JoJo Delegate Communication Thread

[JoJo]

October 2025 voting

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Snapshot votings

Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies

Vote: For

@JoJo

@JoJo

in general in favour. With one caveat. We need to set expectation properly for this round.

Last time, plenty of builders reached out proposing their infra, vaults and product to put the assets at work. Most of them didn’t make it, and was later explained how the proposal goals was mostly to produce yield in a very safe and would say passive way from the DAO. I will just assume that this process won’t happen again, and we will rely on the consideration and decision of the committee.

I would personally prefer an allocation skewed toward ecosystem growth.
Arbitrum is not only lending: is dexes, is automated vaults, is perps, and we we should be mindful of every aspect of it and of the key players of our chain, albeit I do understand how lending market are often time a very good primitive to start enhancing the capital available.

I did vote in favor, but my concerns did grow in the last couple of weeks.

Do we need to allocate the idle assets in the treasury? Of course. But we have to be clear on what the main purpose is.

In the last few days, delegates called for a more comprehensive call to discuss parameters such as yield, risk allocation and overarching goal of this program. The answer that we got, so far, is that previous iteration was more oriented toward growth of the ecosystem, and this one will be more oriented toward pure yield for the DAO.

I wholeheartly disagree with the statement above.

In the last season, allocation was toward AAVE, Lido Eth, Fluid, Camelot.
The one from Camelot was suboptimal as allocation due to the passive nature of the deployer (the foundation) which, talking with the risk committee, would have not been able to manage the position in a more active way.
The allocation in Fluid for sure helped the protocol bootstrap in Arbitrum and the Drip is continuing the job. That said, i hardly see how this could be defined as “oriented toward growth” of the chain" as others framed it.

I don’t want to only point out to semantic. I think we need to be all on the same page of what

• allocating toward growth really means
• allocating toward yield really means
• what are the risk/rewards of both choices.

So far former two points are, in my humble opinion, not properly laid out, the latter point is just not discussed at all.

I won’t campaign against the current season, is not worth it, and it does bring benefits to the DAO. Reaching sustainability with a treasury that is concentrated in mostly one coin (arb) is a good goal.

I would invite Entropy, the Foundation and the delegates to reflect on the following point tho: does moving, for example, from a 2.6% net yield to a 3.2% net yield, bring us anything meaningful beside having on 8500 ETH a further 51 ETH so a further gain of $200,000 for us? In my opinion it does not.

There is a lot of underestimation about the second order effect of making the DAO the first customers of Arbitrum protocols. Any 0.x% more yield we could get on the ethereum we have will greatly be outpaced by any positive mindshare that changes how the ecosystem is perceived by participant; and it will reflect on our treasury because this is one of the multiple reasons why the price action of Arb as a coin has been lackluster compared to any benchmark.
I am perfectly aware i am mentioning a rather complex topic, arb price action, that can’t be reduced to a bullet list or a few sentences; but whoever is out there talking with users, and builders, know that we do have a perception problem in our ecosystem.

With my vote in favour I hope that we do indeed put the idle assets at work to produce yield as we should, but also that we start to properly frame the intent behind our action while having a more thoughtful and omni comprehensive scenarios of the choices at our disposal and what they means not only for us as a DAO but as ecosystem.

In the end, does it matte if we become a self sustainable DAO if no one is left in our chain beside us?

[Constitutional] AIP: DVP Quorum

Vote: For
The voting on the principle makes a lot of sense, we have to move away from a quorum that is based on the float to something that is more manageable. Quorum and threshold based on how much is currently delegated is the only viable solution, at least for now. I do support the concern of a few delegates pointing out on how numbers proposed are not enough, but here we are voting on the mechanism and not on the parameters.

AGV Council Compensation Calibration: Benchmark for Future Council Terms

Vote: For
The initial proposal posted on snapshot was a bundle of both future council and current council; I provided a feedback for this bundled version, but the principles are the same, and will vote in favour also for the previous council unless anything specific in term of changes happens.

@JoJo

I voted in favour of both options.

First, why both: it doesn’t make sense to push for the change in comp in just one of the cohort.

I do understand that there might be general concerns about what is a de facto retro on current council; matter of the fact, the biggest lift of council is usually exactly when a DAO program needs to stand up, because there is so much more things to do. For this reason, if the new cohort will deserve the raise, the same applies to the current one.

On the next cohort and general idea: the data proposed show how the council might just be underpaid for the responsability and workload they have. There are a few emphirical things I guess we can put on table: a somehow similar job compared to the OAT, a strong presence of council members in the operations of AGV etc. On the last point, as a couple of example that I experienced first hand: David was one of the member with whom I made a job interview a few weeks ago with AGV, and Coinflip has been reporting the progress of AGV live at several events such as EthCC in Cannes to the rest of delegates at the delegates’ day.

At the same time, while I think the raise is fair, there is something to improve. Some members of the council should be more present in the DAO life since we barely know them.
I am not specifically advocating in this case for the IC member, it makes sense that have the work of this person a bit more segmented from here since is not only vital but also closer to more traditional rails; but for the others, we do need a stronger presence.
I won’t specifically refer to any in particular here, but this to me is where effectively there is the biggest different between the current OAT of OpCo and the council of AGV.
Hopefully this is something that will be naturally fixed during next election.

[Temperature Check] Should we try a Delegate Incentive Program like the Arbitrum Triple Dip?

Vote: Against

@JoJo

Voting against this proposal in the temp check.

@JoJo

Thank you for your proposal.
[…]

First, most of the points i posted above were not properly addressed. Just from an operational standpoint, thinking that a program that rewards delegates has none or minimal costs (in term of time, people and discussion) is quite naive. It doesn’t matter if, on paper, is totally algo based: delegates will complain, will ask for clarifications, will look for authority to address perceived issues. One of the thing I said, more than 1 year ago, to SeedGov, was that they were asking for too low of a pay considering the amount of trouble they were getting into, and looking at the amount of work they did per month for a year I was probably right.
All this to say: there is the need of a program manager, just because we are here about rewarding people for contributions here. Even just the simple action of voting might need tweaking: if we go back to a situation stip like, it might just not matter if a delegate is not able to vote on all proposals for example. TLDR: all algo only exists on paper.

I am also a bit surprised about the fact that the proposal got more complex over time, just now going to vote I saw that a third mechanism was added. I do understand that the third one is effectively a simplification of the previous second, going for a quarterly type of review.
But the second one, based on likes, IMHO doesn’t work.

While there are weights for “likes” based on who puts these out (author vs foundation vs dip delegate vs unknown user) the system does not take in account that there is an heavy skew of users activity in the forum itself.
As napkin rule, we can see that the biggest a delegate, the less the participation in the forum is, with a few exception. And this is still tied to what I posted above.

@JoJo

Governance is already cumbersome for most delegates, especially the ones that have a vested interest in the chain (think about builders and protocols) but not the DAO

These users, these power entities of arbitrum, are just not here in the forum. Evaluating forum contribution based on forum likes is, in the end, the creation of an echo chamber, and doesn’t solve the problem (is it even a problem?) of big accounts/entities interacting with this very board.
It doesn’t matter currently if there are different weights: with the proposed one, 0.2 for unknown vs 1 in dip, you need 5 unknown/unregistered to make basically a valid vote, and we do have several forum members (thousands) that are registered, that do interact from time to time but that never were strong part of this community.

Even just cutting out this latter portion and keeping the DIP delegates as interaction, is fairly easy to see how the participants to this activity will only be a small subset of the current DIP enrolled people, which still lean toward the echo chamber approach.

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I want to add a final remark. I was thinking about voting abstain, to also have more time and reflection on the proposal from the foundation as well that should follow this one next week, and give space for more discussion and alternatives.
But the more I read this proposal (that got more complex over time), the more I understand how it fails to address the fact that we have basically people doing activities and being rewarded for such activities. Thinking that this setup doesn’t require a central entity to which the community as a whole can fall back for issues, questions, problems and discussion, and thinking that this role is implicitly for foundation to take at almost 0 cost in term of time and energy, shows how imho there is little understanding for these social dynamics.
As a second note, the added complexity of this version of the program is not calibrated to solve for properly evaluating impact of activity of delegates, since it falls into an echo chamber approach.

The DAO Incentive Program (DIP 2.0)

Vote: Abstain

@JoJo

I am voting abstain.

There are a few things that don’t convince me about this proposal.

The main thing is the structure of a single proposal for both delegates and contributors.
Even though DIP 2.0 distinguishes between the two, they should live under the same umbrella. These are very different dynamics: former is highly programmatic, and the latter is more subjective. We should have two separate programs with distinct oversight and metrics.

The second painpoint is the denomination risk (ARB vs stables).
Budgets and payouts are set in ARB, and the pool comes from ARB. That introduces high volatility but, above all, poor predictability for participants, especially if we’re closer to a top than a bottom in the market, and one could argue that this could be the case for the current one. In a severe bear market, payouts could become trivial, in the order of 30-50 dollar for constitutional proposals, relative to the intended incentive level. Yes, PM/OpCo can adjust quarterly, but that’s still reactive and limited by an ARB budget.

The third point is about payout sizing and predictability.
I’m personally neutral on the mechanics (proportional vs quadratic, and VP/total VP etc). There are many ways to do it. The real issue is predictability when payouts are ARB denominated. Over a 1 year program, ARB drawdowns could reduce the effective payout to levels that won’t move the needle, particularly for delegates with meaningful VP. While quarterly reviews helps, having USD denominated targets would better stabilize incentives.
As a secondary note, this lack of predictability might just kill the effort of the last few months made by SeedGov and the community itself to gather high VP but previously dormant delegates that might find themself not wanting to partake in voting.

On the Peer Assembly gating I’m neutral. But a gate for delegate rewards can exclude high-VP delegates from payouts and may create unintended secondary effects. I understand the intent, and I can think about lobbigy for example which we have historically wanted to be excluded by DIP rewards (not judging on the merit here just stating facts), but I’m not sure if there are other tradeoffs.

I would suggest the following adjustments

• Price payouts in USD to preserve incentive efficacy across different market regimes.
• Budget composition: have the budget in stables, or at least a 50/50 stables-ARB mix. PM/OpCo could decide month by month which portion to use. If sell pressure is a concern, stable-sourced payouts could be converted to ARB via buybacks just before distribution. A bit clunky and complex operationally, but doable.
• Separate the programs: run a delegate program, and a contributor program, with different structures, KPIs, framework and budget. Voting is mechanical, and payout up to some degree could/should be deterministic. Contribution can be quite subjective instead.

I am abstaining to still show support, some elements are imho worth saving such as nudge seasons, and there is a clear intent to try and fix previous things of DIP perceived by the broad community as either unfair or worth changing; that said, we are not hitting the proper target here, which is incentivising voting power on important proposals.

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Tally votings

Transfer 8,500 ETH from the Treasury to ATMC’s ETH Treasury Strategies

Vote: For
Confirming the snapshot vote. I do like the verbage added (namely, benchmarks for ETH and USDC apr), and I like that is explicitely written how the commission might forfeit a bit of yield to pursue growth opportunity in the chain. I do hope we will see this become factual, and properly explained if and when it will happen.