to cancel the partnership if poor decisions are being made.
  3. If we assume that Flipside is going to be the partner to run this campaign, they should have the authority and ability to act in the way they see best for the campaign to succeed. Ultimately the decision to start the partnership is decentralized. If passed through governance then outside of holding Flipside accountable for performance, there should not be much more involvement by the governing body.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

Original vote would stand if there were no known issues with it for a Full Reimbursement

Languages I speak and write: English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I am a delegate for Optimism and a core contributor at Synthetix (which has not yet launched on Arbitrum)

3 Likes
218

Mr.Max -Delegate Profile (Individual)
Address:0x59c37E94Da9747052d4C051D1832BAb10d4AF2b5
ENS:shark175.eth

twitter:@MaxRichakyla75
Hi all, my name is Max.Doing full time crypto.Analyzing markets and projects.Creating Ambassador posts and doing activity.I would like to become a delegate because it would be a very enlightening experience for me and it would give me the opportunity to better communicate and share governance suggestions and developments in my content with the Arbitrum community and make people feel like they are part of the governance even if they are not directly involved. In the event that the foundation and board felt it was the right thing to do, I could find ways for my community to play an active role in my voting decisions, which would always be aimed at making Arbitrum a robust, community-oriented network.

I don’t have direct experience managing DAO, but I am very familiar with its concept and its role.I will make an objective management decision.I have the trait of an honest and decent person and can say that I want to be a member of a community that can improve Arbitrum.In one decentralized, scalable, interoperable ecosystem of interconnected independent blockchains I take votes but what I mean is decisions are always made by a narrow circle of people who are very hard to influence.I see so here would be guys thinking.
Thank you very much for your attention.

2 Likes
220

Name: Brian Fakhoury

ENS: fakhoury.eth

Tally Profile URL: Tally | BrianFakhoury

Areas of Interest for Contribution:

  • DeFi Development on Arbitrum
  • Supporting Infrastructure

Stance on the Overall Goals for the DAO: It is crucial for Arbitrum to expand the economic sphere of Ethereum through the integration of multiple networks. Liquidity mining serves as a vital instrument for distributing governance over this mission, and should be pursued assertively during periods of stagnation and judiciously when the market is overheated.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

  1. Against
  2. Given that the program outline and funding have been deemed acceptable, the proposal should be amended by adjusting the seating allocation for the two committees.
  3. Centralization and decentralization often find themselves in opposition, as the former enables smoother execution of actions. Nevertheless, from a foundational perspective, a distinction can be drawn between a slower-acting DAO and agile service providers. In the case of the Uniswap bounty proposal, Flipside should maintain their ability to offer services (such as bounty suggestions) while relinquishing oversight and allocation power.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Proposed Approach: My stance on this issue is to advocate for Full Reimbursement. Given the experimental nature of such protocols, restoring brand value should not take precedence over ensuring the well-being of users, both directly and indirectly impacted. A DAO, in its pursuit of growth, should uphold the ethical principles of its constituents. This implies that individuals affected by an unfortunate event, not caused by their own actions, ought to receive support from those in their community.

Languages Spoken and Written: English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: I declare no conflicts of interest. Mechanism Capital, my current employer, is an investor in Arbitrum.

4 Likes
222

Saligamer

0x527A22368C958BBFe684b9c9857855ebB87fccFD

What area are you most interested in contributing to?
Public Goods funding
Improving Governance participation
Supporting Infrastructure
Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
First and foremost, the purpose of a DAO is to allow for the healthy and decentralised development of the rollup. This vision, of course, can entail many different aspects, from the more technical and security focused sections of the rollup (which the DAO should have oversight over) to encouraging the development of a healthy ecosystem and growth with the ARB token. Basically, every decision the DAO makes should return to the question: ’ How does this benefit the long-term sustainability and success of not just the ARB token, but also the broader future of rollups?’ .

From this question we can begin exploring different roles that the DAO could assume in the broader Arbitrum ecosystem, and the careful balancing act that follows for each decision. Some examples include:

  • Technical protocol and security upgrades: If arbitrum truly wants to be community owned, they need to have an oversight over what the protocol will develop into and all the layers that are part of the Arbitrum ecosystem. However, the average voter will probably not be knowledgeable enough to vote in good faith on whether a development will be fruitful or not. One potential solution that could be explored is a technical subcommittee in charge of overseeing this side of governance, which ultimately might report back to the wider DAO. The DAO is already planning to do this with the Security Council, but this same idea could be implemented in other technical areas.
  • Liquidity Mining - While this strategy can assist for the short-term growth and user acquisition on the protocols selected for these campaigns, it should not be seen as a permanent fixture of any protocol. Liquidity mining serves as a great opportunity for someone to get acquainted somewhere new in search of the yield, but if subsidised too long by the Arbitrum DAO, it could lead to an unhealthy subsidy of protocols through unsustainable emissions.
  • Grants - While liquidity mining handles growing users and technical committees handle the rollup itself, grants are the greatest part of the DAO that will target builders. Grants have to be handled carefully, as they have a degree of social trust needed both from the DAO and the builders. Builders have to be able to demonstrate deliverables for the amount and accountability. Despite the complications, grants will allow for the development of tools and dApps that the space might need, but currently might not be as profitable.

These are just some examples of DAO goals, but of course there are endless more possibilities on what might be handled!

Sample Voting Issue 1 - UniSwap/Flipside Bounty

How would you vote?
For
Delegation of voting power is necessary for any DAO to be able to function efficiently in the long term. Even though it brings a degree of centralisation, as long as they do not control an excessive amount of the larger DAO and they have sufficient accountability measures it’s a good initiative.

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

  • Separate the grants into quarterly distributions: For an allocation as large as 25 Million, I don’t believe that it is wise to simply divide it into Year 1 and Year 2. I understand that half of it was going to employing staff so they would rather have the reserve upfront, but considering that the only upside of delivering such amounts once a year is saving some time on transactions and communications, it feels that dividing the allocations into at least quarterly separations would’ve been wiser.
  • Introduce checkpoints across the delegation period: In addition to having a committee handling immediate matters related to the grant, it would’ve been preferable to also introduce routine votes to ensure that the DAO was still comfortable with such a large allocation. This would have also encouraged the grantee to increase accountability and deliver accountability reports.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

It’s inevitable that effectiveness and decentralisation are inversely proportional. As long as the centralised entities are still ultimately dependent on the DAOs approval, and they operate as transparently as possible, this is a necessary tool for the development of the DAO.

A DAO should consider having centralising points only when specialists are required to act knowledgeable and quickly, something which the Vox Populi of the DAO might struggle with. The entities to do this should be trusted members of the space of course.

Sample Voting Issue 2 - Rari Hack Reinbursement

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.

i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

Split Reimbursement

Hacks and loss of funds are to this day one of the strongest blockers we have from people trusting the space and onboarding onto it. Every time a large draining of protocol contracts occurs, the idea of the Financial Legos gets threatened, as people become less and less willing to risk connecting with other protocols.

For this reason, I believe at least a partial reinbursement is always to be considered when a protocol has decided to cooperate with you. These parties decided to entrust the security of your smart contracts, and their dedication and trust that was placed onto the protocol should be thanked by at least trying to provide some funds back. In the future, this could even be handled with DAO insurance protocols, which are already being developed in the space.

Languages I speak and write: By order of preference - English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
Currently, I am spending most of my time working on the ParaSwap DAO. This means that I will automatically abstain from any discussion that might involve DEX Aggregation, as my opinion will obviously be biased. The positive side of this participation is that ParaSwap is also deployed in Arbitrum, which means that the success of Arbitrum will also positively impact ParaSwap (through increased liquidity sources and volumes), as well as vice versa (by encouraging efficiency and decentralisation of liquidity in the rollup by aggregating all of these together through a single, simple to access interface).

Additionaly, I also applied to be a delegate on the Optimism collective, which although is also part of the wider ethereum ecosystem it could be considered a conflict of interest. Currently, I am being allocated ~ 1k OP. In addition to this, ParaSwap has also been selected as one of the Protocol Delegate Scheme recipients, and if necessary, the representative of ParaSwap could be a different DAO member if this is considered a major conflict of interest. Personally, I believe that the growth of any decentralised rollup on the Ethereum ecosystem is a net positive for everyone in the space, and I will do my best to lend my knowledge in bettering the entire space

3 Likes
223

Name (individual) - ifir3

ENS - fir3.eth

Tally Profile URL - Tally | ifir3.eth

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

  • Gaming development on Arbitrum
  • Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

Sample Voting Issue 1:

Against
In terms of the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done, it is important to consider the potential risks and benefits of each approach. Centralizing authority can lead to quicker decision-making and implementation of programs, but it also increases the risk of abuse of power and favoritism. On the other hand, a decentralized approach may result in slower decision-making and implementation but provides a system of checks and balances to prevent abuse of power.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Full Reimbursement
provide full reimbursement to the affected parties. This approach may be appropriate if the hack was due to a flaw in the organization’s security systems or protocols. However, it is important to ensure that the reimbursement does not create a moral hazard that incentivizes reckless behavior.

I am writing to apply for the position of delegate on the Arbitrum network. I have been following the development of the Arbitrum network and I am excited about the potential it holds for the future of decentralized finance.

As a delegate, I believe I can contribute to the growth and development of the Arbitrum network. My technical expertise in blockchain technology, including experience with smart contract development, gives me a deep understanding of the underlying technology and its potential applications.

In addition to my technical skills, I am also passionate about community building and engagement. I believe that a strong community is essential to the success of any decentralized network. I have experience organizing and participating in community events, and I am committed to fostering a collaborative and inclusive community on the Arbitrum network.

If selected as a delegate, I would work diligently to represent the interests of the community and promote the growth and adoption of the network. I believe that my skills and experience make me a strong candidate for this position, and I am excited about the opportunity to contribute to the future of decentralized finance on the Arbitrum network.

Thank you for considering my application.

Sincerely, ifir3

Languages I speak and write:

Ukrainian, English, Russian

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

no conflicts of interest

3 Likes
224

Name (organization or individual)

  • Gioele Mussa

Wallet Address or ENS

  • bitcoinzurich.eth

Tally Profile URL (create a profile here )

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

  • NFT development on Arbitrum
  • Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

  • The goal of a DAO is improving participation and sharing value for users.

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Regarding the voting issue, it appears that the proposal has some controversial aspects related to the centralization of power and the favoritism towards one service provider. Therefore, it is important to carefully analyze the proposal and its potential implications before making a decision. Some factors that could be considered include:

The benefits of using Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties.
The potential risks associated with giving too much control to Flipside.
The fairness and inclusiveness of the allocation and oversight committees.
The involvement of other analytics service providers in the proposal.
The concerns raised by Dune and Leshner and their potential validity.

If after careful consideration, you decide to vote against the proposal, you could suggest some amendments that could address the concerns raised. For example, you could propose to reduce the power of Flipside on the committees or to involve other analytics service providers in the proposal.

Regarding the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done, it is important to strike a balance between efficiency and decentralization. While centralized decision-making can be more efficient, it can also lead to biases and favoritism. On the other hand, decentralized decision-making can be more fair and inclusive, but it can also be slower and less efficient. Therefore, it is important to weigh the pros and cons of each approach and find a solution that maximizes the benefits and minimizes the risks.

  1. Against
  2. No amendments, just cancel it altogether.
  3. The solution is reputation system, which solves most if not all DAO participation and token-weight voting problems.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
It depends on how the exploit happened. If this were a case of introducing a self-executable on-chain transfer block on the hacked amount and reminting into the damaged parties’ accounts, then I would vote yes. If the tokenholders and other network participants were to pay for this, no.

The solution to this case is to have each featured delegate disclose any potential conflicts of interest that they may have in advance of participating in the governance process. This disclosure should include any financial, personal, or professional relationships that could potentially influence their decision-making.

Once these disclosures are made, the community can evaluate them and determine whether any conflicts of interest are significant enough to preclude a delegate from participating in the governance process. If a conflict of interest is identified, the delegate should recuse themselves from any decision-making related to that issue.

It’s also important to establish clear guidelines and procedures for addressing conflicts of interest and ensuring that all delegates are acting in the best interest of advancing the Arbitrum ecosystem. This may include regular training and education for delegates, as well as ongoing monitoring and oversight to prevent any conflicts of interest from arising in the first place.

Languages I speak and write:

  • English, Italian, French, German.

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

  • no conflicts of interest
1 Like
225

CHAO - twitter
0x116633950dd99044588F00f3b5Fd2B5c05093f56
Tally | Tednet0
im most interested in Supporting Infrastructure and NFT development on Arbitrum

Liquidity mining is a popular strategy used by DAOs to incentivize liquidity providers and reward community members for contributing to the platform. The aggressiveness of liquidity mining can depend on a DAO’s goals and risk tolerance. A more aggressive approach to liquidity mining may lead to faster growth, but it may also increase volatility and risk.

Previous issues raised in other communities can vary widely, but some common ones include concerns about transparency, governance, and security. DAOs can address these issues by implementing transparent decision-making processes, strong security protocols, and community-driven governance structures.

Overall, the goals of a DAO and the approach to liquidity mining should be aligned with the needs and priorities of its community. DAOs can benefit from incorporating feedback and input from community members to ensure that their strategies and goals reflect the values and interests of the wider ecosystem.

1.For
2.Nothing more
3.The tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done is a common challenge for any organization, including DAOs. On one hand, centralization of authority can provide clear leadership and decision-making, leading to faster execution and more efficient use of resources. On the other hand, too much centralization can stifle innovation, limit participation, and lead to decision-making that does not reflect the needs and priorities of the wider community.

  1. Full Reimbursement
    Imma speak on Eng and Russian a bit
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Nombre: ROBINSON ORTEGA SERRANO

Monedero: 0x611D1f7043c53CA707111F47Bb93F8D802525105

URL del perfil de Tally: Tally | 0x611D...5105

¿En qué área estás más interesado en contribuir? elige hasta dos etiquetas:

Financiación de bienes públicos

Comparta su postura sobre los objetivos generales de la DAO:
la minería de Liwuidity es una buena idea, pero personalmente propondré que nos centremos más en proyectos que atraigan a la gente, es decir, permitan construir cosas que el lugar criptográfico necesita en web3.

Ejemplo de problema de votación 1:

¿Cómo votarías?

  • Contra
  • Sin enmiendas
  • La compensación entre la centralización de la autoridad y la capacidad de hacer las cosas necesita Liderazgo y gobernanza.

Ejemplo de problema de votación 2:

= Reembolso fraccionado
Depende. porque mi respuesta. Si este caso introduce un bloque de transferencia en cadena autoejecutable en la cantidad pirateada y se reinicia en las cuentas de las partes dañadas, votaría que sí. Si los tokenholders y otros participantes de la red pagaran por esto, no. Socializar las pérdidas entre un gran número de personas no es aceptable cuando está claro que círculos muy pequeños de personas son responsables tanto del código inseguro como del robo del dinero.

Idiomas que hablo y escribo:

Español

Divulgación de conflicto(s) de interés:

sin conflictos de intereses

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Name : Robinson

Wallet Address or ENS: 0x5073b7E3b3B7738047D16d798052Cd0B1a466f41

Tally Profile URL: Tally | boredpandas

Area of interest :

  1. DeFi development on Arbitrum
  2. Improving Governance participation

Overall goals for the DAO: I believe the DAO should strike a balance between being aggressive and conservative in liquidity mining, focusing on long-term sustainability and growth. The primary goal of the DAO should be to foster innovation and collaboration, ensuring a thriving and inclusive ecosystem for all stakeholders.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

  • Vote: Against
  • Amendments: I would suggest reevaluating the committee seat allocation to give other analytics service providers a fair chance to participate. Additionally, I would propose establishing clear guidelines for decision-making and greater transparency in the allocation process.
  • Tradeoff approach: Finding the right balance between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done is crucial. I would advocate for a more diverse committee and a system of checks and balances, promoting both efficiency and decentralized decision-making.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

  • Handling the situation: Split Reimbursement. I believe that reimbursing a portion of the losses would demonstrate support for the affected parties while also emphasizing the importance of individual responsibility in a decentralized ecosystem.
  • Instances for refund: In my opinion, reimbursements should be considered when a project’s negligence or malicious intent has led to significant community impact. However, minor losses or user errors should not warrant reimbursements, as this would encourage complacency and moral hazard.

Languages I speak and write: English, Spanish

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: I would like to express my commitment to acting in the best interests of the Arbitrum ecosystem. I confirm that I do not have any conflicts of interest that could compromise my judgment or decision-making on behalf of the community. I am dedicated to contributing my experience and knowledge to create a more decentralized and thriving environment for all stakeholders involved.

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Name (organization or individual)

  • Joseph

Wallet Address

  • 0x3b7780Bc4dAeB27Daaf5F3fc2dD02a825ad398a4

Tally Profile URL

*Tally | 0x3b77...98a4

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

  • Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

  • I do not care about liquidity mining. Bribing people to use X means X is useless. We aggressively build stuff that people NEED instead.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

  1. Against
  2. No amendments, just cancel it altogether.
  3. It is a bad reference to DAOs

Sample Voting Issue 2:
Split Reimbursement
Hacks and loss of money happen in the strongest ecosystems. And investors as well understand this this but security vulnerability is from the part of the ecosystem and they should take responsibility for their investors.

Languages I speak and write:

  • English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

  • no conflicts of interest
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Name: olimpio (individual)

Wallet address: olimpio.eth (0xF4B0556B9B6F53E00A1FDD2b0478Ce841991D8fA)

Tally Profile URL: Tally | olimpio.eth

Twitter profile: https://twitter.com/OlimpioCrypto

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

  • DeFi development on Arbitrum
  • Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
  • Public Goods funding

Please share your stance on the overall goals for the DAO:

I believe that the overall goals of a DAO should prioritize decentralization, transparency, and inclusiveness in decision-making to ensure that the community’s views are represented. I recognize the importance of Layer 2 scaling solutions for Ethereum’s adoption and advocate for the DAO to support and invest in such solutions. This is why in my opinion, funding public goods initiatives is crucial to accelerate the development of the ecosystem, as seen through the positive impact of the Optimism Grants.

Sample Voting Issue 1

How would you vote?
I would like to provide additional information for readers here in Arbitrum forum about this proposal, as I believe that the description on the first comment in this thread lacks information. In the Flipside<>Uniswap proposal, the Flipside team was asking that:

  • A grant of 25M $UNI was given to them so they can LP to the univ3 WETH-UNI pool and generate fees. They would not own these funds, they would just manage them.
  • They wanted to split LP fees (estimated in 30% APR) 50% to Flipside for managing the position and creating analytics for uniswap, and 50% to fund “bounties” that would onboard new users to Uniswap. The idea was to capture more users and bring them to the Uniswap ecosystem.
  • They proposed the creation of 2 committees to do this, as the original comment describes. In both committees, Flipside would have participation.

I would have voted no to this proposal. Reasons:

  • There is a conflict of interest between the committees managing this grant and paying themselves a share to fund their operations
  • 50% of management fees seem excessive
  • The 30% estimated APR was not clearly explained, and some comments suggested it was not conservative. A good idea would be that they include their models so that people can reproduce them

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

  • Their idea of using Uniswap’s treasury to generate fees and then use those fees to fund operations was very good to me. The issue I would have had was with the relationship between the vendor being contracted (Flipside), the manager of the funds and yield strategy (Flipside) and the company that had the most share of decision power in the committees (Flipside). I would start here when thinking of a change to be proposed moving forward.
  • No one can deny the value that something like CEA (Community-Enabled Analytics) (which is what they were proposing to build) would have had in the Uniswap ecosystem, as many people would find it extremely useful. But there were many potential service providers to be considered, and this was unaccounted for when drafting this proposal.
  • I also noticed that universities such as the MIT and Upenn voted yes, and apparently they would be getting seats in the committee. In my opinion, this does not look good, at all. The proposal said that the committee would have “2 Individuals from University Blockchain Orgs. To be Identified and Announced Post On-Chain Vote so as to not influence voting.” It seems they voted yes, as it can be seen on-chain.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Regarding the RARI hack, it’s a complex situation. On the one hand, if a DAO has a sufficient treasury to cover losses from a hack (outside of their own tokens) I would vote immediately in favour to reimbursements. If the DAO has only its own governance tokens, a question might arise: why should holders of the token be punished in the expense of people providing liquidity? Since distributing governance tokens as a reimbursement would most definitively cause sell pressure, this could be seen as going against the interest of token holders. However, another person might answer that the tokens and token holders are directly tied to the protocol, and if the protocol suffers a hack, it’s inevitable that token price will be impacted, one way or another.

In this case, there were many DAOs involved that had a claim on the FEI being distributed. For example, Olympus Finance had a 9M FEI claim on this, FRAX had 12.M. It is also possible that DAOs working together could reach a potential better solution since there’s more ammunition to work with.

My priority when deciding the outcome of this proposal would be to use and deplete as much as possible DAO funds that don’t impact token price first. Then, move with governance tokens and partially team allocations - and try to reach a solution amongst everyone. Regardless, this was an extremely complex situation and there was, in my opinion, not a right or wrong answer. There were many interests involved.

One thing that I am certain of is that I would have considered and researched every interest to the full extent of my capabilities, to try and seek the best solution to cast my vote. Best as in the one that have the most positive impact in the most people possible.

Languages I speak and write:

English, Spanish

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

I have no conflicts of interest to being an Arbitrum delegate. I am a delegate in Optimism, Hop Protocol, and StarkNet, and my goal is to help Ethereum Scale. I am a big supporter of all L2 scaling solutions and I will no doubt work for the greater good of the industry as a whole.

Congrats to the Arbitrum team, and excited to see how the ecosystem evolves, especially grants and public funding!

:zap:

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Cryptonika

cryptonika.eth
Tally Profile URL

I want to:

  • Разработка NFT на Arbitrum
  • Supporting Infrastructure
  • Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

One of the key benefits of DAOs is that they can be designed to operate without the need for traditional hierarchical structures or centralized control. This means that decisions can be made by a community of stakeholders who are all invested in the success of the project.
As a user and delegator , there are a few ways how I can help improve the effectiveness of DAOs. One way is to participate actively in the decision-making process by voting on proposals and providing feedback. Additionally, you can contribute to the development and growth of the project by offering your skills and expertise.

Sample Voting Issue 1

Give stakers small percentage of Arbitrum fee’s

1)Yes
2)No
3)Quorum

Sample Voting Issue 2

Proposal to Allocate Funds for Marketing Campaign

Description: The DAO has been growing steadily, but we believe we can accelerate our growth by launching a targeted marketing campaign. This campaign would include social media advertising, influencer partnerships, and targeted email marketing.

We propose allocating $50,000 from the DAO’s treasury to fund this marketing campaign. The campaign will be managed by a marketing agency with a proven track record of success in the crypto industry.

This proposal is open for discussion and debate. We welcome all feedback and input from DAO members.

Options for Voting:

  1. Yes, allocate $50,000 for the marketing campaign
  2. No, do not allocate funds for the marketing campaign

Instructions for Voting:

Please reply to this proposal with your vote. Only members with voting rights can vote. Voting will be open for seven days from the date of this proposal.

Languages I speak and write:

English
Ukranian
Czech
Russian

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