John Kennedy reconfirmation for AGV council Summary: This poll asks ARB holders if they wish to extend John Kennedy’s term on the Arbitrum Gaming Ventures council without the candidate running in the general, competitive election later this month.
Recommendation: Vote Against. We are voting against this on poor procedural grounds. Note that Kennedy’s initial term was simple ratification (after being recommended by the AGV council), so has never stood in a competitive election process to what is an elected position. This vote against does not imply GFX Labs will vote against Kennedy in the general AGV council election.
Tim Chang reconfirmation for AGV council Summary: This poll asks ARB holders if they wish to extend Tim Chang’s term on the Arbitrum Gaming Ventures council without the candidate running in the general, competitive election later this month.
Recommendation: Vote Against. We are voting against this on poor procedural grounds. Note that Chang’s initial term was simple ratification (after being recommended by the AGV council), so has never stood in a competitive election process to what is an elected position. This vote against does not imply GFX Labs will vote against Chang in the general AGV council election.
AGV - 2026 Council Elections Summary: This poll asks ARB holders who they wish to see fill 3 open seats on the AGV council.
Candidates:
JoJo (Blockworks)
David Bolger
Chris Cameron (GFX Labs)
Tekr0x
Coinflipcanada
Recommendation: Vote 100% for Chris Cameron (GFX Labs). If elected, GFX pledges to provide an independent report on the sate of the AGV to the DAO within 60 days, ensure the AGV begins to publish financial statements, including size and cost basis of holdings, and work with the rest of the council to identify ways to formally expand the mandate beyond gaming investments.
The first is ArbOS 51 (Dia) which adds support for Fusaka EIPs and some minor bug fixes. This update is in place of the previously planned ArbOS 50. An audit by Trail of Bits can be found here.
The second is raising the gas target and alteration to the pricing algorithm and raising the minimum base fee. The most notable changes are from the current single gas target of 7 Mgas/s to a maximum of 100 Mgas/s, and make the base fee .02 gwei instead of the current .01 gwei.
Recommendation: Vote For. These upgrades generally seem productive, although we note the next ArbOS needs to remember to address the edge case where an EIP-7702 transaction could exceed the permitted gas limits.
Quorum = min{max quorum, max{ɑ*DVP, baseline quorum}}
Ɑ = 0.5 (constitutional votes); 0.4 (non-constitutional)
Baseline quorum = 150m ARB (constitutional votes); 100m ARB (non-constitutional)
Max quorum = 450m ARB (constitutional votes); 300m ARB (non-constitutional)
Recommendation: Vote For. Initial quorum parameters are based on historically realistic voting participation.
The primary change is a shift in viewing only delegated voting power as “circulating” for the purposes of governance. Previously, a percentage of the total votable supply was targeted for quorum. This lead to rapidly rising quorums that have been uncomfortably difficult to meet on constitutional votes, risking the DAO being unable to make changes to core contracts.
The new quorum calculation formula eschews a focus on requiring a high-dollar amount of ARB to make sensitive changes, and is now optimizing for making sure changes can be made at all. It’s a trade off, but at the moment, it’s difficult to see an easy alternative, with ARB inflation and falling price combining to both grow total votable supply and reduce enthusiasm to hold and delegate those votes.