Entropy has confirmed with 2 separate references that previously worked at Paxos that Austin Campbell’s description provided herein is truthful/accurate.
We saw some concerns from the community regarding Austin’s credentials that were raised by GFX, and although Austin responded himself, we felt it was necessary to confirm ourselves. We feel extremely confident that Austin will excel in this position on behalf of the DAO.
Updating my thoughts based on the feedback by Sam Martin (@swmartin) on today’s Governance call.
As per Sam, Entropy will not define in the Tally proposal how exactly ARB will be liquidated for stablecoins. Instead, this will be a task for the TMC committee after (if) the Tally vote passes.
The good thing is that TMC will put their plan of ARB liquidation on the Snapshot vote, so if DAO members don’t agree with it, ARB will not get liquidated in that way.
To me, this is sufficient enough, so I plan to vote FOR the proposal on Tally.
cc @Tekr0x.eth and others who had concerns over this point.
Hello all - thank you to everyone who has provided thoughtful feedback on this proposal. We wanted to address some ongoing concerns on the forum with the Snapshot set to conclude on Thursday, November 19th.
The open goverance call will be scheduled prior to moving to Tally, but only if the Snapshot vote passes. Expect this call to be scheduled for next week (Between November 25-29).
Neither group members (TMC or GMC) will be paid unless they achieve their predefined milestones laid out in the proposal. If the TMC or GMC fail to meet the DAO’s standards, no money will be paid to committee members and funds can be returned to the DAO - thereby concluding a failed experiment at no cost. It is important to note that the committees themselves are completely powerless. The TMC and GMC both require DAO approval on recomendations via snapshot, and they never custody the funds themselves (that is the Arbitrum Foundation’s job). Therefore, the community is, as always, in full control.
As a reminder, the DAO is required to approve the TMC and GMC’s recommendation and no funds can be moved without meeting this prerequisite. The DAO will maintain full control over what is allocated (or if any funds are allocated at all)
This was a key takeaway from the initial open governance calls. Please refer to the following open call recordings below. TL;DR - folks did not want to sell much ARB, and also did not want to pay management/performance fees on the DAO’s ETH given the ability to stake it for a very safe return. The skillsets required to allocate the ETH for ecosystem growth is more BD in nature (GMC), whereas the TMC track required more experience in traditional finance/portfolio construction, familiarity with onchain strategies, risk-adjusted performance reviews, etc. Additionally, as mentioned already, if either the TMC or GMC does not produce work up to the DAO’s expectations, they will not be paid anything.
This is certainly possible, but Entropy does not possess the in-house skillset to run treasury management operations required for the TMC track. This would put a ton of responsibility on one or two members and could lead to subpar results. One of the primary critiques of this proposal prior to the changes made on October 30 was that the pay for TMC and GMC members was too low, so we adjusted it higher. With that being said, we are very open to incorporating feedback that has community-wide consensus before heading to Tally.
This will be the job of the TMC and must be approved by the DAO on Snapshot prior to any committee member recieving any payment.
While the cost is high, one of the primary critiques of this proposals first iteration was the payment terms for TMC and GMC members. Therefore, we increased the payment according to community feedback. For what it’s worth, the yield on the underlying should be higher than this proposal’s cost.
The following reflects the views of the Lampros DAO (formerly ‘Lampros Labs DAO’) governance team, composed of Chain_L (@Blueweb), @Euphoria, and Hirangi Pandya (@Nyx), based on our combined research, analysis, and ideation.
We are voting FOR this proposal on Snapshot voting.
Entropy Advisors have delivered another excellent proposal - thank you for your efforts!
We agree with GFXLabs’ concern about bundling multiple items in one proposal. The due diligence done by GFXLabs is what every organization should do when recruiting someone. As a DAO, this is an area we need to improve, so we appreciate GFXLabs’ diligence.
The last bi-weekly call helped us understand Sam’s explanation of Austin’s approach. The fact that payments will be milestone-based gives us confidence. This structure ensures progress, so we decided to vote FOR the proposal to get things moving in the right direction.
We support the idea of linking payments for TMC and GMC members to task completion rather than monthly payments. This approach improves accountability and sets a clear framework for what is completed and paid for. We believe this structure should apply to most proposals.
Since STEP has a similar goal of generating yield for the DAO through RWAs, how will TMC avoid overlapping with STEP? Can TMC use its allocated funds for RWA investments to generate yield?
As mentioned earlier, clear measures to secure DAO funds are crucial. Will the service provider generating yield have risk coverage through insurance providers with players like Nexus Mutual | The crypto insurance? Alternatively, will the DAO get to review the proposal each time a milestone is completed by TMC and GMC?
I am voting FOR this proposal as it is crucial for any project to do proper Treasury Management. As I mentioned in my initial comment, I do think having an entity (OpCo or maybe the DAO) that has the macro vision of Stable and ETH investments could be beneficial.
I’m voting in favor on Snapshot. I don’t think that this proposal is perfect, but it represents a good starting point. Having dedicated people overseeing this aspect is crucial, and while the approach can be refined over time, it’s essential to begin now to make us more competitive.
Also, I think that a first 6-month term for both councils is a good timeframe for experimentation that allows flexibility. I believe that progress should be closely and frequently monitored, and reports should be reviewed regularly to decide whether to renew the initiative.
Regarding the suggestion for two committees, I believe having too many people involved could complicate decision-making—more is not always better. But having clear milestones will surely help maintain focus and accountability.
We can still work on it and make it better, but it’s a good start.
I appreciate the follow up! Changing to a FOR since the due diligence checks out 
On behalf of the UADP, firstly, thanks to Entropy and all of the effort here into structuring and iterating on this proposal. Treasury management is a critical function for the DAO’s long-term health, and addressing idle assets alongside operational needs is a step in the right direction.
Overall, some areas that could benefit from further clarification or refinement:
A lot of the concerns seem to be around committees and maybe inefficients with coordination. We emphasize some of these concerns but above all, just think that the pre-selection of committee members has raised concerns regarding DAO participation and member accountability. Not sure best step forward here but maybe some visibility on this would be good.
Budget wise, could the committees provide interim budget recommendations while OpCo formalizes a comprehensive budget?
Overall proposal is an important step forward for the DAO and something we certainly need. Refining the operational framework and addressing key concerns around transparency in selection processes, and risk management is our only concerns.
I will be voting “For” on snapshot as ultimately I think we really need to get some type of treasury management process in place. While I have some operational disagreements, I think at it’s core the proposal makes sense.
Before the Tally vote, I would like to see this question addressed however. Maybe I’m on an island with this… but I’m not really sure how the DAO voting on ETH investments is going to work if the Growth group is short-term focused
However, I think I’m still in the ‘agree to disagree’ camp here, but maybe more explanation would help. Is the expectation of Growth group a more long-term approach or short-term one? If the plan is to drop the ETH somewhere and let it sit for a year then I think this isn’t as big of a deal… but if the DAO is going to have to have constant snapshot votes because we’re putting 1000 ETH in protocol abc this month and then half the ETH is sold off to go into protocol xyz the next month and then 100 ETH a week is going into protocol 3… and so on… I think you run into those risks I noted before.
And the more I think about it, from a delegate perspective that seems to open the project up to issues with voter fatigue and conflict of interest concerns.
voting For on the current offchain proposal because I feel that this is something the DAO can experiment with at this point.
As in @web3citizen representation, voting FOR in this proposal and bellow is our rationale.
We vote FOR the proposal on Snapshot.
We believe establishing a proper treasury management function in the DAO is critical as the presented key issues should be addressed sooner rather than later. We also appreciate the updated proposal that have incorporated various feedback from the other delegates including the milestone-based compensation scheme.
Ultimately, the program success depends on upcoming suggestions from the TMC and GMC and we believe the selected members are capable of providing them along the way. We will closely review them and make sure they are managed in an appropriate manner via their regular reporting. In the future, as @gauntlet suggested, the DAO should explore a less manual approach to manage the treasury with minimized operations (and operating members to be elected by the DAO if needed) and we would encourage the to-be-established OpCo to propose a revised plan after the 6-months v1.2 initiative.
The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst and @Sinkas, and it’s based on the combined research, fact-checking, and ideation of the two.
We’re voting FOR the proposal in the temperature check.
Having discussed this proposal extensively with both Entropy Advisors and other Arbitrum delegates, we believe that this is a meaningful and reasonably contained experiment that will provide us with important lessons on how to approach treasury management in the future.
In this case, we like the fact that the board members are pre-appointed as part of the proposal, as ultimate success depends on the competence and effectiveness of these specific teams working for both pathways. We believe that Entropy’s vetting and selection of the right teams increases the chances of success and also ensures clear accountability - as these teams are pre-appointed and have mandate from the DAO, they have been provided with everything we could provide to ensure their success.
We also want to ensure our full support as delegates along the way and hope to have a good, healthy relationship with them during their term. We hope that they will present their progress and be available for questions and feedback from delegates during the monthly GRC calls.
Blockworks Advisory is voting FOR this proposal on Snapshot.
We’ve seen the discussion and pitfalls of treasury management in the DAO thus far, and are overall happy to see a proposiiton come forward. We also are confident in Entropy’s ability to properly vet and filter for the right candidates. However, we would like to echo the concerns brought by Tane and Gauntlet, in the future it may be a good idea to have some bucket of the treasury minimally managed.
Gm, gm 
The results are in for the [Non-Constitutional] Treasury Management v1.2 off-chain proposal.
See how the community voted and more Arbitrum stats:
DAOplomats voted in favor of this proposal during the temp check.
The creation of the two management tracks, TM and GM, addresses concerns about service provider shortfalls due to dollar-denominated contracts and insufficient ARB holdings to cover agreed-upon rates, and shortfalls in capital deployment respectively.
These two tracks have a lot on their plates, and we would love to see how they handle their respective responsibilities.
We voted FOR this proposal. The system is well setup to give it a go and the benefits are significant
Hello Everyone. Thank you again for all of the thoughtful feedback on this proposal, and for casting your votes on Snapshot. This proposal has passed the temperature check, and will move forward to onchain vote next Thursday (12/5).
As promised, there will be a chance for anyone to ask questions to specific GMC/TMC members via an open governance call. This will take place tomorrow (11/27) at 9am ET (2pm GMT). The call is on the DAO’s open governance calendar. Alternatively, please find the call link here.
Please find the recording of this call here, and feel free to ask any other questions to specific members in the replies.
After consideration, the @SEEDgov delegation has decided to “FOR” on this proposal at the Snapshot Vote.
We would like to thank @Entropy for facilitating this proposal. We genuinely believe it is a step in the right direction concerning Treasury Management. The issues of Service Provider Shortfalls and the treasury’s inactive assets are matters that need to be addressed promptly:
Despite these two solutions, there is still much to be done in establishing an integral plan that encompasses all implemented proposals in this vertical (STEP, AVI, GCP, etc.). We agree that the OpCo could serve as a structure to align these initiatives, ensuring a unified Treasury Management strategy.