Delegate Statement Template

[Yorks]

Name (organization or individual)
Yorks

Wallet Address or ENS
generativepoet.eth

Tally Profile URL (create a profile here 8.9k)
What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• NFT development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

Arbitrum has led the way in L2, and the DAO should be its democratic expression allowing and onboarding as many new users as possible to participate in this liberating technology. I am particularly interested in helping to enhance its defi infrastructure (coming from a left libertarian background), and to promote its innovative gaming NFT ecosystems. The approach to liquidity mining should not necessary be aggressively pursued, but be aligned with the needs and priorities of the community. Liquidity obviously does play an important part in maintaining the L2’s relevance and allowing projects the liquidity to operate.

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview 1.0k
• Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
• For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
• This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

1. How would you vote?
   Against
3. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
4. How would you approach the trade off between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
   I am in favour of having core groups to make executive decisions, but these groups should fixed-term, elected, and answerable to the wider dao.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Issue Overview:
Overview Link 1 3.0k
Overview Link 2 397
FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:
Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

1. Full Reimbursement

2. No Reimbursement

3. Split Reimbursement
   Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.

4. Full reimbursement. I’m not familiar with the ins and outs of that particular case, but if there was an initial vote which passed then that should be actioned.
   I believe that if the hack is due to systemic errors related to the dao itself, that would be a worthy case for reimbursement, but individuals do have the responsibility to maintain basic levels of security over their assets.

Languages I speak and write: English and French.

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

Diversity of opinions is critical to making progress and determining the future direction of the
Arbitrum ecosystem. We recognize and celebrate the fact that delegates will have diverse views and we both encourage and anticipate good-faith debates in the governance process. That being said, it’s critical that all featured delegates are operating with Arbitrum’s best interest in mind, so please affirm that you don’t have any conflicts of interest that would prevent you from using your best judgement to operate in the best interests of advancing the Arbitrum ecosystem.

I don’t have any conflicts of interest. I have been involved in crypto since the autumn of 2017. I am a university lecturer irl, and a generative NFT poet, who is also a member of the Curation Panel at gm.studio since 2022, and a signatory of the treasury at gm.dao, so I’m au fait with the day to day business of running a dao. I first got involved with arbitrum as a Smol Brains OG, and have loved it and stayed involved with numerous gaming communities there ever since. Thanks for reading!

[metralunab]

Name (organization or individual) - Metralunab

Wallet Address or ENS - 0xb5ec482AA4a11872eF3Fc9d99F83BF7B030f9ab0

Tally Profile URL - Tally | metralunab

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up tot wo tags:

• Public goods funding
• DeFi development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

• To boost community engagement and influence in decision-making, foster decentralization, and improve the overall performance and prosperity of the project.

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Allocating a Portion of Treasury Funds for Community Grants and Incentive Programs

Prompts to Answer:

1. How would you vote?
   For
   Against

2. How will the allocation of funds contribute to the growth and development of the project?

Sample Voting Issue 2:
Establishing a Decentralized Governance Forum for Open Community Discussions and Proposals

Prompts to Answer:

1. Establish a dedicated forum using an existing decentralized platform (e.g., Aragon, Snapshot, or Discourse) for open community discussions and proposals.

2. Develop a custom-built, decentralized governance forum tailored to the specific needs and requirements of the project, integrating both discussions and proposals in a single platform.

3. Postpone the establishment of a decentralized governance forum until a later stage in the project’s development, focusing on other priorities in the meantime.

Languages I speak and write: English, Russian, Ukrainian

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I am certain that there are no conflicts of interest that would prevent me from executing my role in the most effective and impartial manner. Additionally, I pledge to maintain transparency and uphold the highest ethical standards in all my actions and decisions within this capacity.

[MattEscapes]

Twitter : @MatthewEscosio

Wallet Address : 0x8f84D25B3E76E0C64127adc80BF8c0fF43206a13

Tally Profile : Tally | @MatthewEscosio

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

• Public Goods funding
• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• Supporting Infrastructure
• Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

Languages I speak :
Filipino
English

[MattEscapes]

Twitter : @MattEscapes

Wallet Address : 0x8f84D25B3E76E0C64127adc80BF8c0fF43206a13

Tally Profile : Tally | @MatthewEscosio

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

• NFT development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

• I do not care about liquidity mining. Bribing people to use X means X is useless. We aggressively build stuff that people NEED instead.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. Against
2. No amendments, just cancel it altogether.
3. The solution is reputational avatars , which solves most if not all DAO participation and token-weight voting problems.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
It depends entirely where the reimbursement would come from. If this were a case of introducing a self-executable on-chain transfer block on the hacked amount and reminting into the damaged parties’ accounts, I would vote yes. If the tokenholders and other network participants were to pay for this, no. Socializing losses across a large number of people is not acceptable when it is clear that very small circles of people are responsible for both insecure code and stealing the money.

Languages I speak and write:

• English, Filipino

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

• No conflicts of interest

[goldmember]

Name: Anton Nekhotiashchiy
Wallet address: 0xd700A4C3d1502AC21C562FD9Fc3032b4500250Db
Tally Profile : Tally | 0xd700...50Db
Areas where I want to make a contribution:

1. • Improving Governance participation
2. • Supporting Infrastructure

Issue 1:
As a delegate, I would vote against the Uniswap proposal as it currently stands. While I support the idea of using bounties to attract new users to Uniswap, I believe that giving Flipside crypto too much control over the allocation of UNI and oversight of the program could lead to centralization of power and create an unfair advantage for Flipside.

If I were to propose amendments to the proposal, I would suggest that other analytics service providers should also be involved in the proposal, and that the allocation committee and oversight committee should be more evenly balanced, with all parties having equal representation.

In terms of the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done, I believe that a balanced approach is necessary. While it’s important to have clear leadership and decision-making structures in place, it’s equally important to ensure that power is not concentrated in the hands of a few individuals or organizations.

In this particular case, I believe that the Uniswap proposal tips the scales too far in favor of Flipside crypto and risks alienating other stakeholders in the community. As a delegate, I would work to ensure that any proposals that come before the DAO are fair, transparent, and promote the best interests of the community as a whole.

Issue 2:
As a delegate, I believe that the decision of whether or not to reimburse parties affected by an exploit should be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the unique circumstances of each situation.

In the case of the Rari hack, I would carefully consider a number of factors, including the severity of the exploit, the impact on the community, and the feasibility of reimbursement. If the exploit was particularly damaging or if it was the result of a systemic issue within the platform, then full reimbursement may be appropriate.

However, if the exploit was the result of a user error or if it did not have a significant impact on the community, then no reimbursement may be necessary. In some cases, a split reimbursement may be appropriate, depending on the circumstances.

Ultimately, my approach would be to carefully consider all relevant factors and make a decision that is in the best interests of the community as a whole. It’s important to ensure that the decision-making process is transparent and fair, and that all members of the community are represented in the decision-making process.

Languages I speak and write:
English, Ukrainian, Russian

I have no conflicts of interest and will act only in the best interests of Arbitrum.

[Afroryu]

Twitter : @0xAfroRyu

Wallet Address : 0x8f84D25B3E76E0C64127adc80BF8c0fF43206a13

Tally Profile : Tally | @Afroryu.canto

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

• Public Goods funding
• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• Supporting Infrastructure
• Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

Languages I speak :
French
English

[konditer83]

@Oxytocin

Name: Oxytocin (Individual)

ENS: konditer83.eth

Tally: Tally | konditer83.eth

Areas of interest:

• Protocol decentralization improvements
• Arbitrum community meetings

Sure, here is my response in English:

In general, the goals and priorities for a DAO can vary depending on the specific organization and its members. Some DAOs may prioritize decentralization and community governance, while others may focus on maximizing profits through liquidity mining and other DeFi strategies. It’s crucial for DAO members to communicate and come to a consensus on the goals and priorities of the organization.

Regarding liquidity mining, it can be an effective way to incentivize participation and provide liquidity for a decentralized exchange or other DeFi platform. However, it’s essential to consider the risks and potential downsides, such as impermanent loss and the potential for market manipulation.

When it comes to issues raised by other communities, it’s important for DAO members to be aware of and consider different perspectives and concerns. It may be helpful to engage in open dialogue and seek out diverse opinions and feedback to ensure that the DAO is making informed decisions that align with its goals and values.
In short, the issue at hand is whether or not to support Uniswap’s proposal to use Flipside to attract new users through bounties. Flipside would have significant control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the program, which some view as too much power given to one service provider. University clubs support the proposal due to their inclusion on the allocation committee, but others, such as Dune and Leshner, have raised concerns about the centralization of power.

Іf I were to provide guidance, it would be important to consider the potential risks and benefits of the proposal, as well as any potential amendments that could address concerns around centralization of power. It may also be helpful to engage in open dialogue and seek out diverse opinions and feedback to make an informed decision.
when it comes to handling this situation, it’s important to consider the potential impacts on the affected parties and the overall integrity of the ecosystem. The decision to reimburse or not should be made based on the circumstances surrounding the hack and the specific vulnerabilities exploited.

Regarding instances when it’s appropriate to refund, it may be necessary when the hack or exploit was due to a flaw or vulnerability in the system. However, if the affected party was negligent or didn’t take adequate security measures, it may not be appropriate to offer a refund.

As for conflicts of interest, it’s essential for delegates to operate with the best interests of the Arbitrum ecosystem in mind and not let personal biases or interests influence their decision-making.

[Tatka]

Name Individual - Tanya Nekhotiashcha
Wallet Address - 0xd79Aa3C3C6c7dBA872f13681A7dBcEEa2399504a
Tally Profile URL - Tally | 0xd79A...504a
Area for contributing to:

• Public Goods funding
• Improving Governance participation
  Sample Voting Issue 1:

My stance on the overall goals for the DAO would be to prioritize the long-term growth and sustainability of the Arbitrum ecosystem while also promoting decentralization and community involvement. In terms of liquidity mining, I believe we should be cautious and strategic in our approach to ensure that it aligns with our overall goals and doesn’t have any negative impacts on the ecosystem.

Regarding Sample Voting Issue 1, I would vote against the proposal as it appears to give too much control to one service provider and lacks involvement from other analytics service providers. If possible, I would propose an amendment to increase the involvement of other service providers and to ensure a more balanced allocation of control on the committees. In terms of the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done, I believe it’s important to strike a balance between the two and prioritize the long-term health of the ecosystem over short-term gains.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
Regarding the FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement, the decision of whether or not to reimburse parties affected by the hack is a complex one that involves balancing various factors. Some potential factors to consider include:

• The impact on the affected parties: If the hack caused significant financial harm to the parties involved, reimbursing them could be seen as a way to mitigate some of the damage.
• The precedent it sets: If the DAO reimburses parties for every hack or exploit that occurs, it could create a moral hazard where people are more likely to take risks because they know they will be reimbursed.
• The available resources: Depending on the size and complexity of the hack, the DAO may not have the resources to fully reimburse affected parties.

As for the options presented, here are some potential perspectives:

• Full reimbursement: Some people might argue that the DAO has a responsibility to fully compensate those who were affected by the hack, regardless of the cost or precedent it sets.
• No reimbursement: Others might argue that the DAO should not be responsible for reimbursing parties affected by hacks or exploits, and that individuals should bear the risks of using the platform.
• Split reimbursement: Another option could be to split the reimbursement, where the DAO covers some portion of the damages and the affected parties cover the rest.

Ultimately, the decision would depend on the specific circumstances of the hack and the values and priorities of the DAO members.

Languages I speak and write: - English, Ukrainian, Russian

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: - I have no conflicts of interest

[maxlomu]

Name: Max Lomuscio

Wallet Address or ENS: 0xd333bc5c9670c9ceb18f9a2cf02c6e86807a8227

Tally Profile URL: https://www.tally.xyz/profile/sexatnoon.eth

Hi, My name is Max, I am passionate about decentralization and social entrepreneurship .
I have been involved with web3 since 2017, currently working at Connext to help Ethereum scale its values and technology. We have been fully supporting Arbitrum and its ecosystem since the start, and are looking forward to further boosting its development.

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• Supporting Infrastructure

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

The ArbitrumDAO is tasked with the critical role of sustainably developing and growing the Arbitrum ecosystem while embodying the community values stated in the Constitution.

Liquidity, for example, is a critical factor for any chain/L2, as it benefits all the projects deployed and kickstarts a positive flywheel that attracts more developers, users, and funds.
Traditional forms of liquidity mining, however, have proven to be very short-sighted and to attract only mercenaries. Considering that Arbitrum is already leading the L2 ecosystems in terms of value and liquidity attracted on the chain, smarter mechanisms that use incentives to attract long-term liquidity and to further distribute the governance power can be designed to join sustainability and liquidity targets.

Sample Voting Issue 1: Uniswap & Flipside

How would you vote? Against

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any? I believe any protocol that wants to act as public good needs to maintain a high degree of objectivity and neutrality.
If the choice falls between 2 (or more) protocols where the differences can be attributed to objective factors such as their technology or their values (for example, where one is centralized and the other is focused on trust-minimization), then it’s fair to select only one entity.

When the difference between various projects only lies in their capability to develop business relationships and other more subjective qualities, then other solutions can be studied to create committees, distribute tokens to various entities via micro-experiments, etc…

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

Execution is a key element for any organization, and particularly for the fast-paced web3 industry. A system of committees and delegation is necessary to move quickly, and if accompanied by the right mechanism of checks and power balances, can produce the best results.

Sample Voting Issue 2: FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement:

Full Reimbursement
I believe a DAO and its protocol are ultimately responsible for the safety of its users.
In case of a hack, it is the responsibility of the DAO to wholly refund users whenever possible, especially in these early stages of the industry.

If treasury funds are not enough to repay users, then new mechanisms can be designed (vesting system, fee-driven refunds) with the objective of creating an income stream for those affected.

Languages I speak and write: English, Italian, Spanish

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

I don’t have any conflicts of interest that would prevent me from using your best judgement to operate in the best interests of advancing the Arbitrum ecosystem.

[Uabayraktar.eth]

Name:
Pavlo (uabayraktar.eth)
Wallet Address:
0x227538fd3f08546B0a1B894f61C6E7BA875F48d3
or ENS:
uabayraktar.eth
Tally Profile URL: Tally | uabayraktar.eth

Dear Arbitrum Community,

My name is Pavlo and I’m excited to apply to become a delegate for the Arbitrum network. I’m a passionate blockchain enthusiast with over five years of experience in the space. As a long-term believer in the potential of decentralized technologies, I’m eager to contribute my skills and knowledge to help secure and grow the Arbitrum ecosystem.

I believe that the success of any blockchain project depends on the active participation and engagement of its community. As a delegate, I would be committed to actively participating in the network’s governance processes, staying up-to-date on the latest developments and proposals, and engaging with the community to ensure their voices are heard.

If selected as a delegate, I would work tirelessly to represent the interests of the community and help shape the future of the Arbitrum network. I believe in the power of collaboration and transparency, and I’m excited to work alongside other delegates and community members to achieve our shared goals.

Thank you for considering my application, and I look forward to the opportunity to contribute to the success of the Arbitrum network.

Sincerely,
Pavlo (uabayraktar.eth)

[AfroVII]

Name: AfroVII (Individual)
Metamask: 0xB29c269dde518eC98fEd30047D815061db128d09
Tally: Tally | AfroVII

Areas of Interest -
DeFi development on Arbitrum
Public Goods funding

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
The aim of the DAO should be one that facilitates development, engenders trust and a drama-free investment environment - aggressive liquidity mining is viewed with a degree of suspicion these days gives what crypto is recovering from, I’d prefer innovative persuasion.

Sample Voting Issue 1

1. For

2. None - Quick decision-making by interested parties is not a negative, Flipside does not hold a majority vote on either committee it sits and still has to persuade other members on its positions.

3. Complete decentralisation can lead to a loss of the bigger picture and or time wasted discussing minutiae - the ability to pivot quickly is essential in crypto as is a level of oversight by a DAO that understands the core of its mission. I would strongly encourage members to look into informed delegation whilst not dissuading the repeated participation of members who investment and or interest in DAO activities means they are ‘first in line’ to vote.

Sample Voting Issue 2 -
I would consider a split reimbursement to acknowledge the loss by ‘retail’ participants and to show a commitment from Arb to projects on its ecosystem. Further, the protocol has to encourage platforms to be security conscious as well as being adequately ‘hack-insured’

Languages -
English, Yoruba, Nigerian Pidgin-English, basic Spanish.

DoCoI -
None.

[Lina]

Name : Lina
Wallet Address or ENS: 0x2787E404b0c2608fc5E17279dB43e311d547F063
Tally Profile URL: Tally | 0x2787...F063

Position on DAO’s overall goals: I believe that DAO should take a balanced approach in pursuing its goals, including being aggressive in liquidity mining while also prioritizing the security and sustainability of the platform.

1. How would you vote?

Against

2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

Diversity of opinions and participants should be the main objective of a DAO, if a small group centralizes power, the name DAO is only an aggregate.

Something that can help is to predefine in the beginning the creation of committees and delimit the members it should have at the expense of increasing diversity against personal interests.

3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

It is a bad reference to the DAOs, the more decentralized the more difficult it is to agree, but I feel that the committees or delegates fulfill that vital function of representing the voice of many in order to optimize the governance processes.
Sample Voting Issue 2:

3. Split Reimbursement

A DAO must ensure the best environment for its members and also take into account their survival, therefore it will depend a lot on the cases and the type of hack, by literally draining their funds I do not think they can pay.

That’s why I think the best thing to do, and depending on the case like FEI, is to return money to those affected, maybe under a vesting system or the DAO can get down to work to look after the interests of its users.

Languages: Ukrainian, Norwegian, English

[xss]

Name: Envan
ENS: 0xBD54eB54A1d6Aaf8Dee1d28C9165076dE6C3cd90
smartface.arb
Tally: Tally | smart

Areas of interest:

Public goods funding
DeFi development on Arbitrum

When it comes to the overall goals for a DAO, the primary objective is to foster the healthy and decentralized growth of the rollup. This encompasses several aspects, such as technical and security-focused sections of the rollup, which the DAO should oversee, and supporting the development of a robust ecosystem while promoting growth with the ARB token. Essentially, every decision the DAO makes should revolve around the question of how it benefits the long-term sustainability and success of not only the ARB token but also the wider future of rollups.

To explore the different roles that the DAO can play in the broader Arbitrum ecosystem, each decision must be carefully balanced. For instance, the DAO could take up roles such as overseeing technical protocol and security upgrades, liquidity mining, and granting funds to builders. The DAO would need to carefully handle these grants and ensure that the builders demonstrate accountability and deliverables for the amount given. Grants will facilitate the development of tools and dApps that the space may need but are currently unprofitable.

There are endless possibilities for DAO goals, but the sample issues here offer insight. Delegation of voting power is essential for a DAO to function efficiently in the long term. Although this brings a degree of centralization, it is a good initiative as long as sufficient accountability measures are in place. In the case of UniSwap/Flipside Bounty, the author suggests separating the grants into quarterly distributions and introducing checkpoints across the delegation period to ensure that the DAO is comfortable with such a large allocation.

When it comes to the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done, effectiveness and decentralization are inversely proportional. As long as the centralised entities are still ultimately dependent on the DAO’s approval and operate as transparently as possible, this is a necessary tool for the DAO’s development. A DAO should consider having centralizing points only when specialists are required to act knowledgeable and quickly, something which the Vox Populi of the DAO might struggle with. The entities to do this should be trusted members of the space.

Regarding the Rari Hack Reimbursement issue, a partial reimbursement should always be considered. Hacks and loss of funds continue to hinder people’s trust in the space, and every time a large draining of protocol contracts occurs, the idea of the Financial Legos is threatened. If a protocol has cooperated with the affected party, a partial reimbursement is a good show of faith. However, providing a full reimbursement when the hack has already significantly impacted the protocol may not be feasible. The author believes that DAO insurance protocols, which are already being developed in the space, can handle these situations in the future.

[moeen]

• ETH Address: 0xbd9f70E2B1D741b4925c36A0315A5a9aC26BE776

• ENS: moeen.eth

• Twitter: @moeendoteth
  Tally | Moeeneth

• Public Goods funding

• NFT development on Arbitrum

• Improving Governance participation

Web3 believer, NFT, Crypto, Tech Nerd, Mac Expert, Drone Pilot, Photographer

I am a creative/passion-driven soul, art lover, and tech nerd, also heavily into Web3, NFT, and Cryptocurrency. I have a strong working and conceptional knowledge of all non-coding areas of the ecosystem such as Web3, layer 2, Blockchain, NFTs, Trading, DEFI, Smart Contracts, ETF, etc.; I follow news and developments daily and have concepts worked out in detail for projects, and also have some knowledge of coding parts, building and actively participating in different blockchain-related projects for the past one year, besides this I research and find new NFT/Crypto projects and their potential so I can HOLD or Trade them. I actively create content on Twitter and Youtube, covering news, and introducing new platforms, guides, and how-tos. I was a Mod in different discord servers and an alpha caller in our private group. I see our future in Web3

[Intoiter]

Name: Intoiter

Wallet-Adresse: 0x2e62a9344b18CdfB59aBFd409bcCf219d1D54D6a

URL des Tally-Profils: Tally | 0xeEE1...8af5

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up tot wo tags :

• Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
• Supporting Infrastructure

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO :
Party reimbursed for exploitation or not? Full Replacementright for a refund.

Sample Voting Issue 1 :

• Against
• agree with all decisions regarding the DAO
• First and foremost, the goal of the DAO is to enable healthy and decentralized rollup development. How will this impact the long term sustainability of

Sample Voting Issue 2:
Full Reimbursement, we need trust

Languages I speak and write:

*English, German

**Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

• no conflicts of interest

[Michigan_Blockchain]

Blockchain at Michigan Delegate Profile

Wallet Address: 0x13BDaE8c5F0fC40231F0E6A4ad70196F59138548

ENS: michiganblockchain.eth

Twitter Handle: @ UMichBlockchain

Tally Profile

Website: General Site

Areas of Interest: Tooling, Improving Protocol Decentralization; Improving Governance Participation

Organization Overview:
We are Blockchain at Michigan (BAM), a student-run organization at the University of Michigan, involved in building blockchain leaders for nearly five years. The organization contributes to the space via education, consulting, and governance. Our team has actively participated in governance voting and spearheading proposal development for three primary protocols: Uniswap, Aave, and Compound. Each protocol is assigned a designated expert, responsible for continuous monitoring of the protocol’s developments on forums, social media, and voting platforms like Snapshot. At committee meetings, protocol leads share updates with the entire governance team on active proposals and debate the pros/cons to reach a collective decision on how to vote with our delegated tokens. We have a high proposal participation rate, having reviewed and voted on nearly all incoming proposals for each delegated protocol. Prior to publicizing proposals, we collaborate with numerous stakeholders from investors, DAO service providers, and other protocols to draft proposals properly. Our team has also successfully led the establishment of proposals from start to finish. For example, we recently wrote and helped pass a proposal to launch Uni v3 on Avalanche via collaborations with Ava Labs and LayerZero labs.

We are excited to work with ARB token holders by offloading their need to continuously monitor Arbitrum governance. Our team is well-versed in the blockchain space and have been following the Arbitrum ecosystem for some time. Delegating tokens to forward-thinking groups like Blockchain at Michigan directly decentralizes protocols. By delegating to our organization, you permit your tokens to be effectively and actively used for furthering innovation on a rapidly expanding protocol. We aim to have the Arbitrum DAO serve as a role model for decentralized community participation in the development of the leading rollup on Ethereum.

We believe in:

• Empowering a multichain, interoperable future that the Arbitrum foundation is progressing via the development of permissionless, transparent Optimistic Rollups, especially with the release of Arbitrum Orbit
• Fostering an inclusive community that encourages diversity, education, and open-minded discussions to produce the best ideas
• Sustainability by ensuring the long-term success of the protocol along with governance token value accrual for the benefit of the DAO, without negatively impacting dapp users

Sample Voting Issue #1: Flipside/Uniswap Incentive Program

• Vote: For
• From a financial perspective, we are in support of a grant-based system that is self-sustaining, just as the one posed by Flipside. If both analytics development and economic gain for the protocol can be established, then we see a win-win situation. Flipside’s tool to calculate and visualize v3 returns has been helpful to numerous liquidity providers–although it sometimes displays inaccuracies. The development of an ecosystem of analytics tools from the community in general would therefore be beneficial to Uniswap as a whole, especially due to the ambiguity and complexity surrounding the concentrated liquidity mechanisms. We would, however, amend the control and distribution of funds. Instead of fully prescribing funds to Flipside, it would be best to form a conglomerate of DAO and treasury service providers, like Llama, Chaos Labs, etc. Each member would be required to disclose why they should be part of this committee, along with a resume/track record of activity in the space. This way, the grant committee will be more diverse, and each contributor will be compensated fairly.
• The ability to have an efficient and successful implementation is improved by providing Flipside a single seat. There will always be a battle between decentralizing control in the name of security, while simultaneously preserving speed via centralization. We believe in a balanced middle path, where we don’t stifle efficiency but still have reliable actors moderating a system. For this proposal, we hold the position that there should have been a preordained election process in which each candidate posits their credentials in the forums. Thereafter, the community votes on the committee via a Snapshot vote, with each of the committee members hailing from different organizations. This will foster a democratic election process, putting a handful of community-elected representatives in charge of the granted capital. Such a process would also remove the need of an oversight committee, as the DAO itself can act as the failsafe. And the mere establishment of a 7-member committee enables a decent degree of efficiency–it’s certainly faster than letting the entire DAO vote on capital allocation decisions.

Sample Voting Issue #2: FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement

In April 2022, Rari was hacked for $80M due to a reentrancy vulnerability in its Fuse lending protocol. After much debate, an initial snapshot vote (FIP 106) to reimburse affected users was passed in May 2022. However, a subsequent on-chain vote to repay Fuse bad debt (TIP-112) failed to pass a month later. Finally, the Fei Protocol team raised another vote (TIP-121b) for full reimbursement, which passed and was executed in September 2022.

When considering reimbursement for a hack, it’s important to consider from both a user’s and the protocol’s perspective. If users were aware of the risks involved in participating in the protocol and had signed an agreement stating so, they may not be eligible for full reimbursement. However, if the protocol failed to warn users about potential risks, a split or full reimbursement could be considered.

It’s also important to consider the sustainability of the protocol. Full reimbursement may not be practical, as the protocol needs time and resources to repair the codebase and restore its brand. A split reimbursement may be a preferable option. To execute a split reimbursement program, the funds could be aggregated to a multi-sig wallet controlled by a community-elected committee, which would be vested over a certain time frame. This would allow the protocol time to deal with the aftermath of exploitation while ensuring users’ funds are safe.

In the case of the FEI RARI Hack, a split reimbursement would likely be a better option.

We would like to highlight some other issues that emerged during the governance process discussed above. Specifically, the first vote, which approved full reimbursement, was actually just a temperature check. This is a recurring issue, as we have seen similar drama in other decentralized governance processes, such as the choice of bridge for BNB chain deployment for Uniswap. To prevent outcomes from being flipped by new and unseen voters in the second voting stage, it would be helpful to restrict voting entities to those who participated in the temperature check or a whitelist.

Another concern is that the voting procedure is not fully transparent, and the bandwagon effect can undermine the independent ethos of decentralization. A blind voting system (like through the commit-reveal scheme) would help eliminate these concerns and ensure a more equitable and transparent governance process.

Languages we speak and write: English, Mandarine

Possible Conflicts of Interest: We are active governance contributors to Uniswap (3.5M UNI), Aave (80k AAVE), and Compound (50k COMP).

Please reach out to us at defi-delegates@umich.edu or via Twitter @ UMichBlockchain if you have any questions or are hoping to learn more before delegating to us!

[RobopunkCEO]

Name (organization or individual)

• Robopunk CEO

Wallet Address or ENS

• robopunkceo.eth

Tally Profile URL

• Tally

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

• Improving Governance participation
• DeFi development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

• Bribing and LPing is currently à la mode, but the future is here to be shaped.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. Against
2. No amendments, just cancel it altogether.
3. There is no easy solution - talks are needed

Sample Voting Issue 2:
No reimbursement - shit happens - everyone knows the risks involved.

Languages I speak and write:

• English, French, German

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

• no conflicts

[Daucrypto]

Name Nate Dau

Wallet: 0x763C655951e7C791e00b782af9c6F6Aed6d56CbE

Tally Profile URL Tally | Dau

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

Public Goods funding
DeFi development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?

I am not the biggest fan of liquidity mining, at least not directly from a DAO; I think that in the best of many cases the best is to apply to different protocols that kind of incentives, maybe like Optimism that brought diverse uses to its network incentivizing it in an indirect way in usability and ecosystem.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

How would you vote?

Against

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

Diversity of opinions and participants should be the main objective of a DAO, if a small group centralizes power, the name DAO is only an aggregate.

Something that can help is to predefine in the beginning the creation of committees and delimit the members it should have at the expense of increasing diversity against personal interests.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

It is a bad reference to the DAOs, the more decentralized the more difficult it is to agree, but I feel that the committees or delegates fulfill that vital function of representing the voice of many in order to optimize the governance processes.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Split Reimbursement

A DAO must ensure the best environment for its members and also take into account their survival, therefore it will depend a lot on the cases and the type of hack, by literally draining their funds I do not think they can pay.

That’s why I think the best thing to do, and depending on the case like FEI, is to return money to those affected, maybe under a vesting system or the DAO can get down to work to look after the interests of its users.

Languages I speak and write: english,german

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

I am confident that I have no conflicts of interest that would not allow me to perform my role in the best possible way.

[mrizwan13]

Name: Muhammad Rizwan (individual)
Wallet: 0x344a97081CD897Ff6a71d664890550BEcc5495Bd
Tally Profile URL:

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• NFT development on Arbitrum
• Gaming development on Arbitrum

Sample Voting Issue 1 - UniSwap/Flipside Bounty
How would you vote?
Against

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
No amendments

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
Initial equal and fair distribution between active participants, proving more power for useful for DAO actions.

Sample Voting Issue 2 - Rari Hack Reinbursement
Hackings of DAOs can be very damaging both to the DAO owners and to the users who trust them. In some cases, hackings can be so severe that they affect the stability and trust in the entire platform.

As for whether they should be reimbursed, it’s a complicated issue that depends on several factors, such as the size and severity of the hack, the impact it has had on the platform, and the financial capability of the DAO to absorb the loss.

In some cases, the DAO may have an insurance fund or contingency plan in place to compensate affected users for the hack. In other cases, the DAO may choose to reimburse affected users as a matter of goodwill and to restore trust in the platform.

Ultimately, the decision to reimburse affected users depends on the DAO and its community of owners and users. There may be different approaches depending on the DAO and the particular situation.

Languages I speak and write:
English, Spanish

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I have no conflict of interest that prevents me from using the best possible judgment.

[mrizwan13]

Name: Muhammad Rizwan (individual)
Wallet: 0x344a97081CD897Ff6a71d664890550BEcc5495Bd
Tally Profile URL:

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• NFT development on Arbitrum
• Gaming development on Arbitrum

Sample Voting Issue 1 - UniSwap/Flipside Bounty
How would you vote?
Against

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
No amendments

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
Initial equal and fair distribution between active participants, proving more power for useful for DAO actions.

Sample Voting Issue 2 - Rari Hack Reinbursement
Hackings of DAOs can be very damaging both to the DAO owners and to the users who trust them. In some cases, hackings can be so severe that they affect the stability and trust in the entire platform.

As for whether they should be reimbursed, it’s a complicated issue that depends on several factors, such as the size and severity of the hack, the impact it has had on the platform, and the financial capability of the DAO to absorb the loss.

In some cases, the DAO may have an insurance fund or contingency plan in place to compensate affected users for the hack. In other cases, the DAO may choose to reimburse affected users as a matter of goodwill and to restore trust in the platform.

Ultimately, the decision to reimburse affected users depends on the DAO and its community of owners and users. There may be different approaches depending on the DAO and the particular situation.

Languages I speak and write:
English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I have no conflict of interest that prevents me from using the best possible judgment.