nicolas pheonix
0xB100304B9884b274Ca9330113E031B82928A902C
Defi development
NFT development
Goals for the DAO:
To become the greatest healthiest eco system out there.
Sample Voting issue 1
Sample Voting issue 2
Languages i speak and write:
Greek and English
Disclosure of Conflicts of interest:
None
Name (individual): MrBoard
ENS: mrboard.eth
Tally Profile URL: Tally | mrboard.eth
What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:
DeFi development on Arbitrum
IRL Arbitrum community gatherings
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
I believe the overall goals for DAO should be to keep the blockchain fair and accessible for all. The purpose of any DAO is to give voting power back to the people. The arbitrum DAO should be no different, and we should be giving people of the community to voice their opinion about changes to the way things will work in the community.
The DAO should incentivize active participation in the community when it comes to providing LP, voting, and using protocols. The DAO should also incentivize developers to launch projects on Arbitrum.
Please share your stance on issues that were raised previously, in other communities, as described below:
Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview
Prompts to Answer:
Sample Voting Issue 2:
Issue Overview:
Overview Link 1
Overview Link 2
FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.
Prompts to Answer:
Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)
I would choose an initial split reimbursement. Individuals using a platform are not responsible for an exploit hack, but they also knew the risks of using the protocol. They should be made whole, but not at the cost of the protocol being killed in the process. Individuals should be refunded somewhere around 60% of their funds initially, and the remainder should be reimbursed at a later date. The funds initially allocated for the entire refund should be left with the protocol to allow them to use it for development and prevent such an attack from happening in the future. There should be some sort of time proposed, such as a year time, when individuals should be refunded the remainder of their lost funds.
Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.
Languages I speak and write:
I speak/write in Russian/English. I am much stronger in English.
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I donât believe there are any conflicts of interest. I do no work for or run any entities that would influence my decision in regards to DAO. My only bias is that I am a big supporter of decentralization, so I will not support proposals that will give too much power to a central authority.
I believe Satoshiâs initial vision was that of decentralization and giving the power of finance back to the people. As an active DAO member, I will further this vision to the best of my abilities.
Name: Tudienmang (Individual)
Wallet Address: 0xfD232F9D98217d174B053741722C5F969F75D1Bc
Tally: Tally | tudienmang
Areas of interest:
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
First and foremost, the purpose of a DAO is to allow for the healthy and decentralised development of the rollup. This vision, of course, can entail many different aspects, from the more technical and security focused sections of the rollup (which the DAO should have oversight over) to encouraging the development of a healthy ecosystem and growth with the ARB token. Basically, every decision the DAO makes should return to the question: â How does this benefit the long-term sustainability and success of not just the ARB token, but also the broader future of rollups?â .
From this question we can begin exploring different roles that the DAO could assume in the broader Arbitrum ecosystem, and the careful balancing act that follows for each decision. Some examples include:
These are just some examples of DAO goals, but of course there are endless more possibilities on what might be handled!
Sample Voting Issue 1 - UniSwap/Flipside Bounty
How would you vote?
For
Delegation of voting power is necessary for any DAO to be able to function efficiently in the long term. Even though it brings a degree of centralisation, as long as they do not control an excessive amount of the larger DAO and they have sufficient accountability measures itâs a good initiative.
What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
Itâs inevitable that effectiveness and decentralisation are inversely proportional. As long as the centralised entities are still ultimately dependent on the DAOs approval, and they operate as transparently as possible, this is a necessary tool for the development of the DAO.
A DAO should consider having centralising points only when specialists are required to act knowledgeable and quickly, something which the Vox Populi of the DAO might struggle with. The entities to do this should be trusted members of the space of course.
Sample Voting Issue 2 - Rari Hack Reinbursement
Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)
Split Reimbursement
Hacks and loss of funds are to this day one of the strongest blockers we have from people trusting the space and onboarding onto it. Every time a large draining of protocol contracts occurs, the idea of the Financial Legos gets threatened, as people become less and less willing to risk connecting with other protocols.
For this reason, I believe at least a partial reinbursement is always to be considered when a protocol has decided to cooperate with you. These parties decided to entrust the security of your smart contracts, and their dedication and trust that was placed onto the protocol should be thanked by at least trying to provide some funds back. In the future, this could even be handled with DAO insurance protocols, which are already being developed in the space.
However, I would be hesitant to provide a full reinbursement when the hack has already severely impacted the protocol so badly. If the amount wonât make that much of a difference to the bottom line it makes sense to give a reinbursement, but in this particular case the double impact of the hack was so severe that this lead to one of the first instances of a DAO explicitly closing doors. A full reinbursement , in terms of impact, would be the same as a second equally devastating hack.
TL;DR Provide enough compensation to thank the participants for engaging in the system, but while a full reinbursement might help these stakeholders, the impact of this action could lead to the DAO entering a negative death spiral.
Languages I speak and write: By order of preference - English, Spanish, Italian
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
Currently, I am spending most of my time working on the ParaSwap DAO. This means that I will automatically abstain from any discussion that might involve DEX Aggregation, as my opinion will obviously be biased. The positive side of this participation is that ParaSwap is also deployed in Arbitrum, which means that the success of Arbitrum will also positively impact ParaSwap (through increased liquidity sources and volumes), as well as vice versa (by encouraging efficiency and decentralisation of liquidity in the rollup by aggregating all of these together through a single, simple to access interface).
Additionaly, I also applied to be a delegate on the Optimism collective, which although is also part of the wider ethereum ecosystem it could be considered a conflict of interest. Currently, I am being allocated ~ 1k OP. In addition to this, ParaSwap has also been selected as one of the Protocol Delegate Scheme recipients, and if necessary, the representative of ParaSwap could be a different DAO member if this is considered a major conflict of interest. Personally, I believe that the growth of any decentralised rollup on the Ethereum ecosystem is a net positive for everyone in the space, and I will do my best to lend my knowledge in bettering the entire space 
*Name (organization or individual):
@CryptoDegenDAO (Twitter)
*Wallet Address or ENS:
0x1dd3bd4952b0318cE969FE7bD368F0673EF4cEBD
*What area are you most interested in contributing to?
. NFT development on Arbitrum
. Improving Governance participation
. DeFi development on Arbitrum
. Gaming development on Arbitrum
*Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
Everyone has to have their own voice. We aggressively build stuff that people NEED instead.
*Sample Voting Issue 1:
*Sample Voting Issue 2:
It depends entirely where the reimbursement would come from. If this were a case of introducing a self-executable on-chain transfer block on the hacked amount and reminting into the damaged partiesâ accounts, I would vote yes. If the tokenholders and other network participants were to pay for this, no. Socializing losses across a large number of people is not acceptable when it is clear that very small circles of people are responsible for both insecure code and stealing the money.
*Languages I speak and write:
English, Russian, Vietnamese.
*Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
No conflicts of interest
Name (organization or individual) David Barnett
Wallet Address or ENS 0x0Dc9d69659a47877EFF9B37838C25BCCEeBde923
Tally Profile Tally | 0x0Dc9...e923
What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up tot wo tags:
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?
I am not the biggest fan of liquidity mining, at least not directly from a DAO. I think that in the best of many cases the best is to apply to different protocols that kind of incentives, maybe like Optimism that brought diverse uses to its network incentivizing it in an indirect way in usability and ecosystem.
Sample Voting Issue 1:
Against
Diversity of opinions and participants should be the main objective of a DAO, if a small group centralizes power, the name DAO is only an aggregate.
Something that can help is to predefine in the beginning the creation of committees and delimit the members it should have at the expense of increasing diversity against personal interests.
It is a bad reference to the DAOs, the more decentralized the more difficult it is to agree. But I feel that the committees or delegates fulfill that vital function of representing the voice of many in order to optimize the governance processes.
Sample Voting Issue 2:
A DAO must ensure the best environment for its members and also take into account their survival, therefore it will depend a lot on the cases and the type of hack, by literally draining their funds I do not think they can pay.
Thatâs why I think the best thing to do, and depending on the case like FEI, is to return money to those affected, maybe under a vesting system or the DAO can get down to work to look after the interests of its users.
Languages I speak and write: spanish and learning english
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I am confident that I have no conflicts of interest that would not allow me to perform my role in the best possible way.
Name: Kramnatius
ENS: kramnatius.eth
Tally Profile: https://www.tally.xyz/profile/kramnatius.eth
What area are you most interested in contributing to:
TLDR
The purpose of the Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) on the Arbitrum Network is to facilitate a transparent, trustless, and efficient ecosystem for the development and management of smart contracts, decentralized applications, and digital assets.
Purpose of the DAO:
The Arbitrum Network DAO aims to:
Enhance Decentralization: By fostering a diverse and inclusive environment, the DAO allows for more equitable decision-making and minimizes potential for centralization or concentration of power.
Improve Network Security: The DAO relies on a wide range of validators to ensure the safety and integrity of transactions, ultimately safeguarding the network against malicious actors.
Foster Innovation: The DAO encourages collaboration between developers, users, and stakeholders, enabling the discovery of novel applications and solutions that leverage the benefits of the Arbitrum Network.
Facilitate Effective Governance: By employing a decentralized approach to governance, the DAO enables transparent decision-making processes, empowering the community to have a say in the networkâs future.
Support Economic Growth: The DAOâs underlying framework promotes the growth of digital assets and the creation of a vibrant ecosystem, boosting the overall value of the Arbitrum Network.
Role of the Delegator:
As a Delegator within the Arbitrum Network DAO, we will assume several vital responsibilities:
Community Engagement: We will participate in community forums and discussions, fostering an environment of collaboration, knowledge-sharing, and mutual support.
Advocate for the Network: As a Delegator, we will promote the Arbitrum Networkâs benefits, attracting new users, developers, and investors to join the ecosystem.
In conclusion, by becoming a Delegator within the Arbitrum Network DAO, we will contribute to the networkâs success by actively participating in its governance, strengthening security, and encouraging innovation. Our commitment to transparency, collaboration, and the community will help shape the future of the Arbitrum Network and ensure its continued growth and prosperity.
Sample Voting Issue 1:
Vote Decision: Against
As a responsible Delegator within the Arbitrum Network DAO, we would vote against the current proposal for Uniswap to use Flipside Crypto for attracting new users through bounties. Our decision is based on the concerns raised over the centralization of power, the imbalance in the allocation and oversight committees, and the exclusion of other analytics service providers.
Amendments to the Proposal:
To ensure a more balanced and inclusive approach, we would suggest the following amendments to the proposal:
Revise Committee Structure: The allocation and oversight committees should be restructured to achieve a more balanced representation of stakeholders. This can be done by reducing Flipsideâs influence and involving other analytics service providers, promoting fair decision-making and preventing any undue influence.
Inclusion of Other Analytics Service Providers: The proposal should encourage collaboration with other analytics service providers, fostering a diverse ecosystem that leverages the strengths and expertise of various players. This can lead to better results and a more innovative approach to the bounty program.
Transparent Decision-Making: The proposal should establish clear guidelines for decision-making within the allocation and oversight committees, ensuring transparency and accountability. This can help alleviate concerns about centralization of power and potential bias.
Approach to the Tradeoff between Centralization of Authority and Efficiency:
In addressing the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done, we would prioritize a balance that promotes both efficiency and decentralized decision-making. We believe that a well-structured proposal can achieve both objectives through the following measures:
Encourage Collaboration: By involving multiple stakeholders in the committees, the proposal can leverage their unique expertise to drive better results while also ensuring decentralization.
Clear Governance Framework: Establishing a clear governance framework can help streamline decision-making processes, allowing for efficient execution without concentrating power in the hands of a few.
Regular Reporting and Accountability: Requiring regular reporting from the committees and implementing a system of checks and balances can help maintain efficiency while also preventing centralization of authority.
By implementing these measures, we can create an environment that fosters both decentralization and efficiency, ensuring that the proposal achieves its goals while also adhering to the principles of the Arbitrum Network DAO.
Sample Voting Issue 2:
Choice: Split Reimbursement
In handling a situation like the FEI RARI Hack, we would choose to implement a split reimbursement approach. This approach strikes a balance between compensating the affected parties and acknowledging the inherent risks associated with decentralized finance (DeFi) investments. By offering a partial reimbursement, we recognize that while the DAO and its community have a responsibility to support affected users, investors should also be aware of the potential risks and exercise due diligence when participating in DeFi platforms.
Elaboration on instances for reimbursement:
Full Reimbursement: Full reimbursement is warranted in cases where the exploit can be directly attributed to a clear negligence or failure on the part of the platform or its developers. In such instances, the affected parties deserve to be made whole, as the loss is a direct result of the platformâs shortcomings.
No Reimbursement: No reimbursement is appropriate in situations where users knowingly participated in high-risk activities or disregarded clear warnings about potential vulnerabilities. In these cases, users should assume full responsibility for their losses, as they were aware of the risks involved.
Split Reimbursement: Split reimbursement is suitable in instances where responsibility for the exploit is shared between the platform and its users. In such cases, partial reimbursement can help mitigate the losses faced by the affected parties while also ensuring that the risks associated with DeFi investments are not entirely socialized.
To determine the appropriate reimbursement approach in each specific case, a thorough investigation should be conducted to understand the circumstances surrounding the exploit and the extent to which the platform or its users could have prevented the incident. This process will help establish a fair and just solution that upholds the principles of the DAO while also acknowledging the realities of participating in the DeFi ecosystem.
Languages I speak and write: English, Tamil
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
As a Delegator within the Arbitrum Network DAO, we affirm our commitment to transparency, integrity, and the best interests of the entire community. We hereby declare that we have no conflicts of interest, whether personal, professional, or financial, that would compromise our ability to perform our duties objectively and fairly.
We pledge to always prioritize the wellbeing and success of the Arbitrum Network and its stakeholders, and to actively avoid any situations or engagements that could create a conflict of interest or the appearance of such a conflict. Furthermore, we are dedicated to disclosing any potential conflicts that may arise in the future promptly and transparently, ensuring that our actions remain in alignment with the core principles and values of the DAO.
By maintaining this stance, we strive to contribute to the growth and prosperity of the Arbitrum Network, fostering an environment of trust, accountability, and collaboration for the benefit of all participants.
Name (organization or individual): Zonic : NFT Marketplace for L2
Wallet Address or ENS: 0xd3eFbc65713C307d3057b7E0979A996F6A9799AC (zonicapp.eth)
Tally Profile URL (create a profile here): Tally | zonicapp.eth
What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
A DAO, or Decentralized Autonomous Organization, is a general term used to describe a group of individuals who form an organization and make decisions on its direction collectively using a decentralized model. The goals of a DAO depend entirely on the objectives of that particular organization.
As we are discussing the Arbitrum DAO, our goal is to determine a direction that will guide the chain towards sustainable growth in every possible way. For instance, we may vote for the ecosystem fund to finance projects that promote genuine adoption rather than Ponzi schemes. This is a critical step in bootstrapping the chain for long-term growth.
This is just one example, but it provides a sense of how we approach the DAO. As a decentralized organization, we make decisions together with the goal of promoting ecosystem growth that benefits everyone in some way.
Sample Voting Issue 1:
Issue Overview
Prompts to Answer:
How would you vote?:
Against
What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
Granting excessive control to any one group is not advisable, particularly in a decentralized context. I recommend that we reject the proposal due to the significant concerns surrounding it, which cannot be adequately addressed through amendments.
How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
The structure of this DAO seems to be somewhat flawed. To overcome the centralization of voting power, it may be necessary to establish a committee at the early stages. It would also be wise to propose a plan to gradually increase the decentralization of the DAO over time. As the DAO becomes more decentralized over time, this issue should be resolved.
Sample Voting Issue 2:
Issue Overview:
Overview Link 1
Overview Link 2
FEI RARI Hack Reimbursement: In April 2022 Rari was hacked for 80M, a vote was passed to reimburse those affected. Then in May 2022 another vote to refund the Rari hacked was brought forward this time it was not passed.
Prompts to Answer:
Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)
Full Reimbursement
Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.
This issue is complex and highlights a weakness of DAOs. While DAO stands for Decentralized Autonomous Organization, individuals within the organization tend to act in their own best interests rather than for the survival of the organization as a whole. In reality, people tend to decide what benefits themselves most, rather than the other way around.
For issues of this magnitude, it would be best to seek the expertise of domain experts rather than relying solely on the DAO. Since this issue could have life or death implications for the organization, it is essential to note this and take steps to prevent similar situations from arising in the future.
I cannot provide a definitive answer regarding whether reimbursement should be made in full, split, or not at all, as it would require a detailed breakdown for the benefit of everyone involved. However, this situation provides an example of how DAOs should handle such matters.
Languages I speak and write: English, Thai
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
We donât have any conflict of interest.
Name: Jiricepelka.scrt (Individual)
ENS: jiricepelka.eth
Tally : Tally
What area are you most interested in contributing to?
DeFi, Governance, funding Public Goods
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
The goal shouldnât be mining, thatâs a holdover from PoW and the high APR scam farms of BSC, I believe the arbitrum community are not degen monkeys but are trying to build a sustainable and antifragile economy like Ethereum
Sample Voting Issue 1:
Against
A large concentration of power is unacceptable, smaller structures such as subDAOs based on delegation for the members of each working group are definitely needed in the future ( ideally with dynamic changes of membership like Velodrome with VELO liquidity mining )
Besides, it would give too much power over tokens, which could potentially put the whole DAO at risk
Sample Voting Issue 2:
Split Reimbursement
There are a lot of variables, besides it also depends on what the compensation would come from, if it would be newly printed tokens so definitely not, if it would be existing funds so it makes sense to consider partial reimbursement.
Languages I speak and write:
English, Czech
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I am a member of Secret Network, which is a separate L1 built on top of Cosmos, on the other hand I am an active Ethereum user, actively trying to connect Secret Network and Ethereum ( or its L2s )
Personally I donât see it as a interest, but I still prefer to be clear.
Name (organization or individual)
Wallet Address or ENS
Tally Profile URL
What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up to two tags:
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
Sample Voting Issue 1:
How would you vote?
For
What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
Reduce the control of Flipside crypto by separating grants into quarterly distributions and introducing checkpoints across the delegation period.
How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
Centralization can be necessary for effective decision-making, but it should only be used when specialists are required to act quickly and knowledgeably. Entities should be trusted members of the space and ultimately dependent on the DAOâs approval.
Sample Voting Issue 2:
Languages I speak and write:
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
Name (organization or individual) : ARK who is crypto community owner in South Korea
*Telegram: Contact @Board_the_Ark
*Ark Insight | Twitter, Twitch | Linktree
Wallet Address or ENS : 0xD96e09913ee3E3afafe0921e2baf973aaC8483d9
Tally Profile URL : Tally | Arkinsight
What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up tot wo tags:
Public Goods funding and Improving Governance participation.
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
The goals of the DAO should be to promote the growth and development of the Arbitrum ecosystem while prioritizing the interests of its users and stakeholders. Liquidity mining should be used strategically to incentivize the adoption of the ecosystem and promote the growth of public goods.
Sample Voting Issue 1: Prompts to Answer:
1.How would you vote?
Against the proposal as it stands.
2.What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
I would suggest reducing the number of seats allocated to Flipside and ensuring that other analytics service providers are involved in the proposal.
3.How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
I believe it is essential to strike a balance between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done. While some centralization of authority may be necessary for efficient decision-making, it should not be at the expense of transparency, fairness, and the interests of the wider community.
Sample Voting Issue 2: Prompts to Answer:
1.Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
I believe that parties affected by an exploit should be reimbursed to some extent. However, the extent of the reimbursement should be based on a careful consideration of factors such as the severity of the exploit and the impact on the ecosystem.
Languages I speak and write: (Native) Korean, English
Thanks
Name: 0xprof (Individual)
ENS: proxie.eth
Tally: Tally | proxie.eth
Areas of interest:
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
The overall goal of the DAO is to enable community governance of the Arbitrum network.
The primary objectives of the Arbitrum One DAO include promoting the decentralization and transparency of the networkâs governance, ensuring the security and stability of the network, and facilitating the growth and adoption of the network.
By providing a decentralized platform for community governance, the DAO will aim to foster greater trust and collaboration among the networkâs participants, while also promoting the long-term sustainability and success of the Arbitrum network.
We can begin exploring different roles that the DAO could assume in the broader Arbitrum ecosystem, and the careful balancing act that follows for each decision. Some examples include:
Technical protocol and security upgrades: If arbitrum truly wants to be community owned, they need to have an oversight over what the protocol will develop into and all the layers that are part of the Arbitrum ecosystem. However, the average voter will probably not be knowledgeable enough to vote in good faith on whether a development will be fruitful or not. One potential solution that could be explored is a technical subcommittee in charge of overseeing this side of governance, which ultimately might report back to the wider DAO. The DAO is already planning to do this with the Security Council, but this same idea could be implemented in other technical areas.
Liquidity Mining - The goal of the DAO should be to promote the long-term sustainability and success of the Arbitrum ecosystem, which includes the liquidity and trading volume on the platform. To achieve this goal, the DAO may choose to pursue liquidity mining strategies that incentivize market participants to provide liquidity and increase trading volume.
However, it is important to balance the potential benefits of liquidity mining with the risks involved, such as impermanent loss, volatility, and exposure to smart contract risks. The DAO should carefully consider the potential risks and rewards of liquidity mining and make decisions that are aligned with the long-term goals of the ecosystem and the interests of its members.
In short, the aggressiveness of liquidity mining should be based on the DAOâs risk appetite, strategic goals, and the current market conditions, with a focus on promoting the long-term sustainability and success of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
Grants - While liquidity mining handles growing users and technical committees handle the rollup itself, grants are the greatest part of the DAO that will target builders. Grants have to be handled carefully, as they have a degree of social trust needed both from the DAO and the builders. Builders have to be able to demonstrate deliverables for the amount and accountability. Despite the complications, grants will allow for the development of tools and dApps that the space might need, but currently might not be as profitable.
These are just some examples of DAO goals, but of course there are endless more possibilities on what might be handled!
Sample Voting Issue 1 - UniSwap/Flipside Bounty
How would you vote?
For
Delegation of voting power is necessary for any DAO to be able to function efficiently in the long term. Even though it brings a degree of centralisation, as long as they do not control an excessive amount of the larger DAO and they have sufficient accountability measures itâs a good initiative.
What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
Itâs inevitable that effectiveness and decentralisation are inversely proportional. As long as the centralised entities are still ultimately dependent on the DAOs approval, and they operate as transparently as possible, this is a necessary tool for the development of the DAO.
A DAO should consider having centralising points only when specialists are required to act knowledgeable and quickly, something which the Vox Populi of the DAO might struggle with. The entities to do this should be trusted members of the space of course.
Sample Voting Issue 2 - Rari Hack Reinbursement
Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)
Split Reimbursement
Hacks and loss of funds are to this day one of the strongest blockers we have from people trusting the space and onboarding onto it. Every time a large draining of protocol contracts occurs, the idea of the Financial Legos gets threatened, as people become less and less willing to risk connecting with other protocols.
For this reason, I believe at least a partial reinbursement is always to be considered when a protocol has decided to cooperate with you. These parties decided to entrust the security of your smart contracts, and their dedication and trust that was placed onto the protocol should be thanked by at least trying to provide some funds back. In the future, this could even be handled with DAO insurance protocols, which are already being developed in the space.
However, I would be hesitant to provide a full reinbursement when the hack has already severely impacted the protocol so badly. If the amount wonât make that much of a difference to the bottom line it makes sense to give a reinbursement, but in this particular case the double impact of the hack was so severe that this lead to one of the first instances of a DAO explicitly closing doors. A full reinbursement , in terms of impact, would be the same as a second equally devastating hack.
TL;DR Provide enough compensation to thank the participants for engaging in the system, but while a full reinbursement might help these stakeholders, the impact of this action could lead to the DAO entering a negative death spiral.
Languages I speak and write: English
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I can affirm that I donât have any conflicts of interest that would prevent me from using my best judgement to operate in the best interests of advancing the Arbitrum ecosystem
Name (organization or individual)
⢠Sergey Gärtner
Wallet Address or ENS
⢠0x150D4e639418815eEB815D8b9a37A21E7E1f9cee
Tally Profile URL
404_konsilium
What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up tot wo tags:
⢠NFT development on Arbitrum
⢠Supporting Infrastructure
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
⢠I am not a big fan of liquidity mining, at least not directly from a DAO. In my opinion, the best approach is to apply to different protocols in an indirect way in usability and ecosystem
Sample Voting Issue 1:
Against
Diversity of opinions and participants should be the main objective of a DAO. If a small group centralizes power, the name DAO is merely an aggregate. To increase diversity against personal interests, it can be helpful to predefine the creation of committees in the beginning and delimit the members it should have.
The more decentralized a DAO is, the more difficult it is to reach an agreement. However, I believe that committees or delegates fulfill a vital function of representing the voice of many to optimize governance processes.
Sample Voting Issue 2:
⢠Split Reimbursement
A DAO must ensure the best environment for its members while also considering their survival. Therefore, depending on the cases and type of hack, draining their funds to pay is not a good approach. Instead, the DAO can return the money to those affected, perhaps under a vesting system, or work to look after the interests of its users.
Languages I speak and write:
⢠English, Deutsch
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I am confident that I do not have any conflicts of interest that would prevent me from performing my role in the best possible way.
Instructions:
Please use the submission template below to provide your responses.
Name (organization or individual)
Wallet address or ENS 0x9d8Cb97810025F89F46875B150C0dafE2Ce52252
Specify the URL Tally | @pahoruk1
What area are you most interested in contributing to?
NFT development on Arbitrum
Improving Governance participation
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
I do not care about liquidity mining. Bribing people to use X means X is useless. We aggressively build stuff that people NEED instead.
Sample Voting Issue 1:
Against
No amendments, just cancel it altogether.
The solution is reputational avatars, which solves most if not all DAO participation and token-weight voting problems.
Sample Voting Issue 2:
It depends entirely where the reimbursement would come from. If this were a case of introducing a self-executable on-chain transfer block on the hacked amount and reminting into the damaged partiesâ accounts, I would vote yes. If the tokenholders and other network participants were to pay for this, no. Socializing losses across a large number of people is not acceptable when it is clear that very small circles of people are responsible for both insecure code and stealing the money.
Name: Nova Penguins
Wallet: 0xB13CD2a6cf845E149B5b7bD3ae938f4204FfbAed
Tally: Tally | 0xB13C...bAed
Areas of Interest:
NFT development on Arbitrum
Public Goods Funding
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
Liquidity mining is a great way to grow community and also incentivizing liquidity providers increases community, and trust. I think in this days of growth, adoption and development, Arbitrum needs to be fairly aggressive.
Sample Voting Issue 1 - UniSwap/Flipside Bounty
How would you vote?
I would vote against. I feel like the whole proposal, and setup is lopsided and does not tilt towards a more democratic system which is the whole basis of DAOs.
What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
I would reduce the amount of control that Flipside has on allocation and the number of seats on the committee.
How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
Centralization does help to get things done. However, the more democratic system requires decentralization and with DAOs where the majority agrees or disagrees, things can either get done or not. Getting things done should not be more important than community vote if the community is against what is to be done.
Sample Voting Issue 2 - Rari Hack Reinbursement
Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
First, I wonder why a vote that has already been passed is being re-proposed. That is more double Jeopardy than anything. Since the first vote passed for reimbursement, I would vote for full reimbursement.
I believe that where the DAO decides, parties should be reimbursed for exploits.
Languages I speak and write:
English
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
None
Name: HiepHoang (Individual)
Address: 0xc9Bae4Da5Fd312C46C3132A7Ef0F440169472973
Tally: Tally | 0xc9Ba...2973
Areas of interest:
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
A DAO, or Decentralized Autonomous Organization, is an organization that operates through rules encoded as computer programs called smart contracts. The goals of a DAO are determined by its members and can vary depending on the DAOâs purpose. Some common goals of DAOs include:
Overall, the goals of a DAO are determined by its members and can vary depending on the DAOâs purpose and the needs of its community.
Sample Voting Issue 1 - UniSwap/Flipside Bounty
How would you vote?
For
What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
One potential amendment could be to adjust the allocation committee and oversight committee to have a more balanced representation of stakeholders and analytics service providers, rather than giving an overwhelming amount of control to one entity. Additionally, it may be beneficial to have more transparency and communication with the broader Uniswap community to ensure that their concerns and perspectives are taken into account.
To approach this tradeoff, itâs important to consider the specific context and goals of the organization or project. In some cases, centralizing authority may be necessary for achieving a specific outcome or moving quickly in a rapidly changing environment. In other cases, a more decentralized approach may be preferable for promoting inclusivity, diversity of ideas, and avoiding potential conflicts of interest.
One potential solution is to strike a balance between centralization and decentralization, by delegating decision-making power to smaller teams or committees that are representative of different stakeholders or perspectives. Another approach could be to implement checks and balances, such as regular review processes or accountability measures, to ensure that centralized authority is used responsibly and effectively.
Ultimately, the approach to balancing centralization and decentralization depends on the specific circumstances and goals of the organization or project, and requires careful consideration of the potential risks and benefits of each approach.
Split Reimbursement
In terms of handling the situation, it is important to consider the impact on the affected parties and the overall health of the ecosystem. Reimbursement may be necessary in certain instances, particularly when the loss was due to a security vulnerability that was beyond the control of the affected parties. However, it is also important to ensure that reimbursement is not abused and that it does not encourage risky behavior.
In the case of the FEI RARI hack, it would be important to thoroughly investigate the circumstances of the hack and determine whether reimbursement is appropriate. If it is determined that reimbursement is necessary, then the amount and terms of the reimbursement should be carefully considered to ensure that it is fair and does not incentivize risky behavior.
In general, I believe that reimbursement should be considered on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the specific circumstances of each incident. There may be instances where full reimbursement is appropriate, while in other cases, partial or no reimbursement may be warranted. Ultimately, the decision should be made based on a careful assessment of the situation and the impact on the ecosystem as a whole.
Languages I speak and write: By order of preference - English, Vietnam.
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I believe that the growth of decentralized projects on the Ethereum ecosystem, especially Arbitrum is a net positive for everyone in the space, and I will do my best to share my knowledge in bettering the entire space.
Name: Next Best
ENS: Fishfearme.eth
Tally Profile URL: Tally | fishfearme.eth
Areas most interested in:
Supporting Infrastructure
Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
The goal of the DAO is to maximize protocol growth, while minimizing decreases in decentralization (in my opinion, this is more important then growth). This involves reading, understanding and voting on AIPs proposed to or by Arbitrum, aswell as enforcing standards for said AIPs. The DAO should be impartial, as much as it can be being staffed by humans. If the community signals support for AIPs, delegates should trend toward the overall consensus for smaller issues, while drawing hard lines in the sand in matters of decentralization.
Arbitrums future success depends on it being neutral, secure and as decentralized as possible. Liquidity incentives are less important for a pure governance token like $ARB (opinion) then getting the token into the hands of as many people interested in contributing as possible. Provide enough liquidity to make the token easily accessible to all who want to join in the governance process, and prevent huge spikes in either direction in price.
Sample Issue 1: Uniswap Flipside committee centralization issue
If I were voting on this today, I would vote âforâ, with amendments. 3/7 committee members for fund allocation is high - it only requires convincing (or bribing?) 1 extra member to move forward. I would try and amend this to 2 seats. If Flipside wants to allocate funds a specific way, they should be made to have an argument for it at least convincing enough to get 2 more votes.
I approach the âgetting things doneâ aspect with the goal being to be the most trusted of the secondary baselayers of Ethereum. In this particular case, I think since Flipside is doing most of the work in this proposal, with the express purpose of driving traffic and tooling to Uniswap⌠Its pretty much all upside for Uniswap if they succeed, with very little downside if they fail. They should have an easier time making changes because of this, but I still think amending to 2 votes required from other council members is enough to require them to justify their choice with a thought out proposal, but not enough to provide excessive friction in moving forward.
Sample Issue 2: RARI exploit and repayment votes
This is a tough one, but in the end I would have voted for Full Reimbursement. This seems to have been RARIâs contracts that were at fault, they even had previous hacks that should have prompted a stronger review of their codebase. The users of the protocol were innocent in this, and they rightfully put it to a vote. The community decided to reimburse users, and RARI paid for their mistake out of pocket.
In events like this, context is important. Say for Arbitrum, if a layer 3 spins up their own chain on Arbitrums layer 2 and that chain gets exploited because of poor security and audits of the codebase on that chain⌠there should be no reimbursement from Arbitrum itself for the affected users. If Arbitrums code is the reason for the draining of a child chain, or the bridge were to be drained etc⌠I am of the mind user reimbursement will go further towards restoring the core value of the protocol (trust), then protecting the treasury in specific s\circumstances. Funds can be recovered, users often cannot.
Languages I speak and write: English only
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I have no current conflicts of interest, and am employed in cybersecurity outside of the crypto space. I validate only on Ethereum.
Name (organization or individual)
Vladyslav Dohadailo (individual)
Wallet Address or ENS:
0xA6CC3b77C61EE8B2CB13F05ac9eeC16CffDE2c19
Tally Profile:
What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up tot wo tags:
⢠Public Goods funding
⢠DeFi development on Arbitrum
⢠Improving Governance participation
⢠Supporting Infrastructure
⢠Tooling, Improving protocol decentralization
⢠IRL Arbitrum community gatherings
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
how aggressive should we be in liquidity mining, what is the goal of the DAO?
I am not the biggest fan of liquidity mining, at least not directly from a DAO; I think that in the best of many cases the best is to apply to different protocols that kind of incentives, maybe like Optimism that brought diverse uses to its network incentivizing it in an indirect way in usability and ecosystem.
Sample Voting Issue 1:
1 How would you vote?
Against
2 What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
Diversity of opinions and participants should be the main objective of a DAO, if a small group centralizes power, the name DAO is only an aggregate.
Something that can help is to predefine in the beginning the creation of committees and delimit the members it should have at the expense of increasing diversity against personal interests.
3 How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
It is a bad reference to the DAOs, the more decentralized the more difficult it is to agree, but I feel that the committees or delegates fulfill that vital function of representing the voice of many in order to optimize the governance processes.
Sample Voting Issue 2:
3 Split Reimbursement
A DAO must ensure the best environment for its members and also take into account their survival, therefore it will depend a lot on the cases and the type of hack, by literally draining their funds I do not think they can pay.
Thatâs why I think the best thing to do, and depending on the case like FEI, is to return money to those affected, maybe under a vesting system or the DAO can get down to work to look after the interests of its users.
Languages I speak and write: spanish and learning english
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
I am confident that I have no conflicts of interest that would not allow me to perform my role in the best possible way.
Name: Braimo98 (Individual)
Wallet Address: 0xB81b99C4409b2253ad72c4bD396a0422Ed71C1E3
Tally: Tally | 0xB81b...C1E3
Areas of interest:
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
First and foremost, the purpose of a DAO is to allow for the healthy and decentralised development of the rollup. This vision, of course, can entail many different aspects, from the more technical and security focused sections of the rollup (which the DAO should have oversight over) to encouraging the development of a healthy ecosystem and growth with the ARB token. Basically, every decision the DAO makes should return to the question: â How does this benefit the long-term sustainability and success of not just the ARB token, but also the broader future of rollups?â .
From this question we can begin exploring different roles that the DAO could assume in the broader Arbitrum ecosystem, and the careful balancing act that follows for each decision. Some examples include:
These are just some examples of DAO goals, but of course there are endless more possibilities on what might be handled!
Sample Voting Issue 1 - UniSwap/Flipside Bounty
How would you vote?
For
Delegation of voting power is necessary for any DAO to be able to function efficiently in the long term. Even though it brings a degree of centralisation, as long as they do not control an excessive amount of the larger DAO and they have sufficient accountability measures itâs a good initiative.
What amendments would you make to the proposal if any?
How would you approach the tradeoff between centralization of authority and the ability to get things done?
Itâs inevitable that effectiveness and decentralisation are inversely proportional. As long as the centralised entities are still ultimately dependent on the DAOs approval, and they operate as transparently as possible, this is a necessary tool for the development of the DAO.
A DAO should consider having centralising points only when specialists are required to act knowledgeable and quickly, something which the Vox Populi of the DAO might struggle with. The entities to do this should be trusted members of the space of course.
Sample Voting Issue 2 - Rari Hack Reinbursement
Outside the flipping of the vote, how would you choose to handle this situation?
Please elaborate on what instances you believe it is right to refund and which are not.
i.e should parties be reimbursed for an exploit or not? (Please choose one of the below options and then elaborate upon your reasoning)
Split Reimbursement
Hacks and loss of funds are to this day one of the strongest blockers we have from people trusting the space and onboarding onto it. Every time a large draining of protocol contracts occurs, the idea of the Financial Legos gets threatened, as people become less and less willing to risk connecting with other protocols.
For this reason, I believe at least a partial reinbursement is always to be considered when a protocol has decided to cooperate with you. These parties decided to entrust the security of your smart contracts, and their dedication and trust that was placed onto the protocol should be thanked by at least trying to provide some funds back. In the future, this could even be handled with DAO insurance protocols, which are already being developed in the space.
However, I would be hesitant to provide a full reinbursement when the hack has already severely impacted the protocol so badly. If the amount wonât make that much of a difference to the bottom line it makes sense to give a reinbursement, but in this particular case the double impact of the hack was so severe that this lead to one of the first instances of a DAO explicitly closing doors. A full reinbursement , in terms of impact, would be the same as a second equally devastating hack.
TL;DR Provide enough compensation to thank the participants for engaging in the system, but while a full reinbursement might help these stakeholders, the impact of this action could lead to the DAO entering a negative death spiral.
Languages I speak and write: By order of preference - English, Spanish, Italian
Disclosure of Conflict(s) of Interest:
Currently, I am spending most of my time working on the ParaSwap DAO. This means that I will automatically abstain from any discussion that might involve DEX Aggregation, as my opinion will obviously be biased. The positive side of this participation is that ParaSwap is also deployed in Arbitrum, which means that the success of Arbitrum will also positively impact ParaSwap (through increased liquidity sources and volumes), as well as vice versa (by encouraging efficiency and decentralisation of liquidity in the rollup by aggregating all of these together through a single, simple to access interface).
Additionaly, I also applied to be a delegate on the Optimism collective, which although is also part of the wider ethereum ecosystem it could be considered a conflict of interest. Currently, I am being allocated ~ 1k OP. In addition to this, ParaSwap has also been selected as one of the Protocol Delegate Scheme recipients, and if necessary, the representative of ParaSwap could be a different DAO member if this is considered a major conflict of interest. Personally, I believe that the growth of any decentralised rollup on the Ethereum ecosystem is a net positive for everyone in the space, and I will do my best to lend my knowledge in bettering the entire space
Name: ruslan.klinkov
Wallet Address or ENS: suckmydiscoteque.eth
Tally Profile URL: Tally | ruslanklinkov.eth
What area are you most interested in contributing to? choose up tot wo tags:
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
Liquidity is the blood of the ecosystem. No liquidity means the blockchain is dead and no one needs it. We donât have to be aggressive in extracting liquidity. We need to create good conditions for liquidity to be added naturally and stored securely. The main task of the DAO is to form the principles of fair management of the protocol. Decisions made must be in the interest of Arbitrumâs development, not of individuals.
Sample Voting Issue 1:
Sample Voting Issue 2:
However, reimbursing everyone will set a precedent: projects can be scammers and do their own hacks of their protocols. Thatâs why I think that most protocols should insure themselves, to be able to cover costs, at least partially.
Also, there should be strict controls and security checks on smart contracts. Without an audit, the protocol should not be allowed to operate.
Languages I speak and write:
speak and write English fluently
I have no conflict of interest. I want to be important and necessary for the development of Arbitrum
Mehdi Naeini
0x20005e6a7049a0c093b5abF197c31F8dD0C15d96
Areas of interest:
Please share your stance on overall goals for the DAO:
As a prospective delegate for the DAO Arbitrum blockchain, my overall goal is to promote the growth and development of the community while ensuring that the interests of all members are represented. To achieve this, I believe that the DAO should prioritize initiatives that foster liquidity and encourage participation from a diverse range of stakeholders.
Ultimately, my stance on these issues is guided by a commitment to transparency, inclusivity, and responsible stewardship of the resources and assets entrusted to the DAO. As a delegate, I would work tirelessly to ensure that the communityâs interests are represented and that the DAO continues to thrive and grow over the long term.
Sample Voting Issue 1:
As a delegate, I would vote against the Uniswap proposal as it currently stands. While I believe that bounties can be an effective way to attract new users to Uniswap, the proposal gives Flipside crypto too much control over the allocation of UNI and oversight of the program. In my view, this could lead to centralization of power and create an unfair advantage for Flipside.
Sample Voting Issue 2:
As a delegate, I sympathize with those who were affected by the hack, I believe that itâs important to weigh the potential benefits and drawbacks of reimbursement carefully.
Ultimately, I believe that the decision of whether or not to reimburse parties affected by an exploit should be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the unique circumstances of each situation. As a delegate, I would work to ensure that the interests of all members of the community are represented fairly and that decisions are made in a transparent and responsible manner.
Languages I speak and write:
Persian (native), English (upper intermediate)