JoJo Delegate Communication Thread

[JoJo]

September 2025 voting

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Snapshot votings

[CONSTITUTIONAL] AIP: ArbOS Version 50 Dia

Vote: For
Technical proposal, being accelerated due to the temp check likely being a validation/green light from the DAO to OCL to start working on the Arb OS 50 upgrades before Fusaka. Useless to say all the proposed upgrades align with what we want to technically achieve in Ethereum, and we are looking forward to the audit from Trailbits.

Revert the Delegate Incentive Program (DIP) to Version 1.5

Vote: Preserve current 1.7 DIP, Abstain, Revert to 1.5, Cancel DIP

@JoJo

My vote on the matter will also answer the question above.

I am strongly voting against this proposal. There is a bunch of reasons, some tied to the evolution of the DIP until now and some tied to how this very idea came to life.

First, to me it doesn’t make sense to vote now on reverting to a previous version when we had a vote, 1 month ago, about updating it, and we didn’t even get the first results.

I sincerely don’t know why we are doing this now, with this vote that just happened, and 3 months to the end of the program, I can’t find the logic honestly even if I shake out all my bias.

Second, DIP 1.5 was quite good to bootstrap the delegates’ activity but had a huge collateral effect: a lot of noise and very less signal. For people that were in here, most of points were accrued for simply stating your own opinion, despite if it was provided in the first few days of discussion of the votes or later, and despite if others already provided the same opinion or not.
That had the byproduct effect of having a series of delegates creating a pletora of messages which, by a big amount, were just repetition of others.

Hoping that nobody gets offended, what we basically had was this

We then moved to 1.6 which introduced two main changes:

• opinion provided has to be timely, has to be valuable, has to be new and fresh and not a repetition
• the vote multiplier.

The former addition was in my opinion great: being able to filter repetition of the same idea over time, not providing a payment for this activity, was to me something fair. The fact that there are delegates (taking the list from Paulo which published this in the chat) that were able to always qualify for the DIP regardless of this change and regardless of their voting power is indeed an attestation that you can provide value to the DAO even with stricter rules: L2BEAT, myself, tekr0x, GriffGreen, GFXLabs, tempetechie, Bob Rossi, Gauntlet. This list spans from two of the biggest delegates in our DAO, to delegates with a few millions of vp, up to delegates barely above the threshold. To move to the latter point of the list, it means that the multiplier based on vp, while can introduce some difficulties, is absolutely not a gate to qualify. And we can for sure discuss if that is/was a good idea or not, the answer is probably a bit subjective and lies in what we want to incentive, and to me being able to put more weight into people and entities that have more vp is indeed the fair and right choice.

We are further moving away from this with the 1.7 with

• an adjustment of payout based on the less amount of proposals we have
• a new “passive” tier, tier X, aimed to incentivse the participation of dormant mid and big holders.

Again, as I stated for that vote, I think both are fair changes: we do indeed have less votes so it makes sense to reduce reward, and we do have quorum problem so incentivising a passive behaviour that can help in this sense makes a ton of sense.

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The question then becomes: why should we want to go back to 1.5? What value would bring, today, having 20-30 delegates all posting in any discussion just a slight variation of what is usually the same idea with the goal not of providing value but most of the time to qualify and get points for the payout?
We did that already, and it didn’t provide in my opinion a value worth the cost. And bear in mind, here for me cost is not only monetary cost, but the time and energy needed to navigate in all discussion and form an idea of how the dao is oriented.

I would like to add a few points here that are very very personal. I am not in love of having a discussion that

[CONSTITUTIONAL] AIP: Security Council Election Process Improvements

Vote: in favour of all choices (Allow members to rotate keys, Allow candidates to rotate keys, Increase cohort duration, Reduce qualification threshold, Allow members to bypass nominee

All the choices above are consistent with the early feedback provided in the discussion.
I do see a point with some delegates saying that bypassing nominee could be a potential danger; I am personally more optimistic and I trust a lot the election process and the current set of delegates, to be able to elect every time good security council members, and so give them a green pass in future. In case something bad happens, foundation can step in with a placet from the DAO and exclude (like it happened in the past already) specific personalities.
Also, in favor of rotation of keys from both members and candidates because bad things can happen at unforeseeable times and we should not be constrained in behaviour that can be detrimental for security.

@JoJo

Thanks for the proposal. I think the changes are generally consistent with the changes we are seeing broadly in the DAO and DAO related councils, initiatives etc, specifically

• dropping amount of votes needed to do X
• increasing time in the role.

In particular

1. the reduction from 0.2% to 0.1% seems to address the barrier of rising quorum. In favour
2. term of 1y vs 6 months, allows for less operational burden in the DAO. In favour.
3. auto pass of previous security council members: in general if they were elected they are likely still good enough for the council. In favour.

Would like to expand on last point, especially for answering @0xDonPepe and @jameskbh above.
While I do see a scenario in which you want to put checks and balances, it is quite likely that any incumbent going again for nominee would pass that phase.
But: passing that phase means, here, to get that 0.1% of total votable supply, that potentially can’t go to other candidates. To say in other terms, if we have a low turnaround of voting in security elections (or a rising quorum which gets us to the same result), allowing incumbent already vetted to not have to go through that again means increasing the chance to have fresh names for the actual election.

I do see, tho, a situation in which an old incumbent could not be deemed suitable anymore due to new reasons. But I guess there is still the ability, from the Arbitrum Foundation, to cut a name from the final phase of election like it happened a few elections ago for the vp of security / security officer (can’t remember the title sorry) of polygon, right? This should preserve us from the scenario in which an old incumbent has a free pass but is not suitable anymore for whatever reason written in the constitution.

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Tally votings

[CONSTITUTIONAL] Remove Cost Cap, Update Executors, Disable Legacy USDT Bridge

Vote: For
Confirming the snapshot vote(s). We do really need to solve constitutional quorum, we can’t keep bundling different proposals forever.

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Security Council

Security Council, nominee phase

**Vote: WakUp Labs 376k, Cyfrin 350k, Immunefi 350k **
I have decided to split my votes in more or less the same weight between these 3 candidates:

• Cyfrin: not only is a very good security firm, but also I am experiencing in the D.A.O. Grant Program the very good job they are doing with GMX
• Immunefi: another very good security firm
• WakeUp Labs: a new comer in the SC election that we have known through the first seasons of the Grant program and that created for the ecosystem an interface to pass transactions to mainnet and avoid censorship in our chain. They are a good, young team very Arbitrum aligned, and worth supporting.