Name (individual): Eye State
Wallet Address or ENS: frened.eth (0xb118338458a1bE28a31434f590015F3b380a5c37)
Tally Profile URL: Tally | eye_state | frened.eth
Twitter/X Profile: Twitter/X: @eye_state
What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:
- Improving Governance participation
- Supporting Infrastructure
- Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
- IRL Arbitrum community gatherings
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
I believe that DAOs should prioritize decentralization, supporting specially small delegators to encourage decentralization, giving them visibility to point out the community point of view.
My aim with this profile is to show the opinion of the community that don’t want to delegate to the current whale delegators.
Sample Voting Issue 1:
- How would you vote?
Against.
- What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?There is a conflict of interest between the committees managing this grant and paying themselves a share to fund their operationsThe original proposal also establish a very high management fees like 50%. So the money is diluted in too much hands and the funds used to atracting users stay lower than what they could be, because of the interest of a few ones.
- How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?I think the proposal of distributing bounties to attract liquidity was good, but I would make a few changes. First, I would eliminate as many committees or intermediaries as possible, as they mainly absorb the bounty rewards that would have been allocated to users.
I would mainly give users the opportunity to decide how these bounties should be distributed by creating a forum where users can propose how it will work. This way, committees or intermediaries would be minimized, resulting in a larger bounty to distribute.
Sample Voting Issue 2 Rari hack :
Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
I think the question is not well-posed. The problem lies in the method of making the refund. If the refund involves affecting the price of the protocol token, it is not a fair refund. This can be profitable for those affected by the hack, but it comes at the cost of subtracting liquidity from the users who support the project by holding its token.
I’d issue a refund using as many funds as possible without affecting the protocol token. This may include solutions like distributing a portion of the dapp’s profits among hacked users over time as well as utilizing the reserve funds of the protocol, such as stablecoins. This solution may take a very long time, or users might not be refunded 100%, but it’s the only way to avoid making others pay for the hack.
Additionally, I think the dapp should prioritize small users, who can be refunded more easily than whales. It may be preferable to make 10,000 people with a $100 deposit happy rather than refunding a whale with $1 million. This method might be unfair to whales, but my thesis in this case is that among these 10,000 people, there are more for whom $100 may be a significant amount of money, so they should get the refund first.
Languages I speak and write:
English and Spanish.
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I don´t have any conflict of interest to being an Arbitrum delegate. I’m just a normal user of the arbitrum chain who would like to make visible the opinion of the smallest chain users like me.