Lampros DAO Delegate Communication Thread

Snapshot Vote


  1. [Constitutional] DVP Quorum for ArbitrumDAO: Implementation & Parameters
    Voted - FOR
    Reason -

Tally Vote


  1. [Constitutional] DVP Quorum & Proposal Cancellation
    Voted - FOR
    Reason -

Snapshot Vote


  1. Automate the Consolidation of Idle Funds into the Treasury Management Portfolio
    Voted - FOR
    Reason -

Snapshot Vote


  1. Updating the Code of Conduct & DAO Procedures to Become Living Documents
    Voted - FOR
    Reason -

    The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

    We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.

    We’ve already seen multiple iterations of these procedures in a short time. Keeping them as fixed documents has been adding unnecessary friction for what are mostly operational updates. Living structure makes more sense at this stage of the DAO.

    Shielded voting did not clearly improve outcomes during the trials. Making it optional is a more practical call. Overall, this aligns better with how governance is actually running today.


  1. [Constitutional] AIP: ArbOS 60 Elara
    Voted - FOR
    Reason -

    The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

    We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.

    This feels like a natural step after ArbOS 51. Multi-dimensional gas fixes a real issue we’ve seen on-chain where very different workloads share the same pricing model. This should improve efficiency without pushing costs up across the board. Stylus limit increase was needed. The current cap was already holding back more serious use cases.

    On delegation, we’re aligned. The DAO has already moved toward faster execution, and tuning these parameters through full governance each time is not practical. The bounds and time limit make this reasonable.

    There is some added reliance on Offchain Labs, but at this stage, iteration speed matters.

Snapshot Votes


  1. Transfer 6,000 ETH and Idle Stablecoins from the Treasury to the Treasury Management Portfolio
    Voted - FOR
    Reason -

    The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

    We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.

    The DAO is already generating ETH through sequencer and Timeboost revenue, and keeping it idle creates unnecessary opportunity cost. Moving it into the Treasury Management Portfolio allows the DAO to put this capital to work and generate some returns.

    This also strengthens the shift towards active treasury management, which is also important. It helps build a more sustainable treasury without relying only on ARB.


  1. Improvements to the Arbitrum Audit Program
    Voted - FOR
    Reason -

    The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

    We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.

    The changes reflect what we have seen in practice. Strict exclusivity has been a blocker for good teams, especially those already operating multi-chain. Moving to a flexible alignment approach makes the program more realistic and competitive without losing ecosystem focus.

    Adding AI-based scans also strengthens the pipeline. Many teams are not audit-ready today, and this gives them a path to improve before using full audit resources. That should lead to better use of capital and higher quality outcomes.

Tally Vote


  1. Transfer 6,000 ETH and Idle Stablecoins from the Treasury to the Treasury Management Portfolio
    Voted - FOR
    Reason -

    The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

    We are voting FOR this proposal in the Tally voting.

    Our position stays the same as what we shared during the Snapshot vote.

    The ATMC has shown improvement this year, with ETH yield going from 2.16% to 4.81% since January. That gives us confidence in moving the idle ETH into the portfolio. Keeping it undeployed when there are working strategies available is just leaving value on the table.

Snapshot Vote


  1. Approve Release of Frozen ETH
    Voted - FOR
    Reason -

    The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb) and @Euphoria, based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

    We are voting FOR this proposal in the Snapshot voting.

    The reasoning is straightforward. These are stolen funds that were frozen by the Arbitrum Security Council. They were never Arbitrum’s money to begin with, and leaving them frozen at a dead address helps no one. The right thing to do is route them toward making affected users whole, and that’s exactly what this proposal does.

    The DeFi United recovery effort has a clear plan, a defined multi-sig, and a commitment to post-recovery reporting. The upgrade to a 3-of-4 Gnosis Safe following community feedback was a good call. This isn’t Arbitrum giving something away, it’s returning stolen property to the people it was taken from.

    On the legal restraining notice, we think the argument is straightforward, a thief doesn’t pass title. The exploiter had no legitimate claim to these funds, so no party can meaningfully attach an “interest” to them. The rightful owners are rsETH depositors.

    The delegate indemnification gap is something we want to flag honestly. Delegates are protected only through the Captive Insurance Product while the Foundation, Offchain Labs, and the Security Council have direct, uncapped indemnification from Aave Labs. That asymmetry is not acceptable as a long term standard, especially with a live legal notice in the picture. We are absorbing this risk consciously and hope it gets addressed in future proposals of this nature.

    The 49-day timeline is painful. Users have open borrow positions accruing interest daily through no fault of their own. We hope the coalition seriously explores having a large ETH holder front the funds while governance runs its course, that’s the cleanest path to helping users without skipping constitutional steps.

    This situation has also exposed that Arbitrum has no formal framework for handling frozen exploit proceeds.