JoJo
May 3, 2025, 10:52am
14
May 2025 voting Snapshot votings Vote: For
Vote: Yes to both
hello, let me chim in. I was reached out first from Brick that mentioned to me this problem Daniel had, and if it was viable to utilize old funds.of the aforementioned safe
Being that these funds were either assigned to protocols that didn’t complete their grant path, or did forfeit that grant, or just unassigned, reallocating to other projects doesn’t affect in any chance any operation.
I don’t think this is should be framed as a “precedent”: the amount the Hackaton need is rather small for the amount the DAO is used to handle to initiative, and at the same time is key for them to finish the initiative and for us to understand if this type of new initiative is viable (grant as investment with intermediate judgment from commission).
Quite unrelated, it could make sense to pass the net remaining part of stablecoins, after funding the hackaton, directly to the TMC for the stablecoin management: we have assets such as bridged usdc, nowadays kinda deprecated, that would need a conversion regardless. At this point let’s just put it to use. Food for thoughts.
For the reasons mentioned above, voting in favor of both topping up and moving remaining funds in hands of TMC. I think we remove friction, allocate spare funds to a treasury program, and also avoid to devote any more mindshare to issues that are in my opinion secondary to other important things we need to achieve.
Vote: For
Thank you for the proposal.
Posting to support the vote in the temp check.
First, there is a general appetite from builders to renew an incentive program, albeit with differences from the past we have had.do make a difference at the ecosystem level and protocol level: with more and more competition from alternative L1s, and new L2s, and an always more fragmented mindshare, it does make sense to utilize economic incentives to strengthen the metric of Arbitrum.
I have a few remarks that I want to list below.
I can understand how the DAO wants an “owner” of the program, in terms of responsibilities for success/failure. It makes sense. I don’t think Entropy, though, should be treated as the only responsible for this program. I partially echo GFXlabs comment above on the 2/3 decision process, not because I see Foundation and Lab teaming up against Entropy, but because in the end Entropy does not have the final decision, which again relies on a vote for majority. I don’t think the solution is to curb down the commission, nor to give Entropy full control: I think all 3 stakeholders are both well-intended and rightly positioned to make the best decision possible. For these reasons, while Entropy might indeed have more weight in the operations and granular decision process, the initiative will ideally have to be evaluated as one of the first explicit ones run by three AAEs.
KPI definition will be where the devil lives. It would be superficial to define meaningless KPIs that are easy to reach; it would be unfruitful to define KPIs that, while good on paper, won’t necessarily allow us to reach goals that can be seen as pragmatic in the current market and for the Arbitrum ecosystem; it would be simplistic to define KPIs that are not normalized based on current and past conditions and receptive to the markets’ narratives. This is not a critique of the program, Entropy, or others, just a reminder of what we (already) saw in the past. The work on these metrics will be the key unlock of the program; and I will add, I don’t think the DAO should necessarily define them, because while it might seem simple on the surface, it is instead an extremely hard job. In my very personal opinion, one way to solve this would be to interview the most important protocols in Arbitrum, and find a common denominator between these findings and the experience of the analysts we have available, alongside the strategic goal that OCL wants to pursue for the next year.
As I already mentioned privately, one of the main risks of the program is choosing the right technological partner. I will be honest: so far we haven’t seen in our DAO entities and proposals that are able to go into the nuances of incentive programs, such as avoiding the situation where multichain DEXes reduce the spread of pools in Arbitrum to 0 to subsidize LPers with incentives, while the protocol itself still has revenue from other chains (and so hurting DEXes that are mainly focused in Arbitrum), or analyzing what % of fee rebate in all perps protocols gives an equilibrium between organic growth in demand versus simply creating farming dynamics. We just didn’t see the granular breakdown up to these details in the last several months of calls, and it might also mean that there is no entity out there specifically able to minimize these unhealthy situations.
Vote: For
I’m voting in favor.
Not a lot to add to what was so far mentioned but will try to give my 2 cents on the topic.
yes, this is clearly a short term bandwith: by the time everything goes live, we are back at quorum level of april
we can make this measure effective, short term , only if paired with other short term solution such as
Increasing, as we saw last 2 months, the amount of delegated tokens to active delegates. This probably comes from a BD print from AF/OCL and should be pursued aga
Avoid outcomes like the one proposed for Event Horizon . As much as i can understand the goal of adjusting voting power based on the new scope, stripping EH of 7 millions would negate around 28% of the gain we would get with this proposal
There are several delegates, in the top 20/30, with several millions of ARB delegate to them that barely vote. One of them is, for example, Yoav , that was recently elected in the security council. This is just one specific case, but the point is that we need to find a way to involve these delegates, having vested interested in arb or a specific role in the DAO, to be more involved in day to day voting. Knowing how taxing this activity is, we should find a way to facilitate them as much as we can, and starting with AF/OCL contacting them 1:1 with the aid of certain delegates like krst or others that in past expressed their interest on the topic could be a start.
All of the above put together could give us a breathing room of 2-3 quarters, and let us figure out a better long term solution.
Tally votings Vote: For
Vote: For