I voted following this reasoning, so my first choice was additional funds for 1 year.
I voted as follows:
- Additional funds for one year
- 6 months from available funds
- New election at $86,581 per year
- Liquidation of RWAs and STEP
- Abstain
The yield earned from the RWA portfolio is enough to cover the shortfall, so this seems like the best solution to me. However, I share the concerns raised by others that there should have been a hedge in place to avoid this issue, and/or that the currency denomination should have been clearer from the start. But as we say in my country, āel hubiera no existe.ā
I voted New election at $86,581 per year, Liquidation of RWAs and STEP, 6 months from available funds, Additional funds for one year , Abstain because this feels like extortion. we should procure new service providers for this.
I voted in the attached order on the temp check proposal.
The STEP program is one of the most successful DAO initiatives to date. We should keep this simple and pass a proposal to backfill the funding for the remainder of Stakehouseās contract. Hopefully this is a learning experience for all involved to build more buffer into operational expenses, and to liquidate the ARB quickly if expenses are denominated in USD.
In the future, we as a DAO need to consider a solution for shortfalls such as these due to ARB volatility. Itās an issue weāve run into multiple times at Tally. Weāve simply eaten the cost difference in the past, but this is not something we are likely going to be able to do on an ongoing basis.
I voted to earmark additional funds. After all the effort that was made, it would be a pity to abandon it due to the lack of funds. I think that this program is really essential.
Voted #1 Additional funds for one year (then other options):
When we were voting on the original proposal, I was in favor. While I think this was an operational mistake by the team, we should avoid this mistake in the future. I still believe the STEP program works very well, and the team behind it should be compensated fairly. The solution to add funds for one year sounds like the best way to fix this. However, we should use this example to learn from and avoid repeating this mistake in the future.
Thank you for doing this at Tally @Frisson and eating up the cost for ARB price volatility. Itās the right move!
The following reflects the views of L2BEATās governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and itās based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
Weāre voting FOR the proposal and choosing to provide additional funds to cover the entire 1-year tenure.
Having spent a lot of time and effort to set up STEP, and having gone through the process of electing a program manager to oversee the program for a year, it doesnāt make sense to jeopardize all that progress for a shorter term of a new election.
The yield from the RWAs was supposed to be used for the DAO treasury anyway, but it hasnāt already been allocated to any initiative. With that in mind, it makes sense to cover the funding difference from the yield instead of having the DAO provide additional funds.
I vote for providing additional funding to cover the entire one year tenure as it would clearly be best to avoid changing to a new program manager.
Volatility is the norm tho in this spaceā¦ so iām sort of surprised that the treasury management group got caught by this, pretty ironic
Here is my ranking:
We support allocating the additional funds to extend contract for the full one-year term, recognizing the significant effort invested in setting up the STEP program. A six-month term risks disrupting the programās momentum and creating operational inefficiencies, whereas securing their management for the entire year ensures continuity and stability.
We are in favor of allocating additional funds to cover the full one-year tenure for the STEP Program Manager. This decision is critical for ensuring continuity, stability, and avoiding operational disruptions to a program that has already proven to be a successful DAO initiative.
Key Points:
- Timely Compensation: The manager should be paid their quoted amount. It is important to maintain the trust and accountability of external service providers by honoring the original USD-based contract.
- Utilizing Yield: Since the yield from the RWA portfolio is sufficient to cover the shortfall, using these funds for payment is the most logical step. This approach will allow us to avoid liquidating RWAs or re-launching another election process, both of which would incur additional costs and delays.
- Lessons for the Future: This situation offers a key learning opportunity for the DAO. Future proposals should include clearer processes for converting ARB to USD upfront to mitigate any issues arising from market volatility. Additionally, building a buffer into operational expenses could prevent future budget shortfalls.
We support moving forward without delay, collecting yield ASAP and ensuring that the program runs smoothly for the entire year, while learning from these challenges to improve proposal execution in the future.
Blockworks Research is in favor of providing additional funds to cover the full year of tenure for the STEP program manager. Treasury diversification and management is no joke, and we think that it would be best to provide the best incentives so that this is executed properly.
We stress though that this is becoming a recurrent problem for the DAO, and a greater payment plan needs to be structured. Multiple initiatives have fallen to the wayside because of ARB<>USD conversion problems.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to vote āAdditional funds for one yearā on this proposal at the Snapshot vote.
Rationale
We recognise the tremendous effort it has taken to manage this proposal and that is why we see no point in going any other way than to honour the agreement and pay Steakhouse for the whole year. It would even be a dangerous precedent to take any other decision, as we would be sending the message to service providers that the volatility of ARB and the difficulties in converting it to stables that we face could somehow alter the agreement reached with the DAO.
For all these reasons, it is reasonable to use part of the yield obtained to cover the corresponding annual payment.
We vote for additional funds for one year as the first choice on Snapshot.
While the DAO needs to address the issue around the conversation between the fiat and ARB token, we agree that the initial promise and contract with service providers should be respected and followed through with funds compensated by the treasury. Now, itās more critical to execute the program than delaying the operations.
This is a difficult one. I voted for additional funds for a year. Itās been a tremendous effort to run this project for the DAO, and it aligns with our long-term goals.
However, does this set a precedent for project managers or service providers to convert their funds to USD after passing a proposal?
We understand these are challenging times for the market, butā¦ can we learn from this?
Thinking about the sustainability of the token on one side and the service providers over timeāthese are interesting conversations Iād love to understand and explore.
Additional funds for a year to cover, not amend, the existing agreement. The DAO needs to make good on the terms presented by the service provider and ratified by the DAO constituents.
Cutting the service providerās term short as a result of this administrative failure shouldnāt even be up for discussion. This proposal simply should have been a request for additional funding to cover the shortfall.
The program manager election passed in June 2024 and Steakhouse has been providing services (duties specified in the March 20th proposal) since the āpre-allocationā phase that began shortly after.
There is also a āpost-allocationā phase with a different payment schedule. It appears the tenure weāre discussing will start at this phase after negotiations with the foundation.
@thedevanshmehta, two questions:
- What are the beginning and end dates of the 1-year tenure for program manager?
- Can you provide any more details around what will be defined in the agreement with the foundation?
Voting to keep the project running because I think it is too valuable to let die, however Iāll echo others that this is becoming a recurring problem where projects are wanting to pay amounts in a USD price but keeping the value in ARB tokens.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros Labs DAO governance team, composed of @Blueweb, @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR the proposal and support providing additional funds to cover the entire 1-year tenure.
After investing significant time and effort into setting up the STEP program and electing a program manager for a year, it would be a mistake to risk losing that progress for the sake of a shorter-term contract. Although we recognize this situation arose due to an operational mistake, steps should be taken to avoid such errors in the future.
We have voted in the following order.
Here are the reasons to Support Option 2 (Allocating Additional Funds to Complete the Program Managerās One-Year Term):
- Approving a full-year contract allows Steakhouse Financial to fully execute their project management responsibilities, avoiding potential project disruptions or decision delays caused by contract interruptions.
- This approach helps enhance the DAOās credibility, making it more attractive for future tenders or collaborations, and attracting more high-quality service providers and partners.
Weāre voting FOR additional funds for one year. Hereās our ranking of the options, from most to least preferred:
- Additional funds for one year
- 6 months from available funds
- New election at $86,581 per year
- Abstain
- Liquidation of RWAs and STEP
This ranking prioritizes program continuity and respects the election results while balancing fiscal responsibility. The top two choices maintain Steakhouse Financialās involvement, differing only in duration. A new election is less desirable but preferable to program termination. Abstaining fails to address the issue, while liquidation is the least favorable, potentially wasting resources and community efforts.