Agreed with previous commenters, part of the language around avoiding controversy is problematic. Sometimes, raising attention to something going wrong requires creating a buzz around it. Trying to mediate with someone who’s actively trying to manipulate the DAO doesn’t make sense - and people most certainly will try to do that. At that point would you punish the person creating the controversy?
The rest of the code of conduct is good, pretty standard, not much to add.
Supporting this proposal. I think that a Code of Conduct is an important part of every organization. A DAO should be no different, this would be a key step in professionalizing the role of delegates and reinforcing the values that guide our mission. It is essential to have clear standards for behavior and integrity, especially as Arbitrum continues to grow and establish itself in the Ethereum ecosystem.
Also, I don’t think his framework isn’t just about formality, it’s about safeguarding Arbitrum’s core mission: to create a transparent, secure, and inclusive protocol for everyone involved. This Code should help delegates make decisions that reflect the best interests of the whole community by outlining values like integrity, responsibility, and fairness. By prioritizing transparency and respect this will help build trust between delegates and the community, which I think its very important as the DAO continues to grow.
Additionally, formalizing operational standards and conflict-of-interest policies brings structure and accountability to our governance model. Having clear voting guidelines, predictable schedules, and conflict-resolution practices enable delegates to stay answerable to the community and work more efficiently. It will also help increase the level of professionalism and organization for Arbitrum. A Code of Conduct sets an example for how DAOs can build a culture of responsibility and professionalism.
I vote in favor of this proposal in Snapshot, although I reiterate my previous comments.
Furthermore, I believe it would be valuable to implement this code for one year, after which a report should be made on the studied situations and whether any sanctions were considered. This would allow us to refine the language afterwards.
Just finished casting my FOR vote in Snapshot, as I mentioned earlier; we can all benefit as delegates from having a civil code of conduct to hold us accountable and encourage productive discussions.
This seems like a smart move, especially with the Arbitrum DAO growing to over 800 delegates (data from Kamar). Btw, I know it’s tough for the mods to keep track of everyone’s actions and make sure they meet the standards for professionalism, transparency ,… So having a clear set of values and behaviors will help hold each delegate responsible for what they do.
I have a question, though. Will there be a clear penalty for delegates who break the Code of Conduct in the Delegate Incentive Program? For example, will a delegate be removed right away for any mistake, or will it depend on how serious it is? I’m asking because I plan to run in December
By the way, really happy to see this proposal moving forward!
Even if I always did my best to act accordingly to these principles, I think that a clear formalization can only bring benefits. We are a growing community and, as we grow, we need things to be written somewhere in order to avoid informal behaviors to happen. This would also allow to take clear actions if bad behaviors happen, or to discourage them through a form of ‘deterrence’. Good fences make good neighbors. Voting in favor.
Voted For: As one of the biggest DAOs in the space, we need to lead by example for other DAOs. Having a Code of Conduct is a necessary step. This serves as a rulebook for situations that might arise, allowing us to refer to it as needed. In practice, it’s now up to us (delegates) to follow this code in real life.
We’re voting in favor of the Delegate Code of Conduct because it feels like the right step as Arbitrum DAO continues to grow. Having some clear guidelines helps set expectations, making it easier to hold everyone accountable and creating a more transparent, respectful environment. We appreciate the focus on soft enforcement—it’s not about strict rules but rather encouraging good behavior over time. Plus, with a bit of structure around voting schedules and a holiday break, it feels like we’re setting up the DAO for smoother operations. Overall, it’s a solid foundation that will help keep Arbitrum aligned and professional as we scale.
I voted “FOR” on this proposal. As several stated before, it is good to have this code written, so there is a clear source of information that everyone can rely on. Awesome job once again @Entropy.
As noted in my reply above, I am for this. Having formal rules like this is important to further legitimize the DAO and have agreed-upon reference points for future discussions. Especially as we (hopefully!) grow the DAO with new members.
I’ll repeat my point that I think we should keep a list of who has been reprimanded by the DAO (similar to List of projects banned from the DAO). In the future, that will be helpful for delegates.
I 100% agree with the sentiment of this proposal. We definitively should have a structure for this!
Personally, I am not aligned with this statement. I think a conflict of interest should impact in voting, and behaviour should be indeed altered. It’s not enough to disclose it. On the quoted Snapshot vote, I selected “FOR: Strict Self-Voting Policy”, which unfortunately was not the top choice amongst delegates. This was, however, what the majority chose. (to not alter behaviour and just put a Disclosure Policy in place).
I also do not agree with this. The top choice of this vote was “Against” shielded vote. Suggesting that for elections people would prefer “Shielded vote” because it was the second most voted alternative in the snapshot is an inference and it could be wrong. I would have personally voted for no shielding on either option (general proposals, or election proposals).
For this, I will be voting against this proposal on its current form. The two points mentioned above (which I have already expressed myself and voted on in the past) are incompatible with my views on the structure presented.
This aside, all other points and guidelines look very good, and I look forward to the DAO adopting some for of conflict of interest direction and COC!
I vote FOR the proposal. I don’t see any issues with it, and I believe it’s good for the DAO.
As for the Shielded Vote that olimpio mentioned, I think the will of the voters was clear - they support the shielded vote (56.69% approval). The difference in interpretation of this vote may arise from whether you’re more familiar with the “first-past-the-post” voting system or with the “proportional” voting system. Personally, I believe the proportional system better represents the will of the voters, which means it’s fair to sum up the total votes in favor of the shielded vote.
I voted FOR this proposal on Snapshot. I think most of the items outlined here will make the DAO more efficient and pleasant to contribute to. The code of conduct gives us something to fall back on in cases where contributors are creating a negative impact on the DAO. Just because DAOs are permissionless in the onchain sense, doesn’t mean the social layer has to accept every type of behavior. We can and should have expectations around adhering to a constructive work environment.
I’m not sure we should move forward with shielded elections given the relatively narrow vote in favor, but this concern is not enough to block me from supporting the proposal as a whole.
I agree with @olimpio that this code of conduct doesn’t go far enough.
The Entropy crew did a great job at getting a solid vibe check, and I think they nailed what the overall feedback was of the delegate community on these policies… but I think we must expect better our selves and the DAO.
COI’s being culturally acceptable makes us look unprofessional and undermines the perceived integrity of our DAO’s governance system to the outside world. This should be included and is long overdue, and can be enforced in some extent by the Delegate Incentive Program.
If someone votes in favor of a proposal that gives them a direct benefit, do they really need the Delegate Incentive Program’s reward? Seems like they have incentive enough. If we already have a team reviewing all these comments, it should be easy enough for that team to see if people have clear conflicts get called out for not declaring them or not voting abstain… they should get their incentives slashed, if not completely, then by some large %, and that should be in the CoC.
The large generalized incentive programs will have a large burden to overcome, it is true many delegates may have to abstain. I personally see this as a good thing. It would mean to pass an incentive program, it would have a better chance if it were more narrowly scoped. This is a bug not a feature. We just passed a vote to stop proposing any incentives for 3 months after these massive STIP, LTIPP and STIP-Bridge proposals. It is very questionable if they were good for the DAO, but there is no question, they were good for many large delegates (especially STIP and STIP Bridge).
IMO Proposal’s that benefit a large number of high ranking delegates should be put to a higher scrutiny. Our current lack of COI policies actually make proposals that benefit large delegates EASIER to pass. Imagine what this looks like to an outsider, “If I just structure my proposal so that the large delegates benefit, it will be sure to pass.”
We find this proposal to be thoughtfully constructed and strategically important for the ecosystem.
The proposal effectively addresses crucial aspects of delegate behavior, governance processes, and operational efficiency while maintaining appropriate flexibility.
In terms of the framework, the proposed code of conduct employs a balanced approach between establishing clear guidelines and avoiding overly restrictive rules that could impede governance effectiveness.
There are meaningful operational improvements attained by the standardization of operational procedures, such as the implementation of a structured voting schedule enhances predictability or the establishment of clear election standards addresses potential manipulation vectors.
The proposal’s trial period approach is also appropriate as it enables practical testing of the framework, allows for refinement based on real-world application, creates a clear path to constitutional inclusion while maintaining flexibility for necessary adjustments.
The proposal has a pragmatic and concrete approach to responsible voting in elections with clear mathematical guidelines and practical examples that help prevent manipulation while maintaining voting flexibility. The inclusion of a buffer for UI rounding (0.1%) goes to show the attention to practical implementation details.
Overall, we support this proposal as it represents a meaningful step toward streamlining and professionalizing Arbitrum’s governance while maintaining appropriate flexibility and increasingly nurturing a culture of transparency and accountability.
Thanks @Entropy for this proposal. After carefully reading I can only support it.
I think this proposal will make Arbitrum DAO more organized and professional by setting clear rules for delegate behavior. It will help build a respectful and open community where all voices are welcome and treated fairly.
I am sure that with Code of Conduct,
delegates will be more honest and careful when making decisions, which benefits everyone.
And also a trial period of 6 months lets us see how it works, and we can make changes if needed later. Good work, @Entropy
Voting FOR this proposal. I think @olimpio and @Griff make great points that we should work toward in the next round, but in the meantime I think @Entropy have done a great job of starting this conversation and building in room for iteration given the limited timeframe. I also think it would be premature to commit to a binding structure for delegates before ratifying a mission and vision.
It’s been great to see the well-crafted and detailed CoC for delegates to uphold and hold each other accountable for the social layer of the governance. We also like the approach that having it as a pilot for 6.5 months and then incorporate them into the constitution.
As the Arbitrum DAO grows, establishing clear expectations for delegate behavior becomes increasingly necessary. The policies make sense and address potential conflicts smoothly and efficiently.
Standardized voting schedule is a great idea and makes it easier to both be a delegate and make informed decisions on proposals as the schedule is more predictable and theres time given to research and discuss proposals. It should streamline DAO operations a lot.
The trial period also allows these new changes, and especially the more experimental ones like shielded voting and enforcement mechanisms to be trialed before put into place permanently, allowing for them to be tweaked based on actual results.