The only COI’s that folks should be aware of are the ones stated within the bio’s of the TMC/GMC members. Austin Campbell is the newly announced CEO of an up and coming stablecoin project, and members of Make Markets are contributors to Curve. These are the two most obvious examples that could be seen as COIs - but again, the DAO must apporve any recommendations the TMC/GMC makes. If they are unable to get this passed via Snapshot, they will not recieve payment and funds can be returned to the DAO from the Arbitrum Foundation. The conflicts will be very easy for delegates to notice given how straightforward they are.
If you are asking about COI’s in relation to various treasury managers that may be applying - we specifically seeked memebrs without relationships in the treasury management landscape to avoid any bias being introduced to the process.
In terms of negotiating with various committee members, we needed to ensure everyone was compensated equally accross the TMC and GMC, and when the payment structure was a lower dollar amount paid out in ARB with a vest, that was the primary critique of the proposal. We changed this based on community feedback. We also spoke with dozens of candidates prior to settling on the individuals/companies herein.
We hope this helps alleviate any concerns you may of had! Also, we recommend listening to the Q&A recording posted above in case you missed that.
Treasury Management V1.2 is now pending for a vote on Tally. The veribiage of this proposal has been altered to reflect this:
Please note that the Foundation has elected to use this address for the 26M ARB and 7500 ETH transfers upon this proposal’s passing, which was previously used to custody the funds from Entropy Advisor’s proposal. @stonecoldpat or another Arbitrum Foundation team member can provide confirmation that this is an AF controlled multi-sig, and that funds will be transfered to 2 seperate Foundation-controlled addresses in the days following this proposal’s execution.
I can confirm that 0xAc20CD734C65Baf48a1476447af7D3E3165DC739 is a Foundation-controlled safe and that funds will be transferred to separate foundation-controlled addresses if the proposal passes.
Voted in favour. I like the proposal as a whole, and even though the members of the GMC and TMC were “pre-selected”, the teams look interdisciplinary and I didn’t think that enticed a block.
I do think however that in the future (and even if they perform well) members should be elected via election vote. As for the Treasury Diversification itself, selling ARB for USD to be used and attempt mitigating volatility for Service Providers payments is basically transferring the “disadvantage” to the open market (LPs if this is sold via DEX), but I agree it’s also important to stay competitive to attract blockchain talent.
Farming with idle ARB and ETH is a good idea, especially for ETH if it’s deployed to lower risk strategies like established LSTs. I’m not sure how feasible “ARB-only” lower risk opportunities are, they are all mostly multichain.
I do agree with some comments/feedback regarding the complexities of having two separate councils, but I also liked that fees are not performance-based, but rather a flat fee based on milestones. Interesting to see how this performs.
it would be better to keep all this accounting a little bit… cleaner than this. this multisig already had funds from the events budget proposal as well. We should use one multisig per proposal, as per the MSS best practices, even if those multisigs are still controlled by the Arbitrum Foundation members.
Given the uncertainty surrounding a member’s involvement, as discussed in the forum, I have chosen to abstain from voting on Tally. I believe that managing funds requires individuals of the highest integrity. While the proposal itself is promising, I am concerned about the potential risks. If approved…, I expect complete transparency and accountability throughout the project.
voting For on the current onchain proposal because I feel that this is something the DAO can experiment with at this point since the amount is not that high in the grand scheme of things.
The proposal raises several concerns that make me hard to support in its current status.
First, it lacks a clear risk management framework to mitigate potential losses from market volatility or counterparty risks, leaving the treasury exposed to unnecessary dangers. Additionally, the proposal appears misaligned with the DAO’s decentralized principles by consolidating too much power into a single entity without sufficient safeguards.
Sorry, Until these issues are addressed, I cannot support this proposal.
I voted FOR the proposal. This proposal goes a long way towards securing our future as a DAO irrespective of market conditions. Honestly, my take is that we can’t rest on treasury diversification until we have a 250 million endowment earning yield that can fund our activities at 12 or 13 million a year.
We are currently at $30 million with STEP. We would have reached around $90 million with this proposal.
I am curious to know how they arrive at an optimum liquidation strategy but however it is done, its better than not doing it.
Entropy went and checked references so personally my concerns on this front is assuaged.
I acknowledge the proposal’s goals and appreciate its focus on transparency, governance mechanisms, and risk management. The proposal addresses existing issues by providing specific solutions, such as establishing the TMC and GMC, which clearly delineate the management pathways for different types of assets, bringing more professionalism and targeted strategies to DAO treasury management.
Furthermore, I personally support the separation of fund management and growth strategies into different tracks, combined with a phased implementation approach to reduce the risks associated with centralized fund management. Particularly, the reinvestment strategies for ARB and ETH, with clear directions on on-chain yields and low-risk asset allocation, align with the DAO’s long-term objectives of preserving and increasing value.
I’m voting FOR this proposal on Tally. It’s a solid step forward in order to make Arbitrum more sustainable by leveraging our reserves in low-risk strategies. Concerns about a member’s background were addressed during a governance call, so I’m comfortable with the final proposal. That said, I still believe future members should be selected through an election process by the DAO.
Voted YES on Tally. Its important to keep track of the treasury because I think currently we are burning too much and need better strategies and execution on how to handle those assets without too much spending.
I am voting in favor of the proposal on Tally. I’m pleased to see it reach this stage, and I appreciate its responsiveness to feedback: compensation for the TMC and GMC members is no longer paid monthly, but instead tied to deliverables, with a clear timeline added to ensure efficient and orderly progress. This design better aligns interests with the DAO’s long-term goals and steadily reinforces its financial stability.
The proposal addresses current treasury management challenges—such as insufficient funding for service providers and idle assets—by offering practical solutions. Through flexible allocation of ARB, stablecoins, and ETH, it adapts to global rate changes and market conditions, reducing long-term risk. Additionally, it can leverage decentralized infrastructure to enhance yield and asset utilization, creating a more efficient, transparent, and sustainable treasury management framework for the Arbitrum DAO.
In short, I support this proposal because it effectively addresses the problems at hand and fosters the long-term prosperity of the ecosystem.
The proposal directly tackles a critical issue – the reliance on dollar-denominated contracts for service providers while the DAO primarily operates with ARB.
Creating a stablecoin reserve will mitigate the impact of ARB volatility on service providers, fostering a more professional and reliable payment system
Unlocking ARB and ETH Utility
The proposal outlines strategies for actively utilizing both ARB and ETH holdings to generate yield and pursue strategic investments.
The TMC’s focus on on-chain ARB strategies can boost ARB utility within the Arbitrum ecosystem,
while the GMC’s ETH-backed strategies can stimulate growth and partnerships
Experienced and Specialized Committees
The proposed TMC and GMC members bring valuable expertise in DeFi, risk management, and deal negotiation
Their skills and experience are crucial for effectively executing the proposed strategies and mitigating potential risks.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO (formerly ‘Lampros Labs DAO’) governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal in Tally Voting.
Building on our Snapshot rationale, we support this proposal as it addresses critical gaps in treasury management with a structured and thoughtful approach. We particularly like the milestone-based payment model, which ensures accountability and incentivizes results. This approach reflects the kind of transparent and effective management we value and advocate for.
We believe this proposal benefits the DAO by creating a solid framework for managing funds, optimizing ETH and ARB use for immediate needs and long-term growth. The flexibility and foresight demonstrated in this proposal align with the DAO’s mission to adapt and thrive in an ever-evolving ecosystem.