I support Travis Skweres for the Advisor role due to following reasons:
In-depth experience: Over eleven years in crypto is such a long time to really get the big picture and see what works and what doesn’t. Has been actively participating in the development and deployment of numerous dapps and launching one of the best perps dexes.
Excellence: Known to strive for continuous improvement and in the advisor role could provide high-quality advice and support
Professionalism: background from BCG, runs Vela Exchange in a very organized way
Travis has clear goals and a vision of what it takes to make Arbitrum a lucrative ecosystem for innovative new projects and make it grow. Would be a valuable asset to have as an Advisor.
Heyyyy. Would it be possible if we use a pre-recorded video? The available slot is 4am in my time zone. Might not be able to do it live. Sorry about that.
I feel that Travis Skweres is a suitable fit for the Advisor role.
A) Known for being able to assess complex situations to give in-depth advice.
B) As noted in his application, he has been a long-time in crypto, and worked in various projects that are all relevant to the application.
C) Understands what it is to be a builder, and able to sift between those who are truly into buidl.
Castle Labs is flatout lying about their affiliations.
They state this:
They conveniently fail to mention that several key members are highly involved in the GMX project and their twitter activity proves this.
Here is a twitter thread highlighting the inherent bias of Castle Cap’s founder (but it is not only him who is heavily invested/involved in the GMX project):
Given the recommendation in the LTIPP proposal that Application Advisors should be impartial organizations, can you kindly update the COI(Conflict(s) of interests) disclosure, if need be? Specifically, any COI(perceived or actual) involving @castle__cap multisig members in relation to:
* Venture firm legal entity?
* Currently supporting a zkSync project?
* Protocol grants to multisig members?
* Protocol Affiliate/Referrals? Maybe COI for advising other competing protocols?
* Co-authored a protocol grantee proposal? Maybe COI for advising other competing protocols?
As you mentioned in your application, within the initial STIP, the @castle__cap delegate used your initiative and was also acting as an informal Application Advisor, for example: “We aimed to provide applicants with detailed and actionable feedback on their proposals and give delegates additional context and deeper insights before voting on proposals”. Was all COI(perceived or actual) disclosed for:
* Advising reductions in any specific protocol grant to delegates and protocols?
* Advising against voting For any specific protocol proposal?
* The published and widely distributed analyst STIP scoring table, for giving: “delegates additional context and deeper insights before voting on proposals”?
* If any affiliate/referrals, grantee protocol investments or grantee proposal co-authorship?
Hypothetically, whats your opinion on Application Advisors trading tokens, during STIP rounds, of protocols they are advising?
In light of these concerns, we just wanted to clear a couple of things up re: the structure of our collective.
As clearly stated in our application, this role will be held by ‘Castle Labs’, a separate entity to the Castle Capital community.
Castle Labs is a service-based advisory group, separate to the Castle Capital community. Castle Labs and its contributor’s affiliations are clearly stated in our application as quoted above. Currently, the Castle Labs governance team is represented by 0xAtomist and Francescoweb3 only.
The Castle Capital community multisig (castlecapital.eth) referred to above is controlled by the Castle Capital community. This community continuously produces public and free education materials for the space and diligently researches, breaks down, and comments on industry developments.
The wider Castle Capital community (pushing 40 members) contributes and operates across the space, outside of their affiliation with the community. These other ‘members’ have zero representation on the Castle Labs governance team. Furthermore, the activities of some of the community’s members specifically quoted above have no connection to either the Castle Capital community or Castle Labs.
We would also remind all that Application Advisors are not decision-makers able to choose what team is worthy of a grant.
To further remove any lingering concerns, we will also comment directly on the concerns:
As referenced above, any operations around Castle Capital community and other entities are completely separate from Castle Labs.
Castle Labs has never advised or supported a project on zkSync. The Castle Community co-hosted an event at DevConnect with a zkSync project that later did not deliver on its promises to investors. The Castle Capital community never had any involvement in this project and was simply referred to them to co-host. Admittedly, the community could have done more in their due diligence in this instance. Please see a statement from the Castle Capital community.
As referenced above, the Castle Capital community and its multisig are separate from Castle Labs. Despite this, any community member is free to contribute across the space and apply for grants for their work.
The protocols Castle Labs and its contributors are advising are declared in the application.
The ‘co-authored’ proposal referred to we can only assume was part of 0xAtomist’s contributions to Rysk Finance, declared an affiliation in the application.
Previous contributions to the STIP process were conducted by the Castle Capital community and ARB delegate group. Due to this being an open forum discussion, affiliations, and conflicts of interest were not stated.
These comments and thoughts reflect my personal opinions on this proposal as a member of the Arbitrum Representative Council (ARC). These do not necessarily represent the overall views of the council, Treasure DAO or provide an indication of final voting decision by the ARC.
I have recused myself from discussing the LTIPP council applications with my fellow Treasure ARC members since I am one of the applicants myself, though I am dissatisfied with the process and feel the need to post that on this forum so that there might be a transparent discussion about these issues. Let me first say that I am very much in favor of the LTIPP, there is a need for more funding within Arbitrum and I think this proposal is a good iteration on the STIP. I have therefore also personally voted to fund the program with the highest possible amount (45.815m). Yet, when this proposal passed some issues arose:
Although not explicitly mentioned in the LTIPP proposal, the council seats were supposed to be filled by individuals. To me this makes sense; having councils on councils obscures accountability (which a lot of the applicants want to increase, as per their application) and potentially causes conflicts of interest (individuals can recuse themselves from a vote if there is a potential conflict of interest, councils cannot). Since the rules of the LTIPP proposal allow it, you could argue it being excusable and an error on the side of the proposal itself, yet we are also talking about a 45 million fund here (details like these should be in order).
A new rule was added to the Council Elections on Snapshot, that was not included in the LTIPP proposal, namely: ‘Applicants may not vote for themselves’. When asked about this rule @Matt_StableLab replied ‘personally don’t like the no self-voting rule but the community seemed to think that was the fairest way’. It is unclear to me which ‘community’ and how they reached this conclusion. I was not aware, or have seen any open discussions about the implementation of this rule. I have tried to get access to the LTIPP chats to possibly get some more info on this decision, even though I do not fully agree to having a discussion like this on a private TG channel. To me personally, not discussing this decision with the wider DAO; let alone not voting on this decision as the DAO means that a small, closed off group of people have decided to impede on the governance rights of the whole of Arbitrum. To me this is unacceptable, and not what decentralization entails.
Some members of the ARC applied to the LTIPP Council as individuals, such as myself. According to @Matt_StableLab, Treasure DAO voting for any of us would be against the rule: ‘Applicants may not vote for themselves’. Even though I might be a member of the ARC, that does not mean that I myself am Treasure DAO. I am my own person, with my own opinions and my own morality. Therefore, I not only think that this ruling is unfair; the rule itself is not specific enough as to when someone is voting for themselves (are all Treasure DAO and Treasure DAO game partner members excluded, and when are you a Treasure DAO member?) and the specifics are made up on the spot without any transparency or vote from the wider DAO. This again makes a small and private group of people able to decide on the fate of this program.
For Treasure DAO specifically, not voting would mean that all of the people who have delegated their $ARB to us apparently mean nothing anymore. It’s not just the $ARB that Treasure DAO has in its Treasury, but all Treasure DAO’s members that are potentially excluded from voting here. It would be the same as excluding all members of a political party from voting for said political party. I personally, and with me a lot of other $magic believers, delegated my $ARB to Treasure DAO under the assumption that we would be stronger when united. With this arbitrary decision made by a few people behind closed doors, we wouldn’t have a vote at all.
One of my goals for this program was: ‘Bringing public funding to the next level and having Arbitrum be a place where financial gains flow back to the DAO, the project and its users; thus minimizing the need for VCs in the long run.’. With the decision to exclude applicants to vote for themselves we are excluding the two builders (Treasure DAO and GMX) that the Arbitrum Foundation has rewarded with the most $ARB due to their outsized and early contributions to building up the Arbitrum network. Besides that, we are also excluding another important builder on Arbitrum, MUX protocol. Therefore, in my opinion, this unilateral decision hurts the DAO by having the people in charge of the LTIPP funding not being builders, because they have no voting right in who get to be the people in charge.
I partially agree on some of these topics. Partially don’t share them.
All in all i think a public discussion on this “rule” (you can’t vote for yourself or your own people) is needed, in public, in the forum. And not in chats or other places to which users don’t have a direct access.
@AbdullahUmar and I voted for these individuals as part of the UADP. Our decision came down to those who have had a great track record in Arbitrum as well as have proven themselves in prior grants committees and councils.
Acknowledged for great work in the treasury and sustainability working group
Selected to contribute diverse skills and expertise to the DAO, expertise across a broad range of DAOs and specifically their governance analyst Coltron.
Chosen to provide a different perspective based on day-to-day experiences with Arbitrum and related protocols.
Expected to contribute insights into the narrative and operational aspects of the ecosystem.
The selection of council members reflects our deliberate effort to include talented individuals with diverse experiences and perspectives, ensuring a well-rounded and effective governance body for the DAO and Arbitrum ecosystem.
Selected due to Castle Capital’s demonstrated expertise and valuable contributions to protocols, also Castle Capital’s track record of assistance and support for the ecosystem.
Voted for Serious People represented by Ian Campbell due to the positive collaboration experience.
Ian has been instrumental in helping Savvy DAO improve its Tokenomics, showcasing his expertise and potential to benefit other protocols in the DAO and Arbitrum.
The selection of these advisors is rooted in their individual strengths, past contributions, and the belief that their expertise will enhance the success of the LTIP proposal and bring significant value to the broader ecosystem.
Hello, @SmolPhil
I agree that a representative should always have a voice, otherwise this is not democracy.
Moreover, it is easy to bypass such a restriction by launching an offer from some no-name/
I had a chat with @Matt_StableLab in regards to the posts about CastleLabs and based on my own judgement, the first question + response is relevant, but the rest of discussion is distracting from this thread. I’ve removed the other posts. Let’s leave it at that and remember – maximum politeness policy is always enforced.
We will be voting in support of Boardroom, JOJO, and SEEDlatam as advisors for the Arbitrum LTI Pilot Program for their respective roles in the Arbitrum LTI Pilot Program. Each candidate brings unique and valuable expertise vital for the program’s success.
Boardroom demonstrates deep engagement with the decentralized governance ecosystem through their governance platform. This platform, instrumental in integrating hundreds of DAOs, showcases Boardroom’s commitment to effective governance and stakeholder engagement, aligning well with Arbitrum’s values.
JOJO, with their extensive knowledge of decentralized finance and governance and their active involvement in DAOs and DeFi protocols (e.g., JonesDAO), provides crucial insights and expertise that are essential for guiding the program in the right direction.
SEEDlatam adds a diverse perspective with their unique insights and active engagement in the Latin American blockchain ecosystem. Their understanding of different market dynamics and community engagement strategies is invaluable for the inclusive growth of the Arbitrum ecosystem.
We believe that the combination of Boardroom’s governance platform experience, JOJO’s deep understanding of DeFi and DAOs, and SEEDlatam’s regional insights will greatly enhance the LTI Pilot Program, benefiting the broader ecosystem.
Regarding the council position, we will abstain from voting as we are also candidates for this role.
Hello, I was wondering if there are any saved records of content that has been deleted? The topic of conflict of COI needs to be revisited. This could serve as very useful material.
(@SniperMonke01) / X (twitter.com)