Jumpstart fund for DAO improvement

Proposals
1

Jumpstart fund for DAO improvement

Non-Constitutional

Challenge Statement: The DAO struggles with funding the initial steps needed for problem definition, alignment and scoping, causing slow progress and overburdening delegates with inadequate proposals.
Team Lead: Daniel, @mrjackalop on telegram

Slides presentation

2 min video

Abstract

This proposal allows the DAO to proactively define key problem areas and have the community untangle them, as opposed to having delegates be reactive to proposals that benefit small subgroups of community members.
The DAO currently struggles with funding the initial steps needed for problem definition, alignment and scoping, causing slow progress and overburdening delegates with inadequate proposals. To address this, a pilot fund is proposed, utilizing Questbook’s small grants model to support early-stage initiatives focused on problem definition (root causes, gathering requirements), alignment, and scoping proposals for operational and governance improvements. A problem gathering exercise will be conducted to inform proposers and the assessor by identifying key problem areas through user research interviews, qualitative surveys of delegates and other stakeholders, and a collective intelligence algorithm, clustering initiatives to ensure alignment between proposals and the DAO’s current needs.
The pilot fund will prioritize initiatives aiming to improve ArbiturmDAO’s operations and governance. An assessor, elected by the DAO, will oversee the proposal assessment, following the established Questbook program rules. The success of this pilot will be measured by the number of initiatives that receive subsequent funding, clarity and alignment generated within the community, and an over 80% approval rate in a Snapshot vote to continue the program.

The Problem:

The DAO has multiple challenges but currently needs a way to fund the initial steps of addressing them. As a result, only groups with a lot to win will invest all the necessary time and effort and take the risk to evolve a proposal without being paid.

Areas like organisation design, strategy, spending plan, and more require not just crafting a proposal but they require problem definition work: significant stakeholder engagement to determine the right approach, understand root causes and requirements, generate buy-in, and craft the right proposal to make. There’s currently no way to fund all this problem definition and preparatory work leading to the DAO advancing slowly, delegates being overwhelmed assessing proposals that don’t quite hit the mark, and meanwhile key decisions and needed proposals don’t happen.

Proposed Solution:

  1. A method for the DAO to aggregate challenge statements or problems
  2. A funding program for initiatives that will carry out problem definition and initial solution work on one of the challenge statements.

Questbook has shown to be a viable mechanism for distributing small grants to groups. We propose to use this model and set up a pilot fund to evolve proposals that address key Operational and Governance needs to improve Arbiturm DAO.

Additionally, we’ll carry out a “collective intelligence exercise” to identify the key problem areas.
And we’re including an option in the Snapshot to also fund a Playbook for Proposing to the DAO, where we’ll gather the learnings of the grantees who successfully pass a proposal through the DAO and the challenges of those who didn’t, and document them as material for future grantees.

What will be funded via the Jumpstart Fund:

  • Early-stage initiatives aiming to improve ArbiturmDAO ops and gov
  • Priority for funding initiatives advancing problem definition and alignment around key challenges.
  • Requirement for being referred by at least 3 of the top 30 delegates.
  • Priority for proposals including a last milestone for a successful snapshot vote (i.e. success bonus of at least 10%).
  • Initiatives expected to last up to 3 months.
  • Initiatives can request up to USD$50k equivalent (subsequent submissions considered).
  • product/protocol development will not be funded (that’s better suited for other Questbook tracks or programs).

** How are proposals assessed:**

  • An assessor will be selected by the DAO via an election as conducted for previous Questbook tracks.
  • Proposals up to USD $25k can be approved directly by the assessor for this track. Proposals above this amount requires cross-checking with the assessors form other tracks.

Fund governance:

This track will follow the same rules as the ongoing Questbook program (link), whereby funds are held in the multisig operated by the assessors of the multiple Questbook tracks.
The totality of the funds are to be transferred there and the signers will provide payment for the service provision parts upon completion (e.g. problem assessment, playbook if completed, etc).

Method to Identify Problem Areas:

Before opening the fund to proposals, we’ll work with the DAO to identify key problem areas that could then lead to proposals for problem definition and alignment work. This work will be carried by RnDAO’s research team.

Based on Professor Daniel Kahneman’s work, we have selected a collective intelligence method that provides high efficiency (low time involvement required from delegates) and is credibly neutral. The method is based on the use of a qualitative survey of delegates and other stakeholders to collect a list of statements proposing key challenges. We’ll complement this mechanism with user research interviews with the top 30 delegates.
The statements are then analysed using a collective intelligence algorithm (SimScore) that identifies a theoretical ‘central’ statement that would be most agreed upon, and then analyses the provided statements to rank them for proximity to said theoretical centre.

The ranked statements, as well as the graph (positioning of statements relative to each other), will then be made publicly available to inform (not mandate, just inform) those proposing initiatives to the pilot fund.

(Further untangling between statements and root cause analysis is part of the work this Questbook track will fund.)

Timeline:

The Pilot is expected to last 4-6 months depending on whether the option to distil learnings into a playbook for proposing to the DAO is approved in Snapshot or not.

  • Month 1 for identifying problem areas.
  • Month 2-4 for assessing and funding proposals.
  • Month 5 for reporting
  • month 6 for (optional) collecting learnings about proposal development into playbook

What does success look like?

  • Experts in the community can work towards improving Arbiturm DAO.
  • The initiatives funded generate clarity, buy-in, and alignment,
  • The initiatives funded evolve towards full proposals for the DAO and are funded.
  • The delegates love this pilot and want to continue funding it.

KPIs:

  • 40%+ of initiatives continued and received subsequent funding
  • Over 80% approval in a Snapshot vote asking delegates whether the program should be continued after the pilot

Budget

Screenshot 2024-07-14 at 08.50.38
Screenshot 2024-07-14 at 08.50.381506×710 138 KB

Note on forum restrictions:
This proposal was originally posted 9 days ago (at the start of GovHack), then moved to the GovHack category when the submission guidelines for that were announced. As we want to move forward to a snapshot vote, I tried to move it back to the Proposals category but Discourse doesn’t let me, so I created it again here.
The original post: Team 4: Jumpstart fund for DAO improvement - #6 by danielo

call to discuss

Jumpstart fund Q&A [Live on Snapshot]
Monday, 22 Jul • 16:00–17:00 (GMT+1)
Google Meet joining info
Video call link: https://meet.google.com/rep-hfdi-akb
Or dial: +49 30 300195060 PIN: 794 335 364 5992#
More phone numbers: https://tel.meet/rep-hfdi-akb?pin=7943353645992

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Actually, I have gotten positive feedback from multiple top delegates. Of course that’s not a guarantee that it will pass but what makes you conclude that “the DAO is not interested”?

And btw, the reason for posting again is simply that I moved the post to the govhack category but the Discourse wouldn’t let me move it back to proposals

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Hi, Danielo!
I read your initiative twice.
Once at the GovHack stage, the second time now, but I still didn’t understand why this initiative was needed.
I see that the first point is defining the problem: this suggests that the problem itself does not exist yet and we will only look for it. What if we don’t find her? Shall we turn the program around then?

I see a lot of initiatives that don’t actually make it to a vote, but the problem is that only a small number of delegates have enough ARB to trigger a vote.
I have already encountered this when my votes were not enough for the initiative to be considered. I see this problem, but this proposal does not solve it.

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Hey
thanks for asking. So for context, the M&A and AVI proposals had about 4 months of unpaid work put up front. Same for the Treasury diversification ones. A lot of that work is speaking with delegates, aligning, and refining the approach so the right thing is proposed. Now, those initiatives have advanced because the proposers could have a lot to win (e.g. 1% of a 250mn treasury management contract), but for initiatives that don’t have that ‘selfish’ motivation, nothing progresses. Some current examples are Organisation Design, Strategy Framework, etc.
Basically, only insiders who have attended a lot of events and calls can know what to propose and even then you need to align with like 30 people (like the unpaid work I’m doing right now answering your question).
So that creates a big bottleneck that’s only bound to get worse over time and a situation where only ‘selfish’ initiatives progress.
The fund is not a silver bullet but I do believe a solid experiment in enabling the DAO to define problems that need solving and funding the work to figure out the right solution by analysing root causes, engaging and aligning stakeholders, doing a bit of research on different approaches, etc.

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Lately I see a lot proposals that have a buffer for ARB price volatiliy. Unfortunately no one has yet clarified if they intend to pay back those ARB if the price of ARB rises well above the price when a proposal is created.
So lets say the token is now sitting around 0.7$ and will be in 2 months at 2$. Will you pay back the difference in ARB token or what is going to happen to that surplus?

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I’ll have to check the legality of returning funds, but the idea would be:

  • if possible: return funds
  • if not possible: use the funds to fund additional grantees
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I support the proposal. It aims to create a more efficient and inclusive process for addressing and solving the DAO’s challenges.

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This proposal raises interesting points, but we have concerns about potential unintended consequences. Could this create a self-perpetuating structure that seeks problems to justify its existence? Decentralized systems often solve issues organically. If significant DAO problems exist, they might surface naturally through proposals or forum discussions. How can we ensure this doesn’t lead to unnecessary bureaucracy or governance bloat? Maintaining our decentralized nature while addressing real needs is the main priority. Perhaps we could discuss alternative approaches that encourage organic problem-solving without adding administrative layers? Community calls could go a long way, similar to what we often see in devs calls, where the real current problems are discussed and some new tangents are popping up from those discussions.

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I have voted against this proposal as @cp0x already mentioned it seems like this proposal is looking for a problem the DAO may have but we are not sure yet.
Also I think that the asked amount of funds is way too big. But thats just my personal opinion.

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I observed the development of this proposal during GovHack in Brussels.

I decided to vote FOR this proposal, even though I understand that there are already proposals for early-stage projects like Questbook, Fire Stars, etc.

Why? The collaboration during its development and the opportunity to build together in alignment with Arbitrum’s values.

However, after reading the current state of this proposal, I can definitely see areas for improvement. It makes me wonder whether there was excessive optimism during GovHack or if the proper feedback wasn’t provided at the time, leading to a situation where proposals like this take up significant development time without delivering a clear outcome.

This speaks about how we are currently handling such matters.

In any case, during GovHack, I heard the concerns of early-stage projects about understanding how to build within Arbitrum DAO. The need to effectively communicate the existing possibilities is evident.

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Hi @danielo

Thanks for the discussion. How do you think this proposal is consistent or complements with what @Entropy is proposing as a team dedicated to executing something similar?

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Hi @danielo,

Thanks for the proposal. Unfortunately, we do not agree with the problem statement enough to justify supporting this program. While we agree that the operational side of the DAO is not perfect as with any DAO, it’s far from being dysfunctional. Paying individuals to seek out problems for the sake of seeking out problems does not seem like a great use of DAO funds.

If an individual or group of individuals feel strongly about a certain problem within the Arbitrum DAO there is nothing stopping them from creating a brief problem statement and proposing a method to reach a solution in return for some funding from the DAO. This requires them to have enough confidence in bringing their proposal forward without spending too much time in its creation before funding is secured.

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Blockworks Research will be voting AGAINST this proposal on Snapshot.

Similar to what others, like @cp0x, have said, we believe this proposal creates some perverse incentives. It appears to be “planning to plan” and needs more concrete evidence prior to pursuit. We would prefer a proposal that thoroughly addresses the DAO’s problems upfront. The current proposal allocates $350,000 to the pilot fund but lacks a detailed distribution plan and specific funding targets. There is also a lack of clarity on the fund’s structure and how it will manage its Questbook tracks. While it mentions an assessor appointed by the DAO, it neglects to define the criteria for this role and the specific problems the assessor will address.

Additionally, we have concerns about the timeline:

The Pilot is expected to last 4-6 months depending on whether the option to distil learnings into a playbook for proposing to the DAO is approved in Snapshot or not.

There is no mention of key metrics and objectives beyond general goals. For a project of this magnitude, potential delays and buffering periods should be considered. While KPIs are valuable performance metrics, we need to see more KPIs beyond the project’s continued existence through funding. If the infrastructure aims to improve DAO interactions, there should be a KPI related to the delegate side of the organization. Finally, we need clarity on the 20% volatility buffer in the funding plan and the payback mechanism for overestimations in case of token appreciation.

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Thanks for the feedback. i’d suggest your position is a perfect example of why such a fund is needed: you reuqetsed many details to figure out and that would require significant work to draft, then get feedback on, then propose, then find out someone else has an issue with them, come back to the drawing board, and all that without knowing if one’s going to get paid anything for it. As someone trying to contribute to the DAO it feels demotivating.

Now, I’m happy to work on the feedback but one thing is having concerns about details e.g. the criteria to elect the person, and a different thing is directionally being against the initative altogether. Could you please clarify?

For clarity, the sense making excercise proposed would define which problems should be worked on (so it’s not about “inventing problems” if no problems are proposed there would be no backing to approve grants to do problem definition). I have no means of suggesting the list of problems upfront without very significant work (i.e a sense making excercise), so hence this is part of the proposal.

Also please note that defining criteria for the role upfront might not be a good approach for an elected position. The candidates can submit their reasons for being a good pick and the delegates select as per their own criteria or ask questions as needed. After this pilot, there could be more clarity on what the characteristics were and this could be documented with an empiric approach.

Would an approach where there’s just the sense making excercise proposed and the rest is left for a later proposal be something you’d support?

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Thanks for the feedback

I’d argue that we have multiple examples of the contrary. It’s VERY expensive to develop a proposal - one needs to network with you guys to develop trust and communication channels, draft, get feedback, iterate and refine. and then it might all be for nothing e.g. I believe problem definition is critical for any organisation, you disagree and so maybe it doesn’t get funded, all the upfront work was for nothing.
The sense making mechanism proposed changes the game. It allows the DAO to map proactively which problems are meaningful, and then people can do a bit of digging to really unpack them without the risk of weeks of unpaid work. The assessor would be armed with that data so they’re not just funding random problems, rather they’re funding the problems the DAO defines (through the sense-making).

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Entropy is a service provider that supports proposers with advise and introductions, but does not fund proposers to do all the work that’s needed. Then, Entropy also does some work to identify problems and then execute on them by crafting proposals.

The quesiton is then whether the DAO wants to exclusively rely on a third party service provider to do all the work of problem definition, aligment, etc.

Personally I belive a single service provider here creates a singificant single point of failure, risk of capture, bottleneck, etc. And we’re better off with a plurality of options: entropy + jumpstart fund + potentially also 1-2 other service providers.

If this was a startup with a constrained budget, then I’d suggest that having only one service provider could be a necessary risk, but if we want to grow the ecosystem and develop many capabilities and fulfill the potentil of Arbitrum, I wouldn’t centralise everything on a single team that’s not owned by the DAO and instead increase capacity.

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Please note the structure doesn’t fund problems unless problems are brought up (during the sense making exercise and with a bit of room for manoeuvring by the assessor). And I have yet to find an organisation that runs out of problems to solve.
That being said, I do understand the risk you’re mentioning but would suggest that with a 3.5bn treasury and this just being a pilot, it could be tested. A tally proposal could include that if no significant problems are identified in the sense-making, then the fund doesn’t go through.

Also, if it was found after the Pilot that your concern has indeed materialised, a renewal of the program wouldn’t go through.

If 350k is too much for a pilot, we could start with 200k or so. Thoughts?

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Ehy Danielo, I already saw this during govHack, and as you know, I proposed to you a way to align all users in effectively delivering on proposal by having, whatever budget granted for a written proposal, being delivered for the most part (50% or more) only if the proposal itself was voted and approved on snapshot.

This way your track would put everyone on the mission of effectively solving for problems the dao has interest in, which will be testified by the passing snapshot vote. Why was this not included? And, of course, this is just my opinion, but I really thought it would have been a way to effectively push for a better solution here.

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It is included :slight_smile:

I left it at the discretion of the assessor to make exceptions and maybe the 10% could be higher, maybe 20-25% (although 50% seems too high as it can incentivise “solutioniring” i.e. going with what’s popular and easy to pass and less work on understanding root causes by investing more on research. Note that in science a big issue is people not publishing negative results so I want to make sure people don’t work at a loss if the outcome is that the problem shouldn’t be solved).
But I do agree with the incentive in most cases! Because it could be a pervasive incentive in some areas (comment above), system-design-wise it’s a good practice to allow for flexibility for those in the trenches to manage case by case. And then assessors are held accountable for their actions by the delegates anyhow.

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