Thank you for starting this discussion. Before diving in, we want to acknowledge the significance of the DIP and the work @SEEDGov has put into designing and iterating the program through governance’s evolution.
As a disclosure, we are current DIP participants. Over multiple iterations, we’ve adapted our contributions even as the program has become more demanding and compensation has been reduced.
If the DAO wants to attract and retain quality delegates and contributors, it must be intentional about how it incentivizes them—both financially and non-financially. Any future delegate incentive program should consider not just return on voting power (ensuring large VP delegates remain engaged and quorum is reached) but also return on people. This latter category includes both delegates and contributors, and today’s program doesn’t clearly differentiate between the two.
As @JoJo notes in [Constitutional] AIP: Security Council Election Process Improvements
On a similar note, we would like to highlight @krst’s comment in Proposal - Updates to the DIP, The Complete 1.7 Version:
We echo this sentiment and encourage SeedGov to work closely with the DAO to design mechanisms that continue to properly incentivize delegates and contributors—whose initiatives have been foundational to the DAO’s success—while still fulfilling their role as a program manager in ensuring expenses remain prudent and sustainable.