Delegate Statement Template

[lucasarb]

Name: marian (Individual)

Wallet Address: 0x31B5aBcF044049daa96cDC387a44747a48a0ac62

Tally Profile URL:
[Tally | maiste.eth] (https://Tally)

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

I am most interested in DeFi Developement on Arbitrum and Gaming Development on Arbitrum

Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview

• Uniswap planned to use Flipside to attract new users to Uniswap through bounties. Although the program outline and funding was fine, the proposal was contentious because it gave Flipside crypto too much control over allocating UNI to bounties and oversight of the entire program.
• For instance, Flipside had 3/7 seats on the allocation committee and 1/3 seats on the Oversight committee. There was also concern since none of the other analytics service providers were involved in the proposal.
• This proposal flew under the radar but at the 11th hour got very heated. Large votes from university clubs supported the proposal since they would get a seat on the allocation committee. However, Dune and Leshner spoke up about the issue because of the centralization of power and favor of one service provider.

Prompts to Answer:

1. How would you vote?

I would have voted against it

2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

It is clear that the proposal openned the door for exploitation, therefore
I would implement a system where the maximum allocation would be something like 1/7 of the seats for the Allocation committee and 1/3 Max seats for the Oversight committee.

3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

Its a fine line, while centralization allows for a quicker course of action and a quicker way of doing things it should never be prioritized against decentralization. Decentralization is essential for the functioning of a DAO and therefore its inefficiency is sometimes justified

Sample Voting Issue 2:
Issue Overview:
Overview Link 1
Overview Link 2

FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)

1. Full Reimbursement
2. No Reimbursement
3. Split Reimbursement
   Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.

In my opinion I would issue a Split Reimbursement to all parties effected. While users should not have to suffer losses due to a protocol being hacked, we agree that the position of the DAO would be weakened if a full reimbursement would be issued. I would provide a partial reimbursement big enough for users as possible and complete the reimbursement in the case that the police is able to get the stolen funds.

Languages I speak and write: I am a native spanish speaker and can speak French, Italian and English fluently.

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: No.

[cypher]

Name : Cypher (Individual)
ENS : cyphersoul.eth
Tally : @cypher

Areas of Interest (Where I could bring in more Value) :

• Defi development, NFT development and Gaming development are the areas that am most interested in contributing to. As I’m more of an artist, designer and a DeFi farmer personally. These are the areas I’m more strong at and thus could bring in more value too.

-My stance on the overall goals for the DAO :
As far as the most interesting thing to me is that the goals of the DAO are closely connected with gaming, NFT, and DeFi development. The DAO aims to create a scalable, secure, and usable platform for developers to build and deploy their applications, including games, NFT marketplaces, and DeFi protocols. By improving the scalability of the Arbitrum platform, the DAO can enable high-throughput gaming and DeFi applications to run smoothly on the platform. By prioritizing security, the DAO can create a trusted and safe environment for developers to build NFT marketplaces and other applications that require secure transactions. Finally, by prioritizing usability, the DAO can make it easier for developers to build on the platform, which can help to drive adoption and growth in the ecosystem. Ultimately, the goals of the Arbitrum DAO are closely aligned with the goals of developers in the gaming, NFT, and DeFi spaces, which can help to drive innovation and growth in these rapidly evolving areas of the blockchain industry.

Sample Voting Issue 1: Uniswap Flipside Bounty
-1. How would you vote?
I would Vote FOR.
Its indeed true that, most of the protocol governance are not truly decentralized in the sense of the voting power each shares. And it takes time to get evenly distributed and thus becomes more decentralized. But the thing here is how advantageous a single service provider was and that triggered the manipulation of the proposal.

-2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
Being a lumpsum amount, the period of distribution could be extended.
And also the DAO could put out proposals on to recheck the previous proposals impact.

-3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
The DAO mechanism itself works on a collective consensus but sometimes the centralization do kick in. To solve this, I would recommend something like proof of HONOUR like badge attached to each of the voters DID, which increases in rating on the basis of participation in governance activities in the DAO. And this proof of HONOUR rating must be also weighed along with token voting power.

-Sample Voting Issue 2: Rari hack reimbursement

• Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation? i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not?
  I would prefer a FULL Reimbursement, as being a platform who collects fees for the product they sell, they are ofcourse obliged to be responsible for the losses of their customers in case of a hack.

Languages I speak : English, Malayalam,
Languages I write : English, Hindi, Malayalam

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interes:
I’m confident that I don’t have any conflict of interest.

[litocoen]

Name: litocoen (Individual)

ENS: lito.eth

Tally:

Areas of interest:

• DeFi development on Arbitrum
• Public goods funding

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
Beyond the obvious goal of continuing to improve the technology underlying Arbitrum chains, I believe the DAO’s main task should be focusing on ecosystem development. In crypto more than anywhere else, ecosystems have network effects. The more useful new applications are being built on Arbitrum chains, the more existing applications benefit. Both from the influx of new users entering the ecosystem as well as new integration possibilities and B2B partnerships.

Attracting these projects and builders to Arbitrum and making sure existing applications flourish will be paramount in the months and years to come. As the ecosystem scales, the core team alone will be overwhelmed by this task and this is where the Arbitrum community can come together and help in an unbiased and transparent way.

I think targeted liquidity mining can be highly effective at bootstrapping new apps & protocols the DAO feels optimistic about and would like to see succeed. However, it will be important to define clear guidelines and goals to avoid the DAO treasury becoming a slush fund.

For
I thought the proposal suggested a clever way to fund itself through yield generating activities on Uniswap. Getting quality external contributors involved is the best path for a DAO to scale operations.

It is impossible to make everyone happy and include every analytics provider just to have a balance of power. A DAO, just like a company, wants to see results and not 5 different analytics companies overseeing a committee with the typical in-fighting that this would result in.

The DAO has to choose the best people for a job and ignore the voices that have a clear conflict of interest (in this case e.g Dune or related VC’s).

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

• I think a diverse committee of individuals is often better than selecting a single company or service provider for an initiative like this to make sure there are enough checks and balances.
• Starting small and nimble is often better and less controversial than requesting $25m at the first go. People are mistrusting so it’s better to request a small amount, deliver results and work your way up.

Split payment
I think a split payment would have been the best path forward here. On the one hand I think retail investors in DeFi and DAO’s shouldn’t assume that just because a DAO is well capitalized, there’s a 100% money-back guarantee in case of a hack. On the other hand, the DAO (unless it plans to wind down operations after the hack) needs to have sufficient funds to have a credible shot at continuing its activities, which includes developing a new protocol, legal fees, payroll etc. So it’s very much a case by case thing and context matters as well. In the case of Fei, it seems like the core team had previously made promises to make users whole. In general, I think it’s in the best interest of a DAO to make users whole to the best extent possible without overly stretching its financial capabilities.

Languages I speak and write: German, English, French and Spanish

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest: I am a minor delegate in the Optimism DAO but consider myself a supporter of all rollup teams. I am also a delegate in the Safe DAO and plan to become more involved in the Instadapp DAO.

[STAKEME]

We have been following Arbitrum for a long time, and we would like to help you develop it. We would very much like to get the role of delegate.

StakeMe helps web 3.0 projects to test their product, increase the number of participants in the tesnet, and provide the most efficient development support with dedicated tools.

Introduction

• Address: 0xf92B10C4dEBFb64d3a0e78c1a044c678b3c37Da8
• Twitter: @stakeme_pro
• Personal Website: stakeme.pro

Our developers are now actively creating a new self-written explorer exploreme.pro/ (Statistically about 1,500 visits per day), we initially support Cosmos, but we can integrate other blockchains as well.

Areas of interest

• Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
• Supporting Infrastructure
• DeFi development on Arbitrum
  Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
  The overall goals of a DAO will depend on the specific context and purpose of the organization. Generally speaking, a DAO is designed to be a decentralized and autonomous entity that operates on a blockchain or other decentralized platform. Its members can collectively make decisions, allocate resources, and execute actions without the need for a centralized authority.
  Ultimately, the goals of a DAO will depend on the needs and objectives of its members. By providing a decentralized and autonomous platform for decision-making and resource allocation, a DAO can facilitate collaboration and innovation while promoting transparency and accountability.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

[kikkori]

Name (organization or individual)

kikkori

Wallet Address or ENS

kikkori.eth

Tally Profile URL (create a profile here 5)

N/A

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

NFT development on Arbitrum
Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

I would love to see the growth of liquidity mining on the network

1: For

We should strengthen it and would hep attract new users to the network and help the over all health of the community

Languages I speak and write:

Japanese,English

no conflicts of interest

[ChainLinkGod]

Name: ChainLinkGod

Wallet Address or ENS: chainlinkgod.eth

Tally Profile URL: Tally | ChainLinkGod

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

• Supporting Infrastructure
• Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
Layer-2 rollups are central to addressing one of the many fundamental problems that prevent blockchains from achieving global adoption: scalability (high transaction throughput while maintaining a low verification cost). With Ethereum being the most secure and decentralized smart contract platform, it is the natural home-base for rollups, but like with any other nascent technology, there are improvements to be made, bugs to fix, and growth strategies to be deployed. Hence the necessity of rollup upgradability, which implicitly means rollup governance, which means a DAO. Such a DAO needs to faithfully oversee upgrades to Arbitrum itself (approve changes from supporting development firms), support economic growth initiatives to expand its network effects (via token subsidies), and support a long-term economically sustainable ecosystem (via user fees and DAO treasury operations).

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. How would you vote?

Against

2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?

Change allocation committee to 1/7 instead of 3/7 from Flipside. Move to quarterly payments versus bulk yearly payments. Reconsider if subsidizing a data analytics provider is a necessary move in a ecosystem where multiple well-funded data analytics providers already exist.

3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?

There is no universally correct approach when it comes to decentralization and centralization in terms of governance, particularly when it comes to smart contract parameters, it’s simply what is the right tool for the right job. DAOs are optimized for slower moving and economy based decisions, such as when it comes to the allocation of resources (subsidies / treasury) and when a diverse viewpoint is required. Multi-sigs of trusted members (or tangentially related DAO elected ‘board of directors’) are more optimized for emergency actions to protect users and more efficiently decisions from members who are usually much more deeply involved the systems they manage than the average token holder. Right tool for the right job.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

This depends on how much of a hit a community wants to take their treasury in the short term versus extending long term payments. Would push towards split/hybrid reimbursement, cover a portion of user loses with treasury funds and issue debt token that represents the rest of the debt owed, providing a liquid market. Pay down on debt token via buy-backs over time with priority of funding source deriving from protocol revenue and treasury funds as a backstop. Provide option for DAO to vote for for full redemption if and when protocol treasury is a perceived strong state.

Languages I speak and write: English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I am a Chainlink community ambassador, but I speak and vote solely based on my own personal viewpoints and perspective.

[pattie5555]

Name: pattie5555 (Individual)

Wallet: 0xa187fD5928725C6128203b14CD19d9A7F6814E63

Tally: Tally | pattie5555

Areas of interest:
Gaming development on Arbitrum
NFT development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
Regarding the overall goals of a DAO, it is important to consider the needs and desires of the community members involved. Some may prioritize growth and expansion, while others may value stability and security. Additionally, the specific nature of the DAO’s operations and the assets it manages can also influence the goals and strategies pursued./

As for liquidity mining, it can be a useful tool for attracting liquidity and incentivizing participation in a DAO’s ecosystem. However, it is important to balance the potential benefits with the associated risks and costs. Some may advocate for a more aggressive approach to liquidity mining to increase the DAO’s visibility and appeal, while others may be more cautious in their approach to avoid potential negative outcomes.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. Against. Regarding the allocation of UNI to bounties and oversight of the program. It would be important to carefully consider these concerns and ensure that the proposal is structured in a way that aligns with the goals of the DAO and protects the interests of its members otherwise it’s just not fair…

2. If I were to make amendments to the proposal, I would suggest adjusting the distribution of seats on the allocation and oversight committees to ensure a more balanced representation. For example, Flipside could have a smaller percentage of seats on the committees to reduce the level of control they have over the allocation of UNI to bounties and oversight of the program.

3. The tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done can be a delicate balance. On the one hand, having a centralized decision-making authority can lead to faster decision-making and implementation of initiatives. On the other hand, a concentration of power can lead to a lack of diversity of perspectives and potential abuse of power.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
It depends entirely where the reimbursement would come from. If this were a case of introducing a self-executable on-chane transfer block on the hacked amount and reminting into the damaged parties’ accounts, I would vote yes. If the token holders and othr netwrk participants were to pay for this, no. Socializing losses across a large number of people is not acceptable when it is clear that very small circles of people are responsible for both insecure code and stealing money.

Languages I speak and write:
• English

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
• no conflicts of interest

Cheers!

[cryptocomical]

Cryptocomical
cryptocomical.eth

cryptocomical.eth's DAO Profile

I’m most interested in DeFi development on Arbitrum and helping to contribute to IRL Arbitrum gatherings.

I believe the goal of the DAO is sustained long term growth and development.
The focus of the DAO should be to minimize onboarding barriers for other protocols to Arbitrum. Aiding with deployment issues, and helping to incentivise users to try out those protocols in the early stages.

The second focus , imo, needs to be marketing and communication support for both Arbitrum itself and the projects built upon it. The DAO is uniquely positioned to provide cost effective and strategic marketing for the ecosystem through IRL and online campaigns utilizing multi-project marketing. Through this Arbitrum becomes attractive to both new projects and increased reach to users including new-to-crypto users.

Sample Vote 1:
Against

Whilst centralization can be more efficient, it can, such as in this case, increase bias.
There are a number of novels ways that may be better at solving this situation, but the most simple providing token distribution is sufficient could be to have a community elected committee with set goals, deadlines and accountability.

This both maintains decentralised control as well as the efficiency of a more centralised decision making process.
Mandated regular, short, easy to follow updates and having a failsafe “Vote of no confidence” mechanism would further reduce the effects of potential bias and bad actors.

Sample Vote 2:
It depends on the financial state of the project at the time and that there should be clear governance guidelines set out ahead of time. It is unfair to refund one episode and not another without having set these guidelines out ahead of time.

I believe if the treasury is sufficient to support it then a partial refund should be performed, and ideally benefits such as increased returns on future investments and other soft benefits should be given to those effected to increase the likelihood of them continuing to use the project and forgive the hack. I think this and putting more funds towards a bug bounty would be a better utilization of treasury funds in the aim to restore confidence and goodwill to the project in order to continue to progress the project,

Languages: English, learning Hindi and Portuguese

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest: No conflict of interest. I take pride in maintaining my integrity in all aspects of my work, should i have a conflict of interest in any future position of power it would be publicly stated and if appropriate would step aside until the COI had abated.

[Kins1234]

Name: Yinusa durodola

Wallet: 0x3845a9b812daf843370d004D6057FD0dD26742A4

Tally | Tally profile

Most interested in contributing to:
*NFT Development on Arbitrum
*Gaming Development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

The goal of the DAO is to give ARB holders the power to vote on key decisions governing Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova – networks that allow users to transact on the Ethereum blockchain with greater speeds and lower fees.

How aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?

I personally don’t think that liquidity mining is any good in this case. I think it’s a little too risky and will create a lot of volatility.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

How would you vote?
Against

What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
I believe that DAO should prioritize the security and sustainability of the platform.
Make sure it’s truly decentralized and not governed by a smaller entity.

How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
On one side a range variety of individuals can collectively come together from around the world to act as a single entity but on the other it often takes longer for decisions to be made as there are more voting participants. I think there should be a balance between the two but never give all the power to the smaller governing entity.

Sample Voting Issue 1

Full Reimbursement
A DAO must ensure the safety for all its members. In case of a hack everyone should be reimbursed

Languages I speak and write: Russian, English, Spanish, Chinese

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

I am confident that I have no conflicts of interest that would not allow me to perform my role in the best possible way.

[Jinxro]

Name:Jinxro

Wallet: 0xB2CdDE7599DF453e90204158aA22bD12f1F45B1e

tally: Tally | 0x0121...c580

What area are you most interested in contributing to?**

• Improving Governance participation
• DeFi development on Arbitrum

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

• Bribing and LPing is currently à la mode, but the future is here to be shaped.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. Against
2. No amendments, just cancel it altogether.
3. There is no easy solution - talks are needed

Sample Voting Issue 2:
No reimbursement - shit happens - everyone knows the risks involved.

Languages I speak and write:

• English, French, German

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

• no conflicts

[Klif]

Name: Klif (Individual)

Wallet Address: 0x73069c766560Aaa3afEE2b14d34c0aE6CE0f6B06

Tally Profile: Tally

Areas of interest:

1. Public Goods funding
2. Gaming development on Arbitrum
3. Improving Governance participation

My stance on overall goals for the DAO:

As an ardent fan of GameFi sector. I think we need to support this sector as much as possible. Because it is possible to go through this sector to adapt ordinary users. That is, DAO should focus not only on the DeFi sector, but also on GameFi, so we will attract more users to the Arbitrum network.

Sample Voting Issue 1 - UniSwap/Flipside Bounty

1. How would i vote?
   Against
2. What amendments would i make to the proposal if any?
   I would shorten the tokens offered and as an option, I would give another, similar dApp.
3. How would i approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
   I think I would divide communities into groups and subgroups. For example, those who understand their industry are groups, and subgroups are already dividing people into more competent and less competent.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

I think it depends on whether Rari has enough money. If the project has enough, then you can solve this - full or partial refund + give some bonuses to victims. If there is no money, you can take it into account and, for example, return it with bonuses or when you have the means to return.

Language: English, Russian

[Astragirl]

Name: AstraGirl (Individual)
Wallet Address or ENS
0xe1B54EC48d81440e81bEd8A6Ff0b3068FbE9DB6f
Tally | AstraGirl

Hello everyone, I, like you, am a crypto enthusiast and crypto tester who has more than three years of experience in the cryptocurrency industry.

I started developing my skills in the field of cryptocurrencies a long time ago, and my work as a crypto tester quickly gained recognition in the crypto community.

I am a responsible and hardworking employee who is dedicated to achieving my goals. I am ready to make additional efforts to ensure that my work is of the highest quality.

The delegates should choose me as a delegate because I am a highly motivated person with a deep passion for building a community. I have a deep understanding of DAO concepts and principles.

Sample Voting Issue 1:
How would you vote? Against. Limit the control share. Be transparent with the verification that the interests of the community are represented, and the ability to remove authority if this is not the case.

Sample Voting Question 2:
Full Reimbursement

Languages I speak and write:
English

[guoguoSoStrong]

[quote=“Lemma, post:1, topic:31”]
Name (organization or individual)
GuoguoOverflow

Wallet Address or ENS
0x67eF349DA4960c746c51A6969f035F909A588c89

Tally Profile URL (create a profile here )
GuoguoOverflow

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

• Public Goods funding
• Gaming development on Arbitrum
• Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
• IRL Arbitrum community gatherings

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
eg — how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?
Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

As a member of the community with a background in software development, I’m very happy to see arbitrum getting better and better, and would love to be involved in its development and iteration. However, I am a freelance full-stack engineer and would like to contribute to the development of arbitrum in the same way that I participate in open source projects on githubs.

I suggest that the community post some requirements for the development of arbitrum, and more people like me can get more arb token while completing these requirements, that would be very exciting!

Languages I speak and write:

english and chinese

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
no argument
no confilict

[0x-0777]

名称（组织或个人）

鱼小孩

钱包地址或 ENS

0x3B100FF80A6714194C76eD27B51314091402Db64

**理货个人资料网址 **

理 货

0x-0777 的 DAO 配置文件

DAO 成员资格、投票和提案

您最有兴趣为哪个领域做出贡献？

• 在仲裁上的 NFT 开发
• 改善治理参与

请分享您对 DAO 总体目标的立场：

• 我不在乎流动性挖矿。贿赂人们使用X意味着X是无用的。我们积极构建人们需要的东西。

投票问题1示例：

1. 对
2. 没有修改，只是完全取消它。

示例投票问题2：
这完全取决于报销的来源。如果这是一个在被黑客入侵的金额上引入一个自我可执行的链上转账区块并重新铸造到受损方账户的情况，我会投赞成票。如果代币持有者和其他网络参与者为此付费，则不会。当很明显，非常小的人圈子对不安全的代码和偷钱负责时，将大量人的损失社会化是不可接受的。

我说和写的语言：

中文、英文

利益冲突的披露：

无利益冲突

[aramz]

Name (organization or individual)

• Alpha Drops

Wallet Address or ENS

• myalphadrops.eth

Tally Profile URL (create a profile here )

• Tally | myalphadrops.eth

What area are you most interested in contributing to?

• NFT development on Arbitrum
• Improving Governance participation

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:

• Liquidity mining is of no concern to me. Incentivizing individuals to use X implies that X has no practical use. We focus on creating essential solutions that cater to people’s requirements, rather than resorting to such tactics.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. Against
2. No amendments, just cancel it altogether.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
The source of reimbursement is the deciding factor. If a self-executing on-chain transfer block is implemented to remint the hacked amount into the accounts of affected parties, I would support it. However, if token holders and other participants are expected to cover the costs, I would not. It is not fair to spread the losses among a large number of people when a small group is responsible for both the insecure code and the theft of funds.
Languages I speak and write:

• English, Kurdish, and Persian

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:

• no conflicts of interest

[Kimpot08]

Name (organization or individual)
Kimberly Genaro

Wallet Address or ENS
0xcb1d4a03057f8a73e6499dcdb8a001ba65e8761f

**Tally Profile URL

kimmy's DAO Profile

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
First the purpose of a DAO is to allow for the healthy and decentralised development of the rollup. Community-managed When enacting anything through governance, it is important to consider: How will this impact the long-term sustainability of the

Prompts to Answer:

1. How would you vote?
Against
None
Use Dao to solve the problems

Prompts to Answer:

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

1. Full Reimbursement
   When a hack occurs in a DAO, it is important to first take steps to mitigate the damages and prevent further losses. Securing remaining assets, and investigating the extent of the hack

Languages I speak and write: English, Japanese and Filipino

[CEOofWeB3.0]

Name : Anky

ENS : ThreatT0Society.eth

Twitter : @ThreatT0Society

Primary Wallet address : 0xb528273a8F1EC8b4f8636ed2feD3A6cbD7A2f265

(Wallet eligible for airdrop : 0x8c34390ae0088045c6C0e3bc085a2d5C8b2e1022)

I intend on migrating all the funds from my prev wallet (which might’ve gotten compromised) to the new one as soon as I can as a security measure.

What can you expect from me ? :

You can expect me to always act with the best interests of the DAO (and the people it represents) in mind, No matter my personal beliefs.

My duty would be to implement the will of the individuals who’ve trusted me as a delegate and uphold the integrity of the DAO.

Tally : Tally | threatt0society.eth

Areas of Interest :

• Improving Governance participation
• Public Goods funding

My Stance on the Overall goals :

1. Fund the creation of the $ARB ecosystem via incentivising the best builders to build on the platform.
   The goal is to attract the best talent, which in turn will make us much more attractive in the longer term.

• The social value of the network is determined by the the Builders, The validators and the people who interact with the Network.

• Case in point, Solana has reached the level it did cause of the (Crem’ de la Crem’) Builders who developed a variety of innovative use cases on that particular chain.

2. Set new standards for the Democratic Consensus process. With the aim of further decentralising the command structure of the DAO, especially the Voting structure. Which is in line with our efforts

• Pioneer alternate voting structures which incentivise the

Voting issue #1

Vote For the Proposal (if the changes I suggest are implemented)

I’m really stoked about the idea of providing grants with the money generated by providing Liquidity using the grant amount. I had a couple of qualms about it.

I would try to Minimise the power any single Individual or Entity holds so that any attempts to make an overreach can be swiftly dealt with.

However, I do believe that some level of centralisation is required for the functioning of the Executive wing of the DAO, you can think of it as a necessary evil. Without which, It cannot start to function, let alone act in the full capacity of the

What we can do is try to create a balance between them. We’ll have to ask ourselves questions like What is the bare minimum level of centralisation needed to keep the executive wing running without any problems, ensuring that the Well Oiled machinery is running smoothly ?

Voting Issue #2

Split Reimbursement

If a hacker exploits a vulnerability within the DAO’s smart contract to siphon off tens of millions of $$, It should be held liable to repay the users their money back. I was leaning towards the side of No reimbursement, but then I realised that’ll just remove any liability from the DAO’s who are really at fault here

Depends on where the reimbursement is coming from, If it’s like the 2016 DAO hack which lead to the Hard forking of Ethereum chain.

Even if a Hard Fork doesn’t take place, I don’t think a full reimbursement is the way to go, the problem was within the code of the DAO itself so it should be held liable.

Languages : English, Hindi and Sanskrit

Full Disclosure :

• NO Conflict of Interests

[ricardo]

Name: Ricardo

Wallet: 0x0957A010926f445888a2309436Bd6e4d7dd332cF or 0xb36c858638ead44016c58e6b60e4b10d2534a057

Tally: Tally | 0xB36c...A057

Area of interest:

DeFi development on Arbitrum
Improving Governance Participation

Stance on overall goals for the DAO:

The DAO should be focused on helping the Arbitrum Network Community as a whole to become the most efficient and human organization that would foster excellence and transparency for the ecosystem to serve as an example of DAO’s goal and ecosystem for the world, in perpetuity.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. For

2. No amendments

3. In general I consider that DAOs are doing the necessary to inform their community and users about new potential votes. The people most interested in it will participate and if they have the necessary know-how and qualities to achieve the goal that is requested, then the vote should go to them, however, centralized the team is. Note that the prerequisite for a team to participate in such votes should be that they are not anonymous, or if they wish to be, they should be backed by non-anonymous backers who know them well and who are prominent in the crypto community, and their ethos and fundamental values should be 100% aligned with decentralization, trustlessness, censorship resistance, and the greater good.

Sample Voting Issue 2:

1. Full reimbursement - Building a DeFi protocol should entail responsibilities to the builders. In the banking system, top managers are not responsible for their acts, despite being paid hundreds of millions in bonuses, as we have seen throughout the times and most recently with the Credit Suisse debacle. The DeFi era should be an era of transparency and responsibility, where builders are responsible. Indeed, these builders will be highly rewarded if their protocol works, and they should be also protect their customers, as their reputation should be the most important value that they should cherish.

I speak and write:
French, English, Italian, German, Portuguese, Spanish

[Balin]

Name (individual): Balin

ENS: Balin.eth

Tally Profile URL: Tally | balin.eth

What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:

• Improving Governance participation
• Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization

Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
I think that the DAO’s first goal should be its own health. That means autonomy from controlling interests (even friendly ones like the Dev team). We should aim to avoid plutocracy and spread the governance as far as possible; until vesting unlocks, VCs do not have a significant voting power and we have a great opportunity to decentralize. As Ethereum has shown, value will eventually accrue to protocols that demonstrate antifragility through decentralization. From a governance standpoint, that means increasing the proportion of small holders who are participating; from a protocol standpoint that means distributing validators and ensuring trustless solutions.
In regards to our treasury, that means we should focus on ways to fairly distribute the additional arbitrum tokens as widely as possible, while keeping a sizable warchest to continue funding use for a decade or more. I think financing liquidity mining is one way to fairly distribute tokens, although it tends to favor centralized and well capitalized actors (ie it is fair but not equitable). I think having additional anti-sybil tools in place to determine proof of humanity while distributing directly to real users/governors is a better way to drive engagement and ongoing use than choosing winners and losers amongst the protocols.

Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. How would you vote? Against the uniswap proposal
2. What amendments would you make to the proposal if any? I think this method is flawed from the start; it’s too large a grant, that is too centralized, with inappropriate DAO oversight.
3. How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
   Decisions made by 1 (centralization) or 10,000 (anarchy) people are undoubtedly worse than decisions made somewhere in the middle; usually 7-15 people seems like a happy medium for a committee. For that, you need delegate responsibility rather than direct democracy. In this case, my issue is that the vast majority of the funds are flowing out of the ecosystem to a company whose purpose is to extract profit, and they control a sizable minority of the decision making ability. Grant funding should leverage existing community enthusiasm and activism to do more with less; moreover, if a DAO is paying the full costs of salaries, the DAO should be in control of that individual’s work. Lastly, the DAO should be involved in involved in choosing the individuals that make decisions on its behalf. not forced to vote yes or no on a predetermined block.

Sample Voting Issue 2:
FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.

Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?

Split Reimbursement: Generally, if the exploit was due to the fault of the DAO, i support partial reimbursement. However, crypto is an unforgiving place and there are significant risks involved; obviously using funds from the DAO effectively drains funds from the holders. Therefore, it is a balance and has to be taken on a case by case basis.

Languages I speak and write:: english

Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I have other L2 governance tokens and participate with them; I have some other governance tokens to various protocols; however, my tenants are the same and I strongly support a diversity of healthy L2 competitors.

[defi_seer]

Name: Defi_seer (Individual)

ENS: 0x01B686e02B96eEC685D80967c42EC9E970Cc0bF7

Tally Profile URL: Tally | defiseer.eth

Areas of interest:

• Gaming development on Arbiturm
• DeFi development on Arbitrum

My overall goals for the DAO:
At its core, a Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) serves the fundamental purpose of nurturing the healthy and decentralized expansion of the layer 2. This overarching goal encompasses a myriad of critical components, from overseeing the technical and security aspects of the rollup to driving growth and fostering a thriving ecosystem through the ARB token. In essence, the DAO must act as a steward for the rollup, carefully considering every decision through the lens of the long-term sustainability and success of not only the ARB token but also the broader future of rollups. This necessitates a comprehensive understanding of the technical and financial intricacies of the rollup, as well as the ability to navigate the complex interplay between its various components. One of the primary functions of the DAO is to ensure that the rollup remains decentralized, which is critical for maintaining the integrity and security of the system. This requires vigilance and proactive measures to prevent any centralization that may occur, such as a concentration of control over decision-making or a consolidation of power among a select group of stakeholders. Moreover, the DAO must incentivize the continued growth and development of the rollup ecosystem through the ARB token. This entails a multifaceted approach that includes promoting adoption and usage of the token, driving liquidity and trading volume, and encouraging innovative use cases and applications. In summary, the role of the DAO is not only to oversee the technical and security aspects of the rollup but also to drive growth and foster a thriving ecosystem. By carefully considering each decision through the lens of long-term sustainability and success, the DAO can effectively act as a steward for the rollup and ensure its continued decentralized expansion.

Sample Voting Issue 1:

1. Against

Change Allocation of seats: The current allocation of seats and oversight committees make me feel uncomfortable. I would propose that this be amended to ensure a more equitable distribution of seats, potentially by involving other analytics service providers or by giving more seats to independent parties.
Control over allocation : I would also raise my concern with the level of control given to Flipside over the allocation of UNI to bounties. To address this, the proposal could be amended to provide more oversight and transparency over the allocation process, potentially by involving multiple parties in the decision-making process or by requiring regular reporting on the allocation of UNI.
Create fair competition: There is clearly unfair competition if only one analytics service provider is involved in the proposal. To address this, the proposal could be amended to involve multiple providers or to require a competitive bidding process to ensure fair competition.

3. I would approach this:
   By engaging all stakeholders: Bring together all relevant stakeholders, including Uniswap, Flipside Crypto, other analytics services providers like Dune, university clubs, and community members. Facilitate open discussions to understand each party’s concerns and objectives.
   Reevaluate committee representation: Reassess the allocation of seats on both the allocation and oversight committees to ensure a more balanced distribution of power. This could involve reducing Flipside Crypto’s representation and including other analytics service providers or community representatives.
   Define clear guidelines and objectives: Establish clear guidelines and objectives for the bounty program to ensure that all parties have a common understanding of the program’s goals and the criteria for allocating UNI to bounties.
   Encourage collaboration: Create opportunities for collaboration between various analytics service providers, enabling them to contribute to the bounty program in different capacities. This can foster a sense of shared ownership and reduce the perception of favoritism.
   Enhance transparency: Ensure that the decision-making process, allocation of bounties, and oversight activities are transparent. This can include regularly publishing reports and updates on the program’s progress and outcomes.
   Implement checks and balances: Introduce measures to prevent any single entity from gaining too much control, such as voting weight limits or rotating committee seats among different stakeholders.
   Establish a feedback mechanism: Create a mechanism for stakeholders to provide feedback on the bounty program and its governance, allowing for adjustments and improvements over time.

**Sample Voting Issue 2: **

1. I would conduct a full refund to the parties affected. I would do this because if the exploited party has followed best practices in security and the hack occurred due to unforeseen vulnerabilities, it is reasonable to consider reimbursement to these affected parties in my opinion.

Languages: English