RAD Update #3 - March 2026

[OpCo]

Operational Update

Quarterly Budget Review

The original RAD proposal introduced the following budget for the different types of votes:

Proposal Type	Incentive Budget (USD)	Payout Cap
Onchain Constitutional Quorum	15,000	700
Offchain Non-constitutional Quorum	7,000	700
Offchain Decision Making (non-constitutional)	7,000	700
Offchain Election	7,000	500
Offchain Temperature Check (non-binding)	5,000	300

According to the proposal, the OpCo should review the budget on a quarterly basis and adjust it if and as needed to account for changes in participation or in ARB’s price.

During DIP’s last 6 months, the average monthly rewards distribution came out to around ~$67,000 for an average of 5.6 proposals per month.

In RAD, over the last 3 months, the average monthly rewards distribution has been $54,000, for an average of 2.5 proposals per month.

We do not think there’s yet enough data to warrant an adjustment to the budget, and as a result we’ll keep the same budget for the second quarter.

Removal of the $100 threshold for accrued rewards

Delegates must earn at least $100 before a payment is issued. The allocation will carry over to the next calendar month, but it will expire after 3 months if the threshold is not reached. This is simply to avoid sending dust transactions alongside the overhead in doing so.

While the initial thinking behind this term was to avoid dealing with small amounts, we quickly realized that the operational overhead of keeping track of balances was bigger than that of sending out the rewards as they’re accrued, no matter how small.

Going forward, any delegates who participate in RAD and meet the eligibility criteria will receive the rewards they’ve earned, no matter the amount.

Any previous balances up to March 31st will be settled at the next distribution of rewards.

75% Participation Threshold

One of the eligibility criteria for RAD is that delegates have participated in over 75% of the votes in a given month. That term was put in place for 2 reasons:

1. To incentivize continuous participation

2. To deter people from borrowing ARB and earning rewards by voting in a single vote.

Given the low volume of proposals, however, the 75% threshold makes it so that delegates have to participate in virtually all votes to be eligible. Since the whole point of RAD is to incentivize participation, ‘penalizing’ delegates who might miss 1 vote out of 3 within a month seems counterintuitive.

On top of that, not all votes are of equal importance (as also reflected by the budget for each). If a delegate misses an offchain temp check but votes on 2 onchain constitutional proposals, it doesn’t make sense for them not to receive rewards.

At the same time, the reduced rewards and the per-delegate rewards cap make it extremely unlikely that someone will attempt to borrow ARB so they can participate in a vote only to receive the rewards.

As a result, we think it’s prudent and much simpler for everyone involved to simply remove the threshold.

Posting Rationale within 5 days

Another eligibility criterion that came to our attention as something that’s potentially counterintuitive is the requirement for delegates to publish their rationale within 5 days of casting their vote.

The main reason behind this requirement is to ensure that delegates are making informed decisions and are not randomly casting their votes, while also making sure the community is aware of where they stand on the topic being voted on.

What we have observed, however, is that not posting the rationale within the 5-day deadline is the number one reason delegates do not qualify for rewards.

Since there’s no qualitative criteria or checks for the comments, and a delegate still qualifies even if they just comment something as simple as “I voted for/against/abstain because I liked/disliked/was indifferent to the proposal”, the criteria has been reduced to a pointless matter of bureaucracy.

We believe that treating posting a rationale as a bonus is a good way to strike a balance between incentivizing a behavior and penalizing non-adherence.

Therefore, what we suggest is that delegates who do not post a rationale within the 5-day deadline will still be eligible, but will have their rewards trimmed by 10%.

For example:

• If you’re supposed to earn $700 but you didn’t publish your rationale within 5 days, you’ll only receive $630.
• If you’re supposed to earn $500 and published your rationale within the deadline, you’ll receive $500.
• If you’re supposed to earn $350 but you didn’t publish your rationale within 5 days, you’ll only receive $315

Given that the above two suggestions are an alteration of the eligibility criteria set forward by the original proposal, we will not implement them unless there’s strong agreement from the DAO, as confirmed by an offchain temp check if needed.

In the coming days, we’ll reach out to all RAD participants, along with a representative sample of delegates, regardless of their participation in RAD or their voting power, to gauge whether they feel the proposed changes should go to a temp check or if we should introduce the changes without a formal governance process.

March Rewards

There were 2 votes, plus the Security Council nomination phase in March. You can find the rewards calculation in this post by SEED. The rewards are expected to go out today.

Update 7/4/2026
March rewards have been paid out (tx) and we’ve also settled all previous balances as per the post above (tx).

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For any questions, please contact Sinkas on Telegram.

[MconnectDAO]

Great update from OpCo appreciate the transparency..

Honestly, the 75% threshold removal was long overdue. When there are only 2–3 proposals in a month, one missed vote could unfairly knock out an otherwise active delegate. That never felt right.

The rationale trimming (10% instead of disqualification) is also a much more reasonable approach sometimes you just need a couple of extra days to think through a complex proposal properly.

Curious to see how the community responds during the outreach phase. Hope this leads to more consistent delegate participation overal..!

[Zeptimus]

I’m generally in favor of these changes. I would also recommend encouraging comments at the earlier stages of a proposal, as that’s when they are most valuable. Pushing comments at the Tally stage just for rewards feels like overkill if you’ve already shared your stance, unless the proposal has actually changed. To keep it simple, I would do 1 comment per proposal, and see if it also helps delegates to share their stance this way 1 comment is 10% 2 times and removing the fricction of writing a comment for the 10% sake.

I think rewarding everyone who is eligible to vote and use the rationale as an incentive its relevant here. Even if some people just follow or copy delegates they trust, they are still making their vote public, so there is a reputation at stake that helps keep things balanced.

Regarding the implementation, I don’t think we need a full proposal for these changes. They are relatively small and uncontroversial, and since OpCo was assigned to manage the program, we should give them the autonomy to shape it. I am a bit surprised by how much pricier RAD is compared to DIP(DIP was paying contributions aswell), but overall I like the pay-by-proposal mechanism, it helps us understand delegate costs and see exactly when the delegates are needed and provide most value.

[MikaelBondum]

As one who missed the March rewards exactly due to missing a vote, I feel the “punishment” on the 75% threshold.

So strong support from my side to the changes mentioned.

[mihal]

Both proposed changes make sense to me.

Agree with Zeptimus that these are minor enough operational adjustments that OpCo should be able to implement them without a formal temp check.

[Jean_MUX]

All of the changes make sense to us. Thanks for the transparency.

[Michigan_Blockchain]

We don’t mind these changes at all. Thanks for keeping us informed.

[Sov]

These updates are appreciated, particularly the threshold removal and the 75% participation change.

As a smaller delegate, both of these changes directly address my situation. The rationale timing trim over disqualification is also a more proportionate approach.

Thanks for putting these together and looking to iterate on the program.

Disclosure: these changes directly affect my compensation as a RAD participant.

[TodayInDeFi]

We appreciate OpCo taking the lead on these adjustments. The previous framework often felt more like an administrative hurdle than a genuine safeguard for participation, so it’s encouraging to see a shift toward a more pragmatic model.

Eliminating the $100 payout floor and the 75% participation threshold is a necessary move. In lower-volume months, the previous rules inadvertently penalized active contributors for minor gaps. Moving toward a more granular “pay-per-contribution” approach is much fairer and reduces the operational friction of tracking rolling balances.

Regarding the rationale requirement, shifting from total disqualification to a 10% penalty is the right call. It maintains the DAO’s standard for transparency without being unnecessarily punitive for minor scheduling delays.

[AranaDigital]

Thanks for the updates—after reviewing the proposed changes we don’t hold a terribly strong opinion but would err on the side of not implementing these alterations, specifically the 5-day rationale change and the 75% participation rule.

While we recognize that reducing overall friction makes participation more accessible for delegates, we’re a bit cautious about the downstream effect on engagement quality. Voter passivity is already a known issue in the DAO, and changes that lower the bar further could compound that over time. The rationale requirement, even if unsubstantial in practice, still serves as a marginal filter that nudges delegates to actually read proposals before casting their vote. And a marginal filter is still a filter worth keeping in some form. On the 75% threshold, the low volume concern is noted, but in our experience maintaining, that bar isn’t particularly burdensome when proposals are live for 7 days (and longer for onchain votes), so the case for leniency isn’t necessarily ideal. The goal is to strive for perfect participation as opposed to marginally better participation. That said, we appreciate OpCo’s transparency and the thoughtful iteration here, and again, don’t consider these changes deal breakers.

[Chris_Areta]

Thanks @OpCo for sharing these updates. Sharing some feedback as follows:

• Removal of $100 Threshold Floor: We’re comfortable with this revision. If a delegate has earned a reward, then it makes sense for them to receive it.
• 75% Participation Threshold: Given the reduced number of proposals voted upon per month, we recognize how this rule might work counterintuitively as described. However, we feel that maintaining some sort of participation threshold is necessary. Rather than entirely removing the threshold requirement; we’d suggest revising it to require delegates to have participated in (a) 100% of votes in the case of a month with 2 votes or less; and (b) Majority of votes in a month, in the case of a month with 3 votes or more. This at least sets a minimum standard for delegates while being fairly easy to compute, on the operational side.
• Posting Rationale within 5 Days: We strongly align with the logic here and welcome this change.

[CornellBlockchain]

Thanks for the updates!

In considering payouts, we’d love more info about the payout structure, as well as a breakdown on the $67k number- especially in regards to who is getting paid and how much. We are also fully onboard with the removal of the $100 payout floor to make the DAO more equitable for smaller holders. However, we are hesitant on the complete removal of the 75% participation threshold. To encourage consistent participation while balancing not penalizing delegates for missing just one vote a month, we were thinking a 50% threshold may be a sweet spot.

[Michigan_Blockchain]

We are in favor of all these changes. Our biggest concern, as it relates to delegate incentives, is creating the most straight-forward system possible. These changes (particularly removing the accrued rewards threshold) simplify the system on both the delegates’ end and the OpCo’s.

While we were originally concerned that these changes would increase logistical overhead on behalf of the OpCo, we were assured that payouts will be administered with the same amount of ease if the proposal passes, and are not concerned that this will over-burden the OpCo.

We strongly support these proposals, and are excited to see them take effect!

[Axia]

I align with these proposed changes.

In particular, removing the $100 payout threshold, removing the 75% participation threshold, and treating the 5-day rationale requirement as a modest reward reduction rather than a hard eligibility cutoff all seem like sensible adjustments based on what the program has learned in practice.

What stands out to me is that these changes reduce administrative overhead, make the program easier for delegates to participate in, and cut down on rules that appear precise but do not seem to add much signal in practice. That feels more consistent with the stated goals of RAD in the original Snapshot vote: increasing active voting power, reducing voter apathy, and generating useful public sentiment through forum feedback.

This is also consistent with what I found in my Arbitrum DAO Contributor Program Research, completed as part of a Firestarter grant. Programs like RAD, and a possible DAO Contributor Program, tend to work better when they are designed around clear incentives and low-friction participation, rather than brittle eligibility criteria that create avoidable process burden for both the program manager and participants. If a requirement is mostly functioning as bureaucracy rather than meaningfully improving the program’s goals, it is usually better to simplify it or convert it into a lighter incentive.

Overall, these changes seem like a reasonable move toward a program design that is easier to administer, easier for delegates to engage with, and more aligned with the actual outcomes the DAO wants.