Operational Update
Quarterly Budget Review
The original RAD proposal introduced the following budget for the different types of votes:
| Proposal Type | Incentive Budget (USD) | Payout Cap |
|---|---|---|
| Onchain Constitutional Quorum | 15,000 | 700 |
| Offchain Non-constitutional Quorum | 7,000 | 700 |
| Offchain Decision Making (non-constitutional) | 7,000 | 700 |
| Offchain Election | 7,000 | 500 |
| Offchain Temperature Check (non-binding) | 5,000 | 300 |
According to the proposal, the OpCo should review the budget on a quarterly basis and adjust it if and as needed to account for changes in participation or in ARBâs price.
During DIPâs last 6 months, the average monthly rewards distribution came out to around ~$67,000 for an average of 5.6 proposals per month.
In RAD, over the last 3 months, the average monthly rewards distribution has been $54,000, for an average of 2.5 proposals per month.
We do not think thereâs yet enough data to warrant an adjustment to the budget, and as a result weâll keep the same budget for the second quarter.
Removal of the $100 threshold f0or accrued rewards
Delegates must earn at least $100 before a payment is issued. The allocation will carry over to the next calendar month, but it will expire after 3 months if the threshold is not reached. This is simply to avoid sending dust transactions alongside the overhead in doing so.
While the initial thinking behind this term was to avoid dealing with small amounts, we quickly realized that the operational overhead of keeping track of balances was bigger than that of sending out the rewards as theyâre accrued, no matter how small.
Going forward, any delegates who participate in RAD and meet the eligibility criteria will receive the rewards theyâve earned, no matter the amount.
Any previous balances up to March 31st will be settled at the next distribution of rewards.
75% Participation Threshold
One of the eligibility criteria for RAD is that delegates have participated in over 75% of the votes in a given month. That term was put in place for 2 reasons:
-
To incentivize continuous participation
-
To deter people from borrowing ARB and earning rewards by voting in a single vote.
Given the low volume of proposals, however, the 75% threshold makes it so that delegates have to participate in virtually all votes to be eligible. Since the whole point of RAD is to incentivize participation, âpenalizingâ delegates who might miss 1 vote out of 3 within a month seems counterintuitive.
On top of that, not all votes are of equal importance (as also reflected by the budget for each). If a delegate misses an offchain temp check but votes on 2 onchain constitutional proposals, it doesnât make sense for them not to receive rewards.
At the same time, the reduced rewards and the per-delegate rewards cap make it extremely unlikely that someone will attempt to borrow ARB so they can participate in a vote only to receive the rewards.
As a result, we think itâs prudent and much simpler for everyone involved to simply remove the threshold.
Posting Rationale within 5 days
Another eligibility criterion that came to our attention as something thatâs potentially counterintuitive is the requirement for delegates to publish their rationale within 5 days of casting their vote.
The main reason behind this requirement is to ensure that delegates are making informed decisions and are not randomly casting their votes, while also making sure the community is aware of where they stand on the topic being voted on.
What we have observed, however, is that not posting the rationale within the 5-day deadline is the number one reason delegates do not qualify for rewards.
Since thereâs no qualitative criteria or checks for the comments, and a delegate still qualifies even if they just comment something as simple as âI voted for/against/abstain because I liked/disliked/was indifferent to the proposalâ, the criteria has been reduced to a pointless matter of bureaucracy.
We believe that treating posting a rationale as a bonus is a good way to strike a balance between incentivizing a behavior and penalizing non-adherence.
Therefore, what we suggest is that delegates who do not post a rationale within the 5-day deadline will still be eligible, but will have their rewards trimmed by 10%.
- If youâre supposed to earn $700 but you didnât publish your rationale within 5 days, youâll only receive $630.
- If youâre supposed to earn $500 and published your rationale within the deadline, youâll receive $500.
- If youâre supposed to earn $350 but you didnât publish your rationale within 5 days, youâll only receive $315
Given that the above two suggestions are an alteration of the eligibility criteria set forward by the original proposal, we will not implement them unless thereâs strong agreement from the DAO, as confirmed by an offchain temp check if needed.
In the coming days, weâll reach out to all RAD participants, along with a representative sample of delegates, regardless of their participation in RAD or their voting power, to gauge whether they feel the proposed changes should go to a temp check or if we should introduce the changes without a formal governance process.
March Rewards
There were 2 votes, plus the Security Council nomination phase in March. You can find the rewards calculation in this post by SEED. The rewards are expected to go out today.
Update 7/4/2026
March rewards have been paid out (tx) and weâve also settled all previous balances as per the post above (tx).
For any questions, please contact Sinkas on Telegram.