JoJo Delegate Communication Thread

JoJo · May 25, 2024, 1:13pm

JoJo Delegate Communication Thread

Delegate address: 0x4f685b29514eed0c9d929386e86d9cd81981118b

Delegate ENS Address: jojothecow.eth

Forum Usernames: @jojo

Voting Activity: Tally & Snapshot

Big fan of iterating imperfectly and fast, especially in a world, crypto, in which we go at fast speed light. Cow engineer, doing risk analysis and models at Jones DAO, helping in Arbitrum governance as much as I can. You might have seen me in a few grants program, such as the LTIPP, the Questbook “New protocols and ideas” domain, and the Uniswap Arbitrum Grant Program. Yes, I like helping protocols grow in Arbitrum a lot.

Note: this thread will encompass only my personal voting reasons, and does not represent the opinions of any protocol or entity that I might be part of, partner with or contribute in any form. Remember, I’m just a cow.

JoJo · May 25, 2024, 4:27pm

May 2024 voting

Snapshot votings

GovHack at ETH CC (Brussels)

Vote: For

Grant Request - Curve Finance

Vote: For

All LTIP proposals voted after counci’s feedback: Buffer, Sushi, Synthetix, Clipper, DODO, Tradao, Deri protocol, Yearn, Bedrock, D2 Finance, Rage trade, CVI.Finance, ACryptoS, Smilee, Connext

Vote: Abstain

Since I was one of the advisor involved in the LTIPP program, I decided to abstain to maintain neutrality on all protocols who resubmitted after the council’s feedback.*

Proposal for Approval of DeDaub as the ADPC Security Advisor

Vote: For

Adding a Security SME to the ADPC

Voting “for” on onboarding DeDaub as security consultant

price is reasonable

there is the need of a technical consultant that knows both the topic and is engaged in the market, so understand rates and other relevant issues

appreciate that ADPC has money in their pocket but is still asking the DAO to use it.

On people asking “can we get other SME / alternative”. I totally understand where this comes from, and I undertand is the first thought one could have. But I think we should detach a bit from this type of thinking that, at this point, is a bit encapsulated.
If we elect a committee, and we assigne a budget, we should trust that committee. Micromanaging the committee instead is only detrimental, drags the discussion toward how to do stuff instead of effective doing stuff, kills the purpose of having a committee in the first place cause if they have to ask to the dao for everything at that point why were they even elected?

Pilot Phase: M&A for Arbitrum DAO

Vote: For

All STIP Addendum challenged proposals: Umami, Dolomite, Thetanuts, OpenOcean, Angle, Socket, Furucombo, Stake DAO, Savvy, Thales, Boost, Gains, KyberSwap, Tide, Sanko, Solv, Stargate, MUX

Vote: Abstain

As for the LTIPP, since I was one of the advisor involved in the STIP Brdige program, I decided to abstain to maintain neutrality on all protocols who went to vote either because they were challenged or because they posted a late application.*

Arbitrum Multi-sig Support Service (MSS)

Vote: For

[RFC] Arbitrum Multi-sig Support Service (MSS)

After some thoughts, decided to vote “for”, including the reporting implementation.

I want to clarify a few things here.

inclusion of monthly report: it is a bit costly to be honest. But it makes a lot of sense to have data reporting on the txs executed, is the only way to really keep track of what the dao is doing

performances of signers: this should likely be included in the above report. With no judgment, just as data. Knowing how many tx were created and signed by each signer. It will be clear, over time, if there are outliers that never take part to the program or not, and at least the dao will be able in a future election to know who should not be re elected

i agree with users above stating that 12 months is not the standard time for these roles in the dao. To me tho, is not a detail significant enough to vote it down or even to change the proposal: a multisig should be something quite mechanic, quite reliable, quite boring. It can make sense to effectively have a 1y mandate on this (and potentially also on other boring, mechanic, reliable roles that we will need in future).

But, this is not necessarily an endorsement on a tally vote.
Initially i thought it would be hell cause signers would need to be able to create txs for all programs. And while this seems trivial for people outside of multisig world, is definitely not (ie: txs for a group of people, but excluding one that didn’t kyc yet; tx that is partially paid in fixed amount of arb, and variable amount of arb cause payment is in usd equivalent at the time of the tx itself; same as before, but with the usd value that has to be on a 30day moving average; etc).
Then, luckily, @dk3 educated me on the delegation feature that will allow external people to post a transactions in the safe for signers to sign. But I also understand there could effectively be issues, especially because not all programs are equal (ie: the delegate incentive program is one if the highest lift in term of number of transactions, variability of payout, problems with kyc and timing).

Regardless of the chosen solution, we need to address the above cases with a plan that will have to be integrated in every program using the MSS, in a way that scales and either allows one of the program main stakeholder to post transactions, or provide a way for a chair/signer to more actively participate to the single program. Which means, necessarily, a bigger overhead in time and costs. The latter solution also means finding a consensus mechanism between participants (=signers for that program) to choose the designated one. Either randomly, by internal election, they all fight in a room, but there is going to be one member who will effectively be paid more and also have more responsibility and will need to invest more time talking with someone from the program. If it’s the chair I am not sure. But in general, my suggestion for programs in which there is the need of scalability without effectively knowing the final size of labour needed (ltipp anyone?), should be to think about both a fixed comp, and the one proposed above is to me good enough, but also a potentially variable one tied to the number of programs one should interface with. Would dare to say, potentially even further specialise this component between programs with low amount and variance of transactions and high amount of txs or heterogeneous ones.
Hope the suggestion helps.

Streamlining the LTIPP Bounties

Vote: For

Kwenta x Perennial: Arbitrum Onboarding Incentives

Vote: For

Kwenta x Perennial: Arbitrum Onboarding Incentives (UPDATED)

I am voting For on this proposal.

I am intrigued by the shared mechanism of two protocols, and I personally love incentive mechanism aimed to acquire/retain users in other chains. The quest for kwenta users in other chains is good (and i suggest the team to put a cutoff to wallets right before this mechanism was published). For the fee rebate, would suggest, if it was not done yet, to align to other perp protocol to have a 75% rebate and not an 80%. Seems like there is a general consensus on this number for this asset class; the leftover 5% of the 36% (so, 1.8% of the total or 34200 arb) can likely be allocated to quests or LP, or potentially be used as wildcard for other initiatives still allocated to users.
There is overall a net benefit for Kwenta to be here, and the fact that the proposal is outside the framework of stip, ltipp and others should not stop us from moving forward good initiatives, in the same way it happened with curve a couple of weeks ago.

Tally votings

Double-Down on STIP Successes (STIP-Bridge)

Vote: For

Confirming snapshot vote, which I report here for completeness

Double-Down on STIP Successes (STIP-Bridge)

I am voting yes for this proposal.
I wrote the reasoning publicly on twitter 10 days ago. This is what I firmly believe right now.

image1238×1402 203 KB

(from here)

I also understand the questions of some who are saying: why we should double down on stip if we can’t measure it yet. Why don’t we wait for the ltip to iterate on that. Etcetera. I get it. These are all valid concerns.
But, to me, the above is valid: we can’t stop right now. And also, if we REALLY want to know what success looks like, we would need to all sit down at a table, for a few days, and just discuss what we want to achieve in arbitrum in the next 6 months, 2 years, 5 years. Which is something realistically not doable in a DAO and that is usually what a board + a ceo do in the corporate world. What I mean is that while there is a merit in knowing what metric grew and what didn’t, metrics are just that: metrics. They don’t define necessarily on a 1:1 relationship success.

Lastly, i think that crypto AND the ethereum world AND the L2 world are in a specific phase (at least for another few years): growth. Which means, it could make sense to target generic metrics (users, tvl, volume) as proxy of a pathway to greatness, which is what we should generically pursue regardless of specifics.

NOTE: i obviously have also a biased interest here in voting yes, since i work for Jones DAO. For what it matters I would have voted yes even if i was working in a mc donald tho.

GovHack at ETH CC (Brussels)

Vote: For

Confirming snapshot vote

Grant Request - Curve Finance

Vote: For

Confirming snapshot vote

*note: in future I might reserve the right to vote in a non neutral way, opposite of what I did in STIP Bridge and LTIPP, in programs in which I am directly involved. This because, after what has so far been happening with situations like the one of Synapse, we just can’t be sure that others will speak when there is, indeed, the necessity to.

JoJo · May 25, 2024, 10:40pm

June 2024 voting

Snapshot votings

Set up a Sub-Committee for the Security Services Subsidy Fund

Vote: For

Proposal [Non-Constitutional]: Set up a Sub-Committee for the Security Services Subsidy Fund

Contrary to most here, i am voting in favour of this proposal.

Yes, there is definitely the merit in saying that ADPC should pursue this goal with their own current means.

But the way this is shaping is that it will be basically the equivalent of a grant program: from a protocol standpoint, applying to get money for incentives, or for audits, or to pay operation is quite similar. The end result, to me, could be the same of every grant programs we already had: an underestimation of the demand we will have (remember stip in which we had 2 rounds and we overbooked the first by 50%; ltip, that was about potentially 80 protocols with 60m available, and we ended up with 180 protocols asking for 160m).

I don’t think the adpc has the necessary manpower to do it. And in case the program will be overbooked (which i don’t think will happen), they current mix might not be the one with the best capabilities to discern who should and should not get the security grant.

AIP: Nova Fee Router Proposal (ArbOS 30)

Vote: For

AIP: Activate Stylus and Enable Next-Gen WebAssembly Smart Contracts (ArbOS 30)

Vote: For

AIP: Support RIP-7212 for Account Abstraction Wallets (ArbOS 30)

Vote: For

[NON-CONSTITUTIONAL] Pilot Phase: Arbitrum Ventures Initiative

Vote: Abstain

[Non-Constitutional] Pilot Phase: Arbitrum Venture Initiative

I am voting ABSTAIN on this proposal.

I really like the idea. We should pursue the venture investment thesis for our DAO. We are in a phase of our industry mature enough in which this is doable.

Just, I think this pilot phase as it is doesn’t make too much sense.

If I read both the current AVI proposal that has been published in snapshot just a couple of days ago, compared to the tally m&a proposal already approved , this is what we can read.

In the M&A proposal we have: value upside analysis […], Assessment […], Facilitating interactions across the DAO […] strategic analyses of target areas […], Integration options […]

In the AVI proposal we have: The outcome of this pilot proposal is to produce a detailed investment thesis, market consultation findings, community engagement feedback, strategic recommendations, and an operational plan.

This clearly shows for the AVI initiative not only very similar deliverable of the M&A, but also a very similar semantic, without the specificity (not reported here but available in tally ) of the specific, different field: ventur capitalism. Amost a 1:1 overlap, up to the point in which in the AVI initiative there is also the willingness to have an IRL event much as in the m&a initiative that will participate to GovHack at EthCC.
The above is especially true when i read about new initiatives such as Elixir which adds a lot of detail to the venture considerations, despite being a younger one.
And speaking about Elixir, another thing to consider, which could be secondary but worth some reflection, is how AVI proposes to “funding and oversee” eventually initiatives like this one and others in venture capitalism, without really providing any meaningful detail.

Don’t get me wrong: i am ok in AVI going for a pilot phase, I am ok with it doing also an IRL event, much as m&a. The fact that the structure is a copy carbon can likely mean that the pilot phase for this type of initiatives should be structured this way.

But to me it just seems strange that the outcome is exactly framed in the same way as the m&a activity without the same specificity for its specific field - being in the venture capitalist industry -.
If I also look at the cost being double, $99k, compared to the $52k of m&a, it raises even more doubts for me.

I don’t know if the proposal will go through or not. My hope is that, if it goes through, the above will be addressed before tally at least.

Let me reiterate again: I think this is a good idea for our dao, and i think there are differences compared to m&a and, partially, with gcp. I just think we need to better tailor the initiative.

Finally, just to be crystal clear and shred any doubt: i have actively participated to the m&a working group, but i am not currently part of areta which is leading that initiative. So I am relative neutral to this, and giving opinion mostly from the standpoint of an arbitrum builder looking at the future of arbitrum. Yes, let’s do venture, but let’s do it in the right way.

Election of STEP Program Manager

Vote: Steakhouse, 100% allocation

AIP: BoLD - permissionless validation for Arbitrum

Vote: For

AIP: Funds to bootstrap the first BoLD validator - Bond sentiment.

Vote: For

AIP: Funds to bootstrap the first BoLD validator - Operational cost sentiment.

Vote: For

AIP: BOLD - permissionless validation for Arbitrum

Finally, voting in favour of funding the operational costs for the BoLD validator run by the foundation. The proposal makes imho a good breakdown on the cost related (3% of the 3600 eth for 3 years, so 432 eth, plus the buffer of 68, + 400 eth for gas costs to post and challenge + 500 eth for service fees). Up the point a simple cow is able to understand it. Also foundation won’t take service fees from this.

As a final note, we likely want to keep a tab on all of these numbers and more in relation to the discussion we are having about using the sequencer revenue. While I don’t think is written anywhere, my educated guess is that we will take the eth from there indeed (if not and I missed something feel free to correct me). We finally got an excuse to use them i g

Vote: For

Pilot Stage – Treasury Backed Vaults research and development

Vote: Against

[Non-Constitutional] Pilot Stage: Treasury Backed Vaults research and development

For the reasons I stated above, I have to unfortunately vote Against this proposals.
I will just quote my previous post for the motivation, and add something as a follow up.

[Non-Constitutional] Pilot Stage: Treasury Backed Vaults research and development

I was a bit surprised when this popped up on snapshot today. This proposal was brought to life just 1 week ago in the forum, and there are several unanswered questions from several folks.

First, I’ll report my opinion, already shared privately, and then a considerations on the proposal.

I see 2 scenarios here:

we create a vault for which we establish a cap. Let’s say is 50M stables. And we back it up with 500m arb between collateral and reserve, meaning arb has to go to 0.10$ to get liquidated. We have something that let us get $50m in liquidity, but this amount is basically 1 incentive program for us. All of this by using half a billion arb. Feels like the amount received is too small to have an impact, and so is not that important considering we would have to put on stake half a billy of arb to do so.

we decide to use the vault, with a certain cap tied to the arb price, over time. Which means, while w allocate 300-400m arb between collateral and reserve, we found ourself with arb going to 10$. We now a 4B collateral we can borrow against. And we still borrow 1:10 ratio so we borrow 400m. That is a meaningful amount.

Let’s not consider scenario 1, because to me scenario 1 is not likely important nor worth the effort. Let’s only consider scenario 2, with whatever degree of numbers you want (amount of arb, price of arb, amount we borrow), keeping in mind tho that we want numbers that have an impact, so we are on the high end of the barbell.

Whatever amount you have as collateral. Whatever amount you have in the reserve. Whatever amount you borrow. You now have a target on your back.
You have a series of number which, summed with depth of liquidity of dexes and cexes, can be put in a spreadsheet to calculate how much capital you need to liquidatate that position.
This could be economically viable, or not. But the moment in which it becomes viable, trust me someone will exploit it.

I want to state that

this is obviously my personal view

I am being pessimistic here

I am also realistic tho.

And this was my take on the product. I also reflected upon it, chatting with proposers, and agreed that, for sure, we can do researches on this.

Which takes me to the second big surprise that I have: why are we packing the research with the product? Shouldn’t we first just research if this is viable, or if we are just falling in a crv type of scenario, with the difference that mitch can pick up the phone, his trezor, send money around, gather collateral and manage risk and we, as a dao, are as slow as a crippled elephant?

I thank a lot the author for the numerous answers. We discussed about a research being important in this topic, re: can we effectively create a vault in which DAO can deposits ARB and borrow against them?
I don’t see anything wrong in the research. I personally think the answer of such a research will, likely, be a big sounding no, but I am happy to be proven wrong. All the risks I stated above I think are here, and what has happened to curve just show that a target will be hit at some point. What I am seeing as a problem here is that the research here is tied to development of such product. And I don’t see why the two should be packaged together.

I would more gladly see something like

we have a separate, proper research on lending risk for an arbi tailored vault, exclusive property of the DAO

open dollar can eventually be an advisor in this research (but not the main player: we will go into a trust me bro situation, in which the proponent has all incentive to have a study that reassures the dao without necessarily having a critic eye on the risk per se)

we analyse the research, and if it’s positive in saying “yes risk can be managed” and the dao wants to move forward, we then build the vault. And then Open Dollar can indeed implement and manage it.

I am pretty sure the whole team has done a lot of work here, as well as I am sure they have no bad intentions, nor they are a malicious actor. Just, I think the risk is too high in general, and one way to derisk is to have first the research and then, if any, the product.

[Non-Constitutional] Betting on Builders: Infinite Launchpad Proposal

Vote: Against

Betting on Builders: Infinite Launchpad Proposal

I voted against the proposal.

I am getting familiar over time to what danielo is doing with RnDao.

What I like about him is that he is taking a path I would never take, with an approach I would never had. And at this point I am old enough to understand that even if I don’t agree with something or with a specific mission doesn’t mean there is no value behind, or that it can’t be pursued in ways outside my personal framework.
What is he after, and how, is something I support. And I am also trying to give him a bit of a hand in this sense, starting with the questbook grant for collabberry.

But the current proposal imho just doesn’t properly work. I echo the opinions of, generally, too much overhead costs. This solves either through cost cutting, or increase the amount of capital requested to distributed, and I am not sure what is the right way here.
I am also a bit conflicted on the merge of the initiatives of RnDao, EVM capital and Outlier Venture, that in my understanding initially were separated. I understand how joining forces could be seen as a winning strategy, also how a joint force can be “easier” to manage for the dao in term of voting, but I am not sold on this, sorry. We have different teams, different personalities, and different scopes.

I also want to highlight that my vote, is not a vote against the matter per se; i am willing to support the proposal the moment in which is reworked (because, I think it can be reworked), and be addressed for the following

overhead costs → either we lower the costs directly, or we start with an initial smaller phase and a second phase, larger than the one proposed, so overhead is not that big if phase 1 is succesfull

clear scope between the 3 ventures, and properly understand if they have to run in tandem vs solo

(in general) clear scope on targets, what we want to accomplish etc.

ArbitrumHub Evolution: The Next Step in Streamlining Information Access and Raising Awareness for Arbitrum DAO

Vote: Against

Multisig Support Service (MSS) Elections

Vote: 0x_ultra, defipm, cattin, Sinkas, Frisson, Griff, CastleCapital, AbdullahUmar, Matt_StableLab, juanbug, AlexLumley, memyself

[RFC] Arbitrum Multi-sig Support Service (MSS)

I am voting for the following 12 people, in no precise order, for the Arbitrum Multi Sig.

0x_ultra: works for me at Jones, arbitrum builder, he is sooo security oriented, great fit

defipm: another arbi builder, dopex/stryk, another great fit

cattin: work with him in questbook, not only he is a great delegate but he is currently managing the delegate incentive program and the transactions from that msig which is a nightmare

Sinkas: I was so glad when I saw his candidacy. With l2beat he is doing a GREAT job, and in the same way we are seeing krz going solo as dao advocate, I would really love to see sinkas contributing on his personal behalf to the dao

Frisson: one of the strongest partners of Arbitrum through Tally, he is really aligned with the Dao, always around, and tries to make our life easier through new Tally features

Griff: he is not only a big delegate, but also a delegate that tends to have some time an independent voice. Likely, the multisig would benefit from his perception, despite this not being specifically a council type of job

CastleCapital: I have had the pleasure to work with @Atomist in LTIPP/STIP.b as advisors, I know how oriented they are to details. I want to see them more involved in the dao day to day operations

[RFC] Arbitrum Multi-sig Support Service (MSS)

AbdullahUmar: while AranaDigital is a “new” delegate in arbitrum, I have been knowing AbdullahUmar for a while thorugh the UAGP program. He is quite grounded, has ton of experience through Uniswap (both in msig and op in general), so he is a great fit as well

Matt_StableLab: same as for castlecap, we have been working together in the incentive program, and I like how he works

juanbug / PGov: I have always liked pgov as delegate, and started to know juan better lately, he would be a great fit here

AlexLumley: not only he is another arbitrum builder in Savvy, he is also always around giving a hand and crafting proposals for the Dao.

Me myself of course

I’m quite excited for this election tbh, putting together these many good contributors and delegates is only possible in a program like this one. As i said initially, is gonna be fun

EDIT (something got lost in copy pasting message in 2 posts). There are a lot of good folks listed here, more than the 12 that will be elected imho. While I could have voted for more, I decided to stick to only the 12 I would like to see in this program. This doesn’t mean that others are not endorsed, is just a personal preference, and I really hope to keep seeing some of these and others names more involved in operational programs like this one for the dao. Is all about trust, and trust is something that you build over time and should be rewarded by roles like the above

Tally votings

Front-end interface to force transaction inclusion during sequencer downtime

Vote: For

Confirming snapshot vote, which i report here for completeness:

Pilot Phase: M&A for Arbitrum DAO

Vote: For

Confirming snapshot vote

Catalyze Gaming Ecosystem Growth on Arbitrum

Vote: For
Confirming snapshot vote, which I will report here for convenience

Will also add what I wrote in the comment of Tally.

Despite some stuff have changed (specifically: comp from 10 to 25M and the initiative from 2 to 3 years, so effectively considering that around 6M are about marketing+legal+misc we effectively have an overhead of “only” 3M, which is on the VERY HIGH END of a carry, not here present, of 20%), I don’t think this 3M out of 200M is worth killing the initiative. I still believe games are underserved in crypto and this is a big asymmetric bet.

Constitutional AIP - Security Council Improvement Proposal

Vote: For
At the time I didn’t vote in Snapshot. Regardless of this, the idea to improve the amount of signers will give us the flexibility to go back if/when this is going to be needed; since the other msig is already a 9/12, it doesn’t effectively change that much to increase threshold of the second.

ArbitrumDAO Contribution; Safeguarding Software Developers’ Rights

Vote: For

Confirming snapshot vote (even if at the time i voted for 1.5M, definitely supporting still at 1M)

Kwenta x Perennial: Arbitrum Onboarding Incentives

Vote: For

Confirming snapshot vote

JoJo · June 30, 2024, 8:03pm

July 2024 voting

Snapshot votings

Approval of STEP committee recommendations

Vote: For

Improving Predictability in Arbitrum DAO’s Operations

Vote: Favour (predictability only, predictability + approval, abstain, against)

Improving Predictability in Arbitrum DAO’s Operations

Voting in favour of predicability only.

We need a way for people to know when they will have to do their job (yes, doing this has the responsibilities of a job knowing the consequence of certain votes; and also has for some compensation attached).

I don’t currently fancy having delegates having to approve it to go to snapshot, because I don’t think we are at a point in which votes are spread enough in enough active delegates. While the numbers might seems to point so, we already have a good amount of non active ones. Likely this will translate in pinging some high vote and usually very active candidates to push for the publication.
Would like to see this option (approval), if fails, to be reconsidered in 6 months, after a) we have more data on this b) we have had redelegation weeks and other initiatives that might help toward this goal c) other initiatives that could further reinforce the governance strength we have in arbi.

Cheers!

Pilot for a Questbook Jumpstart fund for problem definition and DAO improvement

Vote: Abstain

Furucombo’s Misuse of Funds

Vote: For - Ban Furucombo from the Arb

Change Arbitrum Expansion Program to allow deployments of new Orbit chains on any blockchain

Vote: For

Temperature Check: Change Arbitrum Expansion Program to allow deployments of new Orbit chains on any blockchain

Voting FOR on this initiative.

One of the biggest strong point of Arbitrum is the tech stack, and we should leverage it as much as we can.

While some, as we discussed in calls, believe we should keep it more focused on the Eth world, there is a pragmatic consideration to do: if we don’t do it, someone else will. And, likely, we are going in a world in which every dapp might just have his own chain; how big could be the network effect of having Arbitrum tech being the engine of 90% of the L2s and L3s in the world?

Still think we need to refine a bit the proposal. Specifically, we need to be able to monitor and analyse returns over time from specific chains, to understand where the effort should be put BD wise. We need to also understand the cost that offchain labs might have in term of supporting all of these chains, and in general manage the economy at scale. There is also potentially a merit in being able at some point to revise the numbers proposed above (10%) accordingly to business needs.

Finally, since this won’t happen in a short period, the more we go “outside” of the ethereum world, the more we should be aware of the possibility to just have a sentiment checks to understand if we are still going in a direction that is aligned with the vision of the dao.

Tally votings

Subsidy Fund Proposal from the ADPC

Vote: For
Confirming my previous snapshot vote

Pilot Phase: Arbitrum Ventures Initiative

Vote: For

JoJo · July 27, 2024, 2:58pm

August 2024 voting

Snapshot votings

Gaming Catalyst Program (GCP) Council Voting

Vote: CJ, David Bolger, Coinflip, equal weights

GCP Council Nominations

I’m placing my chips on the following candidates:

coinflip: doesn’t need to many presentation, it is likely one of the best figure for oversight on behalf of the DAO in one of the most novel and important initiative we have spinned up in Arbitrum

DavidBolger: not only deal with gaming partnership, he is part of Offchain Labs. One of the biggest perk of this choice imho is that we get Offchain closes to our DAO activity

CJ.Bzdewka: his experience in private equity and him being part of governance of Treasure makes him the perfect candidate with the perfect mix of skillset.

Few notes: there are A LOT of good candidates here, was quite hard to nail down a choice and was only possible since I have followed closely these candidates. My main choices are about introducing the “dao” element in the GCP election, since the 2 already nominated (Andrew Green and Tim Chang) have strong Growth And Venture experience.

Entropy Advisors: Exclusively Working With Arbitrum DAO

Vote: For

Entropy Advisors: Exclusively Working With Arbitrum DAO

For the reasons above, and all the reasons i posted previously, I am voting “for” on this proposal.

I can see why some, like GFXlabs, can really focus on the overall cost, and tries to cut it through a shorter mandate + wave of exclusivity. It can make sense, from their point of view, and I am glad we also have in the debate voices that can bring a different opinion on the table.

But personally, in this vote, I am focusing on the cost we will face as a DAO of not having a leadership role, even if temporary, in a pivotal moment for our ecosystem in which we are moving toward even more important initiative.
In the last few months, and at EthCC, entropy has shown how they can effectively cover that leadership role. It doesn’t mean that they will have to do it always and in perpetuity; I actually hope they will be the enabled who gives us the tool to have other entities able to lead (some) initiatives.

But again, not having them, here and now, not having them help in the next few months, will likely cost us way more than the amount they are asking here to give a 1y exclusivity deal to our DAO.

ARB Staking: Unlock ARB Utility and Align Governance

Vote: For

ARB Staking: Unlock ARB Utility and Align Governance

I’m voting “for” on this proposal.

As stated before, I really praise Frisson for being able to put together this many conflicting feedbacks together: he was able to find the perfect solution by saying: we build the skeleton, let’s make the dao fill it (amount of rewards, source of rewards, active delegate definitions etc).
I think this will be an initial powerful signal for markets, and also a way to increase governance. While the 2 don’t necessary belong together, I am personally fine with that.

BUT, I have a big caveat to this: we need to create a definition of active delegates that doesn’t hinder protocol representations. One of the potential byproduct of certain parameters could be, for example, that users might redelegate from protocols to others just because the protocols are active, but not as much for the metrics of the program, to allow users to get the yield. This can happen because for example they don’t comment too much on the forum, or don’t vote all proposals.
While we want to obviously incentivise the participation of protocols in governance, we also have to remember that the main job of protocols is making arbitrum a great place for users through developing dapps and other stuff. Let’s avoid to kill the representation they currently have.

To be more detailed, this is the current situation.

image1646×958 115 KB

The current top 4 delegates, making a total of more than 60M votes (or between 33 to 50% of the average amount of votes we have in each proposals) are from non protocol type of entity.
And don’t get me wrong: l2beat, gauntlet, olimpio, wintermute, they are all great delegates well aligned with arbitrum. But we can’t imho create a system that would lower even more protocols’ representation in our governance. It would be a bad outcome.

Transparency and Standardized Metrics for Orbit Chains

Vote: Against

[Non-Constitutional] Transparency and Standardized Metrics for Orbit Chains on growthepie.xyz Allowing Data-Driven Decision Making

I am voting “Against” this initiative.

Nothing wrong with it as a general idea, I appreciate the intent, but I would like first to elaborate on what AlexLumley posted:

[Non-Constitutional] Transparency and Standardized Metrics for Orbit Chains on growthepie.xyz Allowing Data-Driven Decision Making

Why is this Orbit chain data so important for the DAO? I don’t understand why it is important for the DAO to have this data? Will this cause more people to switch to the Arbitrum techstack? Will it improve our Orbit chain incentive programs? Simply having “data” is not enough, it needs to go towards our business objectives.

While I think this could be valuable data, I don’t think it would be valuable now, at least not until orbit chains take a big market share. As a consequences, it feels like the current tools and info instruments we have now to evaluate tvl, data, txs, are more than enough for something that will be (hopefully) extremely important in future, but not prominent in the short term.
Adding to that, the fact that davidgarcia just posted that the Foundation is finalizing agreements to index and distribute data to me is just a confirmation that is too soon for this initiative. We could be easily see more dashboard and services like this born after data is available, with different costs, different use cases and different outcomes

ArbitrumDAO Governance Analytics Dashboard

Vote: For

[RFC] ArbitrumDAO Governance Analytics Dashboard

I am voting “FOR” on this proposal.

I share the concern of gauntlet and maxlomu about potential overlap with other initiatives; but, I will be honest, this is also the reason why we should likely have another source of truth about delegation, voting, activity and all things related to arbitrum governance. The delegate incentive program is becoming a key part of all the DAO, and @seedlatam could potentially see how there could be an integration with this new platform, or even suggest some tailored development to have quality of life upgrade. At the same time, we have live on snapshot the vote about staking arb from Tally. I easily see the potential opposition from some parties, concerned about current karma implementation, and a call for a second source of truth, or just an alternative to their system. And nothing against karma here on my side: just, if delegation and forum activity will become so important, it can make sense to have different parties track governance metrics in different ways.

So Curia you got my support here. But please, when you will move to Tally, try to take in account all of the initiative above, to tailor current key initiatives in our dao; try also to have API implemented in a way that is functional to the data other parties might need as well. We are at the point in which we have a lot of good tools in our dao, but we need to make them work together in a better way

Should the DAO Default to using Shielded Voting for Snapshot Votes?

Vote: For Elections Only

Proposal to Temporary Extend Delegate Incentive System.

Vote: For

An (EIP-4824 powered) daoURI for the Arbitrum DAO

Vote: Against

ArbitrumDAO Off-site

Vote: Abstain

Should the DAO Create COI & Self Voting Policies?

Vote: FOR: Disclosure Policy, FOR: Responsible Voting Policy

Should the DAO Create COI & Self Voting Policies?

For all the reasons mentioned above, I am voting for “FOR: Disclosure Policy” and “FOR: Responsible Voting Policy”.

I think is definitely good if people disclose their conflicts; is also good if, in a vote that can benefit themself, they also vote in a way that is “responsible”, so for other 2 seats in a 3 seats election etcetera.
I am against the self strict voting policies, especially because protocols for example should be allowed to vote for proposals that directly involve themself. If that was not allowed any user delegating their precious arb to the protocol of their choice would see their delegation being useless, because the protocol can’t vote for his own benefit. A byproduct that I don’t want, among others.

Regardless of my vote, Entropy I am also interested about the specific implementation of this proposal. Knowing it can’t be enforced, should any new vote from now on decide what happens if there is a self voting (with the strict voting policy on) or anything that is against the expected behaviour? How we will specifically handle these conflicts?

Ethereum Protocol Attackathon Sponsorship

Vote: Panda, Abstain, Against, Unicorn

Tally votings

[Constitutional] ArbOS 31 “Bianca” (Stylus, RIP-7212 Support, Nova Fee Router)

Vote: For
Confirming previous snapshot votes about Stylus and https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-support-rip-7212-for-account-abstraction-wallets-arbos-30/23298/17?u=jojo

Arbitrum Multi-sig Support Service (MSS)

Vote: For

Entropy Advisors: Exclusively Working With Arbitrum DAO

Vote: For

Confirming snapshot vote

JoJo · August 27, 2024, 9:26am

September 2024 voting

Snapshot votings

[Constitutional] Extend Delay on L2Time Lock

Vote: For

STIP-Bridge Operational Budget

Vote: Abstain

[Replace Oversight Committee with MSS] Delegate to Voter Enfranchisement Pool — Event Horizon

Vote: For

ArbitrumDAO Procurement Committee Phase II

Vote: For

Arbitrum DAO Procurement Committee: Phase II Proposal

Strongly voting “for” on this proposal.

ADPC created one of a kinda entity in arbitrum and I think in crypto in general, and goes in what I think is an extremely good direction for high decentralized orgs like our dao: bridge well known framework and way to solve problems from more traditional industries to ours.

We don’t need to reinvent the wheel everytime, we can easily adapt what already exists in professional world into crypto, with a tailoring for the specific tools and needs we have, and this is what is happening here in my opinion.

I also like the expantion in scope, and I partially share the concern of @Frisson about it potentially be a big too big as workload; at the same time, knowing the parties involved, I think they can pull it off.

As a final note, in this case, like in the stylus sprint, I am strongly against any new election. While I think there could be others that potentially have the knowledge to move this forward (even tho 90% of the lawyerish force of arbitrum is in the parties above), even just the handover, and the reshape of vision, would literally eat on the whole mandate time wise with suboptimal results.

[Pyth Network] Arbitrum LTIPP Extension Request

Vote: Against

[RFC] Pyth Network Arbitrum LTIPP Extension Request

Going back to the snapshot, as for the synthetix application, I am, unfortunately, voting against it, as well as the other extention requests in Arbitrum. To quote my previous answer:

[RFC] Synthetix LTIP Grant Extension Request

I would have normally been in favour if it wasn’t for the detox proposal just recently presented, and passed, in our DAO; but that proposal is an extremely important signal about 1) trying to see what happens to our chains with no incentives 2) give the time to the DAO to best reflect how to weaponize these programs in future. There is also the secondary point, not necessarily as important but indeed important, about competitive advantages of protocols asking for an extention versus protocols that just finished in LTIPP or about to finish in STIP.

In here we have a different situation, which is a potential usage of funds for an infra product, so I could see the merit of the extention. But the mix of the detox proposal + the fact that most of the leftover funds are tied, in my understanding, to lower costs than expected, means that the only real reason to keep Pyth in an extention would be to facilitate his role in Arbitrum. This is something we could advocate for Synthetix and Aave as well, even if their role is different. Again, the vote of the DAO for the detox proposal is more important, and should just be respected by participants.

Synthetix LTIP Grant Extension Request

Vote: Against

[RFC] Synthetix LTIP Grant Extension Request

Thank you for this detailed feedback.

I am, unfortunately, voting against this and all the other extention requests in Arbitrum.
I would have normally been in favour if it wasn’t for the detox proposal just recently presented, and passed, in our DAO; but that proposal is an extremely important signal about 1) trying to see what happens to our chains with no incentives 2) give the time to the DAO to best reflect how to weaponize these programs in future. There is also the secondary point, not necessarily as important but indeed important, about competitive advantages of protocols asking for an extention versus protocols that just finished in LTIPP or about to finish in STIP.

But I also want to add a few things. I really feel you about first, the excitement of participating to this program, and then the constant small delays of integrations and tech development that turn out to be eating more and more week over week on the timeline, up to the point you had to come here to ask for this extention; I have seen this happening, and even in the protocols i work for we had to take hard and complex decisions due to delay of partners’ integrations.
As you already partially mentioned most of the issue would be addressed by a longer program, in which of course we need to embed a process for these and other similar situations: if you have 1 year, and you need to skip the first three months for technical issue, you will still have a way in.

Finally, i want to commend the effort the synthetix team made to come to arbitrum. You decided to go for a specific push in our chain, with an ad-hoc application and obviously a lot of work behind it, on a product level, strategic level and marketing level, and what did happen is indeed unfortunate but also something quite common in the tech world. For this reason, in the next program, I will be one your stronger supporter fwiw.

Enhancing Multichain Governance: Upgrading RARI Governance Token on Arbitrum

Vote: For

Fund the Stylus Sprint

[RFC] Fund The Stylus Sprint

this proposal makes sense. Voting in favour: pushing stylus, from adoption and marketing standpoint, can only increase the strength of technical positions of Arbitrum as a chain, which hopefully will also reflect on the economics down the road. Stylus is a strategic advantage we have.

Now, a few points worth discussing.
Not sure if this would be outside the idea of a “sprint”, but maybe is worth discussing @Entropy.
The amount of the program is non trivial, and the minimum amount suggested, 50k is non trivial either. For a budget of $750k in new protocols and ideas i received 84 proposals in 4 months. While here is more scoped, the combination of only an 8 weeks application + a relative high budget might create a rush of application which, while indication of success, might not be the best organic answer you might be looking for. Suggestion could be a cohort type of approach like the one we had in the UAGP program, potentially here alternative a 4 weeks application + feedback with a 4 weeks evaluation, and repeat for 3 seasons, covering the first 6 months of the program. And this would also mean putting at budget a little bit more than what was posted due to operations extending for further 4 months.
Due to also how the committee is structure and the length of the program, I suggest you to either select in the committee a program manager or add one when you go to tally. There will be plenty of decisions or complex situations along the way such as

evaluating diversity of application from a higher point of view

keeping consistency in modus operandi of reporting and communication

being the ultimate decision maker, in case of disagreement of the commission, on changes from protocols’ developments along this long year, non expected outcomes from protocols and other circumstances that are just too heterogeneous to be mentioned here.
As you described it, entropy could be that program manager, but I also see you listed as advisor; might be worth clarifying.

On the milestones:

[RFC] Fund The Stylus Sprint

Milestone distribution will function as the following are achieved:

10% - Planning + Building: Creation of a Development Plan, Architecture Design, Prototyping, Implementation, Optimization.

30% - Deployment: Testing, Auditing, Deployment. *Projects will be eligible but not guaranteed admission into the subsidy program per the ADPC

25% - Checkpoint 1

25% - Checkpoint 2

This makes a lot of sense theoretically but might just not be practically doable based on previous experience. You should try to integrate this in the template/framework for protocols, but you should also be flexible to other type of structures, because is extremely likely that other needs will arise.

As a final note, i am TOTALLY in favour in a non election type of the committee. In general, while a dao should be open for roles, there are several situation in which the knowledge to be part of a committee is just too vertical that elections are just detrimental. This program, and the ADPC, are clear examples.

Hope this helps, and sorry for not providing this feedback earlier before the snapshot.

[Aave DAO] LTIPP Grant Extension Request

Vote: Against

RFC: Aave DAO LTIPP Grant Extension Request

Voting against. Let me first report a previous feedback released for synthetix, and still relevant here.

[RFC] Synthetix LTIP Grant Extension Request

I am, unfortunately, voting against this and all the other extention requests in Arbitrum.
I would have normally been in favour if it wasn’t for the detox proposal just recently presented, and passed, in our DAO; but that proposal is an extremely important signal about 1) trying to see what happens to our chains with no incentives 2) give the time to the DAO to best reflect how to weaponize these programs in future. There is also the secondary point, not necessarily as important but indeed important, about competitive advantages of protocols asking for an extention versus protocols that just finished in LTIPP or about to finish in STIP.

But I also want to add a few things. I really feel you about first, the excitement of participating to this program, and then the constant small delays of integrations and tech development that turn out to be eating more and more week over week on the timeline, up to the point you had to come here to ask for this extention; I have seen this happening, and even in the protocols i work for we had to take hard and complex decisions due to delay of partners’ integrations.
As you already partially mentioned most of the issue would be addressed by a longer program, in which of course we need to embed a process for these and other similar situations: if you have 1 year, and you need to skip the first three months for technical issue, you will still have a way in.

And I’ll be honest, I am quite said of not seeing the full fledged program about GHO going live in arbitrum, especially after being the LTIPP advisor for AAVE. I can see value + utility for the ecosystem.

My strong advice here, is prepare in the next quarter everything that is needed, from a tech/audit standpoint on the GHO ecosystem. Whatever the next iteration of the program is going to be, I don’t see AAVE not being part of it as one of the main lender, and not being part of it as stablecoin facilitator in the ecosystem, including GHO. I think it will be a no brainer a collaboration between arbitrum and AAVE, also on the diffusion and adoption of gho and increase of stablecoin liquidity in the ecosystem.
So, while I understand this vote can be a frustrating, I am definitely keen to see AAVE here as a constant presence in crypto and in Arbitrum specifically, as well as an important participant to any relevant incenive program we might spin up in future.

Constitutional AIP: Proposal to adopt Timeboost, a new transaction ordering policy

Vote: Collect bids in ETH to treasury

Terms of Tenure for STEP program manager

Vote: Earmark Funds from existing, Have a new elections, Run the program for only 6 months, Liquidate the program, Abstain

**Non-Constitutional: Terms of Tenure for STEP Program Manager**

exploiting for shortening reasons the response from Pennsylvania University cause i voted in the same order (earmark funds, new elections, only 6 months, liquidation of the program, abstain)

Goal is to find the funds to pay Steakhouse for a whole year, to me anything else is unacceptable knowing the effort that was done to create this program growth oriented. Let’s find the money to keep the program running please.

PS please, for the future, write the options in the snapshot in a better way. I understand that there are characters limitations, but a simple option a / b / c etcetera with an explanation of each option in the test would make everything clearer. Took me a few minutes to understand how to properly vote in the way I wanted.

ArbitrumDAO Off-site

Vote: IRL/conference/no scholarships

Arbitrum Offsite format: online vs IRL

Voting as per the below

image1210×806 51.3 KB

I’m in favour of meeting people, but with a series of caveat.
IF we have to do it, to me would be key to have it on major conferences: despite all the fun and giggles, this event or conferences are de facto job travels, and would like to keep it at minimum if possible.
I am also not a fan of scholarships in a case like this one, so it was not my first choice.
As a final note, I think online would not be meaningful nor different from the calls we do on a day to day basis.

Would also like to add that while i can generally support the idea, a potential tally vote to me is dependent on the initiatives that will be moved forward by the GovHack team, that I would favour over this one due to the previous track record.

GovHack Devcon in Bangkok - Hack Humanity

Vote: FOR

GovHack Devcon in Bangkok - Hack Humanity

GovHack Devcon in Bangkok - Hack Humanity

This is proposal is something I am really glad came in our forum.

It has several stuff that either we did succesfully in the past (the govhackaton) or stuff that naturally came in during previous govhacks that the dao and delegates ned (core day).

I told this klauss in a call, when people come to govhack, since it is the first event that gathers people in the arbitrum ecosystem, it naturally transforms (also) in a BD event, with delegates jumping between helping teams and tracks vs personal meetings with others; but this latter part happens without a dedicated time and space, thus creating and inefficient situation.

While I understand that some might ask themself why the addition of core, this is the exact reason: satisfy a need that happens naturally cause of the dynamics described above.

Some more details are likely needed to lay down the proper rules of this new part, but these can be decided together in the next 2 months.

Full support to this initiative, especially cause is quite contained in price.

consistently with this, voting a strong FOR on this initiative.

I really appreciated GovHack at ETHcc, and Klauss was able to go around and gather feedbacks on how to improve.
The initial core day i think is quite important because of the timeline dynamic we see, and is perfectly complementary to the event as we know it. Plus, the budget is somehow contained compared to similar initiatives currently in discussion/vote.

[Non-Constitutional] Arbitrum DAO Delegate Incentive Program

Vote: FOR DIP 1.5

Proposal - Delegate Incentive Program (DIP)

After all the feedbacks here, feedbacks in the call and private feedbacks, voting “For” on DIP 1.5.

Is gonna be a mess, seed is gonna have the hardest time of their life, and I am pretty sure a lot of folks will initially complain about having that 0.75 points more in this or that category.

But often times than not the hardest path is also the path that leads to the biggest growth, and I think evaluating not only the votes, but a big part of the arbitrum governance life, is what we need. We literally need to put all delegates in the position of interacting, and interact in a meaningful way.

A few things here

we are going to have to obviously trust the seed gang here. I won’t quote Uncle Ben here. But you know where i am going with this

that said, if I had to trust one delegate on a massive program like this, it would be seed. Having had the pleasure to work with some of them, and meet a few of them, I see them as a force of good that is pushing more than others for adoption of crypto not to speculate but to solve specific problems. I quote this because is easy for some, as we saw in the call, to think that there could be too much power concentration. While is true, is also necessary since a public mechanism for evaluation would be not only extremely unfeasible, but won’t be consistent over time. TLDR: I trust seed latam, a lot, to run this in the fairiest way possible

As suggested, I think the spread of costs between 1.5 and 1.1 of around 40k is too small. We could find ourself to have a (positive) explosion of delegates presence between this program, the staking program and all the initiatives we have. The amount of work is almost linear with the amount of delegates we have, and since this program is a 1y long one my strong suggestion is to add a clause, on the tally vote, for which that if we will be above X amount of delegates, they might ask for some further funds to cover opex, which is mostly manual labour

in the previous iteration, seed if i recall was not able to enroll in the program to avoid conflicts. I think this be removed for 1.5. To make the participation fair and agnostic, the evaluation of seed governance could be only about the amount of votes, onchain and offchain, plus call particpation. for the rest of the evaluation, subject to interpretation, it could just be the median of the score of all delegates involved in the program, or maybe the median of the second lower half.

Yes, in all of this I am saying that seed should be able to ask more and enroll in the program, thus incresing overall cost. While aware of this, I also understand the enormous amount of workload this program will bring to their shoulders, being a cow that reads all the posts and comments in the forum: if i imagine myself not only reading all, but also evaluating all, and knowing how much this program will probably be relevant for the arbi staking proposal, I really want for seed to have all the ability to do the best job possible here. And here it means being able to onboard all the people they think are needed to have a consistent evaluation over the next 12 months.

[Non-Constitutional] Funds to Bolster Foundation’s Strategic Partnerships Budget

Vote: FOR

[Non-Constitutional] Funds to Bolster Foundation’s Strategic Partnerships Budget

I am voting “for” on this proposal.

As stated above, I think the idea of the foundation having a fund to foster growth for specific deals, is what is needed, especially for orbit expantion.

I partially second the voices of folks calling for more transparency; I also understand that not all details should be disclosed and, in some cases, some details can’t be disclosed due to either specific agreements or just business logic.
We have several gaps here due to the status of Foundation, as the most important stakeholder in our ecosystem. And I don’t think anybody wants to challenge this status, nor thinks it doesn’t hold true. But potentially, this is not for example a way to disclose some information to the dao (re: foundation grant program, while we can see the end protocol getting the grant, I don’t think there is a public list of the amount or scope for each grant request, just to give an example).

So, while the above could be a bit off topic here, would be a solution similar to the one adopted for the GCP be useful?
In there we have a council, under NDA, that can have full knowledge on the operation behind, and can alert the DAO in case something is wrong, and potentially claw back funds (paging @Djinn for confirmation here). I don’t think we should gun necessarily for this specific type of dynamic, nor I do think the DAO should claw back funds from the foundation. But a certain degree of oversight/collaboration, even if under NDA, could be useful, and in general could be a good tool to leverage the operation of DAO and foundation. This council can indeed steer the convo of dao’s initiative toward specific ones that would benefit on going deal of the foundation, and the council could be part of the transparency semestral report (or, add an indepedent section all together).

I am spitballing ideas here, and I am open to a feedback that is: all of this is just nonsense, is non applicable, doesn’t solve problems, does only introduce friction.

But since the foundation is coming to the dao, and since we should enhance the synergy between the dao and the foundation in general because we all have the same goal, this initiative could be a start.

Tally votings

Funds to bootstrap the first BoLD validator

Vote: For
Confirming previous snapshot votes about letting foundation run the first Bold validator and financing potential third parties.

ARB Staking: Unlock ARB Utility and Align Governance

Confirming previous snapshot vote; I also think the new details on the technical implementation (the unistaker module, ability to introduce a small timelock and others) make a lot of sense.

Vote: For

[CANCELED] Delegate to Voter Enfranchisement Pool — Event Horizon

Vote: Against
Vote cancelled due to the wrong details in the proposal, voting against

Delegate to Voter Enfranchisement Pool — Event Horizon

Vote: For

Security council

Nominee Selection

Vote: Dedaub (100% of the weight)

JoJo · September 27, 2024, 10:25am

October 2024 voting

Snapshot votings

[Non-Constitutional] Whitelist Infura Nova Validator

Vote: For

Research on context and retention

Vote: For

An EIP-4824 powered daoURI for Arbitrum DAO

Vote: For – Use ENS txt records

LTIPP Retroactive Community Funding Selections

Vote: Tokenguard
I was quite impressed by their presentation during the Incentive call of this week: they are one of the few providers who decided to try and go more in depth in the data analysis, regardless of LTIPP council not selecting them in the previous months.
I would have normally voted against funding any initiative, but this one bears to me a push forward to keep the team engaged in our DAO: their data while imperfect is to me a good step toward the right direction analysis wise.

Establishing a DAO Events Budget for 2025

Vote: For

Establishing a DAO Events Budget for 2025

With the primary proposal + changes I want to show my overall support.

As a Dao, our goal is to, generically, evolve and get better. While this concept is abstract, from a pragmatic pov it means filling the gaps we have and remove friction.

One of the biggest friction we have is what is in between good proposals from good contributors vs the final outcome; often times than not this is about having not only a budget, but a budget by a certain date. With the previous even we saw that you need to move with weeks and sometimes months in advance, and the event budget will likely remove this friction (same as the treasury initiative to have a certain amount of stables, in our pocjets, will allow to remove friction from programs that requires a usd denominated budget; OT here, I know, but to me it has the same overarching goal of removing friction).

(V2) Arbitrum Research & Development Collective

Vote: For, 2.09M

[NON-CONSTITUTIONAL] - Arbitrum Research and Development Collective [Term 2]

I am voting in favor.

I think we need for our DAO this collective. We spin up ton of initiatives, and some goes in parallel, are highly technical and/or require smart contract implementation. We need to be able to asses the risk and we can’t make the responsability fall back on OCL.
At the same time we need a data science unit; we need to crunch data and understand what is happening both in our world and in the rest of the crypto world.

I don’t have a very strong opinion on the budget. Immutablelawyer I know it would be quite difficult, but maybe in future could be interesting to try and highlight the difference of amount of deliverable (or whatever kpi you deem fit) between budget A, B and C. I am pretty sure that 90% of users here who didn’t work in an audit or research firm don’t know the cost of bread. Because of this, I am going with the middle choice of 2.09M.

As a final thought, I hope that when we are going to have to renew this initiative in 6 months, we will have opco capable of internalize this whole structure. I really think we will need risk and data analyst, constantly, moving forward.

On a more general note, I support the council added on top, I really think analyzing the work can be a very complex task not suited just for a single advocate; the payroll structure (1/3 upfront, and the rest split 50/50 before/after deliverable) is for sure better in term of alignment. I also think it’s more of a theoretical solution than anything, “hours” in crypto are what they are, they are easy to game (not saying anyone would do that) and are a not so meaningful measure compared to IRL jobs in which you just use a badge. But I understand the need to address some concern, and the need to at least try to find solutions.

Thanks for the hard work.

[Non-Constitutional] Arbitrum Token Swap Pilot Program

Vote: Against

[Non-Constitutional] Arbitrum Token Swap Pilot Program

I’m voting AGAINST this proposal in the temp check.

First of all, motivation seems unclear.

[Non-Constitutional] Arbitrum Token Swap Pilot Program

By embedding Token Swaps as a vital element of Arbitrum Ecosystem Development and critical programs such as LTIP, Arbitrum can continue pro-actively incentivizing ecosystem growth

This is what is stated here. In the initial discussion, which I don’t know why it wasn’t linked, it was instead presented with a different motivation.

Proposal [Non-Constitutional] Arbitrum Treasury Token Swap Program

Token swaps are a form of treasury diversification that increases Arbitrum alignment of protocols. In our view, token swaps should be the final stage of ecosystem support by the DAO, which could begin with a small Questbook grant and finally graduate to a direct token swap with us.

The initiative has been moved from treasury diversification to growth of the chain, with a partial common goal of alignment of the protocols. But even here, the treasure example to me doesn’t hold: we are giving for granted that, if our treasury would have held magic, treasure would have stayed in our ecosystem. I don’t think this holds true.
For these reasons, seems like the end goals are a bit unclear.

Also, and maybe is me, I think this program is more a “virtue signal” than anything. Let me try to analyse the reasons why a protocol should do a token swap, knowing that the following are the terms.

[Non-Constitutional] Arbitrum Token Swap Pilot Program

Non-Sales Clause
Arbitrum DAO and the third-party DAO will swap tokens with a 3-month lock. After the three month lock, the tokens will unlock 10% monthly for ten months. If no Arbitrum Treasury Management team is in place within nine months of executing the token swaps, the Pilot team will propose a solution for managing these tokens before they unlock.

Using for OpEx / Incentive program
The protocol will start to receive to get unlocked arb, at a rate of 10%, after 3 months. I see little reason for a protocol to get into this deal for covering opex since these are the terms; but neither the terms are such that the protocol can use the sum easily to spin up their own incentive program, at least not before several months (and they could do it through their own token at that point).

Using as yield generating mechanism
We still don’t have staked arb. We are currently working on it, but will take some time to be implemented; as such, is quite difficult to project the economics in an exchange. Matter of the fact, most token swaps are done because not only you signal alignment, but also because is bad optic for yourself to farm your own protocol with your own token but is instead ok to farm a friendly protocol. How can we even put the real value proposition of arb if we don’t yet know how staking will look like?

Using for voting power
This is the only case currently that would make sense to me: a protocol wants to participate to the governance of Arbitrum. But, looking at the list of the 19 protocols whitelisted, almost all the upperhalf of them is already participating to the governance; the lower half, will be quite difficult IMHO to involve them in governance unless there has been specific contacts on this regards. Happy to be proven wrong, would be good to have more builders involved in our DAO directly.

There is also a final consideration on the management of these coins. Assuming swaps will go through, and let’s even assume we have everything vested, at that point there is definitely a different reputation consequences for the protocols selling the arbs, or for our dao to sell the protocols’ tokens.
For the protocol, selling the arb token will likely be ok, or even go unnoticed.
For our DAO, it will likely be negative (“you don’t support external protocols”) to sell non arbitrum native protocols’ tokens. It will be extremely negative to sell instead the token of arbitrum native one (“the dao doesn’t even support GMX/Camelot/insert name of native arbitrum protocol”). It could potentially be ok to utilize them in yield generating strategies through a treasury manager, but the amount exchanged, since we have a cap of 500k, won’t be worth the hassle in my opinion; plus, we are assuming that there will be good way to generate yield or that we will also have a treasury manager. TLDR: whatever token swap we do, it will be quite difficult for the DAO to sell these tokens.

In my view, the DAO should take a totally different approach to align protocols to the chain and foster growth: we should invest in protocols.
This doesn’t mean buying the token, but literally participating to raises of the protocols, and get a portion of the equity. This, to me, would make way more sense.
We are not there yet because we need legal infrastructure that we don’t have for example. But to me, not having yet the tools doesn’t mean we should go for the path highlighted above.

As a final note, i want to say I appreciate the work done so far. I think the proposal is for sure better than the initial one, and I think the people added (paper, castlecap) add a ton of experience and professionality to this group. Despite this, I really can’t find a way to frame the token swaps idea as a good idea for our DAO, sorry.

GCP Council Re-Confirmation Vote for Tim Chang

Vote: For

GCP Council Re-Confirmation Vote for John Kennedy

Vote: For

Tally votings

UPDATED - Ethereum Protocol Attackathon Sponsorship

Vote: For
Confirming previous snapshot vote

[NON-CONSTITUTIONAL] Arbitrum DAO Procurement Committee: Phase II Proposal

Vote: For
Confirming previous snapshot vote

Constitutional AIP - Extend Delay on L2Time Lock

Vote: For
Confirming previous snapshot vote

[Non-Constitutional] Funds to Bolster Foundation’s Strategic Partnerships Budget

Vote: For
Confirming previous snapshot vote

Enhancing Multichain Governance: Upgrading RARI Governance Token on Arbitrum

Vote: For
Confirming previous snapshot vote

ArbitrumDAO strategic “Off-site” (online) updated proposal

Vote: Against

[Non-Constitutional] Arbitrum DAO Delegate Incentive Program

Vote: For
Confirming previous snapshot vote

Fund the Stylus Sprint

Vote: Abstain
Since I was contacted to be part of the program and help the committee, I decided to abstain from the Tally voting compared to the “for” I gave in snapshot. Still think that obviously this is a great proposal for which I would have voted in favor otherwise

Security council

Member election, phase 2

JoJo · November 1, 2024, 12:07pm

November 2024 voting

Snapshot votings

Adopt a Delegate Code of Conduct & Formalize Operations

Vote: For

[Non-Constitutional] Arbitrum DAO Delegate Code of Conduct + Formalizing the DAO's Operations

Voting in favour of the code of conduct.

First, we are getting big enough that we need at least a piece of paper in which is stated: this is good, this is ok, this can likely have bad consequences. Otherwise, with the amount of people we have, there will be at some point malicious actor that would just justify their action by saying that it was not written anywhere.

While I can understand that most are concerned about hard implementation, I think the soft one is fine, for one reason: if we come to the point of having to exclude someone from the dao life (dip, or other), it is unlikely to come from just a single event. It will come from a behaviour, over time, that will show poor alignment with the dao as a whole, likely culminating with a single event that can be used as a proxy.
I am again positive, and optimist, on the fact that all the og and good delegates we have in here will just constantly observe what happens in the forum, in the chat, in the vote rationale, and also in twitter, and will do their best to solve conflicts and realign parties before we come to the point of having to take actions based on violation of the code of conduct.

Also thanks entropy for this!

[Non-Constitutional] Treasury Management v1.2

Vote: For

[Non-Constitutional] Treasury Management v1.2

Interesting set of feedbacks so far on the votes. Let me first anticipate the vote: in favour.

The issue addressed here, to me, is broad: is about weaponizing some assets that we have in the treasury (eth) + have an environement with less friction in the dao to pay SP in stables (conversion of arb in stables), something that we failed a couple of times already. Plus at the same time find yield strategies for these assets idling, which are the stables and up to some degree the arb.

[Non-Constitutional] Treasury Management v1.2

However, I don’t see this proposal as true treasury management.

I can kinda agree here. This is not necessarily treasury management at full scope, but is a management of a subpart of assets, with just a certain consciousness of DAO spending (regen reports) and no DAO budget yet. It tries to address some needs that we have, plus create yield on some assets doing, effectively, nothing for now.
So again: is it treasury management satisfying all the needs we have in term of spending, risk, yield etc? No. But we don’t have these info, and to me is a very good way to start.
It tried to go for low hanging fruits such as eth staking, stable convertion and some yield. Already with this, in the environment (our dao) that we have, historically quite resilient to these initiative, we see a decent opposition.

I think instead is good that we start exactly here, and evolve into what we need: in 6 months we might have the opco, likely another more aggressive type of market regime, we will have hopefully some insight into timeboost revenue, and other iniative laid down that will tell us if we will have to increase/decrease size, risk, type of assets, etc.

Now let’s go on doubt, margin of improvements and others.

[Non-Constitutional] Treasury Management v1.2

Finally, I would like to inquire about the rationale behind creating two committees to execute each of the management’s objectives.

I don’t have an opinion as strong as this one but can understand the rationality. At the same time, I can understand the rationality like entropy said of the two buckets being run with different skillset in mind.
I think the effective answer is a mix of both: there could be different people in the operation of both buckets, but there should be a single overview to always have a tab on what is effectively happening from a risk standpoint. I think, for now, the current setup is good enough, and hope that in 6 months, at renewal or under opco, it will be instead made more cohesive.

Another big improvement part in future will be STEP: it necessarily has to converge in these initiative. While it also add a somehow very specific growth nature, even more so on a BD and advertisement level since it was also about attracting institution in our DAO, we don’t have to forget how in the end the goal of that initiative was to have stables deployed in RWA to produce yield for the DAO. In 6 months it should converge into whatever we will have here, and any phase 2 for step, if started in the meantime, should be setup with this merging goal in mind.

On a final note on the people involved and the process so far proposed.

[Non-Constitutional] Treasury Management v1.2

More broadly, GFX usually votes against proposals that bundle creation of an office and ratification of specific persons to hold that office.

I can honestly say that this makes a lot of sense as a general approach, but not always. As usual, devil is in the details, and we are a DAO in which we tend to try and have a say in everything, always.
In this very instance we have a topic that is both extremely complex (treasury management), requires a lot of expertise and so specific figures, and a history of the DAO not finding right away the path (remember the karp/gauntlet proposal was on discussion i think in july, almost 5 months ago). The fact that we need to move toward some sort of treasury management, the fact that in 6 months this will likely be revised, and the fact that Entropy made the DD on all candidates, to me is more than enough to support this initiative. And I hope others will see, more than the imperfections of it, the important step forward that it will be for the DAO, knowing that we will be able to adjust it along the road.

Restitution For Extensively Delayed ArbitrumDAO Minigrant Winners

Vote: Against

Proposal for Financial Restitution For ArbitrumDAO Grant Winners

Proposal for Financial Restitution For ArbitrumDAO Grant Winners

Never chimed in the discussion so far, but let me reiterate what others already posted: in a grant program that is denominated in non stable currencies, the change of value in payment is expected.

Is quite unfortunate that this resulted in delay and a blocker for most projects; but this doesn’t necessarily entile the project to further compensantion because nobody would be here if arb would have gone from 2$ to 4$. And this is something i can say first hand because not only i have been in several grant programs, i also have been in programs with payments denominated in arb, in which grantee never complained when price was going up, but had some reservation when it was going down.

This to be clear is not to flip responsability on you. I simpathize with your situation, and having served a lot of small team with grants I know how important these milestones can be just for the survivability of a team, or to effectively ship the product. There was a problem in the program, a lot of delays, that had bad consequences on the operation of project. This will mean that the dao, next time, either won’t vote for the same people to run the program, or for the program itself.

But it doesn’t necessarily mean that the dao should compensate people who requested the grant and saw the dollar value going down. We could, at scale, apply this to the LTIPP program, in which 60M of arbs got distributed, with proposal coming in when arb was way above 1$, and projects receiving the stream for users up to the point in which it was worth 0.4$. While different (we are talking about opex in your case, incentive to users in this case), should there be an argument for it as well? The answer is obviously no.

Consistently with this, I have voted against this proposal.

I really sympathise with both the proposer and the team affected, I really do, and I can understand the frustration. But the grant program has always been denominated in arb.
To give an example, in LTIPP, proposers created specific kpi on economic value based on arb at the time of their proposal (around 1.7$). They effectively received arb at a value that was below 0.8$ or less, and we are talking about 30, 40M arbs. This extreme example is to show that for non denominated arb grants there will always be this problem; it’s unfortunately more prominent in grants that are for smaller team, because it can really make the difference for the survivability of a project.
But again the dao can’t take the burden of how volatile the asset is; the dao can for sure take in consideration how there was a big problem with the service provider involved, and try to find ways to correct this behaviour in future.
It’s really quite unfortunate, I don’t think it would be fair to set this precedent.

Hackathon Continuation Program

Vote: In favour, yes onchain mechanism

Hackathon Continuation Program

Voting in favor, with the option of onchain.

First, the structure is quite interesting. I have chatted privately with Daniel on this proposal, the mentorship part is something that inheretly comes in grant programs for some teams (young founders, founders with extremely good ideas but no experience, founders that got rejected but that have a bright future) but this happens on a spot basis, and is tied to the skill and will of the comimttee/person who evaluate it. And definitely we would need more, so is interesting to see a program structured to incorporate it.

I added the yes to the onchain vote cause i personally evaluated collaberry for a grant in questbook season 2, and I am looking forward to see them showing off their tool in the “real life”.

Tally votings

(V2) Arbitrum Research & Development Collective

Vote: For
Confirming snapshot vote

Establishing a DAO Events Budget for 2025

Vote: For
Confirming snapshot vote

JoJo · December 1, 2024, 11:55am

December 2024 voting

Snapshot votings

[Non-consitutional] User Research: Why build on Arbitrum?

Vote: Arbitrum + 2 Others (OP + SOL)

[Non-consitutional] User Research: Why do people even build on Arbitrum, anyway?

I don’t mind this research, on several fronts, so I am voting in favour with the 2 other ecosystems: it makes sense to do a research that even if scoped, or preliminary, can give us some insight.

Few things tho:

agree with pedrob, this could have stayed on the forum for a while more to be honest

also agree with 0x_ultra that methodology to select builders will be key. You might be for sure more expert than us in this topic, top of my mind selecting exclusive builders vs cross chain ones, and builders that started at day 1 here vs new builders approaching, can give us not only info on the why, but also how this why and the general perception of the chain has evolved over time

it obviously make sense to coordinate with ardc as you posted or in general any other entity that might arise in the dao that can have connections or interest in this topic. In general this is something that I hope for every initiative.

Designing and operating the reporting and information function

Vote: For, More Salary - no bonus

Designing and Operating the Reporting and Information Function

I want to support this proposal, but I also have some doubts.

This doubts are not on the function. I think we need an overall reporting authority with experience in the dao.
Is also not on the person. I think Alex has stick around in our ecosystem for a while, showing he is willing to work and contribute here, both in virtual and in irl meetings.

I think there is value in the mission. And I think Alex is well positioned for this task due to his experience in the DAO.

As every initiative, in the end the evaluation comes down to the following paramters:

mission: does it have value? I already provided the answer above

cost: is the cost fair?

kpi/evaluation: is it easy for the dao to evaluate this initiative, during and post?

While I briefly answered to 1, 2 and 3 are still up for discussion.
What follows comes down to the fact that, is quoted, we will have around 1.03 FTE in 1 year (please clarify if that is not the case, understanding that there is a 45k discretionary budget to potentially hire other members).

As far as I understood (and claude helped me spoiler) we are talking, for the 1.03 FTE, of

$150k as base for 1y

$125k as bonus (will consider your prices for arb and convert them knowing it will be likely adjusted)

Basically, a $12.5k monthly salary, with a $10k bonus.

This, for reporting and oversight work, is the high side of the barrel I will be honest. I would expect a level of scrutiny that is almost at a military grade level, to be blunt. I would expect you to physically chase people who don’t answer you in telegram to get the info you need, and this is no hyperbole, cause sometimes is just so hard to get info from people in chat.
The main doubts from a quantitative standpoint comes from basically plugging the whole initiative, and the persona, at an OpCo level, when OpCo is still in discussion. I easily see this initiative, if it moves forward, being incorporated by opco, and likely at the same initial price. But, if we had the opco live now, would it be done in these financial terms? Not sure.

I will vote in favor of this initiative to signal support, for 1) the initiative 2) the persona running it. I can’t in all honesty agree with the financials, which imho should be revised down.
It’s a bit hard for me to suggest numbers: you reference the senior opco level, but in an org like the opco (in any org, tbh), the scope of work would probably naturally expand based on the needs and would be leveraged in a team to bring additional value as the needs come over time. On what is a 12.5+10 potential monthly salary, I could see for example a reduction to 10+5.
There is also the problem of the quarterly evaluation and release of bonus which as other mentioned doesn’t seem to be addressed, and needs a clarification.

On top of everything, we have a 45k retroactive for the 5 months of GCR working which is 9k/m and you mentioned a discounted rate of 0.75%. I appreciated your hard work, but the 75% rate on the proposal seems high: again is hard to suggest numbers here, if i had to take an educated guess, would maybe put 50% of base which in my suggestion above is 10k, so overall 25k. No hard opinions here, except that charging 75% on the base seems too high.

I want to finalize all of this by iterating that I want to support Alex. I want to see him being more involved in our DAO, work here full time, be happy about what he does, and provide value to us. I sincerely see him as a good contributor to the ecosystem, so I want to see this initiative moving forward. I don’t currently see the numbers proposed matching the expectations of the DAO tho, just that, and I think this can be fixed, which would make me extremely happy.

On this, I am voting in favor, expecting a broader discussion and adjustment on tally on numbers and on way to evaluate the bonus.

Arbitrum D.A.O. Domain Allocator Offerings) Grant Program - Season 3

Vote: Abstain

I’m the proposer so, naturally, have voted Abstain. Would have voted to have 5 domains including Orbit of course.

[NON-CONSTITUTIONAL] Arbitrum Onboarding V2: A Governance Bootcamp

Vote: For

[NON-CONSTITUTIONAL] Arbitrum Onboarding V2: A Governance Bootcamp

I voted in favor of this proposal.

I share some of the concerns expressed above: it’s a bit unclear the value that the initiative will have 1 year from now because we don’t know where these trained analyst will end up being, if in protocols, in our dao, in others etc.

At the same time, I want to be mindful of a trend we have been seeing lately and that few delegates shared privately with me, which is new contributors, in the DAO, entering with a decent amount of criticism in every initiative without necessarily providing solutions or alternatives (or, when that is done, is done through solutions that are quite superficial and don’t necessarily tackle the initial issue). This is partially due on how the DIP is structure, in which de facto commenting increases the amount of point, and part due to the human nature: sounding pessimism and being critic is the easiest way to sound smart to be blunt.
(note: nothing against seed here or anyone in particular. It is what it is, and is a byproduct of our dao growing more and more over time).

For the reason above, I hope this program will indeed elevate the quality of new contributors, and this is why I am voting in favor. I share the concern that of the 193k allocated only 30k goes to analysts: to me it means that the expectation, end of program, is to have 20 kickass black belt governance analysts, I am expecting no less with an opex of 160k.

I also think we should find a way for weaponize these new analysts, and right now one of the biggest gap we have is the protocols’ participations. We should find a way to advertise this pool of participants to protocols (a bit hard: every team tends to internalize people that they trust, not necessarily suggested by third party sources).
I also suggest to select people with also a technical background, that have experience in designing protocols, tokenomics and lst. We don’t need only people that know about governance, we also need people who are technically knowleageable, cause up to some degree we saw partially the limitation of knowledge of delegates during the working group for designing arb staking. I would really like to have more people that have been builders to be trained in governance.

Finally, i agree that DIP kpi are not the right one here. Success, to me, means that the trained analyst end up contributing to our dao, either through specific dao roles, or by being integrated in protocols as part of their personnel etc.

All in all I don’t have all the answers to the questions above, and I hope @RikaGoldberg and gang will iterate between this and tally to try and address some of these concerns.

ARDC (V2) Supervisory Council Election

ARDC (V2) Research Election

ARDC (V2) Risk Election

ARDC (V2) Security Election

Votes:

Supervisory elections: Pedro and James for comms, Entropy+Tamara OPS
Research Election: Castlecap and Blockworksresearch
Security Election: OpenZeppelin
Risk Elections: VendingMachine/Nethermind

[Election & Application Thread] V2 Arbitrum Research & Development Collective

ARDC (V2) Supervisory Council Election

For the supervisory elections, I am voting for pedrob and jameskbh for the communications.

There is a great set of candidates here, but for these 2 specifically I have had the pleasure to know and work with both of them. And I think at this point both deserve more space in our DAO: the skillset they have is quite complementary (james technical and entrenched, pedro very comms oriented, and both extremely present) and they would not let a single detail slide without overviewing it first.
I honestly don’t think we could get a better team for this complex task than these 2 nice folks here, and the DAO would only benefit from the value they can provide.

I am also voting on entropy + tamara since is the only candidate for operations. I am glad we will be able to see them working together, and I am looking forward to see tamara bridging her experience from Lido to the ARDC.

ARDC (V2) Research Election

This is quite difficult due to having only 1 elected member. I will have to split my votes:

63% will go to CastleCapital + DefiLlama. I have worked and meet the castle team, and encountered them the first time with the STIP feedback. It was impressive: tailored feedback for each one of the protocols involved. Quite a lift at the time, and I had then the pleasure to have them alongside me as advisors in LTIPP and STIP.b. I think they have a very good and pragmatic approach. On defillama, as most that are here I have been using their open and free tools forever. The thing that has always struck me was the agility in execution on their side, with defillama website being updated in matter of days when there was enough request on twitter. This agility shows 2 things: ability to listen to stakeholders and ability to quickly iterate. I would like to see them working in our DAO

37% goes to BlockworksResearch. I cannot not support them after what I saw in previous ARDC. I did read all deliverables from all deliverables, and without taking anything from the others, the blockworks reports where just better. Not necessarily more in depth (they were tho), but with an angle that was imho the right one to have followup actions on our side as a DAO, at least up to some degree. For example, their team with Carolina was the only one able to produce normalized data for the incentive programs, something that was the groundwork to even understand if the programs were successful or not.

It’s to be honest a shame that we can’t have both these teams working in our DAO.

ARDC (V2) Security Election

I am voting for Open Zeppelin. Not only they are good, they have been following Arbitrum since almost inception, and have multiple roles in our ecosystem. While diversity of vendors can sometimes be a strength, the experience that Open Zeppelin has in our ecosystem is just too much of an advantage here.

ARDC (V2) Risk Election

Split my vote, 50/50, for VendingMachine and Nethermind. I think all the companies here are quite professional, and as for the comms/ops we should have more than one member. That said, the scope of work presented to me by these 2 was the most valuable, specifically the all around framework from vending machine, and the lst analysis from nethermind.

Unifying Arbitrum’s Mission, Vision, Purpose (MVP)

Vote: For

Unifying Arbitrum’s Mission, Vision, Purpose (MVP)

Thanks for this.

Voting For on the proposal.

We have here the natural continuation of the discussion on mission, vision and goals that started a few months ago after EthCC, with a proper formalization and plan here.

We had the chance to discuss some of these topics, live, in Bangkok, and was a pretty awesome discussion, oriented toward what we all collectively think Arbitrum should be from a high level view point up to the connection with strategic key ideas that can be then translated in actual program andi initiatives.

This is not an easy discussion. We are likely all here (in crypto, not necessarily in Arbitrum) because we “believe in something”: financial sovereign, unlockin equal opportuninties, efficiency of capital flow, just name one, there are thousands of reasons. But asking someone “what is Arbitrum for you” and then “ok, now that I have your definition, what is your plan to make that vision that you have happen” would more likely than not not being followed by a proper answer.

What I like here is that we went for an abstract question, with a process to try and translate it into operational plan. When the vision is approved, we will be able to define in a second phase, the sos, strategic goals. From the strategic goals, in a third phase, we will be able to go more concrete by establishing buckets of capital and budget spending to reailze these goals.

The byproduct is that, if we do phase 1 and 2 right, we should be in a position that for every initiave, old or new, we will be able to evaluate if it fits the vision and the underneath strategic goals. This should definitely give us more clarity, and help for example in the definition of stuff like incentive programs for which everybody and their grandma has an opinion, but not necessarily understand the consequences and the effect from a higher point of view.

Partner with ETH Bucharest 2025

Vote: For, without POAP

Partner with ETH Bucharest 2025 - Eastern Europe’s Leading Ethereum Conference and Hackathon

Understanding the concerns of entropy for this, I might want to highlight that the discontinuity of programs, in this case the D.A.O. grants program, is something that is causing most of this situation, and should be generally tackled better by us as a collective (one of the reason why we gonna move to a 1y program instead of 6 months over 6 months).
That said, and because of the reason above, I am voting in favor with no poap. I don’t necessarily share the concerns about the dao event budget since this will be fixed, hopefully, in a couple of months; but at the same time I don’t see the benefit to add 15k of costs which are an increase of 25% and counting on top of the base of 55k.

I think the organizers are doing a great job tho and that these events can become de facto a staple for the eth and arb community in countries that don’t necessarily have one “champion” yet.

Full support on my side, hoping to have the time to drop there by the time is live

OpCo – A DAO-adjacent Entity for Strategy Execution

Vote: For

OpCo – A DAO-adjacent Entity for Strategy Execution

Already gave plenty of feedbacks, here, here and here, plus some more scattered. And in general, as a judgment on specific topic, have engaged in this interesting convo.

To me situation is relative straight forward:

we need a legal entity that is controlled by the DAO. If we want to hire people, agencies etc is the only way to do it. And I think we need to upscale some operations in tandem with other initiatives, that will require an operative arm such the OpCo.

we need an entity that is “empowered” to carry the mission. Here empowered, very abused word nowadays, means several things: enough financial capital to operate, a mandate that is both precise but also loose enough that the DAO can tap into it, and obviously the right head

as for any venture in any work environment, is mostly about the people. We will need the right people to run it, we will need the right head, proactive, capable to propose a vision compatible with our needs, and a set of people around it capable to implement this vision. This will likely mean a mix of people outside of the dao, and potentially inside the arbitrum ecosystem (not necessarily the dao).

The points above to me are first, compatible with what most has judged as a too long of a mandate. De facto of the 30 months, we can consider the first 6 months burned between setting up the entity, source the ceo (and possibly the cfo), find the oat, negotiate first 2 salaries, get the operations up and running with a first few sets of people being the operational people alongside the 2 c-suite. Even just writing this down, 6 months could be optimistic considering the summer in between.
That’s why 30 months is the bare minimum here.
On the capital, as stated previously, I prefer the OpCo having more than it needs and eventually give it back then the opposite situation; if I read the prospect above with the people + salaries, the 22M arb is compatible with a full fledged org, with again no obligation to spend it all (and here, spend = overhire = controlled by oats).
I also think that salaries proposed are not that out of the world: remember, anybody in there won’t be able to partake in any other initiative in this dao, or others dao, or protocols. This is quite big: the opportunities in the crypto space are quite abundant, having this exclusivity does bear a premium; and the bonus is necessary to align performances (otherwise you risk people doing the bare minimum, and we don’t even want to have to tackle a situation like this, we want people that grind everyday).

The main risk of this proposal is finding the right CEO, this was discussed already, and will be one of the most important key success factor.

Not only i am voting in favor, I vote in favor with the hope that scope will be expanded by the dao overtime.

Tally votings

Arbitrum Hackathon Builder Continuation Program

Vote: For

Hackathon Continuation Program

I’m confirming my snapshot vote on tally.
Would like to add few things for danielo

first thanks for posting a small table with breakdown of costs, this is what we spoke privately, helps to better understand costs vs invstment

a suggestion for the future. I understand the holiday pause can be annoying and somehow disruptive for the flow, but in future you shouldn’t rush any proposal to tally this much. I am voting in favour only cause I think the model is worth experimenting upon and there is monetary commitment from RnDao, and don’t want to kill the initiative, but if it wasn’t for these 2 I would have likely abstained or even vote against. A lot of other proposals are in this very same situation, with different flavour of course, so please let’s avoid this happening again.

Treasury Management V1.2

Vote: For

Confirming previous snapshot vote

JoJo · January 11, 2025, 6:05pm

January 2025 voting

Snapshot votings

Non-Constitutional: Stable Treasury Endowment Program 2.0

Vote: For

Non-Constitutional: Stable Treasury Endowment Program 2.0

I am mostly agreeing with pedrob here; despite so, will vote in favour.

I think is worth hammering the table on one of the narrative in which arbitrum is leading, which is RWA. I would have rather preferred to see some changes, including either

the program falling into the new one just voted for treasury management OR

the program falling under opco.

Understanding that continuity here means moving relatively fast (relatively cause is ognna take months according to the timeline), the handover of the program would likely be such to further increment this time. For this reason, and knowing the very good professional background of Paper & Gang on these instruments, I prefer a continuation as it is. With a caveat: this, ideally, should be the last iteration of this program as it is. For the next one we will either have 1) opco up and running 2) treasury initiative going to expiration with a potential renewal if opco is not ready. I would like an handover of the program. To clarify, doesn’t mean it would need a new committee for example (but there could be a merit to reduce it if the current treasury management committee has some experience, to avoid surplus), nor that steakhouse won’t be the PM until the end of the mandate. But if in 6 months we want to add another 40, 50, $100M to the program, it should be done under either opco or currently elected treasury managers.

On a final note, I hope we will be able to diversify the issuers with the next RFP, obviously always while being compatible with the risk profile the committee will deem necessary. But I would like to see also new issuers, since the growth is one of the target of this program.

As a final note: please potentially reconsider the budget for the 4 committee members. It’s quite likely there should be more applications, and the budget might be on the low end here. An increase of 20-25% to 30-32.5k per member could be ok imho, knowing that there is in these programs a somehow linear effort based on the amount of applicants.

Arbitrum D.A.O. Season 3 Elections - Gaming

Vote: Equally split among all candidates
As the PM of the future program, I deemed necessary abstaining by distributing my votes in the same weight among all candidates, despite having professional and personal preferences.

Arbitrum D.A.O. Season 3 Elections - Dev Tooling on One and Stylus

Vote: Equally split among all candidates
As the PM of the future program, I deemed necessary abstaining by distributing my votes in the same weight among all candidates, despite having professional and personal preferences.

Arbitrum D.A.O. Season 3 Elections - Education, Community Growth, and Events

Vote: Equally split among all candidates
As the PM of the future program, I deemed necessary abstaining by distributing my votes in the same weight among all candidates, despite having professional and personal preferences.

Arbitrum D.A.O. Season 3 Elections - New Protocols and Ideas

Vote: Equally split among all candidates
As the PM of the future program, I deemed necessary abstaining by distributing my votes in the same weight among all candidates, despite having professional and personal preferences.

The Watchdog: Arbitrum DAO’s Grant Misuse Bounty Program

Vote: For

The Watchdog: Arbitrum DAO's Grant Misuse Bounty Program

Voting in favor of the proposal.

We need the ability to tell to “someone” if something is wrong, without fear of repercussion in a space that is not only quite small but lacks proper accountability like other industries, at least for now.
I love that was introduced the clause for which people can submit a report without having to kyc if they don’t want the reward: this is key for several actors, such as protocols, that are best positioned to understand what is going on and if there is anybody acting in a shady way. Pretty sure there were plenty of protocols during stip, ltipp, stip bridge, that saw stuff that was “non compliance” and were just hesitant of coming forward due to fear of repercussion, reputational damage and what not due to the lack of this program.

I am also in favor to build an ad-hoc infra for this (pedrob mentions protonmail, but would not suffice imho because it will make the commission work just too complex; it also does not allow for proper anonimity on the side of whistleblower if they are not careful enough on their email).
But would like to see this infra lately fall into the hands of opco, not in the management sense, but in the ownership sense, as well as all the other website we will build for our dao.

Thanks Entropy

Proposal for Piloting Enhancements and Strengthening the Sustainability of ArbitrumHub in the Year Ahead

Vote: Against

Non-Constitutional: Proposal for Piloting Enhancements and Strengthening the Sustainability of ArbitrumHub in the Year Ahead

I am voting against this proposal.

First I want to commend 0x_Buidler and his crew on iterating on this project for several months if not almost a year: we need, in Arbitrum, builders like you capable to stick to their personal vision. This is not a statement to just sweeten the pill here, I really mean it.
That said, I still have two big issues: the fact this is an isolated initiative for the infra of the dao, and the costs. To report what I posted above for clarity.

Non-Constitutional: Proposal for Piloting Enhancements and Strengthening the Sustainability of ArbitrumHub in the Year Ahead

[…]
The main problem i have is that we have the trend, in the dao, to build all sort of infrastructures (website, bot, dapp etc) that are detached one from another.
Even more, we are doing this with no strategic view on top.

I have the strong opinion that the dao should do a more comprehensive plan in this regard: have his own website, his own socials, his own initiative, and also own the infra and the content related to this.
This hasn’t happened so far because we lack a legal entity, and we have had the AF that has been a steward in this sense when it was needed. But, hopefully, will change when we have the OpCo.

All to say that I personally can’t currently support this proposal because I think we need an higher level plan from the dao to craft and create infrastructures and content that make sense based on the goals that we have (and for this the SOS proposal from @Entropy, after the vision proposal we just voted, will be able to help as well).

Don’t get me wrong, we need a front end for the dao, even this forum is hosted on the foundation domain. But we are at the point in which we need to own it, and we are also at the point in which we need to collectively establish what content we want in there, and then hire eventually service providers or elect people to create such content. It has to fall into a more strategic plan.

Beside this, I generally speaking agree with the comments on the budget. Without going into the specific details, 19k per month for all of this feels like a lot.

While there was the effort to embed this into the SOS proposal and any future change, I don’t honestly think is enough: the website of the DAO will be one of our main front end for communication beside social accounts (assuming we will ever had dao managed ones), and it has to go through a more high level strategic plan.
As a secondary point, the budget is still too high for the service provided. I think that for slightly more we could hire directly a marketing team for the dao which would help us filling a gap that we have. This would help not only driving the engagement higher, but also spread the geography (if we see the reporting dashboard with a 6 months horizon, of the 11,000 visit to the website almost half of them come from India, which is neither right or wrong but is likely a byproduct of the founder being based in that geography AFAIK. Which means, to me, that the current reach is mostly tied to personal effort, and we are at a point in which we need to step up the game in several areas.

As a final note, I don’t know how the current team could interface themself with the DAO in future, and likely with OpCo going forward, I can’t say if with the current terms this project could be for example absorbed by the opco, or the team hired as service provider. I like the work that was done, and I think we should find a way to reward the “stickiness” of a team in the ecosystem, just, not with these economical terms, and not without an higher level plan.

Arbitrum Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) – Defining the DAO’s Interim Goals

Vote: For

Arbitrum Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) – Defining the DAO’s Interim Goals

Arbitrum Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) – Defining the DAO’s Interim Goals

Arbitrum Strategic Objective Setting (SOS) – Defining the DAO’s Interim Goals

This could be partially solved by having epochs long 4/6 months in which

This was something we thought about adding when we drafted the proposal. However, there are quite a few frictions we foresaw with this approach. For example, it’s well-known that DAOs often move slowly, inherent to their decentralized nature, meaning that, e.g., 6 months might not be enough time for the objectives’ “correctness” to materialize. This means that delegates may be more inclined to vote for a change prematurely, especially given delegates voting for a change can’t be obligated to create a submission. Compare this to the current structure, where ad hoc objective adjustments can be proposed by anyone at any time, but this requires them to post reasoning for the change together with adjusted objectives and key results. As such, objectives could still be changed 2/4/6/etc. months after their implementation, but the proposer must be able to clearly justify the reasoning and exert effort in creating an adjusted objectives matrix. This ensures that proposals for change are tied to accountability and require proposers to deeply think about the current objectives as well as what should be changed and why. The proposal also suggests instructing the research member of the ARDC to create quarterly reports on how the DAO is doing against its objectives, meaning that active delegates will receive timely updates on any potential changes that might be needed.

I think this is fair. I totally understand how a quarter or 6 months might just not be enough to evaluate the mid term status of a goal, I did personally face the same thoughts on the D.A.O. program.
The proposed solution is good enough then (having the entity responsible for that goal being able to steer it if deemed necessary + quarterly report from ARDC on metrics), because yes DAOs are slow.

Thank you for addressing my concerns here, I am in generally voting in favor and would have had despite the clarification above, because we need to make concrete what we started with MVP and we need to move from a high level vision to more tangible goals. It’s a long process but I bet will bring a new level of maturity in our DAO.

Tally votings

[Constitutional AIP] Activate Arbitrum BoLD + Infura Nova Validator Whitelist

Vote: For

Confirming the two previous snapshot votes. Also, to quote a few differences, I think is wise to keep the validators’ list in Nova permissioned, since we would have to increase x10 the tvl in there just to create the bond we will have in One.

JoJo · January 26, 2025, 9:34am

February 2025 voting

Snapshot votings

Approve the Nova Fee Sweep Action

Vote: For

Request to Increase the Stylus Sprint Committee’s Budget

Vote: Abstain
Since I am part of the committee, I am abstaining from this vote. That said, I STRONGLY support the additional funds in the program. We did review 150+ applications, and a lot of this should have gone through but it was not possible due to lack of fundings.

Arbitrum Growth Circles Event Proposal

Vote: Against

Arbitrum Growth Circles Event Proposal

I am voting against this proposal.

The idea is well intended but, to me, it starts from a totally wrong premise. We partially covered in the entropy call, will reiterate in the forum: the whole approach here is about making protocol come to the dao, help them, give them a hand, having this back and forth to make everything better.

This vision is totally detached from reality.

As of now

Arbitrum DAO is perceived, by most builders, as a leech entity that is just not helping the ecosystem and mostly dragging it down

Arbitrum, as a chain, has been seen more and more as a place that has lost ground in defi and other key verticals compared to 1/2 years ago

ARB has a token has had lackluster performances, certainly similar to OP and to other low float high fdv tokens we have out there, but this is key in the performances of other tokens in the chain.

I am not mentioning the aboves to just criticize full around, but I am mentioning it to explain why protocols and builders won’t come to us. We are not starting from an advantageous point, as a DAO, and the approach to me should be the opposite: we, as a collective, should start chasing some protocols, likely a very few (and most important ones) at the beginning, understand what they need and understand how we can give them what they need compared to the goals we have as a DAO. And after we create these successfull initiatives, we enlarge the scope out to the point we - hopefully - turn the table in term of reputation, so that builders see us a value added for the chain and not value extracting.

To be clear: I am not saying that the DAO is value extracting. But this is how we are perceived by most builders that have hands down in the chain everyday.

This is the main reason i am voting against this proposal.
I want to also echo some of the feedbacks received here:

Arbitrum Growth Circles Event Proposal

Entropy will again point out that the DAO should hold proposals pulling from the DAO’s 2025 Event Budget to a high standard. Letting this budget slowly be chipped away $60-70K at a time reduces the possibility for a larger scale, more professionally organized Arbitrum event to be funded. […]

Lastly, as per the AVI’s latest update, the DAO is still waiting to receive all of the deliverables from the Pilot Program.

I agree that this habit of chipping out money from the event budget is something I don’t personally like. With the current position in the market that Arbitrum ecosyste has, I really think we should focus on the biggest impact possible, and in this sense is likely that 10 events of 60k have less impact than a single event of 600k (quite superficial but you get the idea).

Finally, I am still a bit puzzled of the AVI findings, not only we have to receive all deliverables but I have yet to see a compacted finalized finding. So far I have seen several threads, with several deliverables, and there should be an effort to unify and simplify the findings with then specific follow ups on specific verticals. This is a bit OT here but partially related in the sense that part of the request is tied to the findings of the AVI research.

To conclude, I think the AVI team is well intended. And I don’t want to question their expertise here nor the network that they have build in the last year. But I just think the approach should be different: if we embark in a 3, 4, 6 months adventure in this sense, we will lose valuable time and so we will lose opportunities in a market that is getting narrower and narrower.

Finally, is worth waiting for the SOS goals to come live. It will be way easier for us to understand how we can help protocols if we know what goals we have as a collective.

Arbitrum Audit Program

Vote: For

Arbitrum Audit Program

Currently voting in favor as support, with few things to address in tally that have been mentioned in the calls but are not clear enough in the proposal:

the nature of protocols who could apply. Understanding that this proposal has a growth nature, we need to clarify if current protocols in arbitrum can apply, if protocols migrating/expanding from other chains can apply. And the answer likely can’t just be a single “yes” otherwise everybody who has to do an audit in arbitrum will come here making life of the committee miserable, there has to be some sort of wording on whom can apply

I would like to know, being this a 1 year initiative, if we will be able to morph it over time based on SOS outcomes and in general other more robust framework we might have in the DAO to create long life tracks for protocols in Arbitrum, ie: a path in which you first get a grant, then an audit, then an investment, all over time.

[CONSTITUTIONAL] AIP: ArbOS Version 40 Callisto

Vote: For
Not too much to add to this being a technical proposal. It follows the roadmap of the Pectra upgrade in ETH, and adds very important quality of life upgrades such as EIP-7702. As for all other upgrades, will wait for the audit report before Tally.

Tally votings

OpCo: A DAO-adjacent Entity for Strategy Execution

Vote: For

OpCo – A DAO-adjacent Entity for Strategy Execution

I gotta say, I am excited to vote in favour on tally. I don’t usually comment when we go onchain, yes there are changes but here what is worth pointing out are the kpi for the first 12 months: achievable, but ambitious.
OpCo in 12 months should be able to consolidate TM + STEP, should have a framework and structure to onboard SP, should be able to handle (excluding funding) an initiative top down, from drafting to vote to onboarding to kyc/b to disbursement of payments. This is literally the bare minimum. At the same time, it would be quite a step ahead in our DAO if we think how convoluted are our processes now.
And yes, looking at the interim goal we have for the year, continuing the SOS proposal up to the reporting part (this will depend on how technical the tasks are tho, and there could be needed a technical support but we will see), absorbing event budget/watchdog, creating standard reporting for financials. Doable as well.
Likely the most complex task is the branding/marketing with the Foundation, because is probably the most abstract goal of the pack. But is exciting to think about being able, as a DAO, to have an enabler like the opco to do things that so far we have had to task others to do on our behalf.

Strong vote in favor.

Non-Constitutional: Stable Treasury Endowment Program 2.0

Vote: For
Confirming previous snapshot vote

Arbitrum D.A.O. (Domain Allocator Offerings) Grant Program - Season 3

Vote: Abstain
Being the candidate PM, will abstain from this vote

JoJo · February 25, 2025, 8:16pm

March 2025 voting

Snapshot votings

TMC Recommendation

Vote: Deploy only the stable strategy, Deploy both, Deploy nothing, Only deploy arb strategies, Abstain

TMC’s Proposed Allocations

Had to cool off for a couple of days before being able to provide a proper feedback.

I am voting as suggested by threesigma in the following way.

TMC’s Proposed Allocations

#3 YES, deploy the Stable Strategy /// NO, do not deploy the ARB Strategy

But this vote is not an endorsement of what was done so far, and comes from the believe that we need to increase the speed of execution from 0.1 miles for hours to 0.15 miles per hours.

Let me break down the proposal.

The Good

The stablecoin strategy are likely good. I am ok in dividing in equal parts in all the 3 parts. I am also ok in karp and avantgard charging a management fee: in the shortlist of protocols i see for both univ3 and camelot v3. Makes me think there is a management of liquidity in a v3 range that might change over time, or at least be manually assessed, since there is no mention of a third party ALM. Managing liquidity is not trivial, and stable pools are all beside stable despite the name.
I am expecting this portion of the strategy to be not only succesfull in yield but useful for the check account of the dao and i am also happy to have avantgard and karpatkey to have a more active role operationally wise in our dao, with gauntlet also consolidating it.

The Bad

The fact that we can’t come up with a proper arb strategy is, to be blunt, quite bad. We all know that, as asset, has only value toward governance; is not not spread enough to be an hub of liquidity (and this maybe can change in future), we don’t have staking out yet so is not a collateral good ebough. This is a quite obvious.
But the fact that, as a dao, we can’t find a way to properly utilize arb at minimal risk and minimal yield for us speaks loud about the state of the ecosystem. I will go back to this but it shows that 1) we need to prepare programs that are more tailored to what we can effectively do in our ecosystem 2) we need to improve the state of arb as a token, in term of utility.

The Ugly

I am honestly still puzzled why the vote was not separated between stable and arb strategy: there was more than 1 suggestion, and if someone has a strong feeling against the current arb approach rule wise it would have to potentially stop even the stable part of the program to push, for example, for a change in rules. This choiche was not only imho quite straightforward but also suggested by some delegates.

Between this proposal, and the GMC, is pretty clear that while both the committees and organizer were well intended, there were issues regarding the risk approach and the availability of options on the table.
We had a very good opportunity to not only create yield for the dao, but also increase the usage of arbitrum native protocols as a signal to external parties that yes, the dao sustains aligned and native protocols. This will be true only in part and applies both here and to the eth side of the treasury.

My STRONG expectation is that, once we move forward with the stable here, and the eth in gmc, we create right away a second proposal in which

the risk parameters, while tight, should be commisurated to be able to take risk in protocols that allows us as a collective to use intensively the most important arbitrum protocols. Is not about to retrofit / tailor fit, is about being realistic on what we can do today in our chain

the financial goals should be such that, if we can’t find a “good enough” source of yield for single side arb, we can instead pair arb with other assets, such as eth or stables, to provide for example liquidity in v2/v3 pools or as collateral for perps

the operations of the committee should be such that, if there is a protocol/vault potentially deemed useful, it can work directly with the protocol operator, to both adjust the application and even tweak if needed some parameters of the vaults in case there is the possibility (which is not there most of the time but asking has 0 cost in life).

I want to stress one final concept. Is relative easy to quantify financial risk of deploying capital here or there in term of projected yield based on market conditions.
What is not apparent, most of the time, is the risk we incur as a DAO by not supporting the stakeholder protocols of our ecosystem. If, as a dao, we don’t promote their utilization by being the first customer on the line, why should we expect others to come to us in the first place?

Note: i have been quite harsh in the judgment above. This is not against single components of the committee or entropy: we have crafted on paper an idea, and this idea has been carried forward while in part being very risk adverse and in part sticking to what we voted for. Which, on paper, is totally fine, and I am sure the committee had to evaluate ton of applications with some (several? most?) not even written in the proper way risk wise. But we need to start pushing toward the last mile here, be proactive, understand how to go toward the goal we want and do the legwork we maybe didn’t expect we had to do. So my harshness is not about badly judging this initiative or the participatns, is in reality just a way to stimulate everybody to be in war mode.

GMC’s Preferred Allocations (7,500 ETH)

Vote: Abstain, due to the fact I helped Camelot in crafting the proposal and worked with the committee to adapt it to the risk profile that was requested
Would still report what I think was the most important feedback on my side here

GMC's Preferred Choices for 7,500 ETH RFP

I am gonna jump the gun to move the convo from the current twitter drama and delegate chat hell into the forum.

I have experienced mixed feeling since the publication of these results. I will start by saying is impossible for me and for anybody else to read all the applications so far posted by the protocols, especially because some are gathed as docs so, likely, any end take I or others will have will be currently mostly

gut related

tied to higher level goals.

At first, I was honestly disappointed by the 3 protocols selected. Don’t get me wrong, I was well aware that lido staked eth would have been an important part of this first tranche, as well as aave. We are talking about battletested protocols, backbone of defi. Thinking arbitrum can succed for example without these 2 would be naive at best, malicious at worst.
I won’t comment on fluid that, as a protocol, I don’t know well enough. I will trust the committee in saying it provides risk adjusted yields that are good enough for our DAO.

All this premised, it seems rather strange that there is not a single eth allocated to arbitrum native protocols.
This is bad because we are on an almost 2 months streak in which the highest autorithy of our chains (OCL through Steven/AJ, Foundation through Patrick, DAO through Entropy, and I am surely missing several here so no offense) talk about how the DAO and the ecosystem should change pace, should push for alignment of participants etc. The one time we had the capacity to take actions matching our collective words, we have a very strict choice of protocols, all from ethereum mainnet.

I am not here to say that these protocols should excluded or others should be plugged in. Nor I am here to say that the committe didn’t do a proper risk adjusted analysis, because I am pretty sure that are well equipped in this sense, likely more than most particpants here. But the decisions here have been extremely short-sighted.

Our DAO is at an inflection point. I personally expect all participants of the DAO, especially the ones in active roles, in knowing how bad the perception of Arbitrum is out there. For this reason, is quite strange that out of 7500 ETH, we couldn’t even allocate 10% spread in other protocols, even to just give outside a signal that “the dao is here to support you, builder that decides to come to arbitrum instead of going to base to enjoy the support of coinbase or to solana to be part of the biggest casino in the world”.

I am going to also try and put myself in the shoes of the committee. The program, as was structured, was mostly a one-way program. Meaning that while there is mentioning of “having a counterparty negotiating”, this is mostly related to numbers. At least, this has been my direct experience having crafted the jones/camelot joint proposal. But, the committee didn’t engage with protocols saying “of X, Y and Z that you proposed, we can do X, we can do 30% of Y and Z doesn’t fall in the risk parameters”. Curious to know if this happened to others.

Let’s also do a practical example.

[Non-Constitutional] Treasury Management v1.2

Again, only strategies that rely on ETH and ETH-pegged asset strategies will be pursued.

This point was in the end unclear in the details. As stated above, only staked lido direct strategies have been pursued with no direct exposure to LRT; likely more than one protocol has submitted strategies involving lido eth, rocketpool eth, renzo eth, etherfi eth etcetera. The committee could have, for example, only onboarded the staked lido part and maybe exclude the others.
Note that I am not suggesting this course of action, but merely stating an example in which there could have been alignment.

Note that taking on actively all proposals, reshaping that on behalf of the DAO, would make this program more akin to what we have had through STIP.b and LTIPP in which advisors indeed had this painful role. We don’t want to go down that route again, but we can find compromise that are driven by the overarching goals of

reach the financial independence of the DAO

give a signal to builders that we, indeed, want to support them in several ways

start to change the perception of the general public of the Arbitrum ecosystem, the DAO, the Foundation, that are all seen in a downward spiral.

An approach like this would have the benefit, for example, to allow utilizing instead of 5000 eth in AAVE, of using 4800 ETH in AAVE and 200 in Dolomite, only in the ETH lending, having what accordingly to defillama is an average yield that is double on only 4% of the initial capital, in a protocol that natively started in Arbitrum, has participated to our incentive programs, and now expanded succesfully in berachain where thanks to the work of the foundation and ecosystem now manages there half a billion in assets. This not a shill for dolo, to which I am not affiliated nor I am an investor, but is a prime example of a protocol that, for the good or the bad, has found better opportunities and more success outside of Arbitrum, and that we should try to retain and keep closer to our ecosystem.

I totally understand that, whatever the choice the commission would have made, it would have made someone unhappy. But the current choice feels is going against what we have been seen preaching by the ecosystem leaders.

I will wait for the proper explanations from the committee. The goal will be, in the end, to have working capital for the dao in a risk adjusted way: if we find ways to do it while signalling support for a broader cohort of Arbitrum protocols, we will have a net positive outcome outpacing value wise both the work needed for it to come to fruition and any yield difference.

disclosure: cow has wrote the applications for jones and camelot, has partially advised winr, and has helped more protocols than he really wants to admit in the end. While biased, cow likes to think he cares about the ecosystem as a whole regardless single protocol preferences

[CONSTITUTIONAL] Proposal: For Arbitrum DAO to register the Sky Custom Gateway contracts in the Router

Vote: For
Pretty straightfoward vote, is something we did for Rari as well, the fact that OCL is engaged in this
activity helps strengthening the confidence

Tally votings

Request to Increase the Stylus Sprint Committee’s Budget

Vote: Abstain
As for the snapshot vote, since I am part of the committee, I am abstaining from this vote.

[CONSTITUTIONAL] - Adopt Timeboost + Nova Fee Sweep

Vote: For
This collapsed the 2 previous votes, i am in support of both so just confirming previous snapshots

[NON-CONSTITUTIONAL] Arbitrum Onboarding V2: A Governance Bootcamp

Vote: For

[NON-CONSTITUTIONAL] Arbitrum Onboarding V2: A Governance Bootcamp

I did vote in favor in snapshot and i am confirming my vote here, but for reasons that are slightly different that I want to explore.

The premise: ongoing changes in Arbitrum sentiment

The landscape of Arbitrum DAO has changed a lot in the last quarter, both due to the new political landscape, the market dynamics and an higher involvement of AF/OCL. This is leading us, chaotically sometimes, toward new sentiment tied to exclusivity of contributors, quality of works, cutting spending that is not deemed necessary. Nothing wrong with any of this.

But, has also created a concerning byproduct in my view: is becoming complex to work and contribute in the DAO.

The problem: keep valuable entities/people engaged in the ecosystem

We can talk a lot about what contributing to this DAO means, we have a degree of flavours that go from being a small delegate in DIP (deemed, by several, as something net negative, bringing noise at a high monetary cost and also indirect reputational damage outside of our sphere) to being a service provider for ARDC, with all that happens in between. The common denominator is: is becoming harder and harder to be part of programs, regardless if you are “aligned”, want to do a good job, want to bring value to both your team and the ecosystem. We have seen this first hand:

some established service providers, that did a great job in the dao (previous ardc, adpc, grant programs) have turned down a lot their contributions in our dao

single meaningful member and contributors can’t find a way to properly be here (one can “use” dip, and the importance of arbitrum, up to some degree to justify the amount of time spent here)

even introducing new people is extremely hard because there is an amount of time spent to pass proposals, with no certainty of the outcome, that drives these new forces away despite a handshake agreement (saw this first hand in the D.A.O. program).

This is, useless to say, my personal opinion. But also the opinion of someone that engaged, directly or indirectly, with most delegates and participated to several programs. You really need a thick skin to work in Arbitrum.

Governance bootcamp as experiment not for junior hiring, but for methodology of junior hiring

So, why all of this introduction? Because while

is true what krst said (i don’t remember when): we are potentially training people for jobs that we don’t know what they will be

is true what others said: we don’t have any guarantee that these people will be retained by the DAO, and they might just move in other ecosystem

is true also what Arbitrum said: costs are high, is not necessary

I think we have to be more proactive and less miopic and think a few quarters ahead.

This, to me, is an experiment to understand if in-house training can partially be a solution to find new workforces. And honestly it could be: when you hire junior people in a company, you hire them based on previous experience and competence, but also you train them to the culture, framework and modus operandi of your company, and you train them to know the intricacy of the people working in there, the overall goals etc.

I think this is a very expensive experiment. But knowing the outcome of this 200k initiative, knowing what things will and won’t work from it, can probably be more valuable than the base cost if the collective goal is to think about our DAO more as a company moving forward. It can help us find our “corporate” identity, and specifically help us try to understand if in this way we can facilitate to have valuable new people in Arbitrum.

JoJo · March 26, 2025, 10:44am

April 2025 voting

Snapshot votings

[Non-constitutional] ARB Incentives: User Acquisition for dApps & Protocols

Vote: n/a

OpCo – Oversight and Transparency Committee (OAT) Elections

Vote: 25% pedrob, 25% Frisson, 25% ajwarner90, 25% stonecoldpat

OpCo – Oversight and Transparency Committee (OAT) Elections

Beside security council, I don’t think we have ever had an election as important as this one. It’s the first time we elect council members that will be in charge to start the operationalization of our DAO. One could argue we did it for GCP, but to me is different: while at the time the amount of capital involved was indeed higher, I think here we have more at stake: defining if we are able to not only self govern ourself, but also manage operations.

In electing OAT members, we have to rely not only in the public figure reputation, skillset, specific knowledge, past but in the trust we can put in whoever is going to be elected. The people in there will be entrusted in choose the right persons to start this company, on behalf of the DAO and in the best interest of the DAO.

Implicitely, this suggest to me that

is going to be hard to vote for people that have never had prominent roles or presence in our DAO: trust can’t be build in a single day

is going to be hard to vote for people who have, involuntarily or voluntarily, harmed the DAO or the DAO reputation outside our (rather small) circle: I personally can’t trust the OAT candidates who have, in past, created situations harmful for the DAO/AF/OCL operations without first doing as much as they could to reach out interested parties. This is not about having/not having the same opinions, is about a course of action in what you do that is responsible toward not only people and operations, but also the perception about Arbitrum, especially perception from outside, that we collectively need to defend

is going to be hard to vote for people that have a very good professional track record, but no strong reference and presence inside our world: Arbitrum is an ecosystem, a very complex one, and there is a fallacy in thinking that the same approach straight out of the box that has ensured success in a somehow smaller environment can also solve the problems we have here. I am talking about not only strategy, but also communication, approach, even philosophy, and all the characteristics that define a person in his attitude toward a working mission.

I have placed my fiches, equally, on these 4 candidates:

pedrob

Frisson

ajwarner90

stonecoldpat

Reasons are the following:

Pedro: I have worked with him during LTIPP and STIP.b, and a few time through SeedLatam before he left the org. I have the uttermost estime for him: the way he approaches the problems we have in the DAO is the type of approach we need, keen toward details, and able to not stop at the first superficial takes.
(one good thing about DIP program is that, for people that have enough time and energy to read all feedback from all delegates, you can now know who just stops at very simplicistic views vs someone able to go more in deep).
I also understand what @paulofonseca means when he says he is the one not having any COI. To me is slightly different: it would be ok, for me, if he was for example still collaborating with Seed, or working on his own company or protocol. What to me is worth noticing is instead the following: he has been in the DAO, now for months, providing value, with just, in the last few months, some compensation through the DIP supporting his efforts. He did show us two things: how much he cares about the ecosystem, and how he is able to tackle complex problem.

Frisson: he has had and still has multiple roles in our DAO. We all know him in his capacity here and in Tally. Lately he showed, again, how he is capable of taking leadership and ownership of problems in the MSS: in a fairly chaotic situation, due to among others how the initiative was conceived, he took the lead in comms, transaction reporting, and communication, doing “what is needed and not what he is paid for”. Can’t say there is a professional perk better than being able to take ownership of problems and solve them when they arise. Beside, it honestly make sense for him to potentially leave all of his roles, consolidate his effort into a very important mission that will for sure benefit from his experience, and at the same time make some space for new contributors, extremely valid, that could fill his roles. A secondary effect that makes me even more confident in voting for him.

AJ: he is, probably, the most stranger to most because in his role at OCL he didn’t had direct contact with most delegates and contributors in here nor he had a presence in the forum or delegate chat. But, if you have “been” in Arbitrum in any capacity beside doing governance in our DAO, you likely know AJ and indeed interacted with him. He has always been very present in the Arbitrum events, always interacting with top delegates, and above all he has insight in the past and future of our Lab and the vision for Arbitrum. This point is key: if he knows what Arbitrum should be from the PoV of OCL, he can definitely help the DAO getting a direction that he thinks is valuable. The other main point is how much he interacted with builders and protocols. My biggest fear for our DAO is alienating builders, detatching our governance from protocols, and AJ in the OAT would mitigate this risk

Pat: I will be totally honest, I was initially conflicted about the Foundation having an active candidate along his observing role. I spent a fairly amount of time asking myself if this was a good move or not, with the OpCo being on paper and among other a potential “alternative foundation, DAO owned”.
Is there a COI (being COI the second most preferred word in our DAO beside framework)?
Would it be a problem having the Arbitrum Foundation in the OAT helping hiring people or shaping/scoping/rescoping the OpCo?
At this point, I don’t think it will create any problem. We could discuss a lot about having a total separation between this new entity and the Foundation and the perks it would give us; but, the focus has to be instead be in having all stakeholders teaming up for the best outcome possible for our DAO. From a practical standpoint, having DAO members, OCL members, AF members, in the OpCo, can just help the flow of information and coordination: Patrick will know what initiative the Foundation is undertaking, even the ones that can be explicitely communicated, and help the DAO leverage this info through the OpCo.

As a final note, I voted 4 candidates for 3 spots. Per the voted proposal, the 3 elected OAT members should then nominate and hire 2 further people. Assuming this happens (and is not given for granted, there could be other proposals to rescope the OAT for example), my hope is that whoever of the 4 above gets elected, will onboard the others. I really think we have, right here and now, the best 4 names we could get, and I will be extremely happy to see all of them working in the council.

TMC Stablecoin Recommendation

Vote: YES, Deploy Stablecoin Strategy
Vote is in line with previous vote, in support of the proposed providers and utilization of stablecoins

TMC ARB Recommendation

Vote: NO, Deploy Nothing
While I would have loved to see utilization of naked ARB, I am trusting the committee decision here and I am voting against the deployment of ARB

Tally votings

[NON-CONSTITUTIONAL] Arbitrum Audit Program

Vote: For

Arbitrum Audit Program

Several good improvements that i see here:

Arbitrum Audit Program

any code audited will need to remain exclusive to our ecosystem for a fixed period of time.

Arbitrum Audit Program

We are targeting relatively early stage projects, projects that have demonstrated product market fit on Arbitrum, and finally projects that have remained loyal to our ecosystem with an upcoming launch or upgrade that has the potential to help grow the ecosystem.

Arbitrum Audit Program

Native deployment. Projects that are operational on Arbitrum must demonstrate either a strong product market fit or a committed alignment with the Arbitrum ecosystem with expectations that subsequent product launches will be successful.

Migrating deployment. Project is planning to migrate from another blockchain ecosystem to Arbitrum

New audits only. Only new code, or code that has undergone significant modifications.

Arbitrum exclusivity. Audited code must remain exclusive to Arbitrum for a fixed period of time.

Arbitrum Audit Program

and a team member from the OpCo (when operational).

I like all of these addition which address most of what was proposed by several delegates. I also like adding one member of the opco because the sheer amount of work could potentially be important, and having more members involved in the DAO can be beneficial even just for comms and to keep context.

JoJo · May 3, 2025, 10:52am

May 2025 voting

Snapshot votings

Approval of STEP 2 Committee’s Preferred Allocations

Vote: For
Trusting the committee on the section of partners for the second round of this program. Hopefully all of these programs (TMC, GMC, STEP) will be consolidated under the same umbrella at some point.

[Non-consitutional]: Top-up for Hackathon Continuation Program

Vote: Yes to both

Proposal [Non-consitutional]: Top-up for Hackathon Continuation Program

Proposal [Non-consitutional]: Top-up for Hackathon Continuation Program

hello, let me chim in. I was reached out first from Brick that mentioned to me this problem Daniel had, and if it was viable to utilize old funds.
We were in the (rather slow) process of gather leftover funds from Season 1 regardless, to send them back to the DAO, and took a while due to the setup of the safes of each domain. As of today, this is the current situation of the aforementioned safe

image1928×656 52.2 KB

Being that these funds were either assigned to protocols that didn’t complete their grant path, or did forfeit that grant, or just unassigned, reallocating to other projects doesn’t affect in any chance any operation.

I don’t think this is should be framed as a “precedent”: the amount the Hackaton need is rather small for the amount the DAO is used to handle to initiative, and at the same time is key for them to finish the initiative and for us to understand if this type of new initiative is viable (grant as investment with intermediate judgment from commission).
Personally would say that not allocating some of these leftover funds to the Hackaton would indeed create more disruption than doing it. So totally in favor of the initiative.

Quite unrelated, it could make sense to pass the net remaining part of stablecoins, after funding the hackaton, directly to the TMC for the stablecoin management: we have assets such as bridged usdc, nowadays kinda deprecated, that would need a conversion regardless. At this point let’s just put it to use. Food for thoughts.

For the reasons mentioned above, voting in favor of both topping up and moving remaining funds in hands of TMC. I think we remove friction, allocate spare funds to a treasury program, and also avoid to devote any more mindshare to issues that are in my opinion secondary to other important things we need to achieve.

DeFi Renaissance Incentive Program (DRIP)

Vote: For

DeFi Renaissance Incentive Program (DRIP)

Thank you for the proposal.

Posting to support the vote in the temp check.

First, there is a general appetite from builders to renew an incentive program, albeit with differences from the past we have had.
Regardless of the general opinion that DAO members can have about these programs, incentives do make a difference at the ecosystem level and protocol level: with more and more competition from alternative L1s, and new L2s, and an always more fragmented mindshare, it does make sense to utilize economic incentives to strengthen the metric of Arbitrum.
I also welcome an approach that is KPI-centered, with measures and goals established beforehand, something we honestly didn’t do in the past.

I have a few remarks that I want to list below.

I can understand how the DAO wants an “owner” of the program, in terms of responsibilities for success/failure. It makes sense. I don’t think Entropy, though, should be treated as the only responsible for this program. I partially echo GFXlabs comment above on the 2/3 decision process, not because I see Foundation and Lab teaming up against Entropy, but because in the end Entropy does not have the final decision, which again relies on a vote for majority. I don’t think the solution is to curb down the commission, nor to give Entropy full control: I think all 3 stakeholders are both well-intended and rightly positioned to make the best decision possible. For these reasons, while Entropy might indeed have more weight in the operations and granular decision process, the initiative will ideally have to be evaluated as one of the first explicit ones run by three AAEs.

KPI definition will be where the devil lives. It would be superficial to define meaningless KPIs that are easy to reach; it would be unfruitful to define KPIs that, while good on paper, won’t necessarily allow us to reach goals that can be seen as pragmatic in the current market and for the Arbitrum ecosystem; it would be simplistic to define KPIs that are not normalized based on current and past conditions and receptive to the markets’ narratives. This is not a critique of the program, Entropy, or others, just a reminder of what we (already) saw in the past. The work on these metrics will be the key unlock of the program; and I will add, I don’t think the DAO should necessarily define them, because while it might seem simple on the surface, it is instead an extremely hard job. In my very personal opinion, one way to solve this would be to interview the most important protocols in Arbitrum, and find a common denominator between these findings and the experience of the analysts we have available, alongside the strategic goal that OCL wants to pursue for the next year.

As I already mentioned privately, one of the main risks of the program is choosing the right technological partner. I will be honest: so far we haven’t seen in our DAO entities and proposals that are able to go into the nuances of incentive programs, such as avoiding the situation where multichain DEXes reduce the spread of pools in Arbitrum to 0 to subsidize LPers with incentives, while the protocol itself still has revenue from other chains (and so hurting DEXes that are mainly focused in Arbitrum), or analyzing what % of fee rebate in all perps protocols gives an equilibrium between organic growth in demand versus simply creating farming dynamics. We just didn’t see the granular breakdown up to these details in the last several months of calls, and it might also mean that there is no entity out there specifically able to minimize these unhealthy situations.
Wanting to be optimistic about it, if we are able to choose a partner that is constantly available to hear from both the DAO and protocols, and is capable of properly measuring, almost in real time, the data needed, and has a mandate that is flexible enough to intervene with even important changes on the fly, then we can probably obtain a good result.

[Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction

Vote: For

[Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction

I’m voting in favor.

Not a lot to add to what was so far mentioned but will try to give my 2 cents on the topic.

yes, this is clearly a short term bandwith: by the time everything goes live, we are back at quorum level of april

we can make this measure effective, short term, only if paired with other short term solution such as

Increasing, as we saw last 2 months, the amount of delegated tokens to active delegates. This probably comes from a BD print from AF/OCL and should be pursued aga

Avoid outcomes like the one proposed for Event Horizon. As much as i can understand the goal of adjusting voting power based on the new scope, stripping EH of 7 millions would negate around 28% of the gain we would get with this proposal

There are several delegates, in the top 20/30, with several millions of ARB delegate to them that barely vote. One of them is, for example, Yoav, that was recently elected in the security council. This is just one specific case, but the point is that we need to find a way to involve these delegates, having vested interested in arb or a specific role in the DAO, to be more involved in day to day voting. Knowing how taxing this activity is, we should find a way to facilitate them as much as we can, and starting with AF/OCL contacting them 1:1 with the aid of certain delegates like krst or others that in past expressed their interest on the topic could be a start.

All of the above put together could give us a breathing room of 2-3 quarters, and let us figure out a better long term solution.

Tally votings

The Watchdog: Arbitrum DAO’s Grant Misuse Bounty Program

Vote: For
Confirming snapshot vote, also in favour of all changes which are logical and sounding

[CONSTITUTIONAL] AIP: ArbOS Version 40 Callisto

Vote: For
Confirming snapshot vote

JoJo · May 31, 2025, 9:53am

June 2025 voting

Snapshot votings

Adjust the Voting Power of the Arbitrum Community Pool & Ratify the Agentic Governance Pivot

Vote: B - Reduce delegation to 100K

[RFC] Proposal to Adjust the Voting Power of the Arbitrum Community Pool & Ratifying the Agentic Governance Pivot

Flipping my stance here, and voting in favour of reducing the voting power of Event Horizon to 100,000.

I have spent the last few days talking to several delegates, specifically

delegates that have been close to event horizon in term of observing how it behaved in the last 8 months

delegates that have been using Event Horizon in the last 8 months

delegates that have never had any interest whatsoever in Event Horizon.

I have to say, I approached the problem from the wrong point of view.
First, the major flaw: comingling the current quorum problem with this proposal. Yes, we are struggling more and more in reaching quorum; but it doesn’t mean we need two mix two very different situations. At most, this proposal should be another reminder that we collectively need to put more effort to increase the delegated amount of ARB.

Second, the specificity of the request. At the time I voted in favor of EH because the idea of allowing smaller delegates and holders to access an higher pool of VP was potentially a good idea.
What we have seen tho, and this came also from the chats I have had lately, is that this didn’t specifically happen: the product didn’t really get too much traction apparently.
Now, we have this pivot toward agents. As stated above, is something I don’t like. Is just too easy to fool agents, is just quite complex to plug in all the sources you would need for an agent to behave as you want. I don’t believe that, as it is now, governance is ready to use efficiently AI.
At the same time as other posted it would be shortsighted to not think that AI will have a pervasive role in our life and also in DAOs.
For this reason, instead of totally disbanding the initiative, I am voting to keep running the experiment through agents with a lower amount of voting power, an amount that will not bear any tangible consequence on governance but will also allow us to gather some data for the few remaining months of the initiative.

Wind Down the MSS + Transfer Payment Responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation

Vote: Wind Down the MSS

Wind Down the MSS + Transfer Payment Responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation

I am voting in favor of disbanding the MSS.

I am one of the signer and have been serving the MSS since the beginning of the term.

The initiative, while well intended, has always clashed with the reality of multisig management that I personally tried to suggest at the time and boils down to the following points:

the chair role, as it was conceived, had an amount of work way higher than what was planned. The initial role of ownership, and partial administration, became over time almost a secondary PM role for each initiative with a decent lift at the very beginning of the funding of a new proposal. At the same time, only 3 chairs meant (when we had a lot of initiative) that the role was likely underpaid

the distinction between chairs and signers doesn’t make sense. We need to have general accountability on all people in there, with a potential split in the initiatives to manage. This would be the only way to have also good performance for signers (see next point)

the performances have been not great. This comes from several factors, the first being a general 7/12 and 8/12 setup. It’s extremely difficult to have transactions signed in 24h when you have to gather 8 people; and, in general, the sheer amount of signers while can increase security posture doesn’t match a reality with several msig, way more important than ours, being 3/5 or 5/7. This is a very superficial take of course since we would have to analyse the opsec of each participant, but is just to convey a general point. A second factor is tied to the performances of single signers. Without going in the specific, we have seen big discrepancies in how fast people were available to first verify all the data and then sign transactions. While this was not noticeable when most of the people were around, during period like weekends, holidays etc it meant that some transactions would be stale way above the 24h sla that we imposed in the proposal.

Is there a way to restructure all of this, keep the initiative in the DAO and make it efficient? Potentially, yes. 5 or 7 signer, a PM (not a chair) that assigns ownership of initiatives, a schedule for unavailability, rules like no transactions being submitted on a friday unless is super urgent, periodic performance audit with rules to replace signers.

But I would still advocate that it doesn’t necessarily make sense, also in the new setup put forward with AAE and OpCo operationalizing the DAO, having the initiative not falling under AF or OpCo itself.
AF is needed, in every initiative, and almost in every transaction. As a signer, we always have to wait for the greenlight of AF from a compliance standpoint; this has also meant back and forth via email with them. Just this point really reduces performances, which to me are paramount here: we have to pay people in a timely fashion to become a professionalized DAO, full stop. Foundation will always be a middle layer, so it makes sense to move the whole function to this middle layer. OpCo will likely be able to have more agile communication with AF as well in future.

Reallocate Redeemed USDM Funds to STEP 2 Budget

Vote: For
Easy and straightforward yes. We need to reallocate the funds and making them being managed by current STEP committee is the ideal path. Seriously hoping we won’t have to go to specific votes in future for these granular decisions: assuming the treasury committee pass, it should take the honour and burden to do such operations

Updating the OpCo Foundation’s Operational Capability

Vote: For

Updating the OpCo Foundation’s Operational Capability

I am going to go point by point here having followed the proposal closely from the beginning.

First a general introduction: I do understand how a proposal that was ideated in eth denver 2024, started a proper discussion in bruxelles at ethcc in 2024, that was voted on snapshot in december 2024 and in tally in february 2025, with elections coming a few months ago, might need updates.

A lot changed in the last year, including the political panorama, how OCL and AF wants to interact with the DAO and broader ecosystem etc. This whole premise to say: it can make sense to put forward a discussion to change a few points that are now deemed by the OAT as too restrictive.

Updating the OpCo Foundation’s Operational Capability

Inability to Interact with Service Providers

I’ll be honest at the time it didn’t make too much sense to me how opco would not be able to interact with service provider. Let’s assume the normal path:

the DAO wants to engage in a certain activity

it tasks the OpCo to do so

but neither the DAO nor other AAEs have the expertise to put forward this initiative

at the same time, OpCo has to manage the initiative in that set of strategic and operational details that requires 90% of the effort

the DAO goes through a procurement process to find a third party (and likely assigns to opco to manage this procurement process? who deals with that?)

the DAO choose a provider with an election based process.

I do get that the ability to elect a service provider is something the DAO wants to retain. At the same time, looking at the past, I do find difficult to see how the DAO can do a better choice compared to the OpCo and the OAT, knowing already the OAT composition and knowing that they will (hopefully) find the right people to work in it.
At the same time opco managing this choice means we remove a lot of friction from any process.

Updating the OpCo Foundation’s Operational Capability

Restrictive Treasury Spend

This could be one of the most controversial point for the DAO: basically using funds allocated initially only for people of OpCo and for the ops strictly for OpCo, to be used to fund also initiatives instead.
I am unsure if this is a positive or negative thing right now. It might create a natural tendency to spend maybe a bit less on people because there will always be the back idea of allocating funds to initiatives. I also see this being contested by delegates who are advocating for putting in circle less arb as possible, and so we are potentially saying that all budget could be utilized even if not all on people. I don’t necessarily care about this last point knowing that few have hundreds of millions of unlocks and so this is mathematically speaking a small amount; I do care instead about the process behind, from Opco, saying “we spend X on this initiative” vs “dao has to put X for this initiative”. And the fact that there might be a disagreement on what X should be, and how OpCo would approach the decision of onboarding the capital cost if below a certain threshold, or outsource to the DAO if above.
This is probably a nuance at this point in time; as long as the reasoning of deciding on internalizing vs asking to the DAO is made clear in each situation, I think it could be ok. But I would like to avoid a situation in which, in an entity that should have had almost $8M earmarked to pay people, we end up spending instead $1M and put aside $7M for initiatives. Is not about overspending on people, but having opco being a real force operating on behalf of the DAO.

Updating the OpCo Foundation’s Operational Capability

Compensation for OpCo Employees

This is one of the thing that makes the most sense. As of today opco can’t offer equity nor anything that is “really” appealing in a world in which you can get stock options, carry etc. We need to make the company attractive.

Updating the OpCo Foundation’s Operational Capability

Restrictions Around Council Elections.

This was probably a big oversight to begin with, and I wonder how many people have not run in the elections due to this very strong limitation. I am one of the few for example. Another point that I strongly support.

Updating the OpCo Foundation’s Operational Capability

Declaring Conflict of Interest

Focusing on the public side of job positions, and disclosing privately to the OAT what could be seen as a potential conflict for other to evaluate, is likely for the best.
We live in a tokenized world. Do I have a conflict of interest if I have OP tokens in my portfolio, or if I particpate to the Echo Coinbase group? Unlikely. Does it make sense to disclose this to peers for the sake of transparency and for them to evaluate if there could be any strange situation? Yes.

Updating the OpCo Foundation’s Operational Capability

Ecosystem Support or Financial Management only

This is another critical point.
I do see how enlarging the scope can make sense. We don’t want OpCo to be a black hole of initiatives; it will likely not be looking at the budget that will rather large is not infinite, even through external requests.
The main point is for the OpCo to evaluate, in good faith, if they deem themself up to the task of properly ideating, executing and managing certain strategies, without internalizing for the sake of control and for the sake of being capital efficient.
It will fall in the same framework posted above: each time there is a meaningful decision, clearly explain to the DAO and other AAEs why it should fall into OpCo, why alternatives are not necessarily advised, and how OpCo should potentially be a better executor.

On one side, I do see OpCo managing intiatives outside the initial “ecosystem growth” and “financial” verticals. Looking at people currently in the OAT, we are indeed on the right path to have a very good team, well interconnected in the ecosystem. At the same time we don’t want to

have OpCo onboarding any initiatives that can’t be executed by AF, OCL, Entropy, AGV because there are “no alternatives”

have the DAO assign to OpCo any initiatives that can’t be executed by AF, OCL, Entropy, AGV because there are “no alternatives”.

It means that people in the OpCo (OAT, Chief etc) will not have to be complacent about their role, and have a constant critical thinking about why they are indeed managing or not managing certain initiatives.

This is not a virtue signal: I am cautiously optimistic in enlarging the scope of the OpCo. But in this whole transition we are collectively experiencing, from DAO executed operations to AAEs taking the lead, we want to constantly ask ourself if we are not losing the plot.

Personally, I am quite confident we won’t.

Let’s improve our governance forum with three proposals.app feature integrations

Vote: Abstain

[Non-Constitutional] Let’s improve our governance forum with three proposals.app feature integrations

I have been quite close through the year to the app made by Paulo and Andrei.
I was one of the judges at govhack 2024 that awarded proposals.app with the first price, then during Questbook season 2 I approved a grant to continue the development.

Useless to say, I think that the application is well done and serves a value and a purpose. I was also quite impressed by the milestone’s videos that Paulo released over time, very detailed.

That said, I am voting “abstain” from this proposal. The reason is simple: to me, the cost proposed even after the reduction is wrong because the proposed model is wrong.
Governance is not something we only have in Arbitrum but in several DAOs, which would all benefit from this integration. This would be, in my opinion, the right way to scale down costs: a $20k integration fee per year on five different daos would bring the team to the price tag initially proposed, and would be potentially easier to obtain. Understanding that, before upselling, you want to have a functioning product, it could have made sense to start here, in Arbitrum (likely at a loss initially) and then expand over time.
I do understand both the attachment and the desire from Paulo to stay exclusive here and I can also appreciate that; but unfortunately this feeling is in my opinion not compatible with the product.
As a side note, I don’t think we are currently in a point of the life cycle of the DAO in which we want to necessarily focus on further governance tooling, but this point is currently secondary compared to the evaluation above.

Arbitrum Treasury Management Council - Consolidating Efforts

Vote: For

Arbitrum Treasury Management Council - Consolidating Efforts

Thanks for the proposal, and for the lenghtly discussion in calls.

A first feedback on the overarching scope, having a single body managing the treasury of the DAO.
We need this. We have a lot of assets deployed in RWA, we are now starting to utilise the Ethereum of the treasury as productive assets, and we have a cash account. It does only make sense, from both a cost and management perspective, to have a unified approach to all of this.
Would still like to explore a few points mentioned, both here and also in the calls that we had.

Arbitrum Treasury Management Council - Consolidating Efforts

Observatory Body

Arbitrum Foundation - Manages movement of funds/custody

Offchain Labs - Inform the aforementioned council members of any ongoing BD efforts that may conflict with fund allocations

We want, and need, AF/OCL to be perfectly aware of what we are doing and eventually inform us of potential opportunities.

Arbitrum Treasury Management Council - Consolidating Efforts

Execution Body

Entropy Advisors - Responsible for strategic financial management, data transparency, and procurement

While there are several entities in the DAO that have treasury expertise (thinking KPK, Avantgarde to name a couple) there is for now only one entity that is exclusive to our DAO and so has the most aligned nature. So it makes sense to have if any external SPs as executor/risk consultant, with strategic planning coming from Entropy.
We have also seen how Entropy does have financial capacities, so I think this choice is the right one. One hope, not necessarily a request, is that Entropy, in evaluating over time how to deploy assets, will also take in consideration the secondary goal of using these assets also for growth. As long as we are in proper risk parameters, allocating for example for a slightly lower APR but utilsing a protocol deemed key in our ecosystem would be, to me, the optimal outcome.
To reiterate: this can be a secondary goal not a primary one. But I am pretty sure that this will be taken in consideration, knowing that also OCL and AF are involved.

Arbitrum Treasury Management Council - Consolidating Efforts

It was made evident in the recent community call, as well as on the forum, that the DAO needs to have a process for spending stables/cash during periods in which it would rather not monetize treasury ARB to cover dollar-denominated expenses, or to cover service provider shortfalls that arise due to downward ARB price volatility.

Moving forward, we propose giving the entity tasked with custody (in this case, the AF) full discretion over covering service provider shortfalls or spending treasury assets instead of using issued ARB to cover dollar-denominated expenses in proposals that pass through Tally. The AF will be required to adhere to any future structures that arise, including but not limited to a DAO budget or Net Working Capital requirements. It’ll be of great importance that the AF, through OpCo, informs a proposer whether or not the proposal’s expenses should be covered through the DAO’s non-native assets instead of issuing more ARB well before the proposal is moved to the voting stage. This way, delegates know whether or not the proposal is asking to dilute ARB when casting their votes or to spend down cash positions from the treasury. However, if this communication does not occur and the language is not included in the original Tally proposal, but the AF still wishes to spend treasury assets, it may do so with the requirement that the ARB moved from the Tally proposal is converted over the subsequent 30-day period for cash-like assets (or the same asset that was spent) and redeployed to the strategy in which the original position was drawn from. Note that such an occurrence should be considered a failure in operations, and this clause is only put in place such that the existing portfolio composition isn’t unexpectedly changed in cases where there has been a breakdown in communications.

This point can likely be considered controversial at first glance by some. But I think is a somehow pragmatic approach to the reality that we have, which is

as of today, AF is the only entity really capable of converting both small and large sum of ARB into stables

AF has internal policies, rules and framework to do so, which might (conditional because I have no knowledge but makes sense to theorize) include converting only up to a certain amount of ARB per day/week/month, understanding market conditions and volatility etc

for this reason, the cash flow needs of new proposals might just be inconsistent with the policies of AF, policies that we collectively don’t know, and that we don’t need to know in my opinion.

Going back to the initial point, this solution seems pragmatic with a reality that has seen several proposals not being funded in a timely fashion due to these externalities.

[Constitutional] AIP: Remove Cost Cap on Arbitrum Nova

Vote: For
As stated by others, Nova feels not necessarily irrelevant for now but a product from which there is not currently a proper strategic plan, at least publicly. Makes sense to cut the subsidization

Tally votings

DeFi Renaissance Incentive Program (DRIP)

Vote: For
Confirming the snapshot vote

[CANCELED] CONSTITUTIONAL Register the Sky Custom Gateway contracts in the Router

Vote: Against

Mistake in the payload, voting against waiting for the right version to come online

JoJo · June 20, 2025, 12:24pm

July 2025 voting

Snapshot votings

Audit Committee Technical Expert Elections

Vote: 60% Gustavo, 40% Andrei
I don’t have a strong preference and think both candidates have the right background and will fulfil the role very well. I have slightly skewed vote toward Gustavo due to his past with Trail Bits and how Trail Bits has always had a strong relationship with Arbitrum.

Extend AGV Council Term and Align Future Elections with Operational Cadence

Vote: Yes

Proposal: Extend AGV Council Term and Align Future Elections with Operational Cadence

Being closer than others to AGV, I have seen first hand how council did work during 2024. But also I do know how effectively the initiative, for several reasons already highlighted in other threads, did start effectively operations only in january.

In my opinion it makes sense to allow them to operate for the whole 2025 as a 1y mandate: the alternative is to replace them very soon (in the next month or two) and this would set back the initiative a lot.
Reason is simple: current council is not just a council, it effectively participate to the day to day operations of the fund, in a way that is not apparent to most delegates (more on this on the other proposal).

Proposal: Extend AGV Council Term and Align Future Elections with Operational Cadence

However, we have reservations about consolidating all Council terms into a unified election cycle. Transitioning the entire Council simultaneously significantly elevates the risk of operational stagnation and knowledge loss. Ideally, staggered transitions would provide continuity and mitigate these risks effectively.

While I can’t decide for AGV, I honestly expect a good portion of the current council to be again candidates for the initiative, knowing how each one of them has been pouring effort into the job; I also expect the DAO to reelect most if not all of them.
One thing that could help is better disclosing their scope of work, and the new proposal is a very good start but we can definitely do more.

Arbitrum Research and Development Collective V2 - Extension

Vote: Don’t Extend

Arbitrum Research and Development Collective V2 - Extension

Voting to not extend the ARDC.

The value provided I think was good. I am a huge fan of a researches, and of the ability for stakeholders to be able to come and ask complex questions and get well thought answers. It’s what we need just because we are in such an experimental field that we will have a lot of questions and answers might just not be trivial. But I do agree with all parties involved that the current structure doesn’t create the proper incentives for smooth operations, specifically

prepaid allocated hours with a fixed time term means that SP (and the DAO) will be pushed to use these hours regardless of real needs

it is hard to see proper followup and the researches more times than not becomes siloed as such (which still has value, but less than what we want).

I also think the equivalent of an R&D department is HIGHLY needed in our DAO, and I do agree with whoever mentioned, here or in voice calls or meetings, that up to some degree every AAE should have his own department.
At the same time, is impossible for all AAEs to have the expertise necessary to cover all the important questions that might arise. Defining an on-call model, with several service providers whitelisted, a preallocated budget from the DAO from which a delegate can query an AAE that takes the task of selecting the SP and negotiate with it, and even the ability for any AAE to use its own internal budget for researches, is probably the model that we need, with some check and balances over time to understand and rate the quality of these SPs and know if the company X, Y or Z did a good/bad job and so we know if we want to engage again with them or not.

EDIT I want to make a clarification to this because is important. I think @Juanrah, @Entropy, all the service providers, all the people previously involved in ops and comms, they all did a GREAT job. I do see a situation in which all these parties in future can either re-facilitate this initiative or even better knowing we want a different structure another, because they proved themself worth it.
My personal vote against, and likely the vote of others, is not about the people but the structure of ARDC. Utilizing and customizing the provisioning framework created by ADPC is potentially a good first step to move forward and rework everything.

Entropy Advisors: Exclusively Working with the Arbitrum DAO, Year 2 and Year 3

Vote: For
Below there is one of the few messages I left in the thread. Not reporting everything to avoid complexity of reading, after this message some stuff changed specifically

15M bonus being split in 5M bonus + 10M managed by OpCo through KPI and other measures
Entropy having OpCo as counterparty.
These two changes make the proposal better; a reason more for me to vote in favour.

Entropy Advisors: Exclusively Working with the Arbitrum DAO, Y2-Y3

Thanks for the proposal, was about time.

First, a small premise.
I have had the pleasure to work with Entropy in different degrees through different initiatives, either with an official role like in the Stylus program, or in a non official role/capacity as a delegate that just tries to chime into initiatives that I deem important. I specifically worked with Pruitt (even before in LTIPP), i have always found in Brick a counterparty willing to explain his vision, even when very different than mine and during weekends. I have spoke extensively with both Sam and Matt. And also clashed, privately, with Matt, more than I would like to admit cause we both have a certain personality, but is the type of clashes that comes from having strong opinions driven by a vision. Is the good type of clashes.
I have also grown appreciating the work of the Data team (Tom, Ali) that have always been open to suggestions.
All to say: i have confidence in my judgments, which are both related to Entropy, the entity, and the people working in Entropy. And that is why I see myself supporting them in this renewal.

I want to loosely comment on a few things. I am going to focus on what might be deemed by some controversial, and analyze past initiatives that might have not created the outcome the DAO wanted, and show why these imho have no material weight in the renewal.

2 years mandate

I think this is quite logical. In the program I run, the D.A.O. grant program, I moved the terms from 6 months to 1 year. I think initiatives that have a broad consensus and are perceived as important need to extend over time the time term because is the easiest way to allow the team to operate focusing on the mission, and not on the fact that in 12 months they will have to go all over this again.
Managing an initiative that moved from 6 months to 1 year, the above explains why having a longer term would be preferred. I also don’t see this as a deal breaker: either we renew entropy or we don’t, and them running for 1 or 2 years is less important than the DAO accepting them.

Budget: $2.5M to $3M per year

This is a bump on base cost of 20%. 1 year ago, in Bruxelles, the team was made by Matt, Sam, Pruitt, and if I recall Brick was recently onboarded or soon to be. Unsure if Tom was already there.
We now have double the personnel and a clear stated goals of hiring more people, accordingly to the infochart with one that is basically here and another 5 that are planned and might come.
Knowing how consultancy work, and even more how it works in crypto, I think the budget is extremely lean, even underpriced. But is partially compensated by the vesting bonus (see below). I won’t for sure push Entropy to ask for more capital, but I think they could have easily asked for $3.5M seeing how they are scaling.

Budget: 15M ARB bonus

I have never been a fun of the DAO voting on bonuses on people (not only on entropy). Yes, the DAO can evaluate if someone did the work it was supposed to do up to some degree. But voting on assigning/non assigning a bonus is tricky because it becomes an issue about quality of the job, if the people involved pushed into the last mile and more vs doing just the homework etc. I don’t think the DAO is well equipped to do this because is extremely difficult to be able to see the outcome as a function of the work behind, just like for an iceberg is easy to see the tip but you can only imagine the size of the submerged part. All of this to say: I think is fair to move to a bonus that is vested.
On the amount. This is quite difficult for me to asses. As it is today, the bonus corresponds to around $4.5M so 1.5 times the yearly budget. But this will be all available in 4 years, and in 2 years from now the amount of unlocked supply of arb should be 50% more than what it is now excluding DAO spending, with around 30M arb unlocked per month. It’s a fool’s game to try and project the notional dollar value. But let’s assume we have 15 people in entropy: it would basically mean an average of 1M bonus each after 4 years; of this, 333k would be unlocked in 2 years.
Comparing the numbers to OpCo, and knowing that Entropy has still a private nature so it can justify a premium to have them around exclusively for further 2 years, I don’t think the number is unreasonable. I will also let other speak on this number.

GMC/TMC proposal

This is explicitely mentioned by Entropy itself in the list of things from which there are mistakes from which they can learn from. Of the last proposals we have had, one of the biggest critique has been around the lack of flexibility and allocation in these proposals, and how protocols could have benefit from a broader framework.
I have been the first one expressing loudly this point. Was there margin for a better execution? Yes. Could Entropy have had this broader vision at day one and be put in the condition of executing this vision right away? Yes and no. The main problem was tied to not only a conservative vision (which is not necessarily a problem honestly, more like a different angle), but mostly on the outreach terms for protocol. If protocols have to take the time to create proposals, explain their strategy and then they get rejected, there is inevitably a bitter feeling as a consequence which also increases the negative sentiments. Entropy would have benefit from better communication with stakeholders like OCL that could have suggested (and I am not sure if this happened or not) allocations that were more oriented toward growth; they would have also benefit from the contributions of very entrenched, defi native people able to contribute to their team and program. All of this is likely solvable in the next iterations: we do have a lot of ETH to spend and this was the first programmatic initiative that weaponized our treasury and opened the path to several other in future. Expecting the first iteration to be already perfected and tailored to our collective needs is a bit unrealistic; plus, the other side of the coin is that our DAO has been live for 2 years (with the chain been live for 3.5 years) and there has been no other party trying to spin up an initiative such as this one.
TLDR: can we have objective critiques on the expectation vs actual outcome of the GMC proposal? Yes. At the same time, we should recognize how this initiative would have not even existed in the first place, how is a first 6 months iteration, and how it made us learn a lot on what we can do and in what areas we can improve.

Of the above mentioned, I think none is material through a renewal that takes in account the following points:

first treasury program that directly utilizes the eth we have. While imperfect, it bootstrapped the initiative

opco: everybody and their grandma in the dao now is eagerly expecting opco to be operating. This would not have happened without entropy. Worth noticing, them pushing for opco is a testimonial of their neutrality since they even voted against.

Converge: while most of us was not aware, Ethena launching on top of our stack is an important milestone. Entropy having a role, with first the data unit and then bd work on the ground is notable

Data and dashboard. I honestly haven’t seen this type of dashboard in any other ecosystem at least not at this level of detail and heterogeneity. I will state the obvious: neither the foundation, nor ocl, nor anybody else did create this data for us which is key to properly measure our operations and allows external parties to asses how good our stack and ecosystem is

sos proposal (previously: MVP): while this proposal was “immaterial”, I can’t think about anything else beside the detox discussion spearheaded by l2beat that had as much involvement from delegates

i could mention a few other stuff: CoC and calendar that allows for smoother operations and some breathing room during december, the stylus program to push for the adoption of the technology (being an insider i can testify that a lot of the passed proposals are key, for OCL, to push the adoption of the tech), the drip program (tbd on that one but we have a different approach and we come from a year with no real practical consensus on how to do incentives).

These are the material results; is a bit subjective and in general hard to understand the immaterial results and second order effect that Entropy manifested in the DAO. Two are worth mentioning:

we have raised the bar in term of professionalization compared to 1 year ago, and this is highly needed if we want the DAO to be a positive component of the Arbitrum ecosystem

Entropy has become a de fact public face of the DAO in a moment in which we didn’t had (and still don’t have) one.

The question becomes: were the $2.5M we paid a good price tag for what we obtained in the last 12 months? My answer as of today is a big yes.

I also don’t want to sound like a cheerleader. Everybody has margin of improvement here and Entropy is not an exception. Specifically, it can benefit by a lot of things. One of the pitfall we likely had, and is quite common in crypto, is a team that is not only extremely motivated, but also quite young. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but the lack of experience can sometimes create shortfalls that could have been easily avoided. This was noticeable, for example, in certain occasion, during communications with the rest of the DAO or some protocols.
As of today, not only Entropy operated for 1 year in crypto (which, like dogs’ years, is equivalent to 7 years of professional life somewhere else), but they will now have a series of other counterparties, either new (opco) or new in term of willing to be more active (ocl), that will make their life probably easier due to their scope being now narrower compared to the initial mandate.
Entropy would also benefit by diversifying a bit their team through hiring people that are “closer to the trenches” to put it bluntly, and the list of future hires does indeed indicate that.
Entropy is growing in the DAO alongside all of us, this is clear to me.

\

Since we are here I want to also give my educated opinion on the above post from Tane, not because his opinion is wrong but because the approach/angle should be a bit different imho.

Entropy Advisors: Exclusively Working with the Arbitrum DAO, Y2-Y3

How will Entropy ensure that its exclusive mandate does not crowd out alternative contributors or foster dependency if priorities shift or performance falters?

OpCo is a good testimonial on how Entropy did facilitate other entities to rise in Arbitrum. They literally voted against because they thought: we, alongside foundation and OCL, can do enough here. And their opinion in this sense was overturned by the overall DAO vote despite them being the biggest delegate.
We also have seen at the same time initiatives still coming out in an horizontal landscape, such as ARDC v2 and D.A.O. Grant Program.
On priorities shift: to me is pretty clear the fact that, as a DAO, we adapt over time. This is both in term of what entropy does, what we decide about what entropy should do, and in general any initiative of the DAO. Think about opco, was devised 1+ year ago, and we are currently voting to change scope. This is the natural and dynamic process of a DAO, that while slowly constantly reasses scope and goals based on new information, through votes and collective decision.

Entropy Advisors: Exclusively Working with the Arbitrum DAO, Y2-Y3

Please outline review gates or competitive checkpoints that allow the DAO to reassess exclusivity at regular intervals.

I am a bit puzzled by this point honestly. Having a provider working exclusively for us is something positive, not negative. It means that they will focus 100% of their energy toward our goal, and that we can align the outcomes in an easier way (re: 15M arb bonus for example). Should we for example in 8 months just vote and say “no, entropy should not be exclusive anymore”? I don’t think so. If we come to that point, the question is likely “should entropy still operate for the arbitrum dao”.

Entropy Advisors: Exclusively Working with the Arbitrum DAO, Y2-Y3

Arbitrum already coordinates Offchain Labs, the Foundation, and the emerging OpCo, so overlapping mandates can easily turn into a bureaucratic cost center without contributing to the actual project’s progress.

Unsure what you mean when you say “Arbitrum coordinates” but will just assume you mean the DAO. The DAO so far has not specifically coordinated OCL; on the contrary, OCL has posted to us their work and we have validated it from time to time. Same with the foundation, up to a lesser degree because the dialague is way more open (and both should improve over time).
OpCo will indeed act as coordation; this coordination has partially being executed by all parties involved. I honestly don’t see the point on this.
On the overlap: it has been clear now that we are really segmenting operations over time. Entropy is posting about treasury, incentives, data just to name three. None of these 3 are verticals that, so far, were managed by the foundation or ocl, nor by the dao independently (except, maybe, incentives with LTIPP and STIP/STIP.b, but the overall consensus in the last year has been to move on from that modus operandi).

Entropy Advisors: Exclusively Working with the Arbitrum DAO, Y2-Y3

A granular cost breakdown—headcount by role, salary bands, data-infrastructure spending, travel, and contingency—will help delegates judge whether the budget matches market rates and expected value delivered.

The cost breakdown (without going into the single salary numbers) has always been outlined afaik in their quarterly reports here: Entropy Advisors Updates - Arbitrum.
The headcount, is literally in the slides presented above, with 7 full time members, one part time, and further hires ahead. Knowing that the budget has been increased by 20% with a 100% increase of people, is easy to have the granular breakdown because it will be very close to what we have today already.

Entropy Advisors: Exclusively Working with the Arbitrum DAO, Y2-Y3

A two-year mandate brings welcome continuity, yet it may also reduce flexibility. Why is a single two-year tranche preferable to a one-year renewal structure tied to performance milestones?

I personally answered in length on the above. But the point is that to build fundamentally strong initiatives we need to start thinking on the long term.
Arbitrum as a DAO has had 2 years now to figure out his identity. We have tested a lot of things in a lot of ways and I am glad we did, it really helped us understand what worked for us. We are now at a point in which we need to double down on

EDIT rereading i realized my point toward Tane is not clear. More than discussing “guardrails, kpis, etc” which are fine but also details in the grand scheme of things, to me we should instead answer the following questions: did entropy do a good job in the past 12 months? Was the job worth the price tag? if the answers to the previous questions are both positive, is the new proposal something that puts them in condition to do a work that is at least of the same quality if not above?
This is not because KPIs are not important. But they can be a way to make us feel like we are doing proper DD, make us feel “good” about our “data driven” decision, while instead we miss the forest for the tree.
We can discuss a lot if the price tag is correct, if the term is correct, if the bonus is correct, what kpi to add. To me this is secondary to the most important questions highlighted above. And as I showed (fwiw, i am just a single cow delegate), the attached numbers feels correct, but that is also a personal take.

[CONSTITUTIONAL] Register $BORING in the Arbitrum generic-custom gateway

Vote: For
Support the expansion of teams in Arbitrum, since also there is no blocker from a technical and security standpoint

[Constitutional] AIP: Update the Upgrade Executors

Vote: For
According to the proposal, it should make some technical operations easier to manage and less prone to errors.

Updating the Code of Conduct & DAO’s Procedures

Vote: For
All the updates make sense:

extending the trial period instead of putting it in the constitution makes it more agile and less set in stone. It was a mistake in the first place to suggest it going in the constitution, but a mistake in goodwill due to being a good idea on paper
extending the shield for election, is good. Reduces the burden on delegates being lobbied
removing the responsible voting: while this pains me a bit, is the right choice, in the end it can’t be enforced and anything that can’t be enforced on chain while likely create issues going forward. But I personally do expect delegates to keep voting in a responsible manner going forward.

[Constitutional] AIP: Disable Legacy Tether Bridge

Vote: For
I don’t love that we have to rely on a third party bridge for USDT0 in Arbitrum (but I do love stargate). That said the decision was basically already made by the Tether team and the token has been setup as an OFT, we are just approving their internal choice here and partially improving UX for users.

Consolidate Idle USDC to the ATMC’s Stablecoin Balance

Vote: For

Consolidate Idle USDC to the ATMC’s Stablecoin Balance

Voted in favor.

Knowing that funds send back to the treasury means having them idle in whatever assets they were sent in the first place, is quite easy to choose to instead put the capital at work, even more if this happens as form of growth of Arbitrum protocols and liquiidity.

That said, as others mentioned, we do need rules to make this process straighforward. When a program ends and stable funds are left over, we have the following options:

send funds back to treasury

send funds to TMC

roll over the funds into the next iteration of the same program.

In my opinion the management of these 3 choices should be straightforward and not require a vote. In the same fashion we just voted to update the Code of Conduct to manage a team member leaving/getting removed in case it was not specified by the initiative itself, we should also implement such measures for stable funds. Specifically:

for any initiatives having stables, assume that leftover stables will be sent to the TMC initiatives at the very end, minus any amount that should be retained for possible expenses, payments and others

any initiative can specify, when approved in the onchain vote, the optionality of retaining the stables remaining from their initial funding for a continuation of the program if/when this further iteration will be voted; assuming there would be uncertainty on renewal, or maybe just a window of time that is “large enough”, the funds could be sent at interim to the tmc. But, in this case, we would rely on the program manager of that initiatives for the decision: it might just not make sense for example to send the equivalent of 50k USDC for a single month to the tmc.

The same framework should be utilized in case initiatives hold ETH, to be sent to the GMC initiative, albeit this seems a very hedge case.

I want to also stretch this forward and put up a practical example. Entropy asked me to gather info on remaining funds of Questbook Season 2. While I am not the program manager for that initiative, I did try to come up with the number of how much fund we can send back vs how much we should retain to finance on going initiatives (we are at the natural end of the program but a few milestones still need to be paid). With several members of the team being OOO, it was impossible to gather an answer in time to include also season 2 in this package, and we are now in the situation of either sending funds back to the treasury or put up a new vote.

All of this to say: we do need to have clear rules on

team management (hiring, firing, leaving)

fund management (leftover mostly; asking for more would require a change of scope and so a new vote regardless)

My question for Entropy and for the whole dao is: a rule like the above, where should be put? The code of conduct seems like a stretch, but maybe is the only answer. Have thought about the question, but not the answer honestly.

Tally votings

[Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction

Vote: For
Confirming the snapshot vote

[CONSTITUTIONAL] Register the Sky Custom Gateway contracts in the Router

Vote: For
Confirming the snapshot vote, also the proposal should be technically correct now

JoJo · September 1, 2025, 10:18am

August 2025 voting

Snapshot votings

[Non-Constitutional] - Updates to the DIP, The Complete 1.7 Version

Vote: For: Upgrade to v1.7
There are a series of changes that most will deem controversial, being the most important

the cut of the payout by around 40%
the introduction of a passive tier, tier X, for large inactive voters.

I would lean toward an agreement on both points. On the first part, while also painful due to the impact that all delegates (including myself) will see on the monthly payment, it does make sense due to less amount of decisions compared to last year. We are moving toward a more concentrated governance model which means less voting, less activity. This doesn’t necessarily mean we will have to invest, linearly, less time in governance: still less but likely this diminish won’t be as the lower amount of proposals.
The second tier is for activating dormant big voters to help us with quorum. With currently no solution in sight from AF/OCL regarding this issue, we have to at least try.
I also see this 1.7 as a “quick and dirty way” to gather some data before the expiration of the program in November, to understand what works and what does not work. The most important thing at this point is for SeedGOV to analyse data, understand if the new payout structure is fair (do we need to allocate more money to active delegates? Or to passive ones? Or this cut is good enough) and understand if and how Tier X is effective on the overall program.
I also dare to say they have an incredible complex job, and the amount of critiques they are and will be facing will always be high due to any decision impacting either delegates that want an higher payout or delegates that don’t care about payout but want the program to not produce noise and cost in the DAO. Impossible to make everybody’s happy, but important to highlight that the high amount of critiques are not IMHO a direct way to evaluate the program for the reason just stated.

Tally votings

Entropy Advisors: Exclusively Working with the Arbitrum DAO, Y2-Y3

Vote: For
Confirming the snapshot vote. The biggest modification has been related to OpCo being the counterparty of 10 out of the 15M arbs, with the OAT establishing internally KPI for Entropy. I think the solution is a fair middle ground with what some delegates, like L2Beat, called for. At the same time while I do see the critique of L2Beat of having the KPI out in the open before the vote, I don’t personally think this is a blocker. I do see the OAT establishing both short and long term KPI, and it would be impossible to do so before the voting itself.

[CONSTITUTIONAL] Register $BORING in the Arbitrum generic-custom gateway

Vote: For
Confirming the snapshot vote

JoJo · September 1, 2025, 10:21am

September 2025 voting

Snapshot votings

[CONSTITUTIONAL] AIP: ArbOS Version 50 Dia

Vote: For
Technical proposal, being accelerated due to the temp check likely being a validation/green light from the DAO to OCL to start working on the Arb OS 50 upgrades before Fusaka. Useless to say all the proposed upgrades align with what we want to technically achieve in Ethereum, and we are looking forward to the audit from Trailbits.

Snapshot votings

Revert the Delegate Incentive Program (DIP) to Version 1.5

Vote: Preserve current 1.7 DIP, Abstain, Revert to 1.5, Cancel DIP

Proposal: Revert the Delegate Incentive Program (DIP) to Version 1.5

My vote on the matter will also answer the question above.

I am strongly voting against this proposal. There is a bunch of reasons, some tied to the evolution of the DIP until now and some tied to how this very idea came to life.

First, to me it doesn’t make sense to vote now on reverting to a previous version when we had a vote, 1 month ago, about updating it, and we didn’t even get the first results.

telegram-cloud-photo-size-4-5895351877078470972-y1280×251 17.1 KB

I sincerely don’t know why we are doing this now, with this vote that just happened, and 3 months to the end of the program, I can’t find the logic honestly even if I shake out all my bias.

Second, DIP 1.5 was quite good to bootstrap the delegates’ activity but had a huge collateral effect: a lot of noise and very less signal. For people that were in here, most of points were accrued for simply stating your own opinion, despite if it was provided in the first few days of discussion of the votes or later, and despite if others already provided the same opinion or not.
That had the byproduct effect of having a series of delegates creating a pletora of messages which, by a big amount, were just repetition of others.

Hoping that nobody gets offended, what we basically had was this

immagine736×981 48.1 KB

We then moved to 1.6 which introduced two main changes:

opinion provided has to be timely, has to be valuable, has to be new and fresh and not a repetition

the vote multiplier.

The former addition was in my opinion great: being able to filter repetition of the same idea over time, not providing a payment for this activity, was to me something fair. The fact that there are delegates (taking the list from Paulo which published this in the chat) that were able to always qualify for the DIP regardless of this change and regardless of their voting power is indeed an attestation that you can provide value to the DAO even with stricter rules: L2BEAT, myself, tekr0x, GriffGreen, GFXLabs, tempetechie, Bob Rossi, Gauntlet. This list spans from two of the biggest delegates in our DAO, to delegates with a few millions of vp, up to delegates barely above the threshold. To move to the latter point of the list, it means that the multiplier based on vp, while can introduce some difficulties, is absolutely not a gate to qualify. And we can for sure discuss if that is/was a good idea or not, the answer is probably a bit subjective and lies in what we want to incentive, and to me being able to put more weight into people and entities that have more vp is indeed the fair and right choice.

We are further moving away from this with the 1.7 with

an adjustment of payout based on the less amount of proposals we have

a new “passive” tier, tier X, aimed to incentivse the participation of dormant mid and big holders.

Again, as I stated for that vote, I think both are fair changes: we do indeed have less votes so it makes sense to reduce reward, and we do have quorum problem so incentivising a passive behaviour that can help in this sense makes a ton of sense.

The question then becomes: why should we want to go back to 1.5? What value would bring, today, having 20-30 delegates all posting in any discussion just a slight variation of what is usually the same idea with the goal not of providing value but most of the time to qualify and get points for the payout?
We did that already, and it didn’t provide in my opinion a value worth the cost. And bear in mind, here for me cost is not only monetary cost, but the time and energy needed to navigate in all discussion and form an idea of how the dao is oriented.

I would like to add a few points here that are very very personal. I am not in love of having a discussion that

Snapshot votings

[CONSTITUTIONAL] AIP: Security Council Election Process Improvements

Vote: in favour of all choices (Allow members to rotate keys, Allow candidates to rotate keys, Increase cohort duration, Reduce qualification threshold, Allow members to bypass nominee

All the choices above are consistent with the early feedback provided in the discussion.
I do see a point with some delegates saying that bypassing nominee could be a potential danger; I am personally more optimistic and I trust a lot the election process and the current set of delegates, to be able to elect every time good security council members, and so give them a green pass in future. In case something bad happens, foundation can step in with a placet from the DAO and exclude (like it happened in the past already) specific personalities.
Also, in favor of rotation of keys from both members and candidates because bad things can happen at unforeseeable times and we should not be constrained in behaviour that can be detrimental for security.

[Constitutional] AIP: Security Council Election Process Improvements

Thanks for the proposal. I think the changes are generally consistent with the changes we are seeing broadly in the DAO and DAO related councils, initiatives etc, specifically

dropping amount of votes needed to do X

increasing time in the role.

In particular

the reduction from 0.2% to 0.1% seems to address the barrier of rising quorum. In favour

term of 1y vs 6 months, allows for less operational burden in the DAO. In favour.

auto pass of previous security council members: in general if they were elected they are likely still good enough for the council. In favour.

Would like to expand on last point, especially for answering @0xDonPepe and @jameskbh above.
While I do see a scenario in which you want to put checks and balances, it is quite likely that any incumbent going again for nominee would pass that phase.
But: passing that phase means, here, to get that 0.1% of total votable supply, that potentially can’t go to other candidates. To say in other terms, if we have a low turnaround of voting in security elections (or a rising quorum which gets us to the same result), allowing incumbent already vetted to not have to go through that again means increasing the chance to have fresh names for the actual election.

I do see, tho, a situation in which an old incumbent could not be deemed suitable anymore due to new reasons. But I guess there is still the ability, from the Arbitrum Foundation, to cut a name from the final phase of election like it happened a few elections ago for the vp of security / security officer (can’t remember the title sorry) of polygon, right? This should preserve us from the scenario in which an old incumbent has a free pass but is not suitable anymore for whatever reason written in the constitution.

Tally votings

[CONSTITUTIONAL] Remove Cost Cap, Update Executors, Disable Legacy USDT Bridge

Vote: For
Confirming the snapshot vote(s). We do really need to solve constitutional quorum, we can’t keep bundling different proposals forever.

Topic		Replies	Views
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