JoJo Delegate Communication Thread

[JoJo]

JoJo Delegate Communication Thread

Delegate address: 0x4f685b29514eed0c9d929386e86d9cd81981118b

Delegate ENS Address: jojothecow.eth

Forum Usernames: @jojo

Voting Activity: Tally & Snapshot

Twitter: jojo17568

Big fan of iterating imperfectly and fast, especially in a world, crypto, in which we go at fast speed light. Cow engineer, doing risk analysis and models at Jones DAO, helping in Arbitrum governance as much as I can. You might have seen me in a few grants program, such as the LTIPP, the Questbook “New protocols and ideas” domain, and the Uniswap Arbitrum Grant Program. Yes, I like helping protocols grow in Arbitrum a lot.

Note: this thread will encompass only my personal voting reasons, and does not represent the opinions of any protocol or entity that I might be part of, partner with or contribute in any form. Remember, I’m just a cow.

[JoJo]

May 2024 voting

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Snapshot votings

GovHack at ETH CC (Brussels)

Vote: For

@JoJo

Voting “for” on this on snapshot.

I wasn’t in Denver, I plan to be in Brussel, and I have only heard good thing about govHack.

Team here has the challenge of putting up the org of a big event in less than 2 and a half month: realistically, they will need funds asap to start paying vendors and suppliers.

Voting for, and hope that a couple of days after snapshot is over goes directly to tally, for the sake of proper execution.

Several people were also able to testify about budget being rightly sized for this type of event, which was my main concern (and the main concern of others).

Grant Request - Curve Finance

Vote: For

@JoJo

Voting a strong “for” on this proposal.

• curve = really important part of DeFi
• proposal = fair for the DAO thanks to the personal commitment of the founder, regardless of the outcome
• incentives on top of a service, crvusd, that is highly appreciated and has demonstrated PMF.

Also, if this passes, it would be basically one of a kind: an incentive proposal outside of any framework program. Which is something that we need to collectively do as a dao.

All LTIP proposals voted after counci’s feedback: Buffer, Sushi, Synthetix, Clipper, DODO, Tradao, Deri protocol, Yearn, Bedrock, D2 Finance, Rage trade, CVI.Finance, ACryptoS, Smilee, Connext

Vote: Abstain

Since I was one of the advisor involved in the LTIPP program, I decided to abstain to maintain neutrality on all protocols who resubmitted after the council’s feedback.*

Proposal for Approval of DeDaub as the ADPC Security Advisor

Vote: For

@JoJo

Voting “for” on onboarding DeDaub as security consultant

• price is reasonable
• there is the need of a technical consultant that knows both the topic and is engaged in the market, so understand rates and other relevant issues
• appreciate that ADPC has money in their pocket but is still asking the DAO to use it.

On people asking “can we get other SME / alternative”. I totally understand where this comes from, and I undertand is the first thought one could have. But I think we should detach a bit from this type of thinking that, at this point, is a bit encapsulated.
If we elect a committee, and we assigne a budget, we should trust that committee. Micromanaging the committee instead is only detrimental, drags the discussion toward how to do stuff instead of effective doing stuff, kills the purpose of having a committee in the first place cause if they have to ask to the dao for everything at that point why were they even elected?

Pilot Phase: M&A for Arbitrum DAO

Vote: For

@JoJo

As we said and spoke about for almost 2 months now the whole program is complex in term of solving specific legal questions and unlocking new possibilities, unexplored for this dao, that will require a certain capital.

At this point, the pilot program can likely be what the DAO needs to understand how it would work in practice, without having too much of an hard commitment in the short term for funds and also workload. Excited to see where this initiative will be going

@JoJo

Based on my response above, voting “for” on snapshot.

• The whole initiative has a merit
• We are solving for how to buy stuff, legal approach, ownership and so on
• in any business you don’t want to reinvent the wheel every day, sometimes you just go out there and buy what you need
• while I have a lot of trust and faith in both bernard, sid and areta, I understand the concerns of the DAO and i think the pilot program is effectively a very good answer to understanding how this will pan out at scale plus what we can all expect.

All STIP Addendum challenged proposals: Umami, Dolomite, Thetanuts, OpenOcean, Angle, Socket, Furucombo, Stake DAO, Savvy, Thales, Boost, Gains, KyberSwap, Tide, Sanko, Solv, Stargate, MUX

Vote: Abstain

As for the LTIPP, since I was one of the advisor involved in the STIP Brdige program, I decided to abstain to maintain neutrality on all protocols who went to vote either because they were challenged or because they posted a late application.*

Arbitrum Multi-sig Support Service (MSS)

Vote: For

@JoJo

After some thoughts, decided to vote “for”, including the reporting implementation.

I want to clarify a few things here.

• inclusion of monthly report: it is a bit costly to be honest. But it makes a lot of sense to have data reporting on the txs executed, is the only way to really keep track of what the dao is doing
• performances of signers: this should likely be included in the above report. With no judgment, just as data. Knowing how many tx were created and signed by each signer. It will be clear, over time, if there are outliers that never take part to the program or not, and at least the dao will be able in a future election to know who should not be re elected
• i agree with users above stating that 12 months is not the standard time for these roles in the dao. To me tho, is not a detail significant enough to vote it down or even to change the proposal: a multisig should be something quite mechanic, quite reliable, quite boring. It can make sense to effectively have a 1y mandate on this (and potentially also on other boring, mechanic, reliable roles that we will need in future).

But, this is not necessarily an endorsement on a tally vote.
Initially i thought it would be hell cause signers would need to be able to create txs for all programs. And while this seems trivial for people outside of multisig world, is definitely not (ie: txs for a group of people, but excluding one that didn’t kyc yet; tx that is partially paid in fixed amount of arb, and variable amount of arb cause payment is in usd equivalent at the time of the tx itself; same as before, but with the usd value that has to be on a 30day moving average; etc).
Then, luckily, @dk3 educated me on the delegation feature that will allow external people to post a transactions in the safe for signers to sign. But I also understand there could effectively be issues, especially because not all programs are equal (ie: the delegate incentive program is one if the highest lift in term of number of transactions, variability of payout, problems with kyc and timing).

Regardless of the chosen solution, we need to address the above cases with a plan that will have to be integrated in every program using the MSS, in a way that scales and either allows one of the program main stakeholder to post transactions, or provide a way for a chair/signer to more actively participate to the single program. Which means, necessarily, a bigger overhead in time and costs. The latter solution also means finding a consensus mechanism between participants (=signers for that program) to choose the designated one. Either randomly, by internal election, they all fight in a room, but there is going to be one member who will effectively be paid more and also have more responsibility and will need to invest more time talking with someone from the program. If it’s the chair I am not sure. But in general, my suggestion for programs in which there is the need of scalability without effectively knowing the final size of labour needed (ltipp anyone?), should be to think about both a fixed comp, and the one proposed above is to me good enough, but also a potentially variable one tied to the number of programs one should interface with. Would dare to say, potentially even further specialise this component between programs with low amount and variance of transactions and high amount of txs or heterogeneous ones.
Hope the suggestion helps.

Streamlining the LTIPP Bounties

Vote: For

@JoJo

Voting “for” on this proposal. There is indeed the need of a more agile management of this mini internal funds. And tbh this also applies in general to others as well, more thoughts on this after all votings is over.

But, in general

• necessary to allow council to be able to leverage funds to effectively answer questions that might arise
• necessary to allow council to be able to leverage funds to effectively answer needs that might arise
• totally agreeing with @Tenzent here: if any selected entity is part of the council, advisors or others contributors of LTIPP, there has to be a very good reason on why 1) the question was posed 2) the answer has to be provided specifically by that entity

Kwenta x Perennial: Arbitrum Onboarding Incentives

Vote: For

@JoJo

I am voting For on this proposal.

I am intrigued by the shared mechanism of two protocols, and I personally love incentive mechanism aimed to acquire/retain users in other chains. The quest for kwenta users in other chains is good (and i suggest the team to put a cutoff to wallets right before this mechanism was published). For the fee rebate, would suggest, if it was not done yet, to align to other perp protocol to have a 75% rebate and not an 80%. Seems like there is a general consensus on this number for this asset class; the leftover 5% of the 36% (so, 1.8% of the total or 34200 arb) can likely be allocated to quests or LP, or potentially be used as wildcard for other initiatives still allocated to users.
There is overall a net benefit for Kwenta to be here, and the fact that the proposal is outside the framework of stip, ltipp and others should not stop us from moving forward good initiatives, in the same way it happened with curve a couple of weeks ago.

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Tally votings

Double-Down on STIP Successes (STIP-Bridge)

Vote: For

Confirming snapshot vote, which I report here for completeness

@JoJo

I am voting yes for this proposal.
I wrote the reasoning publicly on twitter 10 days ago. This is what I firmly believe right now.

(from here)

I also understand the questions of some who are saying: why we should double down on stip if we can’t measure it yet. Why don’t we wait for the ltip to iterate on that. Etcetera. I get it. These are all valid concerns.
But, to me, the above is valid: we can’t stop right now. And also, if we REALLY want to know what success looks like, we would need to all sit down at a table, for a few days, and just discuss what we want to achieve in arbitrum in the next 6 months, 2 years, 5 years. Which is something realistically not doable in a DAO and that is usually what a board + a ceo do in the corporate world. What I mean is that while there is a merit in knowing what metric grew and what didn’t, metrics are just that: metrics. They don’t define necessarily on a 1:1 relationship success.

Lastly, i think that crypto AND the ethereum world AND the L2 world are in a specific phase (at least for another few years): growth. Which means, it could make sense to target generic metrics (users, tvl, volume) as proxy of a pathway to greatness, which is what we should generically pursue regardless of specifics.

NOTE: i obviously have also a biased interest here in voting yes, since i work for Jones DAO. For what it matters I would have voted yes even if i was working in a mc donald tho.

GovHack at ETH CC (Brussels)

Vote: For

Confirming snapshot vote

Grant Request - Curve Finance

Vote: For

Confirming snapshot vote

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*note: in future I might reserve the right to vote in a non neutral way, opposite of what I did in STIP Bridge and LTIPP, in programs in which I am directly involved. This because, after what has so far been happening with situations like the one of Synapse, we just can’t be sure that others will speak when there is, indeed, the necessity to.

[JoJo]

June 2024 voting

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Snapshot votings

Set up a Sub-Committee for the Security Services Subsidy Fund

Vote: For

@JoJo

Contrary to most here, i am voting in favour of this proposal.

Yes, there is definitely the merit in saying that ADPC should pursue this goal with their own current means.

But the way this is shaping is that it will be basically the equivalent of a grant program: from a protocol standpoint, applying to get money for incentives, or for audits, or to pay operation is quite similar. The end result, to me, could be the same of every grant programs we already had: an underestimation of the demand we will have (remember stip in which we had 2 rounds and we overbooked the first by 50%; ltip, that was about potentially 80 protocols with 60m available, and we ended up with 180 protocols asking for 160m).

I don’t think the adpc has the necessary manpower to do it. And in case the program will be overbooked (which i don’t think will happen), they current mix might not be the one with the best capabilities to discern who should and should not get the security grant.

AIP: Nova Fee Router Proposal (ArbOS 30)

Vote: For

@JoJo

No reason to vote against this. Having funds being sent in a permissionless way to the dao treasury instead of having to vote for it should be a trivial decision.
Voting for.

AIP: Activate Stylus and Enable Next-Gen WebAssembly Smart Contracts (ArbOS 30)

Vote: For

@JoJo

Stylus is the way to move forward and to onboard the next 1 gazzillion devs.

I am just a cow, and even I know C++. No reason to vote against, knowing that OCL will go for the robust path of testing and auditing that so far has guaranteed the success of arbitrum tech wise.

Decise “for” on Stylus.

AIP: Support RIP-7212 for Account Abstraction Wallets (ArbOS 30)

Vote: For

@JoJo

Not only account abstraction is needed, we also need to keep up the pace with competition. As @Bob-Rossi said above, no brainer vote tbh.
Voting for.

[NON-CONSTITUTIONAL] Pilot Phase: Arbitrum Ventures Initiative

Vote: Abstain

@JoJo

I am voting ABSTAIN on this proposal.

I really like the idea. We should pursue the venture investment thesis for our DAO. We are in a phase of our industry mature enough in which this is doable.

Just, I think this pilot phase as it is doesn’t make too much sense.

If I read both the current AVI proposal that has been published in snapshot just a couple of days ago, compared to the tally m&a proposal already approved , this is what we can read.

• In the M&A proposal we have: value upside analysis […], Assessment […], Facilitating interactions across the DAO […] strategic analyses of target areas […], Integration options […]
• In the AVI proposal we have: The outcome of this pilot proposal is to produce a detailed investment thesis, market consultation findings, community engagement feedback, strategic recommendations, and an operational plan.

This clearly shows for the AVI initiative not only very similar deliverable of the M&A, but also a very similar semantic, without the specificity (not reported here but available in tally ) of the specific, different field: ventur capitalism. Amost a 1:1 overlap, up to the point in which in the AVI initiative there is also the willingness to have an IRL event much as in the m&a initiative that will participate to GovHack at EthCC.
The above is especially true when i read about new initiatives such as Elixir which adds a lot of detail to the venture considerations, despite being a younger one.
And speaking about Elixir, another thing to consider, which could be secondary but worth some reflection, is how AVI proposes to “funding and oversee” eventually initiatives like this one and others in venture capitalism, without really providing any meaningful detail.

Don’t get me wrong: i am ok in AVI going for a pilot phase, I am ok with it doing also an IRL event, much as m&a. The fact that the structure is a copy carbon can likely mean that the pilot phase for this type of initiatives should be structured this way.

But to me it just seems strange that the outcome is exactly framed in the same way as the m&a activity without the same specificity for its specific field - being in the venture capitalist industry -.
If I also look at the cost being double, $99k, compared to the $52k of m&a, it raises even more doubts for me.

I don’t know if the proposal will go through or not. My hope is that, if it goes through, the above will be addressed before tally at least.

Let me reiterate again: I think this is a good idea for our dao, and i think there are differences compared to m&a and, partially, with gcp. I just think we need to better tailor the initiative.

Finally, just to be crystal clear and shred any doubt: i have actively participated to the m&a working group, but i am not currently part of areta which is leading that initiative. So I am relative neutral to this, and giving opinion mostly from the standpoint of an arbitrum builder looking at the future of arbitrum. Yes, let’s do venture, but let’s do it in the right way.

Election of STEP Program Manager

Vote: Steakhouse, 100% allocation

@JoJo

Voting for Steakhouse, with my full allocation.

After reviewing their application, they have the experience tied to the oversight of Maker which can’t be discounted; while other applicants, like avantgrade, are for sure strong candidates as well, to me the above is the key fact for my personal decision process.
On the cost: while, at first glance, steakhouse is technically the highest one in cost, is also the only entity providing a fixed costs regardless of the amount of protocols to oversee. Which means it might not be the most costly option; and, tbh, even if it was, I would gladly pay a delta of 50k out of a 50M program for proper oversight (1% more).

AIP: BoLD - permissionless validation for Arbitrum

Vote: For

@JoJo

Voting in favour of this temp check, relying to also the technical opinion of Delphi here. No point in gating the upgrade of the protocol in general.

I want to thank other delegates for sharing more technical details on the design choices behind this system (re: @RikaGoldberg mentioning usage of confiscated funds, @swmartin about a potential divergence of viability if there is a big divergence in future of eth price compared to arb, and @PGov for the request of breakdown of funds distribution). Most if not all of this are takes likely outside the comprehensive skillset of a lot of users, and reading them helps understanding potential pitfalls for the future.

AIP: Funds to bootstrap the first BoLD validator - Bond sentiment.

Vote: For

@JoJo

Voting in favour of funding the first BoLD validator and making the foundation run it. We need at least one honest validator, and to be honest we can’t find a better aligned stakeholder than the foundation to do it. Having them running it, with even the caveat as per the proposal that we will be able to claw back funds, is the safest scenario i can think about for now for our ecosystem.

AIP: Funds to bootstrap the first BoLD validator - Operational cost sentiment.

Vote: For

@JoJo

Finally, voting in favour of funding the operational costs for the BoLD validator run by the foundation. The proposal makes imho a good breakdown on the cost related (3% of the 3600 eth for 3 years, so 432 eth, plus the buffer of 68, + 400 eth for gas costs to post and challenge + 500 eth for service fees). Up the point a simple cow is able to understand it. Also foundation won’t take service fees from this.

As a final note, we likely want to keep a tab on all of these numbers and more in relation to the discussion we are having about using the sequencer revenue. While I don’t think is written anywhere, my educated guess is that we will take the eth from there indeed (if not and I missed something feel free to correct me). We finally got an excuse to use them i g

Vote: For

Pilot Stage – Treasury Backed Vaults research and development

Vote: Against

@JoJo

For the reasons I stated above, I have to unfortunately vote Against this proposals.
I will just quote my previous post for the motivation, and add something as a follow up.

@JoJo

I was a bit surprised when this popped up on snapshot today. This proposal was brought to life just 1 week ago in the forum, and there are several unanswered questions from several folks.

First, I’ll report my opinion, already shared privately, and then a considerations on the proposal.

I see 2 scenarios here:

1. we create a vault for which we establish a cap. Let’s say is 50M stables. And we back it up with 500m arb between collateral and reserve, meaning arb has to go to 0.10$ to get liquidated. We have something that let us get $50m in liquidity, but this amount is basically 1 incentive program for us. All of this by using half a billion arb. Feels like the amount received is too small to have an impact, and so is not that important considering we would have to put on stake half a billy of arb to do so.
2. we decide to use the vault, with a certain cap tied to the arb price, over time. Which means, while w allocate 300-400m arb between collateral and reserve, we found ourself with arb going to 10$. We now a 4B collateral we can borrow against. And we still borrow 1:10 ratio so we borrow 400m. That is a meaningful amount.

Let’s not consider scenario 1, because to me scenario 1 is not likely important nor worth the effort. Let’s only consider scenario 2, with whatever degree of numbers you want (amount of arb, price of arb, amount we borrow), keeping in mind tho that we want numbers that have an impact, so we are on the high end of the barbell.

Whatever amount you have as collateral. Whatever amount you have in the reserve. Whatever amount you borrow. You now have a target on your back.
You have a series of number which, summed with depth of liquidity of dexes and cexes, can be put in a spreadsheet to calculate how much capital you need to liquidatate that position.
This could be economically viable, or not. But the moment in which it becomes viable, trust me someone will exploit it.

I want to state that

1. this is obviously my personal view
2. I am being pessimistic here
3. I am also realistic tho.

And this was my take on the product. I also reflected upon it, chatting with proposers, and agreed that, for sure, we can do researches on this.

Which takes me to the second big surprise that I have: why are we packing the research with the product? Shouldn’t we first just research if this is viable, or if we are just falling in a crv type of scenario, with the difference that mitch can pick up the phone, his trezor, send money around, gather collateral and manage risk and we, as a dao, are as slow as a crippled elephant?

I thank a lot the author for the numerous answers. We discussed about a research being important in this topic, re: can we effectively create a vault in which DAO can deposits ARB and borrow against them?
I don’t see anything wrong in the research. I personally think the answer of such a research will, likely, be a big sounding no, but I am happy to be proven wrong. All the risks I stated above I think are here, and what has happened to curve just show that a target will be hit at some point. What I am seeing as a problem here is that the research here is tied to development of such product. And I don’t see why the two should be packaged together.

I would more gladly see something like

• we have a separate, proper research on lending risk for an arbi tailored vault, exclusive property of the DAO
• open dollar can eventually be an advisor in this research (but not the main player: we will go into a trust me bro situation, in which the proponent has all incentive to have a study that reassures the dao without necessarily having a critic eye on the risk per se)
• we analyse the research, and if it’s positive in saying “yes risk can be managed” and the dao wants to move forward, we then build the vault. And then Open Dollar can indeed implement and manage it.

I am pretty sure the whole team has done a lot of work here, as well as I am sure they have no bad intentions, nor they are a malicious actor. Just, I think the risk is too high in general, and one way to derisk is to have first the research and then, if any, the product.

[Non-Constitutional] Betting on Builders: Infinite Launchpad Proposal

Vote: Against

@JoJo

I voted against the proposal.

I am getting familiar over time to what danielo is doing with RnDao.

What I like about him is that he is taking a path I would never take, with an approach I would never had. And at this point I am old enough to understand that even if I don’t agree with something or with a specific mission doesn’t mean there is no value behind, or that it can’t be pursued in ways outside my personal framework.
What is he after, and how, is something I support. And I am also trying to give him a bit of a hand in this sense, starting with the questbook grant for collabberry.

But the current proposal imho just doesn’t properly work. I echo the opinions of, generally, too much overhead costs. This solves either through cost cutting, or increase the amount of capital requested to distributed, and I am not sure what is the right way here.
I am also a bit conflicted on the merge of the initiatives of RnDao, EVM capital and Outlier Venture, that in my understanding initially were separated. I understand how joining forces could be seen as a winning strategy, also how a joint force can be “easier” to manage for the dao in term of voting, but I am not sold on this, sorry. We have different teams, different personalities, and different scopes.

I also want to highlight that my vote, is not a vote against the matter per se; i am willing to support the proposal the moment in which is reworked (because, I think it can be reworked), and be addressed for the following

• overhead costs → either we lower the costs directly, or we start with an initial smaller phase and a second phase, larger than the one proposed, so overhead is not that big if phase 1 is succesfull
• clear scope between the 3 ventures, and properly understand if they have to run in tandem vs solo
• (in general) clear scope on targets, what we want to accomplish etc.

ArbitrumHub Evolution: The Next Step in Streamlining Information Access and Raising Awareness for Arbitrum DAO

Vote: Against

@JoJo

Have to vote against this one.

Arbitrum hub is an awesome site. The news from Angela, are super helpful.
I just don’t see the budget of these being almost half a million dollars for 6 months, sorry.

I don’t specifically know the current rate about hosting, running certain services and so on; for what is worth, I think the price of the weekly news is kinda ok-ish, maybe a tad high (6k per month). Biggest problem is the hub management.

I think 0x_Buidler should not give up on this tho, the site is useful, the whole set of service is useful, just coming back to the dao with a better cost plan could do the trick.

Multisig Support Service (MSS) Elections

Vote: 0x_ultra, defipm, cattin, Sinkas, Frisson, Griff, CastleCapital, AbdullahUmar, Matt_StableLab, juanbug, AlexLumley, memyself

@JoJo

I am voting for the following 12 people, in no precise order, for the Arbitrum Multi Sig.

• 0x_ultra: works for me at Jones, arbitrum builder, he is sooo security oriented, great fit
• defipm: another arbi builder, dopex/stryk, another great fit
• cattin: work with him in questbook, not only he is a great delegate but he is currently managing the delegate incentive program and the transactions from that msig which is a nightmare
• Sinkas: I was so glad when I saw his candidacy. With l2beat he is doing a GREAT job, and in the same way we are seeing krz going solo as dao advocate, I would really love to see sinkas contributing on his personal behalf to the dao
• Frisson: one of the strongest partners of Arbitrum through Tally, he is really aligned with the Dao, always around, and tries to make our life easier through new Tally features
• Griff: he is not only a big delegate, but also a delegate that tends to have some time an independent voice. Likely, the multisig would benefit from his perception, despite this not being specifically a council type of job
• CastleCapital: I have had the pleasure to work with @Atomist in LTIPP/STIP.b as advisors, I know how oriented they are to details. I want to see them more involved in the dao day to day operations

@JoJo

• AbdullahUmar: while AranaDigital is a “new” delegate in arbitrum, I have been knowing AbdullahUmar for a while thorugh the UAGP program. He is quite grounded, has ton of experience through Uniswap (both in msig and op in general), so he is a great fit as well
• Matt_StableLab: same as for castlecap, we have been working together in the incentive program, and I like how he works
• juanbug / PGov: I have always liked pgov as delegate, and started to know juan better lately, he would be a great fit here
• AlexLumley: not only he is another arbitrum builder in Savvy, he is also always around giving a hand and crafting proposals for the Dao.
• Me myself of course

I’m quite excited for this election tbh, putting together these many good contributors and delegates is only possible in a program like this one. As i said initially, is gonna be fun

EDIT (something got lost in copy pasting message in 2 posts). There are a lot of good folks listed here, more than the 12 that will be elected imho. While I could have voted for more, I decided to stick to only the 12 I would like to see in this program. This doesn’t mean that others are not endorsed, is just a personal preference, and I really hope to keep seeing some of these and others names more involved in operational programs like this one for the dao. Is all about trust, and trust is something that you build over time and should be rewarded by roles like the above

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Tally votings

Front-end interface to force transaction inclusion during sequencer downtime

Vote: For

Confirming snapshot vote, which i report here for completeness:

@JoJo

This, provided in a way that is user friendly, is a good value add. In time of peril (aka: when everything pumps or dumps) nothing work usually, so alternative routes are needed. Voting for on this proposal.

Pilot Phase: M&A for Arbitrum DAO

Vote: For

Confirming snapshot vote

Catalyze Gaming Ecosystem Growth on Arbitrum

Vote: For
Confirming snapshot vote, which I will report here for convenience

@JoJo

I am voting “for” for this proposal.

Reason is simple. Despite is imperfect on some mechanics, and there is a huge amount of money at stake, I think we need it like oxygen in Arbitrum.
Games take time, and we need to act now. This doesn’t mean spending in a way that doesn’t give a ROI to the ecosystem. But crypto as a whole is still in a growth phase, and gaming in crypto even more. Makes a lot of sense to allocate a good chunk of resources to this. Otherwise we will just be left behind.

Will also add what I wrote in the comment of Tally.

Despite some stuff have changed (specifically: comp from 10 to 25M and the initiative from 2 to 3 years, so effectively considering that around 6M are about marketing+legal+misc we effectively have an overhead of “only” 3M, which is on the VERY HIGH END of a carry, not here present, of 20%), I don’t think this 3M out of 200M is worth killing the initiative. I still believe games are underserved in crypto and this is a big asymmetric bet.

Constitutional AIP - Security Council Improvement Proposal

Vote: For
At the time I didn’t vote in Snapshot. Regardless of this, the idea to improve the amount of signers will give us the flexibility to go back if/when this is going to be needed; since the other msig is already a 9/12, it doesn’t effectively change that much to increase threshold of the second.

ArbitrumDAO Contribution; Safeguarding Software Developers’ Rights

Vote: For

Confirming snapshot vote (even if at the time i voted for 1.5M, definitely supporting still at 1M)

Kwenta x Perennial: Arbitrum Onboarding Incentives

Vote: For

Confirming snapshot vote

[JoJo]

July 2024 voting

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Snapshot votings

Approval of STEP committee recommendations

Vote: For

@JoJo

Voting “for” on this proposal.

This is the natural evolution of several months work, experimental but also important in size, that we need for our treasury.

As i told devansh in other channels, what i don’t like is the fact that the trimming from the initial 17 projects to the current 6 has not been publicly motivated. While I can understand some issues in disclosing details on unreleased products, the space would likely benefit most in understanding why a protocol was selected, and why another was not. I strongly suggest, for a potential next iteration of this, to change this specific course of action.

Improving Predictability in Arbitrum DAO’s Operations

Vote: Favour (predictability only, predictability + approval, abstain, against)

@JoJo

Voting in favour of predicability only.

We need a way for people to know when they will have to do their job (yes, doing this has the responsibilities of a job knowing the consequence of certain votes; and also has for some compensation attached).

I don’t currently fancy having delegates having to approve it to go to snapshot, because I don’t think we are at a point in which votes are spread enough in enough active delegates. While the numbers might seems to point so, we already have a good amount of non active ones. Likely this will translate in pinging some high vote and usually very active candidates to push for the publication.
Would like to see this option (approval), if fails, to be reconsidered in 6 months, after a) we have more data on this b) we have had redelegation weeks and other initiatives that might help toward this goal c) other initiatives that could further reinforce the governance strength we have in arbi.

Cheers!

Pilot for a Questbook Jumpstart fund for problem definition and DAO improvement

Vote: Abstain

@JoJo

Gonna vote abstain on this danielo.

Again, we spoke about it: as posted before, i firmly believe the bulk of a payment on a proposal in a stream like this should come mostly through the confirmation of a snapshot voting. I don’t see this being less than 50%, because 10 or even 20-25% would be a “nice bonus” on top of the work. If at least 50%, if not more, is instead tied to the success of it (and here to me success = approval from the dao = “for” vote), the proposers would work toward this goal, from the foundation of the problem.

I see your point about failure = lesson learned, so still valuable. I can see that, but in this specific stream to me we should push for the other side of the coin, a succesful proposal more than anything.

Gaming Catalyst Program (GCP) Council Voting

Vote: CJ, David Bolger, Coinflip, equal weights

@JoJo

I’m placing my chips on the following candidates:

1. coinflip: doesn’t need to many presentation, it is likely one of the best figure for oversight on behalf of the DAO in one of the most novel and important initiative we have spinned up in Arbitrum
2. DavidBolger: not only deal with gaming partnership, he is part of Offchain Labs. One of the biggest perk of this choice imho is that we get Offchain closes to our DAO activity
3. CJ.Bzdewka: his experience in private equity and him being part of governance of Treasure makes him the perfect candidate with the perfect mix of skillset.

Few notes: there are A LOT of good candidates here, was quite hard to nail down a choice and was only possible since I have followed closely these candidates. My main choices are about introducing the “dao” element in the GCP election, since the 2 already nominated (Andrew Green and Tim Chang) have strong Growth And Venture experience.

Entropy Advisors: Exclusively Working With Arbitrum DAO

Vote: For

@JoJo

For the reasons above, and all the reasons i posted previously, I am voting “for” on this proposal.

I can see why some, like GFXlabs, can really focus on the overall cost, and tries to cut it through a shorter mandate + wave of exclusivity. It can make sense, from their point of view, and I am glad we also have in the debate voices that can bring a different opinion on the table.

But personally, in this vote, I am focusing on the cost we will face as a DAO of not having a leadership role, even if temporary, in a pivotal moment for our ecosystem in which we are moving toward even more important initiative.
In the last few months, and at EthCC, entropy has shown how they can effectively cover that leadership role. It doesn’t mean that they will have to do it always and in perpetuity; I actually hope they will be the enabled who gives us the tool to have other entities able to lead (some) initiatives.

But again, not having them, here and now, not having them help in the next few months, will likely cost us way more than the amount they are asking here to give a 1y exclusivity deal to our DAO.

Furucombo’s Misuse of Funds

Vote: For - Ban Furucombo from the Arb

@JoJo

Voting in favour of banning furucombo here.

Would like to provide also some more color to this beside what has been already stated above.

All the stakeholders here (foundation, organizers of stip/ltip, council/advisors, protocols) to their best to create program that have an impact and are fair and trasparent. To do so, there is A LOT of work from everyone, including protocols who take time to devise proper mechanisms to distribute incentives and implement them, prepare biweekly report, create dashboard to have precise data analysis etcetera.
Not complying is simply inadmissible considering the effort that everybody puts in these programs.

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Tally votings

Subsidy Fund Proposal from the ADPC

Vote: For
Confirming my previous snapshot vote

Pilot Phase: Arbitrum Ventures Initiative

Vote: n/a