Proposal: AGV Council Compensation Calibration: Benchmark for Next Term & Startup-Phase Bonus

Proposals
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Non-Constitutional
This updated draft replaces the original forum post to reflect the latest proposal iteration.

Summary

This two-part proposal seeks DAO approval for an updated compensation framework for the Arbitrum Gaming Ventures (AGV) Council. The first part aims to calibrate future Councils’ compensation to align with benchmarks from comparable roles in similar industries, while the second part would grant a bonus to members of the inaugural Council in recognition of the much higher than scoped work load required during AGV’s startup phase.

Both components of this proposal are to be fully funded within AGV’s existing operating budget and require no additional DAO funds. Together, they ensure that Council members are fairly recognized for past contributions while setting a sustainable, market-aligned baseline for service in the years ahead.

Part A: Benchmark Calibration for Future Council Members

In order to align AGV Council pay with external benchmarks for comparable advisory and portfolio-oversight roles across DAO, venture, and corporate board ecosystems, we recommend the following forward-looking adjustment to Council compensation packages, beginning with the next Council term:

  • Annualized Base Salary: $50,000 USD stipend (up from $30,000 USD) for Council members, and a $100,000 USD stipend for the Investment-Committee seat (up from $80,000 USD)

  • Bonus: 60,000 ARB token incentive vested on an accelerated 6-month schedule following the Council term.

These changes are intended as a one-time calibration, not a recurring increase. If approved by the DAO, they will not retroactively apply to the current AGV Council.

Part B: Startup-Phase Bonus for Current Council Members

For the current Council (Year One), we recommend a one-time startup-phase bonus of 90,000 ARB tokens per member, fully vested, in recognition of the heavier-than-anticipated contributions required to establish AGV’s structure, processes, and early investment strategy during its startup phase.

This startup phase bonus is a retrospective acknowledgment of extraordinary effort, not an element of the benchmark alignment.

Rationale

Part A: Benchmark Calibration for Future Council Members

The AGV Council provides sustained oversight of a program deploying 200m ARB in capital. Council members review investment strategies, guide strategic alignment within the Arbitrum ecosystem, and help maintain the integrity of AGV’s operations and budgets.

Currently, AGV Council members are compensated at rates that are below average when compared to comparable advisory and portfolio-oversight positions across DAO, venture, and corporate board ecosystems.

For detailed market comparisons that informed these compensation levels, see the table below:

Table A: Industry & VC Compensation Benchmarks.

Role Type Scope & Repsponsibility Typical Annual Compensation Structure Benchamark Source
Corporate Board Members Strategic oversight, quarterly meetings, minimal operational role $45K – $90K USD stipend + occasional equity NACD, Spencer Stuart
Board Advisors Subject-matter expertise, low time commitment, very early stage startups $30K – $60K Cash + small equity grant (0.1–0.25%) PwC, Deloitte
Startup Advisors (Seed–A) Hands-on product, GTM, or domain guidance for early-stage companies $20K – $50K Cash or 0.25–1% equity, 2–4 year vest (rarely becomes liquid) Carta, AngelList
OATs Independent oversight, reporting accuracy, compliance checks, covers many initiatives, up to 10h a week commitment, diverse responsibility ~$90K USD + 100k ARB (~$50k) = $140K Total The bonus payment is vested, with funds released after a 24-month cliff following the term’s end Arbitrum OAT
Current AGV Council Provide oversight and input program performance, operations, and DAO transparency $30k ($80k for IC member) USD annualized base compensation AGV

This forward-looking adjustment will increase the annualized base salary of each Council member by $20,000 USD, plus grant each member a bonus of 60,000 ARB tokens, vested on an accelerated 6-month schedule following the Council term.

Adjusting Council compensation in this way will set a sustainable baseline for future Council service, while the inclusion of a bonus denominated in ARB tokens directly aligns Council’s contributions with the long-term health and growth of the Arbitrum ecosystem, incentivizing responsible and effective oversight and input.

Part B: Startup-Phase Bonus for Current Council Members

The startup responsibilities required to transform AGV from a concept into a functioning business entity were not envisaged at all in the original Tally proposal. During AGV’s launch, Council members undertook a heavier, more hands-on workload than was scoped or anticipated. This extra work undertaken during AGV’s startup phase was essential to successfully turn the original GCP Proposal into a functioning VC.

These startup-phase efforts, which were essential to successfully turn the original GCP Proposal into a functioning VC, are listed and expanded on in detail below:

Table B: AGV Startup Phase: Scoped vs Actual Council Workload

Category Original Scope (4 hrs/week) Startup Phase Scope (~10 hrs/week) Notes / Impact
Risk Mitigation & Investment Thesis Advise on initial investment thesis and portfolio approach Contributed to initial portfolio strategy design, including risk policies and compliance checks Front-loaded work to ensure robust oversight scaffolding and 0-1 strategic direction
Team Oversight & Nominations Provide oversight and input on GCP team members and performance Direct involvement in early hiring of core partners; provided input on org design Higher time intensity due to recruitment, headcount planning, and onboarding of initial team members
DAO Liaison Serve as liaison and oversight committee between DAO and GCP initiative Engaged in foundational DAO communications, collaboration with Arbitrum Foundation, legal, ensuring transparency during setup Higher oversight/responsibilities, frequency of updates needed at launch
Compliance & Governance Complete NDAs, KYC, disclose conflicts; uphold Arbitrum Constitution Helped shape governance documents (bylaws, entity setup), ensuring legal/structural alignment with DAO goals Expanded scope vs. original role

The AGV team fully supports fair recognition of the Council’s critical role during the program’s inception. The proposed startup-phase bonus specifically acknowledges the extraordinary, front-loaded effort involved in designing AGV’s foundational systems and launching its operations. This one-time award is separate from the forward-looking, market-benchmark adjustment and reflects the Council’s instrumental work in positioning the program for scale.

Process, Implementation & Next Steps

The AGV team, in carrying out its responsibilities under the Foundation Bylaws to manage general and administrative matters of the GCP Program, including finance and human resources, prepared this proposal using industry and compensation benchmarks identified in Table A (above). The proposal was presented to the Council, which provided key input but recused itself from the decision-making process to avoid any conflict of interest. The Foundation Director has reviewed and approved the proposal in its current form.

In order to seek tokenholder approval on financial discrepancies between the original GCP Proposal and this proposal, the AGV team and Council now submit this proposal for a DAO vote.

Following the posting of this proposal, a one-week community feedback period will remain open on the forum to gather input from delegates and stakeholders.

After that discussion window, a Snapshot vote will go live on Thursday, October 9 and remain open for seven days. As this is a modification to an existing initiative, there will be no set voting requirements.

If the proposal passes:

  • The startup-phase bonus will be distributed to each current AGV Council member promptly after the vote concludes.

  • The new compensation framework will take effect with the start of the next AGV Council term.

Delegates and community members are encouraged to review the full proposal, ask questions, and provide feedback during the comment period to ensure a transparent and well-informed vote.

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Cross posting from the other thread.

Having had direct experience of the operations from AGV, I do see how council is, today, more aking to a set of employee than a simple oversight body. They do provide expertise each one in their field, and also in specific tasks like job interviews and others. They have also been the closest to the the operations of the fund so far.

I personally do agree that their current salary is not matching the level of responsability and value they bring to the fund.
I also do understand how most delegates are unaware of this, and I think it would be better to start disclosing, in more details and when possible, how the contribute on the day to day operations.

This, for example, is a good start. But can likely pass unnoticed to most since is just a single sentence in a proposal, and would urge AGV on working on better surfacing the amount of work all people in there do because to most of Arbitrum is a black box, and is just fair, for the people that carry the torch on a daily basis, to have their work highlighted.

This also makes a lot of sense.

In support of the proposal.

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Thanks for this proposal!

I have several questions and concerns, mainly related to the attempt to extend the term durations:

  1. Why is participation in the upside (profit share) not considered?
    The motivation emphasizes that Council members do not receive equity or carry, presenting this as a problem. However, the proposal itself does not attempt to address this directly, for example, through a profit-based reward mechanism, KPIs, or performance fees.
    Why wasn’t an option for upside participation proposed? This could serve as a stronger motivator and be more equitable for the DAO, effectively addressing both compensation and incentive issues.

  2. Violation of the conditions under which the current Council was elected.
    Raising compensation by 66% without a new vote or mandate revision seems questionable, as voters supported the current Council based on the original $30K per year terms.
    Don’t you think it would be more appropriate to implement such changes in the next cycle or after a new vote? Alternatively, vote now but apply these new conditions only to the next Council composition.

  3. Where are the performance metrics for such a significant salary increase?
    Given the substantial compensation increase, it is reasonable to expect clear KPIs or reports on each member’s contributions.
    Is there a plan to introduce KPI for each of Council members?

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Good points, which echo much of what came to mind for me while reading this proposal.

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Thanks @JoJo, we appreciate you raising this. We’ll continue to work on making the responsibilities of the Council more visible going forward. It’s possible that terms familiar to AGV might carry different connotations to the broader DAO and we recognize the importance of continuously surfacing those differences more clearly so expectations are aligned.

Thanks as well @cp0x for the thoughtful feedback. We’ll respond to each point in turn:

1. On the lack of performance-based compensation (carry/profit-share)

This is a valid observation. In traditional venture setups, carry or profit-share is common. However, AGV’s structure and governance model, where Council members are reelected annually, make this difficult to implement. There is no guarantee that the same individuals who approve deals today will still be serving when returns materialize years later. This disconnect creates challenges in aligning performance incentives across election cycles.

So while the lack of long-term upside is a known gap, it’s more of a structural limitation rather than an oversight. It also reinforces the case for fair fixed compensation, particularly when Council members take on operational roles typically compensated with both salary and carry in private funds.

2. On increasing compensation mid-term

We understand the concern. To clarify, this proposal is being posted precisely so the DAO can weigh in before any changes are made, including voting to approve or reject the adjustment.

While the original compensation mirrored other DAO council structures (like STIP or LTIPP), the role of the AGV Council is fundamentally different. AGV’s Council is not just about oversight; it is operational. Council members lead due diligence, evaluate all proposals, conduct interviews with founders, and approve every investment or grant made. They are also involved in hiring, including our current GM search, and are embedded in every major operational decision.

After benchmarking compensation across similar roles in the ecosystem and factoring in the lack of profit participation, it became clear that AGV’s Council was significantly under-compensated for the scope of work required. The proposed adjustment brings compensation closer to an upper bound aligned with industry standards and reflects the level of responsibility Council members carry.

3. On performance metrics and KPIs

This is a fair question, and one we’ve considered closely.

The challenge is that most meaningful KPIs for a fund like AGV (e.g., realized returns, portfolio company success) are multi-year outcomes, well beyond the tenure of any single Council. Short-term KPIs, such as “number of deals approved” or “grants disbursed,” risk incentivizing quantity over quality, which is counterproductive to AGV’s investment mandate.

In a traditional fund structure, performance metrics would apply more naturally to a stable, long-term team with carry. In our case, with rotating Council membership, no carry, and DAO-driven oversight, we’ve focused on ensuring transparency and accountability through public reporting, forum updates, and community engagement, rather than artificial quantitative KPIs.

That said, we’re open to suggestions on how we might improve performance transparency without misaligning incentives, and appreciate the push for clearer and more transparent accountability.

We’ll continue iterating based on all the feedback received and welcome any additional thoughts as we move toward a vote. Thanks again to all who’ve taken the time to engage here.

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Thanks for your reply, however I’ll continue

I still believe that simply increasing the fixed salary does not address the underlying issue. My suggestion is:

  • Keep the base salary at the current level
  • Introduce performance-based bonuses, such as:
    • а success fee for each deal that is approved and closed by the foundation
    • а bonus based on the growth in valuation of AGV’s portfolio
  • Introduce a profit-sharing mechanism tied to long-term performance
    Even if a contributor is not re-elected the following year, they should still be eligible for a retroactive bonus if a deal or project they worked on becomes successful - provided the KPIs they were individually responsible for were met at the time of their contribution

This would align incentives more effectively and ensure compensation reflects real impact

I have a few suggestions regarding short-term KPIs:

  • Number of projects reviewed – for example, reviewing at least 10 projects per quarter
  • Number of projects passed to due diligence – e.g. 3 qualified leads per quarter
  • Number of investments approved – tracking how many sourced deals successfully passed through the full process
  • Number of personal publications or detailed reports on work done – encourages accountability and visibility within the DAO.

These KPIs are designed to motivate individual participation, making it clear that bonuses and potential reappointment will directly depend on personal contributions.
If someone clearly delivers more than others, their chances of being re-elected for the next term will naturally increase

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Strong yes from me on this.

It’s time we stop treating governance like a side hustle when the work clearly isn’t. The AGV Council has gone waybeyond “advisory”, they’ve been doing the heavy lifting: managing oversight on $100M+ in assets, leading investment diligence, shaping strategy, and keeping the program aligned with DAO values.

Compensating them fairly isn’t a bonus, it’s a necessity.

This proposal simply acknowledges reality: high-responsibility, high-context roles deserve market-aligned compensation, especially when there’s no equity or upside involved. The $50K/year adjustment (and $120K for the dual-role member) is not only reasonable, it’s overdue.

No new DAO funds are being requested, and we retain top-tier contributors without compromising integrity or budget. That’s a win-win for everyone.

Let’s keep raising the bar for what accountable, long-term governance looks like.

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Hi @cp0x, thanks for the thoughtful suggestions. We really appreciate you taking the time to engage so deeply with the proposal.

AGV, like much of what the DAO is building, is still early and evolving. We’re approaching this with a startup mindset: moving quickly, learning from what works and what doesn’t, and adjusting along the way. One of our key learnings early on was that in order to deliver real oversight and operational momentum, the Council had to be far more hands-on than originally envisioned, not just reviewers, but active participants in the build.

On Performance-Based Bonuses & Profit-Sharing

We’ve explored this idea, but there are several challenges that make performance-based bonuses difficult to implement at this stage:

  • Attribution is a moving target. Success in venture-style investing is the result of many interlocking factors, including timing, team execution, and market shifts. It’s difficult to draw a clear line from outcome to individual contribution, especially when Council composition may change years down the line.

  • Timing is misaligned. AGV investments are long-term. It can take years before meaningful results materialize. Structuring retroactive bonuses would require a complex tracking and claims system, which doesn’t fit our current operating model and introduces friction for a lean, fast-moving operation.

  • Misaligned incentives. We’re wary of introducing task-based KPIs or bonus systems that push quantity over quality. Counting projects reviewed or deals closed risks shifting focus away from thoughtful diligence toward hitting a quota, which goes against AGV’s mission to fund only the most compelling opportunities.

On Proposed KPI Metrics

We’ve intentionally avoided tying compensation or evaluation to volume-based metrics. The quality of AGV’s investments, not how many are processed, is the north star. Forcing numerical targets might generate activity, but not necessarily outcomes. Given how early we are, staying flexible and allowing the Council to apply judgment is more valuable than rigid KPI targets.

We agree visibility is important, and this is already built into our process. AGV produces a biannual transparency report that’s reviewed and approved by the Council before publishing. While the core AGV team drafts the report, the Council is responsible for ensuring it reflects an accurate and complete view of operations and decision-making.

We’ll continue evolving AGV’s structure and accountability mechanisms as the program matures, including revisiting compensation models if/when a longer-term fund structure supports it. In the meantime, we’re committed to being transparent, responsive to feedback, and iterative in approach. Thanks again for helping us improve.

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The following reflects the views of L2BEAT’s governance team, composed of @krst, @Sinkas, and @Manugotsuka, and it’s based on their combined research, fact-checking, and ideation.

We are voting FOR the proposal.

Having followed the work that the AGV council is doing and the responsibilities they are carrying, we understand where the request for adjustment to their compensation comes from, and we’re supportive of it.

We internally debated whether the retroactive aspect of the adjustment makes sense, and we would have been more comfortable supporting the proposal if it weren’t for that part. However, after deliberation, we concluded that we’re essentially voting to adjust the compensation in recognition of the work that the Council has been doing, not as a path for them to do more in the future. With that line of thinking, the retroactive adjustment makes more sense.

However, we would like to clarify that one thing we expect from the Council going forward, especially with the adjusted compensation, is improved communication with the DAO and increased transparency. Castle Labs is doing good work as the communications party of the AGV, but we also expect the Council itself to be more communicative. Similar to how the OAT from the OpCo attends calls and makes itself available to the DAO, we expect the same of the AGV.

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Having had no direct exposure to the AGV I (and most likely a range of other delegates) find it hard to understand the role that was previously envisioned vs what it actually turned out to be.

I had asked about a simple detailed breakdown in a previous comment GCP Council Salary Updates, Ops Improvements, and Transparency Cadence - #23 by tamara without getting a clear answer, hence here it is again:

Clear breakdown as follows:
- Initial responsibilities (aka what we thought the Council has to work on)
- Actual responsibilities (aka what they are actually doing on a monthly basis)
- Additional responsibilities (aka what they will be doing on top if this proposal passes)

The above neatly formatted in an Excel (or table as has been done with the comp overview) would be a nice visual

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Concur with Tamara’s request here.

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This thread has been edited at 2025-10-02T15:50:00Z to reflect the updated AGV Council Compensation Calibration proposal.

Please review the update proposal above and feel free to provide feedback/ask questions; as mentioned above, we plan to launch as Snapshot vote on Thursday, October 9.

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Hey @tamara , we paused this process for a while, but have taken your feedback in drafting the newly updated proposal. Please take a look at Table B: AGV Startup Phase: Scoped vs Actual Council Workload in the (edited) first post in this thread for the details you requested.

Also tagging @Jonezee for visibility.

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