We appreciate the effort that went into drafting this proposal and the intent to improve the Delegate Incentive Program.
However, we voted against it.
We do not believe that reverting to v1.5 would result in a better framework than the current one. Both the mobilization of voting power and qualitative contributions such as forum engagement and operational input are essential to the health of DAO governance, and we do not support a design that disregards voting power entirely. Moreover, v1.5 encouraged a large number of low-value comments, which diluted meaningful discussion. Governance quality is not necessarily improved by simply increasing the number of participants, so we do not view v1.5 as a superior model.
That said, we recognize the importance of addressing legitimate concerns. It may be worthwhile to lower voting power thresholds for delegates who consistently provide high-quality contributions, but such reforms should be handled in a distinct framework rather than through a simple rollback. We also believe subjective evaluation criteria need to be reconsidered, and that the current program management overhead is disproportionately large relative to delegate incentives. A streamlined and redesigned structure is necessary, but again, reverting to v1.5 is not the right path.