Hey @Vertex_Protocol following the feedback received we have opted to remove Hats Protocol given that several people felt that it was not necessary at this stage given the low amount of on-chain actions the ARDC has. However, we are looking to implement this once the Optimistic Governance Module is deployed by Tally.
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Thank you @DefiLlama_Research for your interest in the role of the Research Member!
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Thank you @BlockworksResearch for your interest in the role of the Research Member and for the contributions made in the ARDC V1.
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Thank you for the feedback, @karpatkey. While the ARDCâs alignment with the DAOâs goals should indeed be part of its core structure, we believe itâs crucial to reinforce this alignment explicitly. The Supervisory Council is intended to guarantee independent oversight, providing an extra layer of accountability and expertise where needed. Compared to the DAO Advocate, this Council will be better positioned to capture a full range of perspectives, bringing in a variety of skills and viewpoints to strategic discussions.
Additionally, we have also included the roles previously falling under the Operations Lead into the remit of the Supervisory Council. By also being responsible for day-to-day management and coordination, this dual focus helps to close the gap between high-level guidance and the actual execution of tasks.
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Thank you @ReveloIntel for your interest in the role of the Research Member!
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Hey @raam thanks for your feedback. We have updated the proposal to better clarify the dependency of the ARDC V2 on the Optimistic Governance Module (OGM). In summary, the ARDC v2 does not depend on the OGM for implementation; however, once Tally deploys the OGM for the DAO, a proposal will be submitted to integrate it into the ARDC structure.
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Thank you @CastleCapital for your feedback and for expressing your interest in the role of the Research Member!
We believe that for the ARDC V2 holding an election for one member per vertical will result in a more efficient process given that an RFQ process for every request can be time-consuming and slow down the ARDCâs ability to deliver timely insights. An elected representative per vertical streamlines this process, allowing for more consistent deliverables. Should the Supervisory Council deem a member of the ARDC to have acted negligently, in bad faith, or contrary to the mandate/purposes of the ARDC, with a simple majority (2/3) they will be able to terminate such a member and submit a call for applications for the vacant ARDC seat.
Additionally, while we understand the desire to have greater visibility for the reports and data carried out, this information is already being published publicly on the forum itself, and thus, any parties interested enough can access such information. We have also updated the Operational Parameters section to include more detail and transparency concerning the monthly report as well as the outcome report to be prepared at the end of the initial 6-month term.
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Thank you @SEEDGov @JoJo @Argonaut for your feedback.
We have revised the proposal to clarify that working members (service providers) are expected to outline a two-month scope of work, representing one-third of their initial six-month term. This approach offers two key benefits:
- The proposed scope of work will reflect each working memberâs understanding of the most pressing needs within the Arbitrum DAO, which will serve as an additional consideration for their selection.
- The Supervisory Council will ultimately decide which deliverables are prioritized within each vertical. This proposed scope of work will act as a buffer until specific requests are made, with the Supervisory Council determining whether the proposed tasks should proceed (they wonât be automatically approved upon election). While the Supervisory Council has the final say in making such decisions, ideally they would solicit feedback from the community, delegates, the Arbitrum Foundation, Offchain Labs and other key stakeholders to ensure the DAO is fairly represented.
We believe this is an ideal middle ground which ensures that sufficient flexibility is provided.
Furthermore, in ARDC V1, the initial funding was set at 1.76M ARB, which, at the then-current price of $1.70 per ARB, would have been approximately $3.01M USD, including a 30% buffer. Ultimately, ARDC V1âs average funding totalled over $1.0M USD. This amount is closely aligned with Option B, which proposes funding ARDC V2 with 1.05M USDC over a six-month term. Options A and C offer variations around this baseline, reflecting an increase or decrease of around 20%, respectively, allowing the ArbitrumDAO to make the final decision.
Please note that (i) the funding amounts in the updated proposal reflect costs projected over one year and (ii) these funding figures represent the maximum allowable amounts, setting a spending ceiling that cannot be exceeded, rather than a guaranteed payout. Based on feedback, we decided to also increase the allocation for the Risk Member by 20%.
Regarding lessons learned, we have incorporated these throughout the updated ARDC V2 framework. We believe that many of the key challenges identified have been addressed through the introduction of the Supervisory Council enabling a more structured and well-managed framework, revisions to the payment model, the ability to extend the ARDC for an additional six months pending approval through a Snapshot vote and the adoption of Aera to convert the programâs ARB into USDC for operational purposes.
@SEEDGov as for funding the ARDC for 12 months, we received similar feedback from other members and have decided to take it on board and update the proposal accordingly. In summary, there will be 2 phases:
Phase 1 - Upon the passing of this proposal the first tranche of funding for 182 days (6 months) will be unlocked.
Phase 2 - At the end of the initial 6-month term, a Snapshot vote will be held offering the ArbitrumDAO the following options (i) extend the ARDC with the same working members (ii) extend the ARDC with a re-election of the working members (iii) do not extend the ARDC. If the DAO chooses to not extend the ARDC after the initial term, MSS will return the remaining funds in stablecoins back to the Treasury (i.e. there will be no subsequent OTC to buy back ARB).
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Thanks for your feedback @jameskbh. Based on feedback received, we have decided to consolidate the responsibilities of the Operations Lead into the Supervisory Council. This combined responsibility for both high-level oversight and day-to-day management ensures a seamless transition from strategic guidance to task execution, reducing unnecessary bureaucracy.
Replacing the DAO Advocate with a three-member Supervisory Council allows the ARDC to benefit from a broader range of perspectives and skills, enhancing strategic decision-making. This Council is essential, as it will ultimately decide which deliverables to prioritize within each vertical, ensuring the ARDCâs resources are used effectively and addressing certain inefficiencies observed during ARDC V1.
Moreover, after considering your feedback, along with input from other members, we have decided to remove Hats Protocol from the proposal.
As for the setup of Aera Vaults, this alternative is preferred as it grants the DAO an avenue to convert funds in a low-impact manner and reduce the counterparty price risk on OTC desks (i.e. if the DAO OTCâs through an OTC Desk, there is no guarantee that that OTC desk will not proceed to dump that allocation in a low-impact manner). Through Aeraâs protocol-owner-execution strategy, we actually get to have low-impact transperant (and on-chain verifiable) solution for fund conversion that guarantees that we convert ARB in a sensible manner. You can see the images attached for further details on how this is done.
Finally, as for the scope of work, we have updated the wording of the proposal to reflect the fact that working members (service providers) are to outline a scope of work covering two months of their term (1/3rd of the workload given their initial 6-month term). The value-add of this is two-fold (i) the proposed scope of work will reflect the working members understanding of the most pressing needs within the Arbitrum DAO, which will add any layer of consideration as to them being elected for the role (ii) the ultimate decision as to the work to be carried out (which deliverables are to be prioritised per vertical) will be the responsibility of the Supervisory Council. Therefore, the proposed scope of work acts as a buffer until requests are made, and the decision as to whether this work is to be carried out will lie with the Supervisory Council (it will not automatically apply following their election). This emphasises the importance of the Supervisory Council in ensuring an effective ARDC V2.
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Hey @cp0x thanks for your feedback.
Feel free to take a look at the updated proposal as we have removed the Operations Lead and integrated his responsibilities within the Supervisory Council. To clarify, will not be âcreating a whole committee, and then a supervisory boardâ, but rather there will simply be a Supervisory Council consisting of 3 members. The rationale for this streamlined approach and the updated operational framework is detailed in our response to SeedGov, Jojo, and Argonaut.
Additionally, the value of the ARDC is demonstrated by ARDC V1âs achievements: it delivered 43 distinct outputs, which, as outlined in the final outcome report, helped return over 1,000,000 ARB to the DAOâs treasury. This recovery effectively offset a significant portion of the ARDCâs costs, which averaged just over $1,000,000 USD.
As for the third point, we are currently having discussions on alternative payment methods.
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We are in favor of funding the team, but are a bit confused around the different options and the exact granularity with it. Some general questions:
- Again, what metrics will the DAO use to assess the success of the ARDC v2 and determine if the proposed budget allocation is delivering the value âpromisedâ?
- Given that two-thirds of the cap is contingent on actual project needs, what specific criteria will the Supervisory Council use to evaluate the necessity and priority of new tasks?
Overall, the supervisory council seems pretty useful, but weâre not convinced the three of them is best for this, and might just introduce unneeded overhead and expenses.
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Thank you for this proposal! First of all, we must acknowledge the achievements of the Arbitrum Research & Development Collective [V1], which has made valuable contributions to Arbitrum DAO. I reviewed the latest revised version of the proposal, and many of the Delegatesâ suggestions have already been incorporated. However, before the Snapshot vote, I have one concern that I hope can be addressed.
The current proposal is very comprehensive, with detailed requirements that align well with Arbitrum DAOâs principles of transparency. However, my concern lies precisely in thisâcould all these rules and regulations discourage council members from actively participating? They would need to spend a significant amount of time and energy proving the work theyâve done, and this isnât exactly a highly-paid role. Personally, if I were required to fill out numerous forms to prove my workload, I would find it frustrating, as I donât enjoy working under rigid guidelines.
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Hey @Larva !
Thanks for your comment - appreciated as per usual ser
On the roles, albeit the numerous points that there are they can be summed up as follows:
Comms Members (2) - DAO Representation (Most importantly, as these are indeed DAO Representatives), routine engagement w/stakeholders, bi-weekly calls (an hour per two weeks), distributed ARDC work across DAO Socials, engage w/delegates, AF, OCL etc. on a continuous basis. All in all, ensuring that the ARDC work is granted optimal visibility to the DAO, AF, OCL, and the ecosystem in general.
Operations Member (1) - Monthly Report, Outcome report at the end of the term, facilitating the RFQ process and managing the notion page (the page is for the most part populated by SPs themselves, not by the council - council just makes sure this is up to date and maintains SP accountability).
All in all when you look at the work that actually needs to get done itâs not substantial to the point where it wouldnât attract people - what we wanted is to attract the right people that (ideally) have experience in these roles for example.
We wanted to clearly outline certain responsibilities to avoid a situation where no ownership of tasks is taken (i.e. if the SC is generic, there might be issues w/members not taking ownership of certain tasks or expecting someone else to do it). It also ensures that we have someone to be held accountable for each role/responsibility.
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Thank you @Immutablelawyer for the quick response. I fully understand that a clear accountability mechanism is essential, I just had some minor concerns before. Youâre right, for the right people, this wonât be an issue. I will definitely support this proposal!
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First, the introduction of a retainer model for members seems like a positive step towards aligning incentives, but there is a risk that this could lead to inefficiencies if expectations regarding time and deliverables are not managed properly. I recommend implementing clear metrics to assess performance, which would strengthen accountability and maximize value for the DAO. Second, the inclusion of an Optimistic Governance Module is intriguing, but its implementation might require more clarity. How will bureaucratic bottlenecks be mitigated, and what will the veto process look like if proposals initially face no objections? I think this aspect needs more detail to ensure effectiveness in distributed governance environments.
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Having closely followed ARDC v1 from the sidelines, speaking frequently with Blockworks/Delphi, and understanding the value of this research, I support this proposal and would be keen for Messariâs Protocol Services to contribute our efforts towards the DAO in the future.
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I voted for 100% of âFunded with 2.60M USDC + Councilâ.
This option was chosen to ensure ample resources for large-scale operations, providing the necessary budget for critical functions like risk, security, and research while maintaining robust oversight through the Supervisory Council.
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Weâre Voting 100% for option A with a budget of $1.73 million USDC
- Option A represents the lowest financial commitment among the proposed options, allowing the DAO to carefully assess the value and impact of ARDC V2 before committing to larger budgets
- The lower budget encourages a more focused and efficient approach to resource allocation, potentially mitigating concerns about bureaucracy and redundancy
- If ARDC V2 proves highly successful and demonstrates clear value, the DAO can consider increasing funding in future iterations based on data-driven evaluation
- Rationale
- Proven Value
- ARDC V1 demonstrably provided value to the ArbitrumDAO by delivering numerous research outputs and returning a significant amount of ARB to the Treasury
- Continuing this initiative could further contribute valuable insights to guide decision-making
- Structured Framework
- ARDC V2 introduces a more structured framework with the Supervisory Council, which aims to address concerns about accountability and alignment with DAO objectives
- This council, with dedicated roles for communications and operations, could improve transparency and facilitate smoother collaboration between the ARDC and stakeholders like Offchain Labs and the Arbitrum Foundation
- Retainer Model
- The proposed Retainer Model directly ties payments to project needs and incentivizes efficient work, mitigating potential underutilization
- Specialized Expertise
- The continuation of the Risk, Security, and Research roles ensures continued focus on vital aspects of the Arbitrum ecosystem
- Proven Value
- Points to Consider
- Bureaucracy Concerns
- Several community members have raised concerns about the increasing number of roles and entities within the ArbitrumDAO, suggesting that the ARDC V2 could contribute to unnecessary bureaucracy
- Overlapping Responsibilities
- The need for a Supervisory Council has been questioned, with some arguing that aligning ARDC activities with DAO interests should be inherent to the structure
- Limited Visibility and Impact
- Some community feedback highlights the need for better visibility and accessibility of ARDC outputs
- Lack of KPIs and Evaluation Metrics
- The proposal lacks concrete key performance indicators (KPIs) or evaluation metrics beyond the number of reports produced
- Bureaucracy Concerns
Given the concerns about bureaucracy and the need to demonstrate clear value, a cautious approach to funding is recommended.
- ADRC should clearly define the scope and responsibilities, addressing concerns about overlapping roles with other entities and potential bureaucracy
- Develop a robust communication strategy to ensure the visibility and accessibility of ARDC outputs, translating research findings into actionable insights for the DAO and the broader community
- Establish clear KPIs and evaluation metrics to measure the effectiveness and impact of the ARDCâs work, providing data-driven insights for future decision-making
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Thank you for your proposal. Overall, this proposal can help to better manage and optimize the R&D process and deserves to be supported to support ARDC in achieving the above objectives
In the area of transparent budgeting, the restructuring of the budget in the proposal is good, but the Oversight Committee should ensure that funds are used transparently to avoid overspending.
At the same time, monitoring improvement: the introduction of the monitoring committee is a good idea to strengthen the management of the budget and projects, to ensure that each project advances on time and to avoid the waste of resources.
Also retaining the payment model: this is useful to motivate members to be more focused and efficient, and also avoid useless work, efficiency will increase
I think the adjusted scope of at-risk members is clearer, provides real value to the ecosystem, and is worth supporting.
But as a general outsiderâs view, I think a few points need attention
1. budget transparency: budget adjustments are good, but the oversight committee must ensure that every dollar is clearly spent to avoid waste.
2. Reduced roles: Eliminating unnecessary roles improves efficiency, but key positions must not be missing to avoid jeopardizing project progress.
3. Linking workload to remuneration: a flexible retention model is good, but it has to be ensured that there is someone to supervise it, so that no one can just get paid and not work, and the quality of work has to be kept up.
The most important thing is the feedback mechanism, supervision mechanism. I see accountability mentioned in many reports.