We will be voting for the “None” option among those proposed by the AGV team.
What concerns us about the proposal is not (1) the increase in compensation for Council members or (2) the performance bonus intended for them.
The problem with the proposal is the ability to make this change without the need for a vote requiring a 3% quorum for non-constitutional proposals. This is not a problem with the AGV, but with the Arbitrum DAO procedure for modifying and canceling proposals, designed by Entropy.
With the ability to change the form of the proposal with only a >50% approval, without the need for a 3% quorum, it becomes easy to approve a change after the initial proposal has been approved in governance. This is a weakness in the security of DAO governance.
We reiterate: this opposition is more against the procedure for voting/change than the AGV requests themselves.
We understand that this makes it easier operationally for Arbitrum initiatives, but it opens up an opportunity to attack the DAO.