Proposal: Sunsetting the Delegate Incentive Program (DIP)

Proposal: Sunsetting the Delegate Incentive Program (DIP)

A Call for a Fairer, More Effective, and Accountable Arbitrum DAO

TL;DR

The Delegate Incentive Program (DIP) was created to encourage active participation in governance. However, the program has failed. Instead of fostering a healthy ecosystem, it has become unfair, unstable, and subjective.

It is run by Program Managers (PMs) at @SEEDGov who have consistently ignored community feedback, applied rules retroactively, and created a system that punishes smaller delegates while failing to hold large, inactive ones accountable. Their proposed “fix” (v1.7) only makes things worse by raising the entry barrier 10x, cutting delegate pay by 40%, and asking for a 25% raise for themselves.

The program is broken, its management has lost the community’s trust, and it is doing more harm than good. It’s time to end it.

This proposal calls for the complete sunsetting of the Delegate Incentive Program.

The Problem: A System of Patronage, Not Performance

The DIP is no longer a fair system of rewards. It has become a system of patronage, where payments depend on the personal, opaque judgment of the Program Managers, not on clear, objective work.

1. The Rules Are Subjective and Unfair

The program has shifted from a predictable system to a “black box” where the PMs decide what has “quality” and “impact.”

  • Guessing Games: Previously, delegates got points for explaining their vote (CR). Now, that clear rule is gone. Your explanation only gets points if the PM decides it was “impactful.” When delegate Paulo Fonseca pointed out that this was a “conceptually dangerous” metric that could reward bad behaviour, the PMs offered no clear definition, admitting it could only be judged “in hindsight.” This forces delegates to guess what the PMs want, which is not a healthy way to run a DAO.
  • A “Caste System” for Delegates: The program introduced a “VP Multiplier” that punishes smaller delegates . If you have less than 4 million ARB, your score is automatically cut by up to 20%. @paulofonseca correctly called this a “sort of caste system,” and other delegates labeled it a “penalty” that makes it nearly impossible for new, hardworking delegates to get fairly compensated.

2. A Pattern of Mismanagement and Unprofessionalism

The program’s management has been marred by constant failures, making it impossible for anyone to rely on.

  • Constant, Retroactive Rule Changes: The rules change almost every month. Worse, the PMs have applied major changes retroactively , in the middle of the month. As one delegate put it, it’s like “changing the rules of the game, literally in the middle of the game.”
  • Late Results and Ignored Feedback: The monthly results are almost always late, and payments have taken as long as two weeks to be signed. When Paulo Fonseca repeatedly asked for proactive communication about these delays, he was met with dismissiveness. This lack of professionalism shows a fundamental disrespect for the delegates’ time and financial stability.
  • Overstepping Authority: The PMs have suspended delegates for things they said on Twitter. This is a serious overreach of their power. As multiple delegates argued, their job is to manage the incentive program based on forum activity, not to police social media.

The Evidence: The Damage Is Real and Measurable.

These aren’t just opinions. The negative impact of the DIP is clear from the data and the words of the delegates themselves.

The Numbers Don’t Lie

The moment the unfair v1.6 rules were introduced, the number of delegates getting paid fell off a cliff.

Month DIP Version # of Paid Delegates Total Payout (USD)
December 2024 1.5 49 $262,228
January 2025 1.51a 32 $205,534
February 2025 1.6 (New Rules) 21 $90,244
March 2025 1.6 25 ~$100,000

Source: Figures discussed in delegate chat logs and forum posts.

The number of compensated delegates was cut by more than half as soon as the new rules took effect. One delegate calculated that 10 out of the 11 delegates who were disqualified in February were “small delegates” hurt by the VP multiplier.

The Program Fails Even Its Supporters’ Goals

Even delegates who supported the program’s goals, like L2BEAT, have seen it fail. @krst Urbański of L2BEAT stated the DIP should help top delegates afford staff and reward passionate, smaller delegates. Version 1.6 did the exact opposite: it punished smaller delegates and failed to hold large, inactive delegates accountable for their lack of participation. The program has failed to achieve the very outcomes that its key supporters envisioned.

Delegates Are Losing Confidence

The most experienced delegates are walking away because the program is unstable.

“We’re now reducing involvement as we can’t know what (if any) compensation we will receive. Working up front without knowing if or how much you’ll be paid isn’t sustainable .”
— cr1st0f, representing ACI, a major protocol delegate

“Most professional delegates would prefer some baseline/bottom line assurance. No bottom end confidence until two weeks after month-end isn’t consistent enough for many delegates.” — DonOfDAOs, delegate

The Final Straw: A “Fix” That Makes Everything Worse

After months of criticism, the PMs proposed an update (v1.7) that confirmed their disconnect from the community. Instead of fixing the problems, they doubled down on them:

  1. More Elitism: They proposed raising the minimum VP for new delegates from 50k to 500k , effectively closing the door on new community members.
  2. Pay Cuts for Delegates, Raises for Managers: They proposed a ~40% pay cut for all delegates while simultaneously asking for a 25% raise for themselves.
  3. No Accountability: They proposed removing the ability for delegates to dispute subjective scoring, cementing their own power.

This proposal is not a good-faith effort to improve the program. It is an attempt to silence critics, entrench power, and reward the program’s managers at the expense of the delegates.

The Solution: Sunset the Program and Move Forward

The Delegate Incentive Program is broken beyond repair. The consistent pattern of mismanagement, unfair rule changes, and disregard for community feedback has destroyed its credibility. The program should be sunset and the funds returned to the DAO.

By voting to sunset the DIP, we can:

  1. Stop Wasting Money: The DIP is expensive, with high administrative costs. In May, nearly 31% of the program’s spending went to the PMs, not delegates. This money can be put to much better use.
  2. Encourage Authentic Participation: Let’s reward work through more direct means, like funding research bounties, paying for governance tooling, or creating a grants program for community initiatives.
  3. Restore Fairness: Ending the DIP gets rid of the unfair “caste system” and the subjective “black box” scoring. It levels the playing field and allows the best ideas to win.

It’s time to trust our community. Let’s stop paying for conversations managed by a flawed system and start investing in actions that provide real, lasting value to Arbitrum.

Vote YES to sunset the Delegate Incentive Program and build a stronger, fairer DAO.

3 Likes

What a timing for a proposal like this!

Actually, I’ve been looking into the financials of the DIP 1.5/6/7 program and collected this data that can be checked here: DIP Accounting - Google Sheets

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Hi everyone,

We’d like to share a statement to clarify several claims made in this post:

We don’t see any arguments supporting the claim that the program has “failed.” Labeling it as unfair is, ironically, a subjective assessment in itself.

As for instability, it’s worth noting that the program underwent minor changes in January, more significant updates in February, and then remained consistent through July. In August, the DAO approved (with over 150M votes in favor) the modifications that came into effect for the month.

On the matter of subjectivity, it’s important to remember that version 1.5 was approved with the explicit intention of introducing subjective elements to the assessment. So we find it inconsistent to point to subjectivity as a flaw, given that it was a deliberate and DAO-approved design choice.

First, the Voting Power Multiplier (VPM) doesn’t work as described. It follows a linear reduction model — below 4M ARB, the voting score begins to decrease proportionally. This change was introduced in v1.6 and later ratified in the v1.7 vote.

Second, the claim that the program creates a “caste system” or makes it “nearly impossible” for smaller/newer delegates to qualify is not supported by data. Looking at July’s results:

  • 9 out of the 22 qualifying delegates had less than 500,000 ARB delegated.

  • 4 of the top 5 scoring delegates — Tempetechie, Tekr0x.eth, StableLab, and Lampros DAO — are all under the 4M ARB threshold (and also under 500K).

It’s evident that some delegates have found ways to consistently add value to the DAO through various activities — and were recognized accordingly. Even delegates who don’t usually qualify, such as Hawheik and TodayInDeFi, earned spots in July due to improved contributions.

We’re unsure when Paulo was met with “dismissiveness.” Here is the message we sent in response to his concerns:

Regarding the July results, we expect to publish them between today and tomorrow. This month we were in a position to publish on the 15th, but an indexing error in the dashboard caused a two-day delay, and then the weekend followed.

With respect to the delay in payments, we would like to clarify that we are only the proposers; it is not our responsibility to sign or execute the transactions, so we are not the appropriate party to answer that question.

It is also worth noting that the 15th has always been an estimated date. It’s difficult to accurately predict what will happen over the course of the following year at the time of drafting the proposal. On more than one occasion, we have preferred to take additional time in order to improve the quality of the analysis rather than rush it just for the sake of being “on time.” It should also be taken into account that in February the individual reports were introduced, which require significant additional effort.

That being said, here are the delivery dates:

  • November 2024: December 12th

  • December 2024: January 14th

  • January 2025: February 19th (staff was on holiday, as it is summer in Argentina)

  • February 2025: March 18th (introduction of individual reports and v1.6 changes)

  • March 2025: April 18th

  • April 2025: May 14th

  • May 2025: June 16th

  • June 2025: July 23rd (ETHcc clearly impacted the timeline, and we notified the community of this in advance)

Except for June, we have never been more than four days past the expected release date — and in some cases, we delivered ahead of schedule.

It’s also worth noting that we do not control the Safe multisig that holds the DIP budget — this is publicly verifiable. We’ve been transparent about the causes of any delays, and we took Paulo’s feedback seriously. Also, we publicly committed to announcing any foreseeable delays in advance moving forward.

This seems to speak on behalf of krst from L2BEAT. We don’t recall him stating that the program has failed. Perhaps it would be more appropriate for each delegate to speak for themselves.

This is another broad and unsupported claim. ACI is returning to the program through APE — a delegation that will now be able to qualify using the AAVE community wallet, which holds one of the highest VP amounts.

The alleged “loss of confidence” is hard to justify, given that just two weeks ago, the DAO overwhelmingly approved version 1.7 of the program.

Once again, the claim that we’re “disconnected from the community” is contradicted by the fact that the 1.7 proposal was passed through a DAO-wide vote. We see this as an attempt to delegitimize the decision made by the community.

It’s also important to highlight that, despite the budget reduction introduced in v1.7, some delegates who previously received no compensation will now qualify under the new Tier X. For instance, Ultra, who has an impeccable voting record, was previously ineligible due to scoring below the 65-point threshold. Delegates like Ultra — and others we won’t name here — will now receive recognition and compensation for their consistent commitment to voting. We encourage a more careful evaluation of the actual outcomes of these changes as we move into the August results, considering that not even a month has passed since their approval, and we have yet to see how it works in practice.

Finally, we want to reaffirm that we’re actively working on Version 2.0 of the program, which will address certain design concerns and significantly reduce administrative overhead by simplifying the structure.

Throughout this entire process, our DMs have always been open. We’ve spoken with a wide range of delegates, stakeholders, AAEs, and other community members to gather feedback. We invite the author of this post to reach out directly as well — we’re happy to engage in conversation as we move toward the next iteration of the program.

1 Like

As I have been referenced here I will point out that the DIP v1.7 proposal was a significant contributing reason, though not the only reason, as to why I will no longer participate as a delegate going forward.

3 Likes

I’ve discontinued participation in DIP explicitly because of program management. Frankly, and I say this only partly facetiously, I’d rather see a community-configured AI assess contributions or a literal lottery than whatever the current black box is. Or both, meet x criterion, you’re entered in the lottery. Gain entries from an AI-assessed quality bonus, more for being a large delegate, etc… Simple, easy, everyone knows the rules, each month you get what you get, and you don’t get upset. And, a fraction of the admin costs.

5 Likes

Tbh, I’ve also felt discouraged from continuing with the DIP given the recent changes, that’s why I’m no longer active / sold my ARB

5 Likes

While I don’t agree with every argument posed by the OP, I do back some of his criticisms of the DIP. Specifically things like the retroactive enforcement of 1.6 version of the DIP, without any sort of reasoning beyond “just because”, which I did take issue with and seemed to impact overall Delegate participation across the forum.

I understand the program has to be fine tuned for efficiency and payouts should indeed be tied to meaningful contributions that at least elicit some form of debate within the DAO; however, low-voting powers delegates have a huge hill to climb that’s only continued to grow since the 1.6 version of the program.

Voting Power Multiplier is indeed a handicap, and while low-voting power delegates can qualify for compensation within somewhat reasonable standards, those with higher voting power can get away with the bare minimum or no contributions at all. I don’t see why we should pretend this is not the case.

The DIP 1.7v, while introducing much-justified changes in compensation amounts -for example-, only amplifies most of these issues.

Lastly, I do find it disingenuous to point out the approval of DIP 1.7v as a sign that these changes are not unpopular, as we all know how voting power and the DAO work, and you can literally see a bubble map of how voting plays out. I would not be surprised to see more and more low-voting power delegates abandon the program and sell their ARB as a consequence.

I cannot say if this is the correct or wrong way to move forward, as that pretty much depends on what you or the program managers think should be the DIP’s objectives.

Personally, I won’t be moving away from the program as I still see value in it as a way to stay up to date with all things concerning Arbitrum, but I can see how the financials, time investment and subjective parameters would simply force out most non-Tier X delegates.

It is interesting that I also summed up the results of the program today, but you already know that I was a constant critic of it and the last times I voted against the proposed changes
You can read my thoughts https://x.com/cp0xdotcom/status/1958978890258362874

And regarding the incentive system - I also have many thoughts on how to improve it all and I wrote many suggestions to SeedGov, hoping to use them
Apparently, it will be necessary to change the system radically after the end of this program in October

1 Like

What is the mission of Arbitrum DAO? To attract as many opinions and find creative solutions to hard problems?

Or to centralize and make DAO decisions as efficient as possible?

If the first option is important, then the DAO should reconsider a more inclusive campgin.

If efficiency matters, then dropping all incentives makes sense.

Personally, I haven’t received rewards since Feb, but still continued to work on the DAO.

I do feel that the incentives rules are too subjective scoring.

Without the VP multiplier penalty, my scores (from Feb to Jun) would consistently place me in tier 3. By July, it became clear that smaller delegates have no chance of being treated fairly.

And the data proves this isn’t just personal: the number of incentivized delegates has collapsed from 48 to only 22 since the controversial February changes. Participation rates also dropped sharply, from 72 in January 2025 to just 57 in July 2025.

The program has created a uncertainty where delegates cannot plan or commit resources. Instead of encouraging participation, it punishes the very people who are trying to contribute.

Maybe that’s the goal of it?

7 Likes

We recognise the significant time and effort required to contribute meaningfully as a delegate in Arbitrum governance. Given the scale of activity in the DAO, we believe there is clear value in providing compensation to delegates who consistently deliver quality contributions.

At the same time, we appreciate that designing an effective incentive program is inherently challenging. Striking the right balance between rewarding delegates, encouraging broad participation, and improving the DAO ecosystem is not an easy task.

For this reason, rather than fully sunsetting the program at this stage, we would like to see an alternative approach to delegate rewards proposed alongside this one. Having both options available would allow the DAO to weigh the trade-offs and collectively decide which path is best for sustaining long-term, high-quality governance.

3 Likes

The following reflects the views of GMX’s Governance Committee, and is based on the combined research, evaluation, consensus, and ideation of various committee members.

We align with Karpatkey’s perspective that both the DAO and its governance have evolved significantly. Seed Latam has invested substantial time, effort, and resources into improving this program and they have always been transparent about it. Also, one thing to note the program will end soon. In light of that, we believe sunsetting the program may not be the best course of action. Instead, we recommend exploring alternative paths forward and collaboratively working toward a feasible solution.

2 Likes

Participating in Arbitrum governance and voting with diligence is time intensive, and the DIP has been a meaningful incentive to encourage active participation. There’s real value in compensating engaged delegates, especially if the aim is to activate more voters and reduce quorum issues. That said, after the recent 40% cut, I worry the incentives may no longer be enough (especially for larger delegates) to justify the hours spent.

I also share the concern others have raised around the subjective criteria. While well-intentioned, it seems to nudge people toward formulaic forum posts that check the boxes, rather than adding genuine signal. This makes it harder to cut through the noise and ultimately hurts discussion quality.

I really appreciate SeedGov’s transparency and willingness to iterate here. I’m not in favor of sunsetting the DIP at this stage, but I’d like to see future versions lean more toward clarity and simplicity (e.g., by focusing primarily on voting activity) if the main goal is to activate larger delegates.

1 Like

Thank you for starting this discussion. Before diving in, we want to acknowledge the significance of the DIP and the work @SEEDGov has put into designing and iterating the program through governance’s evolution.

As a disclosure, we are current DIP participants. Over multiple iterations, we’ve adapted our contributions even as the program has become more demanding and compensation has been reduced.

If the DAO wants to attract and retain quality delegates and contributors, it must be intentional about how it incentivizes them—both financially and non-financially. Any future delegate incentive program should consider not just return on voting power (ensuring large VP delegates remain engaged and quorum is reached) but also return on people. This latter category includes both delegates and contributors, and today’s program doesn’t clearly differentiate between the two.

As @JoJo notes in [Constitutional] AIP: Security Council Election Process Improvements

On a similar note, we would like to highlight @krst’s comment in Proposal - Updates to the DIP, The Complete 1.7 Version:

We echo this sentiment and encourage SeedGov to work closely with the DAO to design mechanisms that continue to properly incentivize delegates and contributors—whose initiatives have been foundational to the DAO’s success—while still fulfilling their role as a program manager in ensuring expenses remain prudent and sustainable.