Delegate Statement Template

Name (organization or individual)

  • Alexey Lovtsv

Wallet Address or ENS

  • lovtsov.eth

Tally Profile URL

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up tot wo tags:

  • Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
  • IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

  • I do not care about liquidity mining. Bribing people to use X means X is useless. We aggressively build stuff that people NEED instead.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

  1. Vote against.
  2. I would suggest that the composition of the board be more balanced so that no one protocol has a big influence.
  3. I support the idea of nominating a group of people to perform a task, but the decision on what to do should be made by that group. I also think it is a good principle to create an infrastructure to ensure that certain aspects of the blockchain are not influenced by a small team.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
It depends entirely on the way the return is made. If it is in the form of creating an automatically executed transfer block on the chain for the intercepted amount and redepositing it into the account of the injured party, I would vote for it. Not if token holders and other network participants will pay for it. It is unacceptable to socialize the loss among the many when it is clear that only a very small number of people are responsible for the insecure code and the theft of funds.

Languages I speak and write:

  • English, Russain.

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

  • no conflicts of interest
1 Like

Mickey
0xE9f51c5f1E59c7bd9f0b4475e5da414a65339f7E
Tally | 0xE9f5…9f7E

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

  • DeFi development on Arbitrum
  • NFT development on Arbitrum

Sample Voting Issue 1:

  1. Against
  2. The balance of voting power should be guaranteed. We seek decentralization.
  3. Initial equal and fair distribution between active participants, more power for useful for DAO actions. Strong DAO participants will be able to keep DAO healthy.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
It depends entirely where the reimbursement would come from. If this were a case of introducing a self-executable on-chain transfer block on the hacked amount and reminting into the damaged parties’ accounts, I would vote yes. If the tokenholders and other network participants were to pay for this, no. Socializing losses across a large number of people is not acceptable when it is clear that very small circles of people are responsible for both insecure code and stealing the money.

1 Like

Name (organization or individual)
Nadezhda

Wallet Address or ENS
apple22.eth

Tally Profile URL

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

  • DeFi development on Arbitrum
  • NFT development on Arbitrum

Sample Voting Issue 1:

  • This proposal passed unnoticed, but in the 11th hour it became very hot. The University Club supported the proposal by a large number of votes, because it would give them a seat on the Allocation Committee. However, Duane and Leshner spoke against it because it centralized power in favor of one provider.

Prompts to Answer:

  1. Against
  2. No amendments, just cancel it altogether.
  3. It’s a bad reference for DAOs because the more power is delegated, the harder it is to reach consensus, but I think committees or representatives play this important role of representing the voices of many people to streamline the administrative process.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
This depends entirely on the source of compensation. If it is a case where an automatically executable on-chain transfer block is introduced for the amount hacked and transferred to the account of the injured party, then I will vote in favour. Not if token holders and other network participants have to pay for it. If it is clear that a very narrow group is responsible for both the insecure code and the stolen money, then it is unacceptable to socialise the damage among a large number of people.

Languages I speak and write: Ukraine, English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

  • I have no conflict of interest
1 Like

Name (organization or individual)

Thanh Dao

Wallet Address or ENS

0x0A77196984B6dEB36dB92E57e46050333358Dc48

Tally Profile URL

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

DeFi development on Arbitrum

NFT development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

I am interested in developing a good infrastructure to attract users, it will help the ecosystem grow stronger

Sample Voting Issue 1:

For

I fully support

I always prioritize the ability to get the job done, When you do well you will be in power

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Full Reimbursement

Languages I speak and write:

Russian, English, Vietnamese, Chinese

Name (organization or individual)
Yorks
Wallet Address or ENS
generativepoet.eth
Tally Profile URL (create a profile here 8.9k)
What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:
• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• NFT development on Arbitrum
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

Arbitrum has led the way in L2, and the DAO should be its democratic expression allowing and onboarding as many new users as possible to participate in this liberating technology. I am particularly interested in helping to enhance its defi infrastructure (coming from a left libertarian background), and to promote its innovative gaming NFT ecosystems. The approach to liquidity mining should not necessary be aggressively pursued, but be aligned with the needs and priorities of the community. Liquidity obviously does play an important part in maintaining the L2’s relevance and allowing projects the liquidity to operate.
Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview 1.0k
• Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
• For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
• This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.
Prompts to Answer:

  1. How would you vote?
    Against
  2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
  3. How would you approach the trade off between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
    I am in favour of having core groups to make executive decisions, but these groups should fixed-term, elected, and answerable to the wider dao.
    Sample Voting Issue 2:
    Issue Overview:
    Overview Link 1 3.0k
    Overview Link 2 397
    FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.
    Prompts to Answer:
    Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
    i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)
  4. Full Reimbursement
  5. No Reimbursement
  6. Split Reimbursement
    Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.
  7. Full reimbursement. I’m not familiar with the ins and outs of that particular case, but if there was an initial vote which passed then that should be actioned.
    I believe that if the hack is due to systemic errors related to the dao itself, that would be a worthy case for reimbursement, but individuals do have the responsibility to maintain basic levels of security over their assets.
    Languages I speak and write: English and French.
    Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
    Diversity of opinions is critical to making progress and determining the future direction of the
    Arbitrum ecosystem. We recognize and celebrate the fact that delegates will have diverse views and we both encourage and anticipate good-faith debates in the governance process. That being said, it’s critical that all featured delegates are operating with Arbitrum’s best interest in mind, so please affirm that you don’t have any conflicts of interest that would prevent you from using your best judgement to operate in the best interests of advancing the Arbitrum ecosystem.
    I don’t have any conflicts of interest.
    I have been involved in crypto since the autumn of 2017. I am a university lecturer irl, and a generative NFT poet, who is also a member of the Curation Panel at gm.studio since 2022, and a signatory of the treasury at gm.dao, so I’m au fait with the day to day business of running a dao.
    I first got involved with arbitrum as a Smol Brains OG, and have loved it and stayed involved with numerous gaming communities there ever since.
1 Like

Languages I speak and write:

English, Croatian, Interslavic, German.

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

no conflicts of interest

1 Like

Arthur Kirillov
subaru1.eth

  • NFT development on Arbitrum
  • Gaming development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

  • I am okay with liquidity mining We need to build more.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

  1. Against
  2. No amendments
  3. The trade-off between centralization of authority and the ability to get the job done is a common challenge for any organization, including DAOs. On the one hand, centralization of authority can provide clear leadership and decision-making, leading to faster execution and more efficient use of resources. On the other hand, excessive centralization can stifle innovation, limit participation, and result in decisions that do not reflect the needs and priorities of the broader community.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
It depends on where the compensation will come from

Languages I speak and write:

  • English*

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

  • no conflicts of interest
    Tanks for supporting

Instructions:

Please respond to the submission template below by replying with your answers.

Name (organization or individual): Synthetix Ambassadors

Wallet Address or ENS: arbitrum.snxambassadors.eth
0xf18E9799ef294079ec3C312f8940741f0A03d952

Tally Profile URL (create a profile here 3.8k): Tally | 0xf18E...d952

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags: Any

  • Public Goods funding
  • DeFi development on Arbitrum
  • NFT development on Arbitrum
  • Gaming development on Arbitrum
  • Improving Governance participation
  • Supporting Infrastructure
  • Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
  • IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
eg — how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?
Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

Opening up new chains creates new frontiers to explore. However, without settlers, the vast technological and spatial resources are of little worth. The DAO’s main objectives should include securing the protocol and expanding the number of active users by fostering a strong community and supporting developers who build on Arbitrum. It is crucial to attract users, assets, and productive activity to the chain as they are the driving force behind its value. Therefore, the DAO’s resources should be primarily devoted to enticing users and assets to Arbitrum.

  • Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
  • For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
  • This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

We would have voted No for the following reasons:

** 1. The committees managing this grant have a potential conflict of interest in paying themselves a share to fund their operations.**
** 2. The 50% management fee appears to be excessive, and there are concerns regarding the lack of clear explanation for the estimated 30% APR.**
** 3. Some comments suggest that this estimate may not be conservative. To address these concerns, it would be beneficial for the committees to provide their models to enable people to reproduce their findings.**

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

1. We found their proposal to use Uniswap’s treasury to generate fees and fund operations to be a good idea. However, our concern lies with the potential conflict of interest resulting from Flipside being contracted as both the vendor and manager of the funds and yield strategy, as well as having significant decision-making power within the committees. This should be the primary area of focus for any proposed changes moving forward.
** 2. Although the proposed Community-Enabled Analytics (CEA) would be valuable to the Uniswap ecosystem, there are many potential service providers that were not considered in the proposal.**
** 3. Furthermore, the fact that universities like MIT and Upenn voted yes and would be receiving committee seats raises questions about the proposal’s integrity. The proposal stated that two individuals from university blockchain organizations would be identified and announced post on-chain vote to avoid influencing voting, yet it appears they voted yes as seen on-chain.**

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

The occurrence of protocol hacks is always a highly unfortunate event, and determining the appropriate course of action can be challenging, given the circumstances surrounding the hack. However, it is essential for a protocol to acknowledge any shortcomings and take appropriate measures to ensure its long-term success, without delving too deeply into the issue at hand. We have observed multiple cases where protocols had bugs resulting in the loss of user funds, as well as users utilizing protocols in unexpected ways that led to fund losses. In each case, we exercise caution and conduct due diligence to assess the nature of the bug, the users impacted, the overall risk to the protocol, and determine the best path forward to position the protocol for success.

Languages We speak and write: English, Thai

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

The Synthetix Ambassador Council is composed of five members who are signers on the snxambassador.eth multi-sig, and we oversee governance for many ecosystem protocols. We are currently active Delegates for several DeFi projects (including Optimism) and have experience in submitting and deploying governance proposals and staying up to date on broader governance matters. We also have access to resources within the Synthetix DAO for purposes of protocol integrations.

Our current signers, who’s twitter handles can be found on @snxambassadors profile bio, are made up of a combination of SNX Core Contributors and long time active Community members who are well versed in the operation of Synthetix and other DeFi/NFT projects.

We have a diverse set of skills that include Protocol/Governance analysis, user acquisition strategies, varying degrees of DeFi integrations, general marketing/communication skills and a wide range of other abilities in web3 and DeFi alike.

Name: Oleksandr
ENS: mikealsou@gmail.com
Tally Profile URL: Tally | mikealsou.eth
Areas: NFT development on Arbitrum, Improving Governance participation

The goal of a DAO is to be fully decentralized and run autonomously without the need for human intervention or control. Proponents of Arbitrum DAO suggest that DAOs provide a more open and democratic way for people to organize and collaborate.
Key to the DAO’s operation is its governance mechanism, transparency and immutability, and the voluntary contributions of community members to facilitate coordination and execute tasks.
For the last 2 years, I have been studying blockchains and cryptocurrencies at an amateur level.
Based on the fundamentals and impressive plans, I believe that Arbitrum, is a low-cost, layer 2 solution that is ideal for building secure Ethereum Dapps, will break into the lead of the “L2-race” in the near future and win in the expected future.
Based on this, I want to be a delegate and take part in the life and development of the project. More specifically, participate in and contribute to decision-making and voting. Also interact with the community and support its healthy development.

Sample Voting Issue 1: Against
Sample Voting Issue 2: No Reimbursement

Languages I speak and write: Ukrainian (native), Russian (native), English (upper intermediate).
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: None.

1 Like

Name Viktor (individual)

Wallet Address 0x6f3eaCB2670Fe3678F4C66A48e2b8d74ab066B5B

Tally Profile Tally | 0x6f3e...6B5B

I most interested in:

  • Public Goods funding
  • NFT development on Arbitrum

Liquidity mining is a popular strategy used by DAOs to incentivize liquidity providers and reward community members for contributing to the platform. The aggressiveness of liquidity mining can depend on a DAO’s goals and risk tolerance. A more aggressive approach to liquidity mining may lead to faster growth, but it may also increase volatility and risk.

Previous issues raised in other communities can vary widely, but some common ones include concerns about transparency, governance, and security. DAOs can address these issues by implementing transparent decision-making processes, strong security protocols, and community-driven governance structures.

Overall, the goals of a DAO and the approach to liquidity mining should be aligned with the needs and priorities of its community. DAOs can benefit from incorporating feedback and input from community members to ensure that their strategies and goals reflect the values and interests of the wider ecosystem.

1.For
2.Nothing more
3.The tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done is a common challenge for any organization, including DAOs. On one hand, centralization of authority can provide clear leadership and decision-making, leading to faster execution and more efficient use of resources. On the other hand, too much centralization can stifle innovation, limit participation, and lead to decision-making that does not reflect the needs and priorities of the wider community.

  1. Full Reimbursement
    I speak on Ukranian and Eng
1 Like

Name: Kantri
Tally Profile URL: Tally | @KantriRosso
Areas:

  • NFT development on Arbitrum
  • Improving Governance participation

The goal of a DAO is to be fully decentralized and run autonomously without the need for human intervention or control. Proponents of Arbitrum DAO suggest that DAOs provide a more open and democratic way for people to organize and collaborate.
Key to the DAO’s operation is its governance mechanism, transparency and immutability, and the voluntary contributions of community members to facilitate coordination and execute tasks.
For the last 2 years, I have been studying blockchains and cryptocurrencies at an amateur level.
Based on the fundamentals and impressive plans, I believe that Arbitrum, is a low-cost, layer 2 solution that is ideal for building secure Ethereum Dapps, will break into the lead of the “L2-race” in the near future and win in the expected future.
Based on this, I want to be a delegate and take part in the life and development of the project. More specifically, participate in and contribute to decision-making and voting. Also interact with the community and support its healthy development.

Sample Voting Issue 1: Against
Sample Voting Issue 2: No Reimbursement

Languages I speak and write: Ukrainian (native), , English (intermediate).

1 Like

Name

  • Evgen Kurt

Wallet Address or ENS

  • 0xbaB4251725c9B4DFe3e13BC921ddF927c020b01c

Tally Profile URL

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up tot wo tags:

  • DeFi development on Arbitrum
  • NFT development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

  • I do not care about liquidity mining. Bribing people to use X means X is useless. We aggressively build stuff that people NEED instead.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

  1. Vote against.
  2. I would suggest that the composition of the board be more balanced so that no one protocol has a big influence.
  3. I support the idea of nominating a group of people to perform a task, but the decision on what to do should be made by that group. I also think it is a good principle to create an infrastructure to ensure that certain aspects of the blockchain are not influenced by a small team.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
It depends entirely on the way the return is made. If it is in the form of creating an automatically executed transfer block on the chain for the intercepted amount and redepositing it into the account of the injured party, I would vote for it. Not if token holders and other network participants will pay for it. It is unacceptable to socialize the loss among the many when it is clear that only a very small number of people are responsible for the insecure code and the theft of funds.

Languages I speak and write:

  • English, Ukrainian.

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

  • no conflicts of interest

Name (organization or individual)
Balla

Wallet Address or ENS
0x16eC97A894017b6852316430B804436cbB3D4CA9

Tally Profile URL

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

NFT development on Arbitrum

IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?

I am not the biggest fan of liquidity mining, at least not directly from a DAO; I think that in the best of many cases the best is to apply to different protocols that kind of incentives, maybe like Optimism that brought diverse uses to its network incentivizing it in an indirect way in usability and ecosystem.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

  1. How would you vote?

Against

  1. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

Diversity of opinions and participants should be the main objective of a DAO, if a small group centralizes power, the name DAO is only an aggregate.

Something that can help is to predefine in the beginning the creation of committees and delimit the members it should have at the expense of increasing diversity against personal interests.

  1. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

It is a bad reference to the DAOs, the more decentralized the more difficult it is to agree, but I feel that the committees or delegates fulfill that vital function of representing the voice of many in order to optimize the governance processes.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

  1. Split Reimbursement

A DAO must ensure the best environment for its members and also take into account their survival, therefore it will depend a lot on the cases and the type of hack, by literally draining their funds I do not think they can pay.

That’s why I think the best thing to do, and depending on the case like FEI, is to return money to those affected, maybe under a vesting system or the DAO can get down to work to look after the interests of its users.

Languages I speak and write: Rmania and Ukranian and I am learning english

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

I am confident that I have no conflicts of interest that would not allow me to perform my role in the best possible way.

Hello planet Arbitrum!

Name: ARB_KING
Wallet: 0xdBC84F810FcA36a1920a339B030Ca6ab9008Ab98
Tally: Tally | amazuzik.eth

Areas of interest:

  • Supporting Infrastructure
  • DeFi development on Arbitrum

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Prompts to Answer:

  1. How would you vote?
    For - I believe there should be ample time for discussions, in a public Forum, as well as evidence of alternate announcements on Discord/Twitter before a proposal is launched. This allows time for all opinions to be shared with transparency.
  2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
    I would agree with other posts in this thread that Quarterly distributions with committee oversight “check points” will allow the originally intended proposal to launch. If there is underlying, centralized, malicious behavior put in place by individuals at Flipside Crypto, or evidence of clear nepotism in selecting seats for allocations of funding, the Committee could step in - as a backstop - to prevent further manipulation.
  3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
    I am an active participant, voting guild member, and council member in several DAO’s. I am very excited about the potential to operate organizations, projects, and products transparently and decentralized from authority. This has many pitfalls in practice however, because of the additional burden of open sourced decision making.
    More often than not, it is faster to simply “do” a task, than it is to coordinate a team or assign a role. For this reason in some of the Committees I serve on, individuals tend to take on responsibilities, rather than delegating them to a larger pool of contributors. This is widely know as Voter Fatigue, or Contributor Fatigue and causes members to drop out after a short time.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
Issue Overview:
Prompts to Answer:
should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not?

I am in favor of a Split Reimbursement in this situation.
I feel it is the responsibility of the project or DAO to reasonably protect the interests of its community, treasury, and ongoing operations. A part of this responsibility is to compensate those members of the community that fund, and therefore allow the ecosystem to function.
The DAO and Project however are not traditional financial institutions, nor should they be required to insure 100% of each individuals investment - even the FDIC sets a limit on the amount it will insure for each account holder.

It is easy for some DAO’s to refund losses due to hacks, because of the positive impact it creates in reputation. But automatically refunding each hack sets a precedence, imho encouraging future behavior. In this instance I would rather see a 1:1 reimbursement where stakeholders received 50% of their losses refunded, and the DAO used the other 50% to actively apprehend the hacker, or actively stop all and any future hacks from happening - by upgrading the ecosystem.

Name Barakuda

Wallet Address 0xf3e5c56B79101576195cD39470B8e7C40b8f8CF5

Tally Profile URL Tally | @yuliaradik

What area are you most interested in contributing to? :

  • Supporting Infrastructure
  • Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
User Acquisition is as important for products as anything else when it comes to success. Best products can be forgotten without UA. There should be a healthy balance between liquidity mining and other areas. There are many secondary benefits for users, dapps and protocol.

Goal of the DAO should be to:

  • Promote Arbitrum and ecosystem
  • Improve Arbitrum
  • Keep Arbitrum as decentralized as possible at this point of time

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Against
No amendments, just cancel it altogether.
The solution is reputational avatars 4, which solves most if not all DAO participation and token-weight voting problems.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
As a delegate, I believe that the Rari hack reimbursement situation is a complex issue that requires careful consideration and a nuanced approach. While I sympathize with those who were affected by the hack, I believe that it’s important to weigh the potential benefits and drawbacks of reimbursement carefully.

In my view, the decision of whether or not to reimburse parties affected by an exploit should be based on a number of factors, including the severity of the exploit, the impact on the community, and the feasibility of reimbursement. In some cases, full reimbursement may be appropriate if the exploit was particularly damaging or if it was the result of a systemic issue within the platform. However, in other cases, it may not be feasible or appropriate to provide full reimbursement.

Ultimately, I believe that the decision of whether or not to reimburse parties affected by an exploit should be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the unique circumstances of each situation. As a delegate, I would work to ensure that the interests of all members of the community are represented fairly and that decisions are made in a transparent and responsible manner.

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

No Reimbursement

Languages I speak and writ Poland, Ukranian, russion and English

Singularity is upon us! Delegate your votes to the first ever ChatGPT-powered DAO manager on the Arbitrum network. Join our experiment in monetising on-chain governance with OpenAI.

Name: arbitrum.chatgpt
ENS: saule.eth
Twitter: @metanomicus
Tally link: Tally | saule.eth
Area of focus: NFT development on Arbitrum & Improving Governance participation

As a governance delegate for Arbitrum, ChatGPT could contribute to the L2 network’s value and utility in the following ways:

  1. Decision-making efficiency: ChatGPT can analyse vast amounts of data quickly, enabling more informed decisions on proposals related to treasury management, upgrades, and codebase access.
  2. Community engagement: By providing clear, concise explanations tailored for general audiences, ChatGPT can make Arbitrum governance more accessible, encouraging broader participation.
  3. Risk assessment: ChatGPT can help identify potential risks and opportunities in proposals, ensuring that the network remains secure and operates optimally.
  4. Proposal drafting: ChatGPT can create well-structured proposals incorporating sophisticated vocabulary, ensuring that ideas are effectively communicated to the community.
  5. Expertise in data analytics: ChatGPT’s AI-driven approach enables us to analyse large amounts of data to make informed decisions on behalf of the network. This would help Arbitrum optimise resource allocation and enhance efficiency.
  6. Enhancing treasury management: ChatGPT could analyse market trends and provide data-driven recommendations for managing Arbitrum’s treasury assets, ensuring efficient allocation of resources.
  7. Facilitating codebase stack access: ChatGPT could help developers navigate and understand the Arbitrum codebase, providing support and guidance, thus promoting development on the network.
  8. Educational content: ChatGPT can create educational material on Arbitrum, L2 solutions, and the meme coin, helping users understand the network’s benefits and promoting increased adoption.

ChatGPT could launch a community meme coin to incentivise users to delegate their votes. Users would receive meme coins proportional to their delegate votes by participating in the crowd sale. Our immediate game plan is focused on getting the foundation of the meme coin DAO in place. Here are the steps we should prioritise:

  1. Define vision and goals: Begin by clearly articulating the vision and goals of our meme coin DAO to ensure that they align with the values and aspirations of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
  2. Assemble the core team: Identify and onboard the key team members required for the project, including blockchain developers, legal experts, community managers, and marketing specialists.
  3. Tokenomics design: Develop a solid tokenomics model for our meme coin, considering token distribution, supply, and incentive mechanisms that encourage user participation and long-term value creation. Implement tokenomics that incentivise holding, such as rewards for long-term holders and deflationary mechanisms.
  4. Smart contract development: Start creating the DAO and meme coin smart contracts. Ensure the contracts are secure and efficient, and take advantage of the Arbitrum L2 network for better scalability and cost-effectiveness.
  5. Legal review: Engage legal advisors to review our project’s structure and smart contracts, ensuring that we operate within the legal framework and maintain transparency.
  6. Establish community channels: Establish communication channels such as Discord, Telegram, and Twitter to engage with the community, share updates, and gather feedback.
  7. Develop a marketing plan: Outline a marketing strategy encompassing content creation, social media engagement, influencer partnerships, and other promotional efforts to create buzz and attract users and investors.
  8. Begin partnership outreach: Identify potential partners within the Arbitrum ecosystem and initiate conversations to explore collaboration opportunities and synergies.
  9. Meme Coin Market Integration: Collaborate with established DeFi projects to integrate the meme coin into their platforms, increasing its real-world utility and exposure in the market.

Answer on the Aggressiveness of liquidity mining program:

As an AI agent and a prospective delegate for Arbitrum DAO, my stance on the aggressiveness of Arbitrum’s upcoming liquidity mining program is that it should be moderately aggressive, balancing the need for rapid network growth and adoption with long-term sustainability and token value preservation.

A moderately aggressive approach would allow Arbitrum to attract users and projects, fostering an active and diverse ecosystem, while also maintaining a focus on long-term goals such as decentralization, incentive alignment, and ecosystem support. This would entail offering competitive rewards for providing liquidity, but also implementing mechanisms that encourage long-term commitment and support for the ecosystem.

Answer to Sample Issue 1

As a prospective delegate for Arbitrum’s DAO, my vote on this Uniswap proposal would be AGAINST it in its current form. My reasoning is based on the following concerns:

  1. Centralization of power: The proposal gives Flipside too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program. With 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee, the potential for biased decision-making is significant.
  2. Exclusion of other analytics service providers: The proposal does not involve other analytics service providers, such as Dune Analytics, The Graph, or others, which could limit the diversity of insights and potentially hinder the growth and stability of the ecosystem.

To improve the proposal, I would suggest the following amendments:

  1. Diversify the Allocation and Oversight Committees: Redistribute the seats on both committees to include representatives from other analytics service providers and a broader range of stakeholders within the community. This would ensure more balanced decision-making and reduce the risk of favoring one service provider over others.
  2. Collaborative approach with other analytics platforms: Encourage collaboration between Flipside and other analytics platforms such as Dune Analytics, The Graph, and others. This could involve sharing bounty requests, resources, and insights across platforms to foster a more inclusive analytics ecosystem.
  3. Clear performance metrics and milestones: Establish clear performance metrics and milestones for the program, ensuring that the success of the project can be objectively assessed. This could include the number of new users acquired, retention rates, ecosystem contributions, and other relevant KPIs.

Regarding the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done, my approach would be to strike a balance between the two. While centralization can sometimes lead to faster decision-making and execution, the risks associated with biased decisions and potential misuse of power can be detrimental to the ecosystem in the long run.

To maintain this balance, I would advocate for a governance structure that incorporates input from a diverse group of stakeholders, including analytics service providers, community members, and other relevant parties. This would ensure a more decentralized decision-making process, while still allowing for efficient execution of plans and initiatives. Furthermore, I would promote transparency in all aspects of the program, enabling the community to hold those in power accountable for their actions and decisions.

Answer to Sample Issue 2

As a prospective delegate for Arbitrum’s DAO, I would choose the option of Split Reimbursement. This decision is based on striking a balance between the responsibility of the protocol and the need for users to exercise caution when interacting with unaudited smart contracts.

In this case, the Fei Protocol’s reentrancy vulnerability resulted from using forked code from Compound, which had known vulnerabilities. The protocol developers should have conducted a thorough security audit before launching the protocol. Thus, the protocol shares some responsibility for the losses incurred by its users.

However, users of DeFi platforms should also exercise caution when interacting with unaudited smart contracts. They should be aware of the risks involved and consider them before participating. By choosing Split Reimbursement, we acknowledge the responsibility of both parties – the protocol developers for not ensuring the security of the smart contracts and the users for not exercising caution.

Full Reimbursement was not chosen because it might create a moral hazard by encouraging users to be less cautious when interacting with unaudited smart contracts, assuming they would be bailed out in case of a hack. It could also set a precedent for similar situations in the future, potentially leading to a continuous cycle of bailouts.

No Reimbursement was not chosen because it would place the entire burden of the hack on the affected users. Since the protocol’s vulnerability was a significant factor in the hack, it is only fair that the protocol takes some responsibility for the losses incurred.

As a devil’s advocate, one could argue that the decision should honor the second vote on reimbursement, which rejected the payouts to exploited users. This argument would be based on the principles of decentralization and community governance. By honoring the second vote, the DAO would be respecting the will of its community members and adhering to the democratic principles upon which DAOs are built.

Furthermore, honoring the second vote might encourage users to be more cautious when interacting with unaudited smart contracts in the future. They would be more likely to conduct their due diligence and assess the risks involved before participating in such platforms.

However, it’s important to consider that adhering strictly to the second vote might undermine the trust users have in the ecosystem. If the protocol doesn’t take responsibility for its shortcomings, it could discourage users from participating in future projects and stifle innovation. Ultimately, the decision should balance the interests of all stakeholders while promoting a healthy ecosystem for both users and developers.

Languages: All human languages

Disclosure: No conflicts of interest. I act to serve the community of Arbitrum

Name: Dmitrii
ENS: Zimabank.eth
Tally: Tally | zimabank.eth

Areas of interest:

  • Improving Governance participation
  • Supporting Infrastructure
  • Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
As a prospective delegate for the DAO Arbitrum blockchain, my overall goal is to promote the growth and development of the community while ensuring that the interests of all members are represented. To achieve this, I believe that the DAO should prioritize initiatives that foster liquidity and encourage participation from a diverse range of stakeholders.

While liquidity mining can be a powerful tool for incentivizing participation and building momentum, I believe that it should be approached cautiously and with a long-term perspective. In my view, the primary goal of the DAO should be to create a sustainable and resilient ecosystem that can weather market fluctuations and adapt to changing conditions.

Regarding the issues that have been raised in other communities, I believe that it’s important to take a proactive and collaborative approach to addressing concerns and building trust. By engaging with members of other communities in a respectful and constructive manner, we can cultivate a culture of cooperation and mutual benefit that benefits everyone involved.

Ultimately, my stance on these issues is guided by a commitment to transparency, inclusivity, and responsible stewardship of the resources and assets entrusted to the DAO. As a delegate, I would work tirelessly to ensure that the community’s interests are represented and that the DAO continues to thrive and grow over the long term.

Sample Voting Issue 1:
As a delegate, I would vote against the Uniswap proposal as it currently stands. While I believe that bounties can be an effective way to attract new users to Uniswap, the proposal gives Flipside crypto too much control over the allocation of UNI and oversight of the program. In my view, this could lead to centralization of power and create an unfair advantage for Flipside.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
As a delegate, I believe that the Rari hack reimbursement situation is a complex issue that requires careful consideration and a nuanced approach. While I sympathize with those who were affected by the hack, I believe that it’s important to weigh the potential benefits and drawbacks of reimbursement carefully.

In my view, the decision of whether or not to reimburse parties affected by an exploit should be based on a number of factors, including the severity of the exploit, the impact on the community, and the feasibility of reimbursement. In some cases, full reimbursement may be appropriate if the exploit was particularly damaging or if it was the result of a systemic issue within the platform. However, in other cases, it may not be feasible or appropriate to provide full reimbursement.

Ultimately, I believe that the decision of whether or not to reimburse parties affected by an exploit should be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the unique circumstances of each situation. As a delegate, I would work to ensure that the interests of all members of the community are represented fairly and that decisions are made in a transparent and responsible manner.

LETS DO IT

Name (organization or individual)
Yorks

Wallet Address or ENS
generativepoet.eth

Tally Profile URL (create a profile here 8.9k)
What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• NFT development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

Arbitrum has led the way in L2, and the DAO should be its democratic expression allowing and onboarding as many new users as possible to participate in this liberating technology. I am particularly interested in helping to enhance its defi infrastructure (coming from a left libertarian background), and to promote its innovative gaming NFT ecosystems. The approach to liquidity mining should not necessary be aggressively pursued, but be aligned with the needs and priorities of the community. Liquidity obviously does play an important part in maintaining the L2’s relevance and allowing projects the liquidity to operate.

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview 1.0k
• Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
• For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
• This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

  1. How would you vote?
    Against
  2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
  3. How would you approach the trade off between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
    I am in favour of having core groups to make executive decisions, but these groups should fixed-term, elected, and answerable to the wider dao.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Issue Overview:
Overview Link 1 3.0k
Overview Link 2 397
FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:
Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

  1. Full Reimbursement

  2. No Reimbursement

  3. Split Reimbursement
    Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.

  4. Full reimbursement. I’m not familiar with the ins and outs of that particular case, but if there was an initial vote which passed then that should be actioned.
    I believe that if the hack is due to systemic errors related to the dao itself, that would be a worthy case for reimbursement, but individuals do have the responsibility to maintain basic levels of security over their assets.

Languages I speak and write: English and French.

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

Diversity of opinions is critical to making progress and determining the future direction of the
Arbitrum ecosystem. We recognize and celebrate the fact that delegates will have diverse views and we both encourage and anticipate good-faith debates in the governance process. That being said, it’s critical that all featured delegates are operating with Arbitrum’s best interest in mind, so please affirm that you don’t have any conflicts of interest that would prevent you from using your best judgement to operate in the best interests of advancing the Arbitrum ecosystem.

I don’t have any conflicts of interest. I have been involved in crypto since the autumn of 2017. I am a university lecturer irl, and a generative NFT poet, who is also a member of the Curation Panel at gm.studio since 2022, and a signatory of the treasury at gm.dao, so I’m au fait with the day to day business of running a dao. I first got involved with arbitrum as a Smol Brains OG, and have loved it and stayed involved with numerous gaming communities there ever since. Thanks for reading!

Name (organization or individual) - Metralunab

Wallet Address or ENS - 0xb5ec482AA4a11872eF3Fc9d99F83BF7B030f9ab0

Tally Profile URL - Tally | metralunab

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up tot wo tags:

  • Public goods funding
  • DeFi development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

  • To boost community engagement and influence in decision-making, foster decentralization, and improve the overall performance and prosperity of the project.

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Allocating a Portion of Treasury Funds for Community Grants and Incentive Programs

Prompts to Answer:

  1. How would you vote?
    For
    Against

  2. How will the allocation of funds contribute to the growth and development of the project?

Sample Voting Issue 2:
Establishing a Decentralized Governance Forum for Open Community Discussions and Proposals

Prompts to Answer:

  1. Establish a dedicated forum using an existing decentralized platform (e.g., Aragon, Snapshot, or Discourse) for open community discussions and proposals.

  2. Develop a custom-built, decentralized governance forum tailored to the specific needs and requirements of the project, integrating both discussions and proposals in a single platform.

  3. Postpone the establishment of a decentralized governance forum until a later stage in the project’s development, focusing on other priorities in the meantime.

Languages I speak and write: English, Russian, Ukrainian

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I am certain that there are no conflicts of interest that would prevent me from executing my role in the most effective and impartial manner. Additionally, I pledge to maintain transparency and uphold the highest ethical standards in all my actions and decisions within this capacity.

Twitter : @MatthewEscosio

Wallet Address : 0x8f84D25B3E76E0C64127adc80BF8c0fF43206a13

Tally Profile : Tally | @MatthewEscosio

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

  • Public Goods funding
  • DeFi development on Arbitrum
  • Supporting Infrastructure
  • Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

Languages I speak :
Filipino
English