I will be voting FOR this proposal. While I believe there are still areas that can be improved, the alternatives on the table make the direction clear. When choosing between extending DIP 1.7 or adopting this RAD framework, this proposal is the better option and moves in the right direction.
I agree with blockful on the 200k VP threshold. Given the simplified requirements and the removal of subjective assessments, I believe participation could be open to anyone, with rewards calculated in proportion to each ARB of voting power. One could even argue that two delegates with 100k each provide more value than one delegate with 200k. Two rationales, two perspectives, as long as compensation is proportional to VP.
I also agree with paulofonseca on removing the payout caps. Getting rid of caps would avoid unnecessary speculation or conspiracy theories while costing the DAO the same amount overall. If the incentive budget is fixed for each proposal, redistribution through caps does not change the total cost. It simply distorts how the rewards are distributed.
Something I have been vocal about before is vesting. Delegate incentives paid in ARB should promote alignment over the long term and a healthier governance culture. Vesting payouts would encourage delegates to think in terms of multiple years, and one could even justify a higher reward rate for vested payments. This is especially true considering that ARB appreciation over the long term could naturally compensate participants.