[Non-Constitutional] Arbitrum DAO Delegate Code of Conduct + Formalizing the DAO's Operations

[DisruptionJoe]

Hello Entropy,

Here are some considerations.

Attending calls

@Entropy

Attending the recurring governance calls on the Governance Calendar

There are quite a few working group calls on the calendar. Maybe clarify with names of the calls delegates are expected to attend.

Abstain Standard

@Entropy

Delegates are advised to vote abstain when unable to conduct the necessary diligence to understand the proposals.

This is very smart to include. Thank you.

When is it appropriate to message publicly?

@Entropy

Delegates should make a best effort to provide constructive feedback through appropriate channels and avoid taking discussions to social media in a manner that could tarnish Arbitrum DAO’s brand and reputation.

While I generally agree that brand tarnishing should be avoided, there isn’t a clear line of when IT IS APPROPRIATE to take to a broader forum. If you’ve pushed in private tg and on forum with no answer, it shouldn’t be against the rules.

I think you leave this intentionally vague, but some clarification might help.

Conflict of Interest advice

@Entropy

Delegates that disclose a conflict of interest are not expected to alter their voting in any way. Self-voting is not banned outright for the reasons stated in this post and based on sentiment gathered from this temperature check. However, as explained further below, a delegate that repeatedly fails to disclose a conflict of interest before self-voting or if a single instance is deemed to be severe, they risk being removed from the Delegate Incentive Program or a DAO-elected position.

This is important to emphasize - some people will tell people not to self-vote at any level. Unfortunately, if it isn’t enforcable onchain, then it creates a systemic advantage for the bad guys - unless we think we would catch 100% of bad actors forever. Rather than being that you can vote anyway, and having good actors peer pressured to not self-voting - this policy simply says you must be transparent about conflicts. Very smart, but requires cultural support and reinforcement.

Need for “graduated sanctions” per Ostroms 8 Rules for Commons Governance

@Entropy

Delegate Incentive Program Removal

This is wisely setup to include an appeal mechanism. It is missing “graduated sanctions”. Its like one offense and you’re gone forever. Consider tiered responses available to the admin and appelate courts.

Snapshot rule question

@Entropy

In accordance with the Arbitrum Constitution, delegates should follow the recommendation that proposals be open to discussion on the forums for at least one week before being put to a vote. This is to allow delegates ample time to review and provide feedback.

Does this mean before being put to a Tally vote or to a snapshot tempcheck?

I’d rather see more temp checks sooner rather than so much time being spent discussing nuances of things that wouldn’t pass anyway.

Unneccessary delay

@Entropy

In order for a Tally vote to start on Thursday, it must be posted on Monday given the 3-day delay from when a proposal is posted until voting begins.

If Snapshots are up for 1 week, couldn’t the Tally be posted on the Thursday when it passes. I don’t understand why create an uncessessary 3 day delay.

Shielded voting misinterpretation

@Entropy

A few weeks ago the Entropy team posted a temperature check to gauge the DAO’s stance on shielded voting. The results indicated that a slight majority of delegates favored the use of shielded voting as the default for elections.

I don’t believe that is the outcome. You would need to assume the “elections only” voters would have voted “all snapshot votes” rather than “against” to make this true. I don’t believe that is a fair assumption. (I voted elections only.)

Accountability questions

@Entropy

Since shielded voting keeps a voter’s position private, monitoring for breaches of the responsible voting policy will be conducted post election.

Who is accountable for this?

@Entropy

ARB tokens allocated to DAO initiatives are not to be used in governance. To keep circulating voting supply from increasing, whenever possible, multi-sigs holding program funds should delegate to the Arbitrum Exclude Address.

Who is accountable for monitoring this?

Conclusion

Thanks for the hard work. I’m 95% ready to vote for this. I believe it is just about “safe to try”.

[Euphoria]

The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.

We are voting FOR this proposal in Snapshot Voting.

This proposal will help make the Arbitrum DAO more organized by setting clear rules for delegates and creating a respectful space where everyone’s voice is valued equally.

@Entropy

@Nyx

Regarding weighted voting, while it has benefits, it also carries the risk of skewed voting outcomes based on individual perceptions, potentially undermining objectivity. Are you proposing that weighted voting be applied universally to all proposal types, or is it intended specifically for elections?

We are proposing weighted voting for only elections, not for all proposal types.

The question around weighted voting, which we raised earlier, was addressed in the discussion, which resolved our main concern.

[duokongcrypto]

Additional recommendations:
1. Enhanced training and support: for new representatives, regular training or mentoring, such as proposal interpretation sessions, could be set up to help them get up to speed quickly on governance.
2. more flexible conflict of interest resolution: after a conflict of interest is disclosed, consideration could be given to setting up a neutral panel to evaluate it, rather than relying on the foundation alone to decide.
3. Community feedback channel: During the trial period, it is recommended to open a special feedback channel to encourage more community members to suggest improvements.

Questions:
1. The proposal mentions that “if the Code of Conduct is violated, the applicant will be removed from the program”, but are the actual criteria and procedures for determining the eligibility of the applicant more clearly stated?
- For example, is there a specific measurement framework or case study for determining “conflict of interest” or “disruptive behavior”? Otherwise, it may lead to disputes.
2. Independence of DAO conflict resolution: The proposal mentions that the Arbitrum Foundation will be responsible for conflict resolution, does this seem centralized? Can the community play a greater role in major disputes, for example through decentralized arbitration or voting mechanisms?

[paulofonseca]

voting Against the current offchain proposal because I think this proposal needs to abide by the constitutional level of quorum (5% and not 3% as proposed) since it’s going to be a constitutional proposal in the end of its trial period. I believe it needs to have 5% of quorum participation so that it is able to enforce the consequences outlined for the delegates that don’t follow this CoC during the trial period, otherwise the trial period would not be really testing the implementation of this proposal. Also, I don’t agree with the assumption that elections should have shielded votes, since that was not the outcome of the previous temperature check vote on that matter. In general I agree we should have a CoC for Delegates like this one, but I feel that this one is not enough since it doesn’t enforce a strict voting policy for delegates that have disclosed or obvious conflicts of interest.

[maxlomu]

gm, voting FOR this proposal.
It aligns with my view on delegate conduct.

[krst]

The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.

We are voting FOR this proposal in the offchain vote.

While we share some of the concerns raised above, we believe that “the perfect is the enemy of the good” applies in this case.

This Code of Conduct is only a social consensus and, in our experience, it will most likely require some additional changes along the way before we get it right.

It may also be necessary to set up a committee to work proactively to enforce these rules, or at least to signal violations.

All in all, we think it’s worth giving it a try and seeing if it’s working properly in about 6 months’ time.

[LevelK]

The LevelK Delegation is voting FOR this off-chain proposal. We support the formalization of a standard for delegate accountability. We believe the best way to arrive at a final version of a Code of Conduct is to have a trial period. We expect that during this trial period, there will be many changes and refinements to the code of conduct. We look forward to further discussion on this topic.

[BlockworksResearch]

Blockworks Research is voting FOR this proposal.

We think that this proposal warrants passing an offchain vote, and that this current Code of Conduct will require additional changes moving forward; alongside more conversation around how the DAO approaches punishments/reprimandment for lack of a better term.

[WinVerse]

DAOplomats is voting in favor of this proposal.

This idea of a code of conduct for delegates is a good one and we are happy to see Entropy foster more transparency within the community. We also appreciate the answers you gave to our earlier questions and thus, more confident to support the proposal.

[0xTALVO.ETH_MTY]

I’ve just cast my FOR vote on Snapshot. As I mentioned before, establishing a code of conduct for this crucial role is essential. Ideally, regular updates would help ensure that delegates remain mindful of Arbitrum’s values and the responsibility entrusted to us.

[snowdot]

Gm, gm

The results are in for the Adopt a Delegate Code of Conduct & Formalize Operations off-chain proposal.

See how the community voted and more Arbitrum stats:

Adopt a Delegate Code of Conduct & Formalize Operations

[Entropy]

At the time of the snapshot, 3% of votable supply was 120,022,984.51 ARB. This proposal has therefore met the specified quorum and passed with a majority of votes FOR.

The Delegate Code of Conduct and operational updates will go into effect Monday, November 11th, 2024 with a ~6.5 month trial period till May 30th, 2025. We appreciate the suggestion from delegates about setting up a specific channel for feedback; our team will consider different options on how to best collect suggestions. As mentioned previously, Entropy will coordinate with the Foundation to make sure the Code of Conduct and the DAO’s procedures are easily accessible. Lastly, a response to the additional questions brought up by delegates during the voting period will be posted in the coming days. Thank you all for the substantive feedback and suggestions made during this discussion.

[Juanrah]

I get @Griff’s concerns about conflicts of interest, I think they are totally jusified. However, this was already addressed in the August vote. Back then it was decided to focus on transparency and responsible voting rather than strict restrictions. The proposal moves forward on the assumption that delegates will act responsibly and with everyone’s best interests in mind. I understand that no framework is perfect, but I think this gives us a good foundation for ethical governance without taking away delegate flexibility. And of course, we can always improve as we see how these policies play out.

[AbdullahUmar]

Below are the opinions of the UADP:

We voted in favor of this proposal—our team believes that a clear set of explicit guidelines is prudent for ensuring cordial participation in the DAO. Beyond general decorum, this code of conduct can allow participants like the Seed team to point towards explicit violations in the agreed code to potentially blacklist certain delegates and revoke their ability to profit from Arbitrum. Such a setup is much better than pointing towards some arbitrary social handbook that hasn’t been agreed on by a majority of the DAO. The election standards are also very much welcome as we’ve seen some discord in the past regarding self-voting.

[Gabriel]

I voted “FOR” for the reasons stated above!

[SEEDGov]

After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.

Rationale

From SEEDGov we provided feedback before this proposal was voted on in Snapshot, and our questions have been adequately addressed.

Regarding the voting outcome on the use of Shielded Voting, although it could be considered somewhat controversial, we believe the DAO has demonstrated support for its implementation, given that the total votes in favor (either option) exceed those against. Taking this into consideration and reflecting on the feedback previously given, we have decided to support this initiative.

[danielo]

RnDAO has voted in favour of this proposal.

That being said, we see the requirement for starting voting on the same day of the week to be superfluous. Shielded voting solves the issue for large delegates who don’t want to vote early, in practice allowing anyone to pick one day of the week to vote and always be able to catch all proposals, no need to extend into the weekend.

[Entropy]

Following conversations with the Arbitrum Foundation, we’d like to update delegates on a decision that was made regarding the approved procedures and Security Council Elections. The proposed Election Standards will apply only to Snapshot votes, rationale is as follows:

First, it is not currently possible to shield onchain elections. When the initial conversation on shielded voting was raised to the DAO, the title clearly communicated that it was for Snapshot votes only - “Should the DAO Default to using Shielded Voting for Snapshot Votes?”. However, we realize now that the language is not as explicit in this follow up proposal.

Second, while the Arbitrum Foundation can remove candidates that have violated the Responsible Voting Policy during the nomination phase, removing a candidate that violates this policy during the election phase can only be done in two ways, each of which is very challenging:

1. An onchain vote for removal with at least 10% of all Votable Tokens have casted votes either “in favor” of removal or “abstain”, and at least 5/6 (83.33%) of all casted votes are “in favor” of removal
2. At least 9 of the Security Council members vote in favor of removal.

As per the Arbitrum DAO constitution, the retroactive removal of an elected Security Council candidate would leave the seat unfilled until the following election.

Lastly, after a deeper review of the Arbitrum Constitution, the current language has been interpreted as such that an approval of an onchain Constitutional AIP is required to change the rules of future Security Council Elections. While the Constitution also grants the Arbitrum Foundation the authority to issue new procedures and guidelines for offchain components of the Security Council Elections, following a discussion with the Arbitrum Foundation, they have advised that the Election Standards as outlined in this proposal should apply only to Snapshot votes during the 6 month trial. After which, a more focused conversation can be held to discuss updating the Security Council Election procedures and incorporated into the onchain proposal. Given the Foundation’s authority on the issue, we believe this recommendation should be respected.

Clarifying language has been added to the Election Standards section in this post outlining the Updates to the Arbitrum DAO Procedures in the Announcements section. A refined version (removed sentences calling for delegate input & slight sentence restructuring to account for it passing Snapshot) of the Code of Conduct has also been posted in the Announcements section. Going forward, these posts should be regarded as the most up to date and active versions until the trial period concludes.

[Entropy]

Additionally, we’d like to clarify that delegates are free to post their rationale & voting choice to the forums during the election. This was a topic discussed during the temperature check for shielded voting, but was admittedly an overlooked aspect in the recently passed Election Standards. Since no specific guidelines restricting delegates from communicating rationale were included, we feel the best course of action is to let delegates retain the optionality of making their positions public.

While this may seem to go against the core premise of shielded elections, as pointed out by @krst during the first discussion on shielded voting, it keeps discussion lively during the voting process and if information is made public that perhaps changes a delegate’s mind, they can always update their vote on Snapshot. Furthermore, we believe it would be very difficult for a delegate to strategically vote based solely on forum rationales, as it would only give a partial picture of the current standings. After the trial period, the topic will be rediscussed and clarifying language will be added to the procedures for the onchain vote.

Lastly, as outlined in the procedures, it is the responsibility of the proposal author or entity/individual managing the election to monitor post-election for breaches of the Responsible Voting Policy and instances of suspected collusion will be investigated by the Arbitrum Foundation.

[paulofonseca]

@Entropy could you clarify if the Responsible Voting Policy applies to the next, onchain and therefore non shielded, security council elections?

because in the latest security council elections, I believe that policy was violated by some delegates.

of course that this latest vote and proposal hadn’t pass the offchain vote at the time of the last Security Council Nominations and Elections, so no foul there, but it would be helpful to clarify this for the next Security Council elections.