I read through everything, and it seems to me that the comment by @PossumLabs gets closest to solving the problem. This is the clearest attempt in this thread to actually identify the real problem rather than just adjust the parameter.
I say that because it rightly
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identifies that quorum is not the core problem (it isn’t)
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treats repeated quorum changes as a sign of a deeper structural problem (they are)
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doesn’t confuse making governance easier to operate with actually making it healthier (two separate things)
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focuses on the level of real stakeholder participation, not just how votes are counted (the actual problem)
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recognises that incentives are part of the problem
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separates symptoms from causes (crucial)
If we’re going to solve this, this is the right direction. Let me explain in more detail, with evidence from previous threads/discussions here, why the comment by PossumLabs is right for each point.
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It identifies that quorum is not the core issue.
Quorum is just one rule inside the system. If participation itself is weak, changing quorum can help proposals pass, but it doesn’t fix the underlying issue. **The underlying issue is that there isn’t a strong enough participating body to carry decisions consistently.
Evidence:
As the OP itself shows, quorum is rising independently of delegated voting power. This means that the mechanism is not aligned with actual participation in the system
And there are explicit efforts to increase participation itself, which makes clear that low participation is being treated as a problem in its own right, not just as a side effect of quorum design
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rewarding-active-delegates-rad-program/30249
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It treats repeated quorum changes as a sign of a deeper structural problem.
If the DAO keeps needing to adjust quorum, that indicates that something underneath isn’t stable. The threshold isn’t the real problem. The real problem is actually that participation isn’t forming or holding at the level the system assumes.
Evidence:
Quorum has already been adjusted once to maintain liveness, and it’s now being revisited again.
You can see this here too because quorum had to be reduced just to keep governance functioning
… and now it’s being revisited again, which shows the previous change didn’t fully resolve the issue
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It doesn’t confuse activity or liveness with health
Yes, making it easier to pass proposals improves liveness (things can move). But that doesn’t mean governance is actually working well. A system can pass proposals and still be weak if only a narrow group is effectively carrying all decisions.
Evidence:
You can see this in the RAD program discussion that the DAO is actively incentivising delegates in order to sustain participation:
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rewarding-active-delegates-rad-program/30249
And in the DIP discussion, participation is explicitly something that has to be maintained through structured programs:
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-delegate-incentive-program-dip/26496
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It focuses on stakeholder participation, not just vote mechanics
Governance strength comes from who’s actually participating and how consistently - not just from how votes are counted. If participation is thin or concentrated, changing the counting rule doesn’t change that reality.
The system relies heavily on delegated participation.
Evidence:
We can already see that quorum is being redefined around delegated voting power rather than total token holders (the OP covers this).
And here, the DAO is explicitly investing in strengthening the delegate layer as the primary mechanism for participation:
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-delegate-incentive-program-dip/26496
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It recognises that incentives are part of the picture
That’s spot on again because participation is already being actively supported through incentive design. If people aren’t participating, we really do have to look at what is motivating or discouraging them. That’s a more fundamental question than adjusting quorum thresholds.
Evidence
Participation and activity are being influenced through incentive design
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rewarding-active-delegates-rad-program/30249
And here there is explicit concern that incentive-driven participation may not be sustainable over time
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-incentives-detox-proposal/25849
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It separates symptoms from causes
This was the best insight. The fact that proposals are hard to pass is a symptom. When participation is weak, any quorum system will eventually run into the same issue again. Changing quorum just moves the symptom around - it doesn’t remove the cause.
Evidence
The proposal itself focuses on making quorum easier to reach - that’s a direct response to proposals struggling to pass.
And separately, the DAO is already running structured programs to increase and sustain participation:
https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/proposal-delegate-incentive-program-dip/26496
The fact that participation needs to be actively maintained through these programs shows that the constraint is structural, not just a parameter issue.
Those are the reasons why this comment stands out to me - it’s actually diagnosing the problem rather than adjusting around it. If participation and delegation aren’t improving, then any quorum model (and it doesn’t matter whether it’s based on supply or DVP) will eventually run into the same constraints again.
This is also why I’ve tried to map these issues more systematically in a problem register here - across participation, delegation, incentives, and structural constraints - rather than just quorum in isolation because this is just one part of the overall puzzle: